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Zainichi Koreans: The Past, the Present, and the Future

Introduction

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Introduction

“Historians and social scientists weave words together like nets to catch the truth; and, like nets, the words leave spaces into which parts of that past continually disappear. The life of a woman interviewed by Koh Sunhui, and the lives of uncounted others like her, are among the stories which have slipped unnoticed through conventional accounts of Japan’s migration history. Looking more closely at these accounts, we can start to see some of the linguistic holes into which they have disappeared.” Tessa Morris-Suzuki

The above quote is from Morris-Suzuki’s article “Invisible Immigrants: Undocumented Migration and Border Controls in Early Postwar Japan.” This course reader brings together Morris-Suzuki’s and seven other articles from Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus that illuminate the experience of Zainichi Korean (Korean residents in Japan) in modern Japan. As the quote shows, a number of discourses and policies in Japan have undermined or repressed the lives of Koreans, whether those Koreans were forcibly brought to Japan or came of their own free will. The Zainichi Korean issues illustrate broader problems of discrimination and of the Japanese propensity for essentializing “Japan.” The articles lay bare the contents of those discourses and policies, as well as the actual lives of Zainichi Koreans who have endured in such an environment.

Recent monographs by historians such as Jeffrey Bayliss, Takashi Fujitani and Ken Kawashima have shed light on the history of Koreans in Japan before and during World War II. The articles here cover the same issues and also extend the story to postwar Japan, when they legally became foreign residents by becoming deprived of their Japanese citizenship. The articles articulate the multiple origins of Zainichi Koreans: Koh-Sunhui and Kate Barclay’s article discusses Jeju Island history, providing a background on colonialism, and explaining why many islanders migrated to Japan during the twentieth century. Morris-Suzuki’s and Mark Caprio’s articles study how the bungled policies of the immediate postwar Japanese government and the GHQ permanently marginalized this community. They explain quite persuasively how the past and the present predicaments of Zainichi Koreans materialized.

Morris-Suzuki’s words also shows the need to look at the accounts of Zainichi Koreans themselves. Included in this reader are articles written by Zainichi scholars such as Kang Sang-Jung and Sonia Ryang, who offer fresh and original thoughts based on their experiences. Drawing on their own lives, they counter hegemonic views on Japan and its modern history that constantly undermine or sideline minorities, such as Zainichi Koreans. They show that Korean ethnicity and origins were significant factors in determining the lives of many people and communities in Japan. Zainichi Koreans provide the major case history in this, as they were the largest minority group in Japan for many years.

According to the article by Sonia Ryang in this reader, there were about 590,000 Koreans in Japan as of 1948. Sixty years hence, the number of Korean nationals in Japan has remained similar as many Koreans opted to become a Japanese national. As Erin Aeran Chung writes, Zainichi Koreans were the largest minority group in Japan until 2007, the
year that the Chinese nationals in Japan overtook them. There were 589,239 North and South Korean nationals plus about 300,000 naturalized Koreans in Japan of 2008.¹

Some other articles critique not only the totalizing narratives of the Japanese nation-state but the notion of homogeneity that many Zainichi Koreans imposed on themselves; some Koreans understood Zainichi Koreans to be a singular, homogenous entity. John Lie argues that what he calls “Zainichi ideology” came to be articulated as a reaction to the hegemonic Japanese narrative that claimed Japan was mono-ethnic. He writes that this ideology, which became a point of identification for many Zainichi Koreans in the early postwar years, came to carry a negative connotation in that it functioned as a prism through which Zainichi Koreans felt it necessary to evaluate their own lives. As a result, certain kinds of Zainichi lives and life choices came to be privileged over others. Lie argues that with the evolution and transformation of Zainichi Korean lives, there is no longer a singular Zainichi Korean identity that subsumes all other identities. His article shows that the efforts to recognize and accept variances among the Japanese should also be extended to Zainichi Koreans.

Morris-Suzuki also writes: “These ordinary everyday voices of the migrant experience, by contrast, can speak to the present day in a way which, I hope and believe, may help to redress, rather than to compound, the intrusive and dehumanizing process through which they were recorded.” Together with the discussion of Zainichi Korean lives in the past, some articles here foreground their present. Rumi Sakamoto article is an alarming but important study on contemporary nationalism in Japan, expressed online in particular, that has taken an anti-Korean or anti-Zainichi Korean stance since the 1990s. The fact that these and other Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus articles make an online counterargument at the very time when racism is raising its head anew among the Japanese in cyberspace merits special attention.

Furthermore, Zainichi Koreans and the authors here look ahead to our common future. The second Kang Sang-Jung article refutes xenophobic nationalism based on the author’s experiences as a Zainichi Korean. Precisely because he himself and his own community have pondered and identified with their own version of ethnic nationalism, he sees a crucial need to relativize or tame such an impulse through constructing a different ideal and an object of identification. He envisions such an ideal to be a transnational East Asian collective.

Taken together, the articles here provide information that is fundamental to understanding Zainichi Koreans. They employ the methodologies of various disciplines, including sociology, anthropology, and history, to address issues such as ethnicity, social class, migration, nationalism, multiculturalism, racism, and regionalism in and outside Japan. Through recognizing and accepting Zainichi Koreans, all Japanese, Zainichi and non-Zainichi alike, can mold and transform themselves further, just as Korean migrants came to transform themselves through being Zainichi. Thinking about Zainichi Koreans can help the

The whole East Asian region connect itself more fully and accurately to its past, its present, and its future, and hence further evolve in a peaceful, friction-less manner.
Part I: Zainichi Korean Experiences

“Memories of a Zainichi Korean Childhood”
Kang Sang-Jung
February 2, 2007
http://japanfocus.org/-Kang-Sang-Jung/2343

Kang Sang-Jung (1950–) may well be the most prominent Zainichi Korean intellectual currently publishing in Japan. The first Zainichi Korean to become a faculty member at the University of Tokyo, Kang has written extensively on political issues concerning Zainichi Koreans and the social and historical circumstances that surround them. In the early 2000s, Kang embarked on two paths that have extended his readership to those outside the academy. One was that with the 2004 memoir Zainichi, he started to publish extensively on his family’s and his own experiences of growing up as a Zainichi Korean. The other direction Kang took was that he increasingly came to write for non-Zainichi Korean Japanese, especially the young, offering them life advice and suggestions.

This article excerpts several key aspects of Kang’s memoir. Kang is a second-generation Zainichi who grew up in Kumamoto, Kyushu. His parents migrated to Japan during the colonial era (1910-1945), his father in the early 1930s and his mother in 1941. They were poor and struggled through the harsh environment of wartime and postwar Japan, initially by brewing liqueur and keeping pigs. They both had little education, and his mother was illiterate, but they were hardworking people living in the ghetto with other Zainichi Koreans. The turmoil of the immediate postwar years and the Korean War kept them from returning to the peninsula after the liberation of Korea.

When Kang was six, his parents started a scrap metal business that they maintained well into the author’s adulthood. With this the family moved out of the Korean ghetto, but still lived a life very much at “the very bottom of the society” (p. 6). Kang remembers the sense of camaraderie that his family shared with the Japanese on the margins, including those at the nearby leprosarium, a hospital for the treatment of leprosy. The other important people in Kang’s early life included two “uncles” whom Kang sees as representing the dire conditions of the first-generation Zainichi. One was his father’s brother, who was a member of the Japanese military police during World War II. After the war he went back to Korea and built a successful career there as an attorney but left behind his family in Japan in the process. The other “uncle” was a former yakuza member who helped Kang’s father’s business after leaving his organization. An extremely compassionate man, that “uncle” took care of Kang as the author was growing up.

Kang shows how the Zainichi Koreans around him demonstrated “a supremely ‘human’ way of being in the face of adversity” (p. 17), an “adversity” that included living through a deep “sense of division” between Japan and Korea. Kang also carried that sense throughout his own life. Kang’s career is admirable for the adversity he had to overcome, and his article is testimony to the lives of Zainichi Koreans. It also shows why their lives and issues remain relevant to any efforts to reflect on modern Japanese history and society.
Memories of a Zainichi Korean Childhood
Kang Sangjung
Translated by Robin Fletcher

This extract from Kang Sangjung’s autobiography Zainichi (Kodansha, 2004) describes the experiences of first-generation zainichi Koreans in the city of Kumamoto, as seen from the perspective of a second-generation child growing up in the Japan of the 1950s. Now a professor at the University of Tokyo, in the Graduate School of Interdisciplinary Information Studies, where he specialises in politics and the history of political thought, Kang Sangjung looks back at the people and places of his childhood. These personal memories provide a starting point for reflections on identity, ‘homeland,’ and the place of zainichi Koreans in Japanese society and in the wider society of Northeast Asia.

Pigs, moonshine and warm-hearted people

I am supposed to have been born on 12th August 1950, the 25th year of the Showa Era. But in fact, it seems that this is not my real birthday, since my parents apparently registered my birth according to the old lunar calendar. The sense of time indelibly imprinted on my parents’ minds was that of the lunar calendar. Even today, the customs of the past still live on in my mother’s notion of time. By remembering people’s birth, growth and death according to the old time of the lunar calendar, my parents perhaps found a way to affirm their connections to their homeland and their ancestors. In any case, I was born right in the middle of the Korean War, in a Korean settlement1 close to the main station of Kumamoto City in Kyushu. My Korean name is Kang Sangjung. My Japanese name is Nagano Tetsuo. This second name is my ‘public name’ [tsumei], and it is the name under which I lived until I came of age. It was not until I was in my twenties that I changed from being ‘Tetsuo’ to being ‘Sangjung’. For me as a second generation zainichi Korean, the change in some ways marked a sharp dividing line through my life. Yet even today, I sometimes feel an odd sort of nostalgia for ‘Tetsuo’. It is not simply a false name and a false life to be rejected. It is also an inescapable symbol which says much about the living reality of who I am. Living a life embracing that name is, I think, a significant element of my experience of living in Japan.

Local histories of Japan’s prefectures, cities and villages—and of the police forces—will tell you that in those days, during the Allied occupation of Japan, many members of the Korean community disrupted the Japanese economy by black-market and criminal activities. They were referred to as ‘third country people’ [sangokujin]2, and were seen as destroying public order and morality. There was virtually no recognition of any positive contribution of Koreans to the Japanese economy, society or culture. This was true of Kumamoto, too. Actually, since Kumamoto had been a stronghold of militarism since before the war, prejudice, suspicion and discrimination against Koreans were particularly strong there.

Kumamoto had been home to the largest army detachment in Kyushu, and so sustained massive damage from bombing raids during the war. By the end of the war, almost all the city from the station to the Suizen Temple had been reduced to a burnt-out wilderness. Reconstruction did not get underway properly until around the time of the Korean War, and even when I was born the dark scars of war still lay over the landscape.

Kumamoto in red
The place where I was born—the neighbourhood of Haruhi-machi, near Kumamoto Station—was an area which seemed notably left behind by the reconstruction process. To the west side of the railway line lies Hanoka Hill, famous as the place where 19th century westernisers established the ‘Kumamoto Band’. The Korean settlement was crowded together on the gentle incline of the neighbouring Banka Hill. In those days, over one hundred Korean families lived shoulder to shoulder there, all living in shabby makeshift tenements.

The Korean people of the settlement supported themselves by keeping pigs and making ‘moonshine’, illicit liquor [doboroku]. Scenes reminiscent of Gorky’s Lower Depths were played out in the community day after day. The civil war in their mother country had torn away the hopes of the adults of the settlement, and destroyed their dreams of ‘liberation’. They had nowhere to go, and their lives oscillated between sorrow and anger. The atmosphere in the settlement was constantly seething like a pressure-cooker.

Communal life there was coloured by roars of laughter and anger, by lawlessness and misery. Everyone was in a state of despair. Yet still they clung to faint wisps of dreams, and struggled desperately to find some means of subsisting in the harshness of daily work. The only means of survival left to them were brewing moonshine and keeping pigs.

Occasionally, when I was four or five years old, I would witness raids by excise officers on the illegal brewing operations. For some reason, I vividly remember one scene of a line of trucks coming up the hill towards the rickety huts which served as stills where the moonshine was brewed. The whole settlement was thrown into turmoil, like a hive of angry bees. I can still hear the cries of “aigo” [alas!] echoing across the hillside. I shall never forget the sounds of anger and grief in the voices of those people whose meagre means of livelihood were about to be destroyed. In my childish mind, I formed the sense that we were somehow living in an outlaw world.

On that unforgettable day, my mother hurled a stone at one of the excise trucks. Its windscreen shattered, and the vehicle was forced to come to a halt.

My mother, who was by nature the most nervous and sensitive of people, seemed for once to have been seized by a fierce anger. Seeing her rage at the officials who were destroying people’s lives took my breath away, and for a moment I couldn't utter a sound. Having hurled the stone, my mother’s knees gave way and she fell to the ground, beating her chest with her fists and breaking into sobs. “Why are we forced to endure such sorrow?” That, I think, was the scream that lay beneath my mother’s weeping.

That day, my mother was taken away to the police station. I stayed close to my father, and, sensing from his anxiety that something terrible was befalling us, could not stop myself from crying. I cannot now remember exactly why—perhaps it was because the truck driver had fortunately not been injured—but mother was soon allowed to return home. The incident shows the courageous side of my mother. In these lower depths, life was driven by constant desperation, but for some reason the grown-ups always treated me with kindness and I received much affection. At least as far as I am concerned, that place conjures up only fond memories.

It may have resembled the impoverished marginal communities depicted in Kumai Kei’s film Apart from life, but I had the good fortune to experience the love and kindness of the adults, and
so the impression I formed of the archetypal zainichi landscape was of a kind and warm community made up of unfortunate people.

How my parents became ‘first-generation zainichi’

Not far from the settlement, there was a small construction company called Takadagumi. My father worked there as a watchman. Takadagumi had operated since the prewar period, using hired construction workers. Our home was a tiny free-standing house in the midst of the settlement, towards the bottom of the hill. There I was born, and there our family of four lived—my mother and father, a brother four years my senior, and myself. My father had come to Japan in the early 1930s, at the time of the Manchurian Incident. He was fifteen at the time, and came to Japan by himself, with just the clothes on his back. My father was the eldest son of a typical poor tenant farming family from Namsan Village, Kyangwon District in the South Korean province of Southern Kyongsang. He arrived in the ‘colonial mother country’ in response to the pressures of poverty. It was a classic exile’s story.

According to the prominent US historian of modern Korea, Bruce Cumings, during the 1930s with the impact of the economic depression and the forced industrialisation of the Korean peninsula, the majority of Korea’s farm population left agriculture and moved to cities and industrial areas. As the boundaries of the Japanese empire grew dramatically following its war with China, the flow of Korean migrants began to be directed overseas. By the year before Japan’s defeat in the Asia-Pacific War, around twenty percent of Korea’s total population was living away from their place of origin. Most of these were people of working age, between twenty-five and forty years old, so that in effect, forty percent of the adult population was living away from their birthplace. Cumings suggests that there is perhaps no other country which has experienced such a dramatic change in its population. The Depression and the concentration of land ownership drastically affected the agricultural population, and a massive workforce was created from the surplus. Kyongsang Province was a particularly important source of this outflow of people.

My father was just one young man from a poor farming family who was caught up in the sufferings of this vast and chaotic movement of people. The heavy burden of the times lay on his shoulders, condemning him to a harsh future. My father’s youth in Japan was so unsettled that I don’t know how many times he shifted from one place and one job to another. Finally he moved to Tokyo where he got a job in a munitions factory. By this time, the national mobilisation system had been imposed on Korea as well, and forced labour was being recruited. Under the slogan ‘integrating Japan and Korea’ [naisen ittai], forced assimilation was proceeding apace, and finally the door was opened to the enlistment of colonial subjects in the Japanese army. In order to look after his younger brother, who was climbing this ladder of ‘advancement’ within the colonial system, my father worked day and night, barely snatching time to eat and sleep.

Father looked like the peasant farmer he was, stockily built, unsophisticated, and, perhaps weighed down by the burden of unremitting hard work, relatively short. By contrast, his younger brother (my uncle) was a tall and imposing young man with a handsome face. Remarkably for a person from the colonies, he studied law at university and eventually became a member of the Japanese military police [kempeitai], serving in Kumamoto. As I will explain later, his urge for self-betterment had an influence on my life.
In the year the Pacific War broke out, my mother came over from her village of Chine, near the southern Korean city of Pusan, to visit her fiancé, my father. She embarked alone on the ferry in Pusan and arrived in Shimonoseki at the very time of the outbreak of the war that would bring disaster to Japan. She had nothing to guide her but my father’s address, and after travelling from one place to another she finally reached the district of Sugamo Sanchome in Tokyo, where father was living in the quarters where the factory lodged its workers. There she began her married life. She was just eighteen years old.

My mother had been deprived of chances for education as a child and she was illiterate, unable to read or write Japanese or even her mother tongue. This devoted new bride, dressed in traditional chima-jeogori5 and barely able to utter a few words of broken Japanese, seems to have been a figure of curiosity to those around her. Apparently she was often surrounded by groups of neighbourhood housewives making scathing comments about her clothing, and all she could do was stand there burning with embarrassment. The joy and sorrow of zainichi existence settled like a sediment in my mother’s heart, from time to time bursting forth in the form of mournful songs or of rushes of passionate emotion.

As the war situation grew worse and air-raids on Tokyo intensified, my parents, together with my father’s younger sister and her husband, were evacuated to Ichinomiya in Aichi Prefecture. Soon after, my parents’ first child was born. They named him Haruo—‘haru’ [spring] being also part of my mother’s Japanese name, ‘Haruko’. However, the family’s life was full of troubles. The air-raids caused my father’s sister to lose her sanity, and Haruo, my family’s first-born son, died. My mother clung to her dead baby for several days, as if she had gone mad, refusing to let his body be taken away from her. To this very day, when she is eighty, my mother has never once missed commemorating the day of Haruo’s death. The way she speaks of him makes me think that perhaps for her the tragedy still seems like something which happened yesterday, and I cannot help feeling that far from memories fading with time, on the contrary they actually recur more vividly than ever.

Taking their son’s ashes with them, my parents moved from Ichinomiya through Osaka and Hiroshima, eventually arriving in Kumamoto. By that time, Japan was already close to defeat. Apparently my parents were intending to return to Korea, and wanted to say their farewells to my uncle, who was stationed in Kumamoto with the military police. They were there when Japan surrendered. In the end, my parents gave up the idea of returning to their homeland, and my uncle returned alone. My parents ended up staying in the zainichi settlement.

For the colonies, Japan’s defeat in the war was a joyful day of liberation. The hearts of zainichi Koreans were seized by a burgeoning and enduring hope that they would be able to return to their homeland. But in 1948 the Republic of Korea was established in the South and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in the North, and finally the Korean War broke out, with unprecedented massacres and vast numbers of victims. The devastation of their homeland was a crushing blow for the zainichi people. For those who had found shelter in the zainichi settlement where I lived, the road home had been closed. Once again, they had to steel their hearts to endure the experience of ethnic discrimination.

The settlement was looked on as a kind of ghetto, an alien space in the midst of Japan. First-generation zainichi at that time all bore their own particular deep sorrows, growing bleary-eyed with the struggle for survival. Finally, the movement for repatriation to North Korea took off,
and people from my settlement were among those who returned in large numbers to the North. From 1959 onwards, more and more people left for the North. In the midst of it all, my parents were urged to repatriate to the North, but they never agreed, choosing instead to stay in Kumamoto. I am not sure precisely why they were reluctant to repatriate to North Korea, but I think there must have been two reasons. First, my uncle, who had served as a judicial staff officer during the Korean War, had strongly warned them against repatriation. My uncle’s absolute feelings of anti-communism and hostility towards North Korea made my parents stand their ground. The second reason was that they felt they could not abandon my father’s family’s ancestral graves, which were in the South. Particularly for my mother, who had a powerful sense of respect for the ancestors, to move to the North would have been an immoral betrayal. So my parents remained in Japan.

Life amidst people of the ‘lower depths’

When I was six, our family left the settlement where I had been born, and moved to the foot of Mount Tatsuta, from which you can look down on the campus of Kumamoto University. We laid out the little money we had to buy a plot of land just about big enough to swing a cat, and set up in business as ‘Nagano Trading Company’, a tiny family scrap business, collecting and recycling garbage. Mount Tatsuta is a spot from which you can see the whole of the town centre, and a place where the citizens of Kumamoto like to come for recreation. It is also the hill that appears in Natsume Soseki’s famous novel Sanshiro.

Unlike my mother, my father was not entirely illiterate. He could read and write some Japanese. All the same, it was really difficult for him to get a driver’s licence. I still recall the resolute expression on my father’s face as he sat in bed first thing in the morning struggling with the questions for the test. Every adult is supposed to be able to apply for a driver’s licence, but for first-generation immigrants burdened with the handicap of dealing with a foreign language, acquiring a licence was undoubtedly a painfully difficult hurdle to clear. On his second try, my father, remarkably enough, was successful and soon after our family acquired a little three-wheeled vehicle called a ‘Midget’. After that, every day my father would leave home at the crack of dawn and not return until late at night. Day after day, he silently laboured away at his tough job.

For me, life in this unfamiliar place was a big change. I was cut off from the communal life of the zainichi settlement and plunged into the midst of a wholly Japanese environment. I felt alone, as though I had somehow become trapped on a remote island. For some reason, I missed the odours of pig-swill and dung, and the smell of brewer’s yeast. The environment and the people had changed, but all the same a remarkable assortment of people made their way in and out of our family’s garbage collecting business. Looking back, it truly seems like a human tragicomedy. I think I became almost painfully aware of the sighs of people who were relegated to the very bottom of society and were desperately trying to keep body and soul together. This, moreover, was a ‘lower depths’ different from that of the settlement where we had lived before. The difference was that the main characters who appeared in our lives were now ‘Japanese’.

My mother, who could not read, had to take on a whole range of tasks, from calculating the items and numbers and value of the scrap that was collected to single-handedly conducting business negotiations. For this purpose, she worked out a system of symbols which only she understood,
and which she memorised in place of Japanese characters. I think her excellent powers of memory were probably the result of desperate efforts to make up for the handicap of illiteracy.

So, little by little, our family’s scrap business got underway. This precisely coincided with the start of Japan’s period of high economic growth, following a postwar economic recovery spurred on by the ‘windfall’ of Korean War procurements.

One thing that remains firmly fixed in my memory is the mass of military swords, helmets and other discarded weaponry which was heaped up in front of our house. It seemed uncanny to see so many swords rusted reddish-brown together with bloodstains. They bore the unmistakable smell of war. My mother, perhaps following Korean purification rites, would sprinkle salt around them, murmuring prayers as she did so. Memories of war, reeking with blood, lingered on even in a place like this. It was the business of garbage collectors to clear away the brutal carnage left by history. I am sure my mother instinctively understood this.

My parents’ struggling family business was also sustained by another first generation zainichi who came to live in our house as part of the family. This man, whom I knew from my early childhood as ‘Uncle’, had sworn an oath of brotherhood with my father, and thus become part of our family. ‘Uncle’ became as much as or even more than a second father to me. Later, after ‘Uncle’ had died, I learned for the first time that he had left a family of his own behind in Korea and come to Japan by himself, his lot thereafter that of a man with no home of his own. He had knocked about in the world of outlaws, and had at one stage apparently been quite an influential figure. Subsequently he had fallen on hard times, though just how he had ended up living with our family I do not know. However, as I shall explain later, ‘Uncle’ played an enormous part in my education.

‘Uncle’ was just one of the wide variety of people whom I encountered in the world around me at that time. They all had their share of hardship, and it seemed to me that they all lived with desperate intensity. Even today, I cannot forget them.

Across the street from our house was a man who could have stepped straight out of the textbook ballad of “The Village Blacksmith.” In his roaring furnace he heated iron and shaped it to his will, producing reaping hooks and hoes and other farm implements before your very eyes. He was immensely skillful, and his wares were of the highest quality. He was a big, uncouth-looking man, but a very gentle person. Every now and then, from over the other side of the road we would hear an astonishingly loud sneeze, which told us that the blacksmith was busy at work again today. It was somehow a reassuring feeling.

For one reason or another, the blacksmith and ‘Uncle’ got on well together. They didn’t have much to say to one another, but they seemed to understand each other nonetheless. “Tetsuo, that uncle of yours is a good’un. True enough, he calls you ‘Teshio, Teshio’. But he’s still a good’un.” ‘Teshio’ was as near as ‘Uncle’ could come to pronouncing my name, and I think maybe the blacksmith, who really understood ‘Uncle’s’ true nature, was trying to comfort me. Not long after, however, the kind-hearted blacksmith was suddenly struck down by a heart attack and died. The sound of hammer on metal and the mighty sneezes fell silent.

It was Mr Iijima who gave me a glimpse of the horrors of the adult world.
In those days, wild dogs roamed around everywhere, and were a major nuisance. We used to call
the person who was employed by the dog pound to round them up ‘the dog killer’. The phrase
contained feelings of both fear and contempt. Mr Iijima, with his little moustache, seemed
amiable enough, but when he came to our house our pet dog seemed to be overcome by terror. It
would make low whining noises and crouch ready to hide under the floor. “That there dog knows
a thing or two! It’s years since I was the ‘dog killer’, but I reckon the smell still hangs about.”
The events of a certain night made me wonder whether the smell of human blood, as well as that
of dogs, clung to Mr Iijima. He was very drunk, and began recounting how during the war in
China, he had raped a young woman and tortured her to death. There was a bitterness about Mr
Iijima’s mouth as, grinning but seemingly ill at ease, he made this confession. Afterwards, I had
a sense of regret that I had heard something I should not have, and could not help shuddering at
the knowledge of the cruelty within the adult world which surrounded me.

When I came to understand the memory of war as a political problem, I found myself often
thinking of Mr Iijima. It seems to me that the war memories of ordinary soldiers were carnal
sensations of slaughter remembered with great force throughout their bodies, and that when the
war came to an end, such things were not to be spoken of openly—at the most, they could be
vented as a sort of confession in the midst of the droning nonsense which drunkenness allows.
There was no sense of guilt, but also no powerful sense of self-affirmation, just a sentimental
attachment to a sad and shabby experience, one which was only loosed by alcohol, history
recalled as a transient memory.

I don’t know what happened to Mr Iijima after that.

Writing of unforgettable people reminds of ‘Kaneko-san’, a good friend of ‘Uncle’s’. Perhaps
because ‘Kaneko-san’ was from the same zainichi background, he was in and out of our house
all the time.

To the north of our house, on the way to Yamanaga, was Keifuen, the famous leprosarium. The
Precautionary Measures against Leprosy [Raiyoboho] have now been repealed but in those days
the policy of isolation was in force and it seems that Keifuen even had rooms constructed for
solitary confinement as a disciplinary measure. Surprisingly enough, however, despite the
rigorous isolation policy of the times there were occasions when the inmates went outside. One
of my playmate’s parents ran an amazake6 and steamed bean-cake shop, and there were patients
from the leprosarium among their customers. My friend’s parents were good, kind people, so a
particular incident made an immense impression on me. My friend’s mother used chopsticks to
take a hundred yen note that a customer with Hansen’s Disease held out between two fingers,
and then put it in the steamer. I think she also handed over the bean-cake in some sort of little
bamboo basket. This was forty years ago, but I remember the scene as if it were yesterday. I was
absolutely stunned that a usually admirable adult could behave so cruelly to those who in those
days were literally treated as ‘untouchables’.

I seem to remember, though, that when ‘Kaneko-san’ came to our house, I would always scurry
off and take refuge in the back room. I didn’t know why, but some ill-defined fear just seemed to
chase me away.

It was completely different with ‘Uncle’ and my parents, though. My father and ‘Uncle’ were
quite comfortable about collecting garbage from the leprosarium, never showing the slightest
fear or hesitation. On occasion, they even shared the inmates’ meals, helping themselves from the same dish. They often invited them into our home, too. It seems to me that they felt sympathy or something like kinship, perhaps because they shared the unfortunate consciousness of living as ‘outsiders’ in Japan. They possessed an innate courage that made them unafraid of contact with things the world considered ‘unclean’ or ‘unsightly’. Their kindness of heart was certainly not erased by the harsh circumstances being zainichi; indeed, the very fact that they had to live in that harsh environment may actually have strengthened their fellow-feeling with the unfortunate.

Both my father and ‘Uncle’ have passed away, and my mother, now eighty, spends much of her time in bed. I hear that ‘Kaneko-san’, though, despite the Hansen’s Disease which used to be feared as an incurable, is still hale and hearty and seems set to live to a ripe old age. The Precautionary Measures against Leprosy were repealed and the nation apologised, but prejudice and preconceptions linger stubbornly in people’s minds, and it does not look as if they will be overcome in ‘Kaneko-san’s’ lifetime. If I could meet ‘Kaneko-san’ again, I would like to apologise sincerely for my own past—and I have come to wish that the two of us could together retrace our memories of my father and ‘Uncle’.

A way of living as ‘zainichi’

It was from the woman from Shimonoseki that I received the strongest image of ‘ethnicity’ at that time. She was what is known as a mudang, or spiritualistic medium, similar to the itako of northeastern Japan. Most zainichi people had reverence for their ancestors, and the mudang’s repertoire of rituals were a type of shamanism, originating in ancestor worship, fused with Buddhistic forms. My mother was a deeply devout woman, and the mudang was summoned from Shimonoseki each year, along with two or three other women who provided the traditional wailing accompaniment. They were all zainichi people.

The woman from Shimonoseki was very tall, and you could imagine from her clear-cut features that she would have been a head-turning beauty when she was young. She held herself very straight, her movements were crisp and energetic, and her gait deliberate and unhurried. One felt she was a personality to be reckoned with. Her sidelocks were arranged to perfection, and she dressed in a spectacular chima-jeogori and white rubber shoes called geomjeong. And thus she would arrive in state at our house. It was undoubtedly a bizarre spectacle for the watching Japanese. I found it unendurable, and when she was due I would run away as far as I could.

The woman from Shimonoseki would come once or twice a year without fail to tell our fortunes for good or evil. For two or three days, my mother would dance to the accompaniment of gong and drums, moving about the house in a trance-like state, murmuring the words that would ward off misfortune and foretell the course of events. At this one time, women were at the centre of all the rituals; men were pushed aside into odd nooks and corners, sitting in formal posture and trying to make themselves as small as possible. When misfortune was forecast, my mother would be deeply afraid, and in order to avert it would set out for Mount Kinpo, where she would perform religious austerities in a waterfall. This may have been because it was believed that Mount Kinpo, which soars above Kumamoto in the distant west, had the appearance of a sacred mountain.
The neighbourhood gossip was that there was something odd about young Tetsuo’s family—all those gongs and drums. Perhaps his mother had a screw loose … All I could do was will those few days and their ceremonies to be over as quickly as possible.

In my twenties, I discovered my name and that of my elder brother engraved on the small shrine at nearby Suigenchi. This epitomised my mother’s concern for the security and good fortune of her two children, and brought home to me once again how deeply she loved us. Years later, the woman from Shimonoseki died and was succeeded by her adopted son-in-law. When my father died, it was this ‘she man’ who made the final farewells at his cremation. It may at the same time have been a message from the woman from Shimonoseki. At that moment, all my former opposition was transformed into something akin to sympathy.

One can view this world of my mother, the woman from Shimonoseki and the others as a sacred space governed by folkloric tradition, accessible only to women, who were otherwise forced to submit to the patriarchal system of the zainichi. It was a space charged with their deep love for family and their feelings for their homeland. Was this not perhaps for them the very way of living as zainichi?

The rituals did not end there. That is to say, regularly as clockwork, when the correct season came, the woman from Shimonoseki would arrive. For a full two or three days, my mother would have worked around the clock preparing mountains of special delicacies to be used as offerings. While feeling great nostalgia for these intensely zainichi memories, at the same time I was also driven by a desire to distance myself from them. They were bitter-sweet experiences.

The people engraved on my memory, bound up in these complex feelings … When I look back now, I see how they gave shape to my memories. It may be that my ‘homeland’ is to be found in memories like these.

Kang Sangjung (front left) and his family

A member of the zainichi ‘elite’, who became a military policeman

In writing of my life so far, I cannot possibly neglect to mention my two uncles.

As I wrote briefly earlier, one of them was my father’s only younger brother, and so my uncle by blood; the other was not a blood relative, but the ‘Uncle’ who was virtually a second father to me. Both were first-generation zainichi, but their life circumstances could scarcely have been more different.

My blood uncle, extraordinarily for a Korean during the war, received a Japanese university education. The year before the war came to an end, he joined the military police and was stationed in Kumamoto. When defeat was at hand, my uncle decided he would kill himself. He had a Japanese wife and a little daughter. It was not until I was at university that I saw the family photograph taken at the time he made his decision. In dull sepia, it shows an imposing youth in military uniform, wearing the armband of the military police and a sword at his hip, and next to him, a baby in her arms, an anxious-looking woman in Japanese dress.
For a colonised people, the day of Japan’s defeat should have been a joyful day of liberation, but for my uncle it was instead the ill-starred day he would meet his death. Although he felt cornered and as if he had no alternative but death, perhaps because he nevertheless could not bring himself to renounce the attractions of the world, my uncle let himself be talked out of it by my father and hid himself in the Mount Mannichi air-raid shelter to escape the pursuing army of occupation. I don’t really know how it came about that my uncle returned to the family home.

Not long afterwards, my uncle returned to his homeland to ascertain how things were in his mother-country. He went alone. The old country which my uncle encountered had been thrown into the tragic chaos of ‘contemporary history’ [gendaishi], disorder which lasted from the day of liberation until the bitter civil war and the birth of the divided nation now known as the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Caught up in this, my uncle again donned army uniform, becoming a judicial staff officer and taking up military duties. Amidst the chaos and ruin, he gave up hope of ever seeing his family again. After the Armistice, he became a lawyer, establishing a practice in Seoul. Whether it was due to the vitality with which he wrestled with adversity and his indefatigable hard work or to his extraordinary adaptability, before long my uncle married the daughter of an affluent family. They were blessed with children, and his feet were set on the path to a happy and successful life.

When the Osaka Expo took place in 1970, my uncle returned to Japan for the first time since the war. He searched for the wife and child he had left behind in Japan twenty years earlier, but without success. I was never far from his side during his visit, and he told me of his life since his return to Korea. It was almost in the nature of a confession.

My uncle had wiped out all memories from before the war, of having been a member of the ‘pro-Japanese faction’ military police, of the wife and child he had left behind in Japan. By burying his own past, he had been able to build a successful new life in his homeland. The sacrifice this had required, though, had been separation from his family and the erasing of his memories. Such was the ‘buried past’ of an ‘elite’ colonial subject, able to survive by obliterating half his own life. Another person who after liberation had a similar ‘buried past’ was, it goes without saying, the great dictator and former president of South Korea, Park Chunghee.8 My uncle, though nowhere near as much of a ‘big shot’ as Park, was clearly also a ‘mutant’ driven across the boundaries of Japanese and Korean history. Such ‘mutants’ were excluded from the body proper of Japanese history and unable to find a place to exist peaceably within ethnic history. Even now, it is as if they are hovering on the periphery. They have passed away, and history moves uncaringly on.

I cannot find it in my heart to condemn my uncle’s ‘anti-ethnic’, ‘pro-Japanese’ past. Even without such condemnation, the past has certainly exacted appropriate revenge through the burden of sad memories he bore throughout his life. While accepting this, I have thought that even so I would like to bring to light once again the memories and history that my uncle blotted out, and throw into relief the nuances of the intricate cross-grained relationships between the ‘defeat’ and ‘liberation’, and Japan and the Korean peninsula. I regard this is the weighty task that has been left behind for me.
In striking contrast was the life of my other ‘Uncle’. Unlike my father’s younger brother, ‘Uncle’ had no education to speak of, and remained illiterate all his life. He had been a yakuza and active in the outlaw world in his youth, but eventually his life fell apart and he finished up in my house despite being no relation. Always having time for me, he stood in for my busy father.

‘Uncle’s’ name was Yi Sangsu. His Japanese name was Iwamoto Masao. For almost thirty years I was completely unaware of ‘Uncle’s’ original name. He was always there, occupying such an incalculable place in my memories that it just never occurred to me to inquire about him. Sadly, it was only when ‘Uncle’ died that I learned of Yi Sangsu for the first time. I am sure my father felt with painful intensity that he wanted ‘Uncle’, who had no relations of his own, at least to be buried under his ‘real name’. This encapsulates the heartbreak of first generation zainichi like my father and ‘Uncle’, who did not speak openly about ethnicity. When I learned that ‘Uncle’ was Yi Sangsu, I felt a deep sense of shame at my own lack of awareness, and wept as I understood the depth of their sorrow.

It may well be that ‘Uncle’ was so good to me because he saw in me a trace of the child he had left behind in the homeland.

‘Uncle’ was vigorous and tough, a man of few wants. Even so, at times his face would be melancholy, shadowed by loneliness. When I think about it now, I am sure that at such times he was looking back with regret at the man who had abandoned wife and child and lost his home. ‘Uncle’ did not grumble about his hard lot, however; his dauntless personality probably did not permit it. I think he probably accepted it as something he would have to go on enduring stoically, and determined somehow or other to work his way through. Even so, his pent-up feelings would sometimes burst out with passionate emotion—‘My country has come to this … my life has come to this … and yet I still feel ….’ As his words came to a halt and he fell into silence, I think ‘Uncle’ was mourning bitterly.

More than anything, ‘Uncle’ loved politics. When he talked about politics, ‘Uncle’, face flushed, was in his glory. He would often be found lecturing ‘Kaneko-san’, whom I mentioned earlier. ‘Kaneko-san’, with his good will for the ‘North’, and ‘Uncle’, who believed in the possibility of change in the ‘South’, were both concerned about the well-being of their families as they intently discussed the future of the mother-country. As I watched them from a distance, I felt there was something remote about the two absorbed figures. This ‘adult’ face was quite alien to the ‘Uncle’ of every day.

‘Uncle’ sometimes told us about social conditions or international relations, based on the store of information he had picked up from here and there. Such-and-such a politician was in a class of his own… this politician was really somebody … there was no politician nowadays who could pull off a thing like that … and so on, and so on. In general, ‘Uncle’s’ interest was in the person, and based on that he added to his store of knowledge of events and circumstances. It seems to me his critiques were often sufficiently accurate to take even a political analyst aback. He certainly had a real political intuition.
It wasn’t only political lectures—‘Uncle’ was also my guide to an unfamiliar world. At a time when entertainment was scarce, when television was a luxury only to be dreamed of, movies were the window onto the world of pleasure. ‘Uncle’ was a huge fan, and many a time he took me along. Whenever I perched on the front of ‘Uncle’s’ bicycle as we headed for the cinema, my heart would beat with such excitement I could hardly breathe. And as we made our way along the dark road home, ‘Uncle’ and I would grow quite heated as we discussed whatever film we’d just seen. As ‘Uncle’ pedalled cheerfully along under the bright moon, myself in front, there was a kind of warmth deep in my heart.

‘Uncle’ worked alongside my family, collecting garbage and feeding the pigs. I stuck to ‘Uncle’ like glue, and loved helping him look after the pigs. The daily routine of preparing the food and cleaning was hard physical work, but ‘Uncle’ toiled on, silent and intent. His compassion for living things was very evident when the sows were farrowing. His careful ministrations as they groaned in their labour pangs made a lasting impression on me.

‘Uncle’s’ compassionate kindness was also directed to animals that met untimely deaths. Our house faced a national highway, and was often littered with the pathetic carcasses of dogs and cats that had been hit by cars, victims of the rapidly rising volume of traffic. Everyone else would avert their gaze, but it was always ‘Uncle’ who would unobtrusively go and pick up the bodies and carry them in a straw mat to the bank of the nearby river, where he would give them a dignified burial. Did ‘Uncle’ perhaps identify with the lifeless bodies of those ‘dumb creatures’ which had met with a sudden, meaningless death? It made my heart ache to watch him the time he returned from the riverbank after burying a dog he’d particularly loved, smoking in stony silence.

‘Uncle’ got drunk on so little that his one indulgence was cigarettes. There was always a packet of ‘Peace’ jammed into his back pocket. I loved ‘Uncle’ when he was smoking, most of all as he sat tranquilly in a corner of the extensive stadium at the University, puffing away as his gaze wandered idly over Mount Tatsuta before him.

‘Uncle’ and I would go each day to pick up leftovers from the kitchens of the student dormitories at Kumamoto University to feed the pigs. We emptied the scraps into two kerosene tins, put the tins in the panniers of ‘Uncle’s’ bicycle, and wheeled it home. ‘Uncle’ would always park the bike in the corner of the University stadium, sit in the shade of a tree, and light up a ‘Peace’. As he exhaled with a deep sigh, the purplish smoke would dance in puffs and disappear into the skies. As I chased after it, for some unknown reason I was absurdly happy. It may be that I had never known such a feeling of boundless joy in my life. I still recall that scene sometimes today.

When I think about it now, though, I am sure that ‘Uncle’s’ heart was full of homesickness as he gazed silently into the deep recesses of the mountain.

‘Uncle’ died in hospital with a deep sigh, as if to breathe out all the hardships of this world. I broke down and wept.

I want to meet ‘Uncle’ once again. I was not able to ward off his sadness—even if I knew Iwamoto Masao, I did not know Yi Sangsu. There are times when I am haunted by the thought that it could be said that I never met the real ‘Uncle’. I want to meet Yi Sangsu, once again. Surely the only way to do so is to ‘go forward’ by facing the past. It seems to me that this feeling
will grow stronger with the years. It may even be that the motivation for my actions in speaking on social issues is the strength of this feeling.

When ‘Uncle’ died, he had virtually no possessions. He left behind a pair of gumboots encrusted with food scraps and pig dung, and a jar containing a few cigarettes. As I gazed at them, I asked myself over and over again what ‘Uncle’s’ life had been, indeed, why on earth he had even been born. An exile from his homeland, ‘Uncle’ had lived out his life quietly in the shadows. When he was suddenly felled by a stroke, he tried to brush away the helping hands, surely signalling that he had had enough of living.

‘Uncle’ in Kumamoto

The two uncles who influenced me so deeply… When I compare their widely-different lives, I finish up reflecting on what it meant to live as a first-generation zainichi. It is fine, as far as it goes, to say that it was a cruel life imposed on them by historical forces. But it seems to me that although battered by life, they both survived, doing the best they could with the means at hand. My ongoing wish is to ensure that the memory of those ‘mutants’ who survived the rigours of their lives does not disappear from the places where they lived.

Torn into pieces time and again

As one follows the traces of my two uncles, the misery of their lives, torn to pieces again and again, surfaces. Their misery is intertwined with feelings of powerlessness and loss. But although they were stricken with grief, they got on with their lives.

One thing they were denied was seeing their country united. What of second generation zainichi like myself, who live on with memories of them? I have still not had the opportunity of seeing my ‘homeland’ united. When I say ‘homeland’, it does not of course have the same sense of ‘native place’ [patrie] as it did for my uncles. My ‘native place’ is Kumamoto, where I was born and grew up. A ‘homeland’ which is not one’s ‘native place’ is a nebulous, insubstantial thing. It does not make sense for me to write of the Korean peninsula, whether ‘North’ or ‘South’ as my ‘homeland’.

And yet, I want to take the plunge and write of the Korean peninsula as my ‘homeland’. By doing so, I wonder whether I may be able to re-discover bonds with my uncles. I wonder whether perhaps I will be able to discover my ‘homeland’ in their memories. Of course, they are no longer alive. Even so, the actuality of the division which was responsible for their misery still continues. Might it not be that when that stark reality is confronted and ended, I will be able to meet my uncles again and begin to say “at last the time has come when your heartache (han) can fade away.”

Today I am a university professor and have achieved a certain degree of public esteem. The contrast with my uncles is obvious. I cannot rid myself of a feeling of shame that I perhaps never really met them, and even now I have not had the joy of seeing a unified Korea. I am comforted by the demonstration my parents and my uncles gave me, a supremely ‘human’ way of being in the face of adversity. This is perhaps what Cumings’ meant by “the Korean peninsula has both
acquired much, and lost much” and that “it is a story remarkable for human triumph over adversity.”

Kang Sangjung 2003

By the time I was in upper primary school, there was an intangible sense in society at large that there was something almost criminal in the very fact of being zainichi, and even worse was the hard fact of division. Why was my parents’ and my uncles’ mother-country being divided? Why was it fighting? Was the Korean race belligerent by nature? When I thought about it, I had to admit that many of the first generation wore their hearts on their sleeves; they were aggressive, abusive and quarrelsome—and so I supposed it might make sense that the country was divided and members of the same race were killing each other. What a ‘barbaric’ people! Images and concepts like these formed one after another, leaving me always heavy-hearted.

History and modern society lessons at school were truly wretched experiences for me. I was seized by a feeling of desolation, as if I had been left all alone in the classroom. Why was I a zainichi? Why were we ‘at the bottom of the heap’? Such misgivings troubled me deeply, but there was no friend or teacher in whom I could confide. I had no alternative but to bury my anxieties deep within myself, and as a result, it was as if a dark cloud of disquiet hung over me.

I was good at both schoolwork and sport, and probably seemed a cheerful, mischievous boy. But at times the cheerfulness would be erased by melancholy and disquiet. There was no real knowledge of or insight into the significance or the origins of division, but it definitely cast a dark shadow. Zainichi—rootless like tumbleweed, deprived of the protective carapace of ‘nation’, fighting among themselves even when in a foreign country, the country to which they should return split in two. In the popular mind, they were nothing short of ‘the dregs of history’. Even the well-meaning people around me were probably unable to imagine how dark a shadow this negative image cast over my young heart. And yet the division was not unrelated to Japanese history.

Later, when I was studying in the former West Germany, I was aware that the division of Germany cast a deep shadow on its people. There was no mistaking that people who live in a divided country have to bear in the roots of their being the burden of negation.

One could perhaps in a way regard the division of Germany, with the weight of the dark legacy of Nazism bearing down on it, as history’s revenge. But the Korean peninsula had been the victim of long-term forcible colonisation, and for that very reason, the history of division was all the more heartbreaking and its influence the more profound.

When I retrace my childhood memories, I feel a melancholy deeper than simple nostalgia, a melancholy that has continued as I grow older. Why, I wonder? I cannot help but think that the answer lies in the circumstances of being zainichi, of which division is the symbol.

There is a complex emotion in zainichi. Some of the younger generation talk of there being two streams within themselves—the country they love most in the world is Japan and that they most dislike is the Korean peninsula. Yet at the same time, the country they most love in the world is the Korean peninsula and that which they dislike most is Japan. It is an extreme form of
expression, but I find similar feelings within myself—Japan is at once my favourite country, the one I should love, and at the same time the country I most dislike; the Korean peninsula too is the country I most dislike and that which in a certain way, I should love. Why does such a state persist in this way?

I think my melancholy usually arises from this sense of division. Division must be healed through reconciliation, not force. It may be, indeed, that reintegration can never be fully achieved. Yet surely it is possible to dispel insecurity by allowing the ‘other’ to enter oneself and co-exist with that ‘difference’? It may be that in the final analysis, it is simply impossible to speak of fundamentally dispelling insecurity. But surely even if the insecurity cannot be dispelled, the heart may be lightened by confronting its source, accepting it, embracing it?

I somehow feel that when even some small reconciliation takes place between the divisions between ‘zainichi’ and ‘Japan’, ‘zainichi’ and ‘North/South’, ‘North/South’ and ‘Japan’, I will at last be able to meet my uncles.

The unification and co-existence of North and South is not simply a matter of bringing together a divided country. The process of reconciliation is itself of great importance. Reconciliation of North and South will necessarily also be bound up with simultaneous reconciliation with Japan. When this happens, we will surely be able to farewell the cruel years of the twentieth century and face the new century. It will be a difficult assignment and there will doubtless be many ups and downs, but I want to be on the spot when such reconciliation occurs. Born as I was during the Korean War, this is my dream.

Translator’s postscript

The aging of the first generation of zainichi Koreans who are the main subject of this essay brings sadness and the vanishing of individual histories, but also sometimes opportunities for remembering. On 3 April 2005, Kang Sangjung’s mother U Sunnam passed away peacefully in Kumamoto. She was 80 years old. Shortly before, on a visit to his hometown, Kang Sangjung had been able to make contact again with ‘Kaneko-san’, who is now very elderly but still has vivid memories of the days described here. They met again after many decades, and were able to share happy and sad recollections of the times and places described here—a corner of postwar Japan which is often invisible in the big narratives of the nation, but whose traces still exert a powerful influence on the Japan of today.


Note on the translator

Robin Fletcher received her PhD from the Australian National University in 2005, for a thesis entitled ‘Yaeko Batchelor, Ainu evangelist and poet’. In addition to researching Japanese history, she has translated a number of Japanese works, including the collected works of Yaeko Batchelor.

Notes to the translation
Korea was annexed by Japan as a colony in 1910. In the 1920s, there were periods of relatively unrestricted entry for Koreans to Japan, and there was a great increase in the number of Koreans working in Japan. Most were single men, employed on construction sites, in mines and factories. Gradually their families joined them. They faced considerable racial discrimination and many came to live in settlements of Korean people. Hundreds of thousands of Koreans were forcibly relocated to Japan with the passing of the National Mobilisation Law (April 1938) and the accompanying ordinance on the immigration of Korean labourers (effective September 1938). By the end of World War II, the number of Koreans living in Japan, including those brought over forcibly during the War, had increased to over two million. (Translator’s note)

The General Headquarters of the Allied Powers (GHQ) declared that Koreans resident in Japan, whether of Northern and Southern origin, were neither citizens of the victorious countries nor of the defeated countries, but were described as ‘third country nationals’.

In 1871, American teacher Leroy Lansing Janes established a school in Kumamoto, the Kumamoto Yogakko, which offered a Western, Christian education. In 1876, thirty-five students pledged themselves to the Christian faith and to missionary work among the Japanese. They were known as the ‘Kumamoto Band’. (Translator’s note)

When a bomb of unknown origin ripped the Japanese railway near Shenyang (then known as Mukden), in September 1931, the Japanese Kwantung army guarding the railway used the incident as a pretext to occupy South Manchuria. This led to the creation of the puppet state of Manchukuo. (Translator’s note)

Traditional dress for Korean women consists of a short upper-body garment, folded in front similar to a kimono (jeogori), and a pleated long full skirt, gathered above the waist (chima). (Translator’s note)

A sweet drink made from fermented rice, sometimes flavoured with ginger. (Translator’s note)

Itako, blind female shamans or spirit mediums, are renowned for their capacity to speak for the dead, through a ritual process known as kuchiyose.

Park Chunghee (1917-1979) was president of South Korea from 1961 to 1979. He had served the Kwantung Army (part of the Japanese Army) in Manchuria in colonial times. Park led a military coup in 1961. In 1971, he declared a state of emergency and suspended the constitution. The following year, he introduced a revised constitution which increased his power to the extent that it made him a virtual dictator. Having survived an assassination attempt in 1974, Park was assassinated in 1979. (Translator’s note)

Broadly definable as a sense of deep sorrow and a desire for restitution invoked by the sufferings and oppression of history, han is often seen as one of the defining elements of modern Korean culture. (Translator’s note)
“The Denationalized Have No Class: The Banishment of Japan’s Korean Minority—A Polemic”
Sonia Ryang
June 8, 2008
http://japanfocus.org/-Sonia-Ryang/2776

Sonia Ryang possesses “double vision” in that she is a U.S.-based anthropologist as well as a cultural insider who grew up as a Zainichi Korean. Her family supported Chongryun (the North Korea–affiliated Zainichi Korean organization), which stood in contrast to the twentieth century’s other Zainichi Korean organization Mindan that was affiliated with South Korea. Zainichi Koreans during the last century was largely divided in their identification either with Chongryun or Mindan. She reached adulthood after attending Chongryun-run ethnic schools including the Korea University in Tokyo and worked as a journalist for a Chongryun newspaper before starting her graduate studies in the United Kingdom. This background endows her Zainichi Korean studies with depths, insights, and a distinctive ethos. In this article, she describes the contours of Zainichi Korean history after 1945 and why “Zainichi Korean” as an ethnicity separate from Koreans in Korea remains relevant today.

Ryang does not delve into her own history in her article, but her argument is clearly based on her early life as a Zainichi Korean. This article opens with a quote that states that social class categories have become more significant than ethnicity for Zainichi Koreans. Ryang uses the whole article to counter that opinion and argues that ethnicity must remain foregrounded in Zainichi Korean studies. One crucial reason is that in 1952 the American occupation and the Japanese government withheld Japanese citizenship from the Koreans, a process that made the Zainichi “officially and completely extra-territorial” (p. 5) in Japan. As a result, Zainichi Koreans were excluded from any social benefits offered by the Japanese government in the early postwar years, which in turn made them identify further with Chongryun and Mindan. Chongryun in turn made it a policy to renounce any assertion of their rights in Japanese society, because they understood taking such a course of action to be an intervention in Japan’s domestic affairs. In a vicious cycle, this made Zainichi communities more insular.

The article also discusses changes that took place for the Zainichi during the next few decades. With the easing of foreign travels, South Koreans started to arrive in Japan from the peninsula again after 1988, and all Zainichi Koreans came to be granted a status of special permanent resident. Unlike permanent residents in the United States, however, the special permanent status does not serve as a path to eventual Japanese citizenship. For this reason, even though many Zainichi rose out of poverty in the 1980s, Ryang argues that Zainichi Koreans remain largely “outside all of those (class) categories and largely invisible” (p. 18) in Japan.

As these articles show, social class and economic factors largely determined which Koreans migrated and became Zainichi Koreans during the twentieth century. Ryang explains why any Koreans did so. She also show that mainland Koreans themselves were guilty of exclusion and amnesia in regard to the Zainichi. Ryang’s article argues powerfully
and persuasively that ethnicity remains relevant to this group of people, who have lived steadfastly and continuously in Japan for nearly a century.
The Denationalized Have No Class: The Banishment of Japan’s Korean Minority—A Polemic

Sonia Ryang

1.

In a recent article by Bumsoo Kim entitled “Bringing class back in: the changing basis of inequality and the Korean minority in Japan,” I read:

“[…] this study shows that the legal/institutional and socioeconomic structural changes in Japan for the past few decades, by decreasing ethnic inequality between Koreans and Japanese while increasing class inequality among Koreans, have made class more significant than ethnicity in understanding the inequality problematic of zainichi Koreans [i.e. Koreans in Japan].”¹

Perhaps it is logical that an oppressed and marginalized ethnic minority, once it begins to receive the benefits of the affluence of the host society, albeit belatedly, would shed its markings of ethnicity and begin to take on the markings of class. Perhaps it is also logical to think that in such a situation class, rather than ethnicity, would become more relevant to forging identity. Unequivocally, however, I remain unconvinced by the argument that a particular category becomes “more significant” than certain others, since the marking of the oppressed is always necessarily multiply compounded.

Nevertheless, what the above passage made me wonder—and what I found to be odd in it—was this: Koreans in Japan have always had incorporated class stratification: throughout the colonial period, during the US occupation and the entire post-war period, and to this day. The question is why, then, do some researchers think that class (and here, I take that they mean, through conflation, class consciousness and class differentiation) was not previously relevant to Koreans in Japan or, more precisely, when we think about Koreans in Japan. When did class disappear from the rhetoric and understanding of and about Koreans in Japan to the extent that now someone has to “bring class back in”?

These questions led me to think not so much about class as about being human—notably, about when a human is not a human in Japan. I find that focusing on class (including class consciousness and class differentiation) or, more precisely, the absence thereof, can provide a
useful perspective when thinking about Japan as a nation-state in which non-nationals are not deemed human.

2.

It is no news to Japan scholars that the concept of class does not always serve as a useful guide. Having said this, class is not a unified category. Following the Neo-Marxist intervention in academe, especially in the work of Louis Althusser and Pierre Bourdieu, no serious social scientist has been content with a definition of class limited to economic relationships. Rather, cultural capital and ideological mechanisms as we understand them today carry as much importance as socio-economic relations and income or wages.²

But there is also the problem of cross-cultural and cross-national compatibility of categories. For example, the category of middle class captures a much broader population in the US than in Britain. While in the latter, at least in popular and lay discourses of the everyday, the middle class stands in clear distinction from the working class (the histories of which have been written; for example),³ in the former, the middle class seems to encompass heterogeneous income groups with vague nomenclatures, often including professionals, blue-collar workers, white-collar workers, small business owners, and so on. Furthermore, in both the US and Britain, poverty lines have often followed racial (in addition to ethnic and colonial) lines of division. While racialized economic borders have long divided the Korean minority from the Japanese majority, the vast majority of Koreans and Japanese would today classify themselves as middle class—if asked, that is. In other words, terms such as class are passé in popular discourse in Japan, just as poverty deceptively appears to have vanished in the eyes of many.⁴

But did class disappear equally and identically for Japanese and Koreans? In other words, is the mode of attrition of this concept from public consciousness the same for Japanese and Koreans in Japan, the former being members of the Japanese national polity, and the latter being outsiders in relation to it? In line with this, my further proposition is that class stratification, including membership of a certain class, should be understood as being premised upon national membership. More crudely put, if one is not a member of a national polity, one is not a class member: that is to say, the denationalized have no class. To a great extent, this is a truism, as many cases, globally speaking, confirm this position. But the case of Koreans in Japan presents a particularly clear instance of the phenomenon, as I shall show below.

I shall argue that there is an important mechanism at work here, involving legal, philosophical, and cultural elements, such that Koreans do not qualify to be included when one talks about class formation in Japan. Such exclusion of Koreans is not new. Throughout the postwar era, Korean residents in Japan have not been recognized as a sociological category, either in the context of censuses and surveys in Japan or from within the positionality of Koreans themselves.

The systematic exclusion of Koreans from Japan’s quantitative data, such as the national census, however, has not been matched by a similar practice in the area of qualitative studies, particularly in the case of the literary print market. Koreans in Japan have been studied from multiple angles, and their cases have been used to test many concepts that populate the margins of Japanese society, including poverty and domestic violence. Strangely, however, these studies have failed to touch upon the concept of class.
I do not attempt to fill this gap in the study of class among Koreans in Japan, but use this omission to highlight an intellectual challenge. I do so by paying close attention to the limbo-like ontology of Koreans in Japan in relation to Japan and Korea. This concept has been explored by other writers, generally carrying the implication of a moral inferiority, or more precisely, an inferior or lesser belonging in one terrain, presumably, Japan’s national entity. Instead, I shall take banishment, or exile, as an important conceptual pillar in this exercise. This position separates me from existing studies of Koreans in Japan that presuppose an inferior, incomplete form of belonging of Koreans in relation to Japanese society: what I am saying is that there is no such form of belonging—complete exclusion or banishment is all that exists for Koreans in Japan. The banishment of Koreans from Japanese society is as much a reality as a useful conceptual tool in clarifying why Koreans have not been studied from the perspective of class stratification in Japan. This, I shall argue, is a result of both internal and external perceptions; by the Japanese government and researchers on the one hand, and by Koreans themselves on the other.

It will be necessary to start from the postwar process according to which emerging Korean expatriate movements effectively segregated Koreans from the Japanese mainstream, rendering them invisible in the context of Japan’s domestic statistics. This needs to be understood in tandem with the legal exclusion of Koreans from the Japanese nation by a concerted effort of the US Occupation authorities in the immediate postwar years and the Japanese authorities thereafter. I shall then introduce a survey, possibly the only existing sociological survey available in English, carried out using quantitatively appropriate methods among Korean males in Japan by Kim Myungsoo in 1995, and shall further interpret its results.

My final goal is to address the question of what it is to be human rather than “Korean” or “Japanese.” The reader will recognize that I do not propose to conceptualize Koreans as holding a transnational or supranational existence or, worse still, “cultural citizenship”—labels that in no way capture the fundamental reality of Koreans in Japan. I shall show that the reason why Koreans in Japan continue to be viewed as irrelevant to, or not conforming with, class divisions within Japanese society is that they are merely and nakedly human and not members of a national polity. As I shall demonstrate below, this is an example of what Giorgio Agamben calls bare life, a form of existence that Hannah Arendt claims as the most perilous and precarious in the modern world.

3.

It should not take too much to persuade the reader that, for a long time in postwar Japan, Korean residents were poor—poorer than their Japanese contemporaries, and poorer than Koreans in Japan are today. With a certain audacity, I might even claim that, for a substantial period, Koreans in Japan had only two cultural assets—a culture of nationalism and a culture of poverty. Koreans were poor, known to be poor, and expected to behave like poor people. This meant that, in the scheme of Japanese stereotyping of Koreans, they were associated with an array of damnable, beastly, and barbaric characteristics including a benighted querulousness, lack of education and intelligence, crude and slow wits, an easily excitable nature, opportunism, dishonesty, and deceptiveness. These were distinctly colonial characterizations of Koreans in Japan by the Japanese media and authorities. But ironically, in the postcolonial self-understanding of Koreans in Japan, poverty and violence loomed large, as these formed part of the unmistakable heritage that Korean expatriate decolonization in Japan had to deal with.
And that violence, that ethnic Korean brand of violence, the intensity of which Japanese sectioned off in urban ghettos such as Sanya or Kamagasaki, readily found its way into Korean homes, fiercely inflicted upon weaker members of the family by the patriarch. The oft-quoted figure of the *areru chichi* or violent father, however, was also seen as burning with the flames of patriotism—there was always a good justification for his actions, as he had been destroyed, abused, exploited, and mentally injured by Japanese imperialism and colonial rule. Note that this portrayal was not found in the writings of Japanese commentators, let alone state-commissioned researchers, but in the writings of ethnic Korean writers in Japan.  

Strangely, however, the poverty of Koreans was not represented or perceived (by Koreans themselves) as a class phenomenon. It was, rather, an ethnic property. Just as Japan’s so-called “untouchables,” the *burakumin*, were associated with poverty, Korean neighborhoods were referred to as *chōsenburaku* or Korean hamlets (or ghettos, in more contemporary language). These consisted of persons engaged in a range of activities (and lack of activity) associated with poverty—raising pigs, collecting cardboard boxes and glass bottles, gathering old nails and melting them in backyards, the ubiquitous day laboring, and chronic unemployment. Families lived in shacks that sometimes had no running water, often using shared outhouses. Men were often heavily dependent on alcohol, which consumed the meager earnings from their daily labors. Women tried to cling to these paltry funds in order to provide for the children. Women also worked, often illegally and with a sense of humiliation, at times brewing rice wine or collecting scrap metal on the streets, all the while nursing and raising children. I have perhaps made the wrong emphasis here—humiliation was not foremost in their thoughts, rather they were preoccupied with the desperate struggle for survival.

All of this, however, remained in the ghetto. Indeed, as long as Koreans did not try to take advantage of the limited forms of welfare offered by local municipalities, there was hardly anything the Japanese government owed them—that is, speaking from the perspective of Japan’s domestic law. This is because, following their 1952 forfeiture of Japanese nationality, Koreans became officially and completely extra-territorials in the eyes of the Japanese government. That is, with the signing of the San Francisco Treaty between the US and Japan in 1952, Koreans lost all the legal properties associated with national belonging in Japan. Instead, thereafter, they became extra-national temporary residents, or sojourners, many of them stateless persons, to be precise. Thus they came to be excluded from veterans’ benefits, atomic bomb victims’ benefits, disability benefits, the national pension plan, national government welfare, and all other nationalized forms of social security. To be sure—and this is important—many Koreans were the recipients of *seikatsu uhogo*, “livelihood protection,” a rescue measure implemented by local municipalities (not the national government). But no access was provided to national-level benefits and welfare. As such, the poverty of this group did not constitute a domestic class problem for the Japanese nation-state. The year 1952 therefore constituted an important juncture in the history of Koreans in Japan. I shall return to this point later.

4.

Historically speaking, Koreans played an important role in the formation of the modern Japanese working class, Japanese trade unionism, and the Communist movement, both during the colonial and postcolonial periods. At the height of the Comintern’s intervention in the Korean and Japanese Communist movements during the 1920s, Korean communists in Japan, following the Comintern policy of one party per nation, joined their Japanese comrades in the name of trans-
When the war ended, there were 2.4 million Koreans in Japan, most of whom were repatriated during the years immediately following Japan’s defeat. Repatriation took place in a chaotic atmosphere, with virtually no administrative assistance provided by the Japanese or Occupation authorities. By 1948, only about 590,000 Koreans remained in Japan. During the early years of the US Occupation (1945-47), leftist movements in Japan regained momentum. Koreans joined this wave by maintaining strong connections with working-class, progressive, and communist forces. Throughout East Asia, activists worked under the assumption that socialist revolutions would spread, domino-like, following the establishment of North Korea (1948) and the People’s Republic of China (1949). On this premise, it was argued that if the Korean left wanted to support Korea’s socialist revolution and the goal of national unification under North Korea’s leadership, it had to first join forces with Japanese communists in their efforts to bring down the current reactionary Japanese government.

The above belief in itself had not prevented leftist Koreans from forming their own organization. Within two months of the war’s ending, in October 1945, the League of Koreans in Japan (zainichi chōsenjin renmei in Japanese and chaeilbon choseonin ryeonmaeng in Korean), commonly referred to as Choryeon, was founded. This body was soon to be confronted with a rival nationalist organization, the Association of Koreans Remaining in Japan (zainichi kankoku kyoryōū mindan in Japanese and chaeil hanguk keoryu mindan), commonly known as Mindan. While it is conventionally (and not completely erroneously) understood that Choryeon supported north Korea while Mindan backed south Korea (reflecting Korea’s partition as of 1945 into a Sovietized north and an American Military Government-run south), the operational mechanisms of expatriate politics reflected boundaries that were far more complex, ambiguous, and unstable. For example, Choryeon had a Seoul office in South Korea. Moreover, the majority of Koreans remaining in Japan originated from the southern provinces of Kyeongsang, Cheolla, and Cheju, thereby rendering it somewhat unnatural that Choryeon enjoyed support among this population, unless one remembered that Koreans (and others also) in those days regarded the country’s partition as a temporary state-of-affairs soon to be resolved.
Koreans of both left- and right-wing persuasions shared fiercely anti-Japanese and nationalistic sentiments and a strong desire to gain complete independence through a unified Korea. What divided them were differing views on how best to achieve the common goal of national reunification and independence from foreign occupation: one camp wanted to unify Korea under North Korean-style socialism, while the other wanted to free the peninsula from revolutionary influences associated with the Soviet Union and China.

The left sought to build a supra-national class coalition. Ironically, such possibilities were augmented by the suppression of the left by Japanese and Occupation authorities. In 1949, Occupation authorities and Japanese military police responded to Choryeon’s support for North Korea, by closing down Choryeon’s headquarters, outlawing it and confiscating its properties, assets, and savings. This was the first application of the Prevention of Destruction Law or hakai bōshihō. Earlier, in 1948, Korean schools operated by Choryeon had been forcibly shut down under the provisions of Martial Law, resulting in deaths and injuries. In the wake of these developments, Korean left-nationalists had no choice but to join the Japanese Communist Party, which had not been suppressed by the authorities. However, this marriage of convenience soon showed signs of strain. The frustrations of Korean members intensified following the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, compounded by disillusionment when the promised East Asian revolution failed to materialize. Fierce debate took place among Korean members, some stressing solidarity with the international working class movement, and others calling for prioritization of national goals and efforts to end the bloody conflict on the peninsula. This debate was brought to an end unexpectedly by communiqués issued by the North Korean Foreign Minister in 1952, which expressed North Korea’s willingness to enter into normal diplomatic relations with the Japanese government currently in power. Following this development, Koreans withdrew en masse from the Japanese Communist Party and, after a few years of internal purges and fierce debates, re-organized as the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan, or Chongryun in its abbreviated Korean form. In retrospect, the emergence of Chongryun in 1955 completed the process of banishment of Koreans in Japan from the Japanese national polity first initiated through the 1952 forfeiture of Japanese nationality. The classification of exiled Koreans as sojourners, rather than as members of the society of the host nation, amounted to a postcolonial settlement in dual terms—for the Japanese government, which could now completely banish Koreans from any form of national planning, and also for Koreans in Japan themselves, who thus freed themselves from the legacy of Japanese colonial subjugation while remaining in Japan. Indeed, in the latter case, it was precisely because they continued to stay on in Japan that they had to self-exile themselves from the Japanese nation-state.

Chongryun, in contrast to Choryeon, renounced all forms of intervention in Japan’s domestic politics. Instead, it declared itself to be the organization representing North Korea overseas. This meant that Chongryun would not wage campaigns demanding civil rights, economic and social benefits, provision of medical care, or other civic entitlements provided by the Japanese government. It recognized these as rights reserved exclusively for Japanese citizens. Furthermore, it renounced the use of unlawful violence in all aspects of its activities, and declared itself to be a law-abiding organization in Japan. This marked the virtual disappearance of Koreans from Japanese left-wing movements. In exchange, Chongryun secured relative
autonomy to operate its own schools with its own academic curricula. As long as its schools were not accredited as Level 1 schools, or ichijōkō, those classified by the Ministry of Education as capable of issuing academic certificates and degrees, the pedagogical contents of programs offered at these institutions would be left untouched by the ministry. At the same time, however, Chongryun schools would not be entitled to public subsidies, thereby freeing the ministry from the burden of having to finance the education of Korean students enrolled in Chongryun schools. Chongryun enjoyed substantial support among Koreans in Japan. At the time of its founding, Japanese intelligence estimated that as many as 90 percent of Koreans in Japan sympathized with and supported North Korea.¹⁴

In short, by 1955, within three years of being deprived of Japanese citizenship, Koreans in Japan (or at least Chongryun and its affiliates, which accounted for the majority of Koreans at the time) had banished or exiled themselves from the Japanese civic terrain. During the period when their status had been ambiguous, that is to say, in 1949, when they were not legally excluded from Japanese citizenship status under the Occupation, they were “outlawed”; in 1952, they were excluded from Japanese civic entitlements; in 1955, Koreans themselves embraced this marginalization by effectively declaring that they had no wish to be counted within Japan’s civic life.

From then on, Koreans were erased from Japan’s national census, national surveys, GDP calculations, and income charts. They were also denied veterans’ pensions, payments for medical expenses for victims of the atom bomb attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and welfare and social security payments. Further, they were denied access to national healthcare, the right to hold civil and public service jobs, and the right to vote, while they remained obligated to pay taxes in a classical form of “taxation without representation.” Fundamentally speaking, their exclusion (and self-exclusion) occluded them from class categorizations—there was, in other words, no way to include them in discussions and conceptualizations of socio-economic class formation and transformation in postwar Japan, since they had been stripped of civil status and privileges. More figuratively speaking, being a member of a certain class stands on the
prerequisite of being a member of a national state polity: if one is not a national, one does not belong to any class, either.

But that is not all. Up until 1965, Japan recognized neither the governments of South Korea nor North Korea. Alien registration certificates carried by Koreans in Japan would include the terms *chōsen* (a general term for Korea; often used to refer to North Korea) or *kankoku* (South Korea). However, the Japanese government’s immigration bureau is on record as stating that neither term refers to a nationality. It may not be intuitively obvious to the reader today, but up until 1965, Koreans in Japan had no official nationality available for them, since neither *kankoku* or *chōsen* written on the Japanese alien registration certificate meant a nation. Since 1965, following normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and South Korea, *kankoku* came to be deemed as a nationality. But even today, a minority of Koreans in Japan continues to have *chōsen* (Korea) entered in the space for “nationality” on their alien registration documents. This term does not denote a nationality, since there is no nation simply called Korea in the world. To this day, Japan does not recognize North Korea, which is often associated with the alien registration status under the name *chōsen*; no precedent exists to the effect that the North Korean government grants Koreans residing in Japan North Korean nationality. The oft-displayed understanding that those whose alien registration bears the label *chōsen* are the citizens of North Korea or the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea living in Japan, therefore, is preposterous. Nevertheless, I emphasize, just as in the case of the 1955 self-banishment of (Chongryun) Koreans from Japan’s national polity, the self-declaration of these individuals as being North Koreans in Japan was a solid reality, if only on a rhetorical level, during the years immediately following Chongryun’s emergence.

6.

The newly acquired name for the Korean left, “overseas nationals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” ethnicized their identity. For them, the bedrock of their consciousness was patriotism, not class-consciousness. Note also, that regardless of what Koreans thought they were, they had no citizenship or nationality. Their idea of being “overseas citizens of North Korea” was a baseless illusion recognized neither by North Korea nor by Japan, nor for that matter by any state or international organization.

North Korea does not issue passports to persons living overseas, and there is no documentation or paperwork inside North Korea that registers Koreans in Japan as citizens of the nation residing abroad. The only time North Korea has officially acknowledged that Koreans in Japan could potentially be North Korean nationals was when it entered into a formal agreement with the Japanese Red Cross so that Koreans could be repatriated from Japan to North Korea in 1959. It is extremely interesting to note that, as discussed in recent research by Tessa Morris-Suzuki, the Japanese government anticipated that the number of Korean would-be returnees to North Korea would total around 60,000. This just happened to be the number of Koreans receiving *seikatsuho* or “livelihood protection” (similar to, but not identical with, social security) through the minimal benefits program offered by Japanese local governments in the 1950s, and Morris-Suzuki suspects that the numerical equivalence here is not totally coincidental. As such, for the Japanese government, the issue of the Koreans and their poverty was to be resolved by physically eliminating them from Japanese soil.

The repatriation of these individuals to North Korea, it should also be noted, became possible through the active assistance of the International Red Cross. It is ironical to observe that an
international human rights organization assumed that the final, best solution was to move people from a country in which they had no claim to national citizenship to another where they were thought to belong. Here again, the human rights of Koreans in Japan were activated only when they were deemed as belonging to a certain country—even though there was no way of securing their return trip due to the lack of diplomatic relations between Japan and North Korea. The ensuing tragedy was that Koreans who thought that they were returning “home” to North Korea found themselves marginalized, bereft of rights, and living under materially and politically harsh conditions.

From 1959 to 1976, 92,749 individuals were “repatriated” from Japan to North Korea. Considering that most Koreans in Japan originally came from the southern provinces, it was an inherently anomalous repatriation. Interestingly, no such mass repatriation of Koreans from Japan to South Korea took place following the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and South Korea in 1965, despite the fact that the majority of Koreans came originally from southern provinces. It is important to register that, due to pronatalist population policies that traced their origins back to the National Eugenics Law of 1940, Japan’s population continued to grow until the late 1960s, thereby obviating the need for migrant workers. It should also be remembered that postwar Japan was the destination for hundreds and thousands of Japanese returnees from overseas colonies, including Sakhalin, Mongolia, China, southeast Asia, and of course, Korea. As the defeated party in World War II and a nation in ruins, the former colonial master of Asia, Japan did not face an influx of (illegal) labor immigrants from outside. This meant that former colonial subjects, the majority of whom were Korean, were the only stateless persons in Japan.

As stated, it was not until 1965 that Koreans in Japan became eligible to adopt a nationality. Following diplomatic normalization between Japan and the Republic of Korea, Koreans in Japan could apply for South Korean nationality. What is extremely interesting is that permanent residence status in Japan was granted alongside South Korean nationality, and that this status made Koreans eligible for public housing, public medical care, and other benefits. It is clearly apparent from such an example that it is only when a person acquires a nationality that human rights begin to be accorded to that person.

Morally speaking, this measure was, of course, unjustifiable: why should the Japanese government only provide benefits to those Koreans in Japan who applied for South Korean nationality, while its colonial rule had subjugated the entire Korean peninsula? This remains an enigma until one considers the historical background of Cold War politics. As the dominant force in the postwar East Asian geopolitical environment, the US wholeheartedly connived in the above strategy. More fundamentally, the post-WWII global order presupposed a person’s belonging to a national polity as the most important condition for that person to be considered human—not the other way around. And this meant that the 1965 treaty left those Koreans who did not opt to identify themselves with South Korea stateless and hence, non-human in terms of human rights. Here is another instance of what Arendt describes: “Man, it turns out, can lose all so-called Rights of Man without losing his essential quality as man, his human dignity. Only the loss of a polity itself expels him from humanity.”17 As long as the globe remains sliced up into national sovereign states, non-nationals or the de-nationalized will remain stateless, homeless, and rightless. They are rightless not because they are legally discriminated against, but because they are outside of the law. In a way, a convicted murderer has more normal human
rights than the denationalized. And the denationalized is disenfranchised from domestic national class stratification: he has no class.

In this light, it should be clear how erroneous it is for many of those conducting research on Koreans in Japan, and especially those with a political conscience and a passion for justice, to argue that Koreans in Japan are treated as sub-humans, second-class citizens, and discriminated against inside Japanese society. For, they are not discriminated against inside Japanese society, since they are actually outside Japanese society, this arising from the fact that they are merely and nakedly human, and not sub-human. Furthermore, to argue that they are treated like second-class citizens would be to miss the central point that they are in no sense citizens in any class whatsoever.

7. Arendt once wrote:

Not only did loss of national rights in all instances entail the loss of human rights; the restoration of human rights, as the recent example of the State of Israel proves, has been achieved so far only through the restoration or the establishment of national rights. The conception of human rights, based upon the assumed existence of a human being as such, broke down at the very moment when those who professed to believe in it were for the first time confronted with people who had indeed lost all other qualities and specific relationships—except that they were still human. The world found nothing sacred in the abstract nakedness of being human.¹⁸

But in Japan’s case and also, therefore, in the case of non-Japanese in Japan, there was another peculiar twist, aptly depicted in the words of Zygmunt Bauman:

If birth and nation are one, then all the others who enter or wish to enter the national family must mimic, or are compelled to emulate, the nakedness of the newborn. The state—the guardian and prison guard, the spokesman and the censor-in-chief of the nation—would see to it that this condition was met.¹⁹

It is more than interesting to remember that persons who are naturalized in Japan are referred to as shinnihonjin or “new Japanese,” as if to indicate re-birth or a new life or, even more controversially, as kikajin, kika meaning a “return” to the correct state, implying that being Japanese or becoming Japanese is fundamentally right (and good) for humanity. This is all too deceptive, considering that a person who used to be only a naked human was not treated as human, while a person who had become a national was now treated as human for the first time.²⁰

The enthusiasm and sense of profound commitment with which former Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō (in power from 2001 to 2006) talked about the possible amendment of Article Nine of the Constitution need to be understood in this context, since this amendment would enable Japan to declare war against other nations: the possibility of war is the possibility of emergency, and further, a state of emergency is a state in which non-nationals can be exterminated more easily than at other times. Controversial behavior by the governor of Tokyo, Ishihara Shintarō, should also be seen in this light, that is, as evidence of a craving to declare a legal civil war in order to eliminate undesirable elements. Of particular note is his 2000 reference to foreigners and immigrants as daisangokujin, or “third country nationals,” a term used to denote non-Japanese, non-Allied nationals (i.e. former colonial subjects) in occupied Japan, branding them as responsible for social unrest. (During the same period, public school teachers
that were sympathetic to the Koreans and/or resistant to the singing of *Kimigayo*, Japan’s national anthem that reveres the Emperor, were criticized and punished).  

For, the exception here derives from *ex capere*, meaning “outside,” and a state of exception is a state in which the law makes itself known by suspending itself. This is an effective way to control a population that exists outside ordinary national law. Of course, undesirable elements can include both nationals and non-nationals. The unknowable number of victims in concentration camps in North Korea and the testimonials of those who have escaped attest to this. Yet here, also, the degree of belonging to the nation became manifest in an unmistakable way: returnees to North Korea from Japan were often sent to camps that had been specially reserved for them, marking them out as a distinctly superfluous population, for example.

Japan used to have a camp that was designated for the detention of illegal border crossers and offenders of the Alien Registration Law (i.e. non-nationals) awaiting deportation. Ōmura shūyōjo, or the Ōmura camp, used to detain offenders for years without trial and no clear plans for their placement—reminiscent of US Guantanamo Bay facility today. The majority of Korean detainees at the Ōmura camp originated from the southern provinces that belong to today’s South Korea. But, since the South Korean government refused to accept deportees from Japan, they became wandering stateless persons and were placed in semi-permanent protective custody.

This case points to an important factor in thinking about the bare life of stateless persons: in situations such as national emergencies or where certain decisions have been made at the national level, a person can easily become stateless, even if deemed to be in possession of a proper nationality. This was the case for Japanese Americans in the US after Pearl Harbor, when even those who were US citizens were sent to camps. Not only that—inside the camps, they were studied as some kind of naked species whose reactions were meant to be used to inform the US government about the Japanese national character. Prominent anthropologists such as John Embree participated in this endeavor.

In other words, as stated above, states of emergency such as wars make anything possible—the elimination of humans, detention of undesirable elements, and deprivation of some citizens of their civil rights as the sovereign state sees fit.

The fact that the Ōmura camp has been relieved of its special duty as a place of detention for Koreans does not mean that the possibility of being incarcerated in a similar institution in future has been permanently removed. In the case of a national emergency, such as a war of the kind
that Japan’s recent prime ministers were eager to have the option of participating in, it is non-
nationals that would be the first to face detention in the name of national security. 

8.

In 1981, simultaneous with Japan’s ratification of the International Covenants for Human Rights and joining the United Nations Refugee Convention, Koreans in Japan who did not have South Korean nationality were given permanent residence in Japan. Their status was termed *tokurei eijūken*, or special exceptional permanent residence, and the Japanese Immigration Bureau subsequently issued such persons re-entry permits for Japan, allowing them to travel abroad. Many Koreans whose family members had been repatriated to North Korea after 1959 were now able to travel to North Korea to be reunited temporarily with their families. However, due to Cold War tensions between the two halves of the Korean peninsula, it remained impossible to visit both North and South—it was an either/or decision at that time.

It was during the 1980s that many situational (*not* structural) changes were made in the topography of Koreans in Japanese society. First, there was an influx of Koreans from South Korea after the 1988 liberalization of overseas travel by the South Korean government. Secondly, inside the Korean expatriate movement, there was a considerable easing in the hitherto confrontational positions held by pro-South Korea and pro-North Korea camps in light of moves toward ending the global Cold War. Thirdly, and in connection with the above, it became accepted inside the Korean community in Japan that the first generation’s myth of an eventual return to the homeland was not going to be achieved. The generations born in Japan came to realize that they and their children would spend the rest of their lives in Japan.

In 1992, all Korean permanent residents, including those who had acquired permanent residence following the 1965 treaty and those who had acquired it in the years following 1981, found themselves under a common classification as special permanent residents, or *tokubetsu eijūsha*. This change was accompanied by a diverse range of improvements in the residential status of Koreans in Japan, including a softening in deportation stipulations for those found guilty in felony cases. But, it should be emphasized that, unlike US permanent residence, which can be seen as a transient status which naturally bridges the gap between the status of foreign national and that of US citizen, special permanent residence status in Japan is no guarantee of eventual citizenship. Japanese citizenship which may only be obtained through naturalization, an arduous process with no guarantee of success.

In the meantime, ambiguity remains the constant for Koreans in Japan in terms of their national affiliations. Those with South Korean nationality differ from those living in the Republic of Korea in that they do not have resident registration numbers, 13-digit IDs initiated about four decades ago that combine birth date, gender, a code for the region in which the holder was first registered and their order of registration. This ID number is computerized and is required for the completion of basic tasks such as internet registration. Unless one has a number that can be identified in the Korean Information and Security Agency database, one is, for practical purposes, not a national. Koreans in Japan who have South Korean nationality do not bear such a number and do not appear in the database. For this reason, if the South Korean passport carried by a Korean traveler from Japan expires while he or she is abroad, a South Korean embassy or consulate in the given country cannot renew or reissue it. Current conditions under which Koreans in Japan retain South Korean nationality also exempt them from military service and
taxation. In exchange, they are not eligible to vote or stand for election. In other words, their South Korean “nationality” is of a dubious sort.

On the other hand, those Koreans in Japan who do not have South Korean nationality, numerically in the minority today, remain stateless. But, paradoxically, rather than being recognized as stateless persons, often in popular consciousness, they are regarded as “North Koreans.” There is no form of North Korean nationality recognized at any level of Japan’s legal and juridical system, since North Korea is not recognized by the Japanese state. Yet, the Cold War ideology of non-South Korean equaling North Korean lingers on, triggering abuse and violence by Japanese perpetrators toward those not holding South Korean nationality and/or those affiliated with the North Korea-supporting expatriate organization, Chongryun, whenever there is any sign of hostility between the Japanese and North Korean governments. After the September 17, 2002, revelation that North Korean agents had kidnapped a total of thirteen innocent Japanese from Japan’s shores during the 1970s and 1980s, Koreans in this category became the most vulnerable. It should also be emphasized that the North Korean government, in the face of the persecution of the so-called “North Koreans” in Japan, made next to no effort to protect them.

It would be this group of stateless Koreans, whose form of existence is nakedly human without the official recognition of any nation-state, that would be the first to be loaded onto the trucks, possibly after being given one hour’s notice to pack one item of luggage, and sent away to the camps. The erasure of Koreans from Japan’s domestic socio-economic surveys has to be understood in this context. In other words, it should be clear that, far from enjoying the privilege of belonging to the lowest strata in Japan’s class structure, Koreans have been, and continue to be, fundamentally and unequivocally excluded from this structure. This is why their historical poverty must be considered ethnic poverty and vulnerability, and not a class phenomenon, in the context of Japan’s national order. 29

Turning our attention to internal class-consciousness, or the lack thereof, among Koreans in Japan, reference to Chongryun will illuminate the situation. Chongryun actively promoted the view that the poverty of Koreans in Japan was an ethnic problem, firstly caused by colonial oppression, and later through continuing discrimination by the Japanese state. Rather than placing Koreans inside Japanese society, and subsequently demanding that the Japanese government grant Koreans the appropriate economic, political, and basic civil rights, Chongryun focused on raising the profile of North Korea among Japanese sympathizers on one hand, while organizing Korean affiliates as loyal followers of the North Korean regime and of Chongryun itself on the other. Strategically, it thus formed a broad ethnic front, soliciting mass support for itself. Backgrounding its success was the image of a South Korean regime tainted by support from the US and ruled by a military regime known for violently suppressing student and worker protests.

In Chongryun’s official rhetoric, all Koreans in Japan were destined to “be embraced in the warm bosom of our glorious socialist fatherland,” their sojourn in Japan only temporary in nature. As such, internal differences among Koreans in Japan—be they related to level of education or size of wealth—had to be disregarded. For, according to Chongryun, Koreans in Japan formed one united people dedicated to the eventual reunification of their fatherland and
the “liberation of their brothers and sisters in South Korea from the US imperialist wolves and their puppet clique.”

Chongryun was able to sustain this notion for two decades or so due to the ethnic marginalization of Koreans as a whole in Japan, and occasionally explicit and blatant acts of discrimination specifically targeted at Chongryun and its affiliates. Chongryun’s political deprivation and impotence in Japan actually strengthened its internal unity, the unity of an ethnic community that was discriminated against due to its political allegiance. This further delayed recognition of the fact that affiliates of the organization were, in fact, divided from each other in multiple ways as a result of the uneven distribution of economic, political, and social capital.

Class divisions evidently existed among Chongryun followers from the very beginning. But this reality was made part of the larger expatriate cause for the reunification of Korea under North Korean initiative. Wealthy donors were decorated and highly praised by both Chongryun and the North Korean government, called aegukjeok sanggongin or patriotic industrialists and entrepreneurs. Their children received special treatment in schools, along with the children of highly ranked cadres. They were given offices in Sanggonghoe or the Korean Association of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, an auxiliary organization within Chongryun. Indeed, they played a key role in enhancing the morale as well as the economic foundation of Chongryun’s endeavors. Here, class division was occluded and deemed secondary—patriotic commitment and loyalty toward North Korea’s leadership formed the utmost priority in Chongryun’s rhetoric and practice.

It was from the early 1980s that inequalities and the uneven distribution of power inside Chongryun, and within North Korea itself for that matter, became the subject of attention for Chongryun affiliates on a number of levels. However, again, this was not done with reference to class differentiation within Chongryun, but through criticism of its bureaucratization by disgruntled voices within the organization. Such criticisms, however, ultimately proved to be ineffective. This was due to the fact that if any Chongryun member wished to leave the organization, there was virtually no sanction that the organization could actually place upon him or her: all he or she had to do was to leave and continue to live on the margins of Japanese society, albeit disenfranchised, as he or she had done until then in any case. By the 1980s, the Cold War mentality of “either with us or against us” had subsided, and unhappy individuals inside Chongryun were prepared to leave the organization. Although this did not mean that they would immediately support South Korea from that point on, the iron curtain, it was understood, had been lifted, and elements of the Korean population in Japan, especially the younger generations, looked to the middle ground.

We must remember that, whereas the transition from a labor-intensive to a capital-intensive economy occurred during the 1960s for the Japanese mainstream, it only reached Koreans in Japan in the early 1980s. Nevertheless, such a transition did take place: the decades of hard work and hardship (and I mean, literally, twelve hours or more a day of labor for starvation-level wages, virtually no savings, and other aspects of the culture of poverty) that older generations endured began to pay off, enabling them to leave Korean ghettos for decent residential areas, provide their children with a higher education, and enjoy some real leisure. In short, the problem of Korean poverty was mainly resolved due to the endurance of the Koreans themselves, outside the planning frameworks and concerns of the Japanese government.
Post-poverty younger generations were altogether different. First off, they were employable in Japanese sectors, unlike their uneducated parents. In a cultural sense, too, they were no longer brought up simply with nationalism, but were also well versed in Japanese contemporary popular culture and socially accepted standards. Politically, in comparison with their parents and grandparents, they no longer had such a fierce interest, nor such a deep personal and professional investment, in homeland-oriented politics.

As stated above, by becoming permanent residents of Japan, Chongryun Koreans gained documentation allowing them to travel abroad. Although the application procedures were maddeningly cumbersome, this re-entry permit enabled Chongryun Koreans to leave Japan and return. The first destination many Chongryun Koreans chose to visit was, predictably, North Korea, partly to be united with their repatriated family members, and partly to be educated “in the bosom of the fatherland.” Various tours were offered—family reunion tours (long-term and short-term), cadre re-education courses (two-week trips up to one-year stays), delegation visits (either based on political merit or monetary payment), professional training visits (for artists, performing artists, musicians, Korean language teachers, and so on), and high-school tours (as prizes for best Youth League unit or winner of nation-wide athletic meets, for example), to cite only a few categories.

Chongryun visitors to North Korea quickly discovered that the glorious socialist fatherland that they had adored and admired was very far from the “paradise on earth” they had expected to find. Previously repatriated members of their families were not given the opportunity to fully participate in nation building, suspected as they were of lacking in loyalty and seen as having been contaminated by reactionary ideologies. Party supervisors assigned to Chongryun visitors treated them in an arrogant and often sexist manner (in the case of male supervisors with respect to female visitors). Chongryun visitors were not accorded freedom of movement; even journalists had to be accompanied by supervisors and were often denied access to fieldtrips for no clear reason.

On a more personal level, Chongryun visitors were harassed, ridiculed, and simply treated with very little respect: flaws in their Japanese-accented Korean were met with contempt, and even their clothing, hairstyles and posture were monitored and pedantically corrected. For many, following a wave of emotional upheaval during their initial visit, repeat visits only confirmed their disillusionment. Chongryun Koreans, even including cadres, who had been born and grew up in Japan, found harassment by the party in relation to such minuscule and insignificant areas of their personal lives not only irritating, but deeply insulting. They failed to understand the way North Korean socialism worked—through heavy ideologico-cultural policing and incessant intervention by the state into the personal realm. This is because Chongryun Koreans, and especially those of younger generations, are individuals that have cultivated a remarkable level of competence in distinguishing between organizational and non-organizational spheres, having spent all of their lives in Japan while remaining devoted to the success of North Korea. In a way, the newly-granted right of overseas travel acted as an opening for the development of a new, critical vision of both North Korea and Chongryun itself.

Such looming skepticism coincided with changes in the economic status of Koreans in Japan. Not everyone, of course, achieved the dizzying success of Son Masayoshi, a naturalized ethnic Korean entrepreneur, but it is true that many second and third-generation Koreans succeeded in a competitive market environment. Although many failed in the 1990s recession, for a good part of
the 1980s, younger Koreans acquired valuable experience as part of Japan’s economy, albeit from the margins and in a more precarious position than their Japanese contemporaries. No longer were they confined to running pachinko pinball halls and *yakiniku* (BBQ) restaurants, and when they did engage in such types of enterprise, young owners introduced fresh and innovative commercial strategies that no longer bore the marks of a culture of poverty. Trendy, odor-free BBQ restaurants became popular date spots for young couples in Tokyo, while pachinko halls began catering to women players, featuring annexes with soft interiors and a children’s corner.

![Son Masayoshi, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Softbank Mobile as well as Softbank group. Son is one of Japan's richest entrepreneurs.](image)

The trajectories of such individuals can be contrasted with those of Koreans newly arriving in Japan in their hundreds and thousands at the beginning of the 1990s. The South Korean government started to issue passports to ordinary citizens around the time of the Seoul Olympic Games in 1988, and many visitors on various types of visa began pouring into Japanese cities, coming close to replicating the Korean ghettos of earlier periods; that is, creating their own enclaves for social gatherings. These typically included small restaurants or bars with non-generic, Japanized names (of the kind often seen in business premises owned by earlier generations of Koreans in Japan). However, such names might refer to a small country town or street, easily recognized as an “insider” location by Korean natives. Such eateries and bars might also often have Korean signage—an unmistakable sign of the newcomers.

More importantly, at least during the initial stage following their migration to Japan, kinship ties and the circle of family friends served as the most effective sources of recruitment. Thus, earlier generations of Koreans and their descendants (the “old-comers”) became the major employers of the newcomer Koreans. This inevitably re-arranged the self-perceptions of long-term Korean residents in Japan. Although confined within the ethnic sector, “old-comers” now faced the somewhat bewildering realization that they were the preferred employers of newly-arrived Korean workers. The arrival of these new Korean immigrants, whose Japanese proficiency was poor, customs and mannerisms obviously different, capital insignificant and appearance foreign, led to the noticeable gentrification of “old-comer” Koreans in Japan. This, of course, paradoxically also meant that the latter became less easily distinguishable from the Japanese mainstream in terms of class and ethnicity. Is this the case, though? Let us see.
I have dwelt so far on the topology of Koreans in Japan’s national landscape. In this final short segment, I shall look at the class morphology of Koreans in Japan—if there is any, that is. Given the dearth of survey data pertaining to Koreans in Japan, Kim Myungsoo’s 1995 survey shines with significance. While its sample is confined to a very narrow category of Korean men in Japan who have South Korean nationality and are aged twenty and above, and a comparable set of Japanese men, the survey results shed light on correlations between economic status, education, and social status. The responses of 889 Korean male permanent residents in Japan were obtained in ten interviews conducted between February 1995 and October 1996. These were compared with the responses of 1248 Japanese men aged between twenty and sixty-nine, obtained through interviews conducted in October and November 1995. Kim finds surprisingly that as the average Korean mean income slightly surpassed that of the Japanese. Very little disparity was also noted in terms of years of education, with a mean of 12.01 years for the Koreans and 12.35 for the Japanese.

Where the Korean data deviates from the Japanese pattern is in the patterns for advancement in society. Whereas for Japanese respondents, length of education correlated with social status, education did not secure comparable upward mobility for the Koreans. At the same time, as many as 70 percent of Korean respondents primarily depended on family and friends, that is, ethnic connections in order to secure employment, and they predominantly ended up among the ranks of the urban self-employed. In Kim’s sample, 42.3 percent of Japanese respondents are white-collar workers as opposed to 26.6 percent of their Korean counterparts, while 23.2 percent of Japanese respondents are self-employed as opposed to 52.1 percent of their Korean counterparts. Of particular significance is the fact that the educational level of Korean fathers was not reflected in the degree of social advancement of their sons, demonstrating that cultural capital does not have the same value for Koreans and Japanese once they are placed in the Japanese (national) job market. A key difference lies in the fact that Koreans are unable to turn to formal Japanese government agencies in order to secure employment given their non-national status (I have already discussed what it means not to have national status).

The breakdown of occupations for Koreans is also indicative: 11.57 percent working in restaurants, 16.07 percent in construction, 12 percent in simple manufacturing, and 8.3 percent unemployed; hardly any are found in the professional or executive sub-class. Not surprisingly, Kim finds that the older the Korean male, the more disadvantaged he is in the job market.

Myungsoo Kim concludes “that employment opportunities and status attainment processes among Korean minority members [in Japan] are in fact far from being fully equal in comparison with the Japanese as the data analyzed in this article indicates, even though the outcome of Korean minority status attainment here appears to have reached levels similar to those of the Japanese.” Compare this with Bumsoo Kim, whose words are quoted in the opening of this article, arguing that class is becoming a more important factor than ethnicity when thinking about Koreans in Japan. Both Kims hold that the livelihood and career achievement of Koreans in Japan today are improving and becoming comparable to their Japanese contemporaries. Yet, in contrast to B. Kim, who regards ethnicity as no longer being as relevant as class, M. Kim shows that large disparities remain between Japanese and Koreans within the Japanese nation state. How should one understand this?
We are dealing here with a parallel phenomenon: the job attainment, living standard, income level and other quantitative indicators documented for Koreans in Japan stand on fundamentally different mathematical (figuratively speaking, that is) footing than that of Japanese nationals. Consider the fact that the government retirement plan is unavailable to many first-generation Koreans in Japan. This makes the family savings of Koreans something other than simply money saved, since it will have to finance elder care single-handedly with no government subsidies. Consider also the fact that large numbers of Koreans continue to work in ethnic enclaves. This makes for situations in which family income remains vulnerable, work hours are much longer, and labor, much more intense and arduous for Koreans. Consider further the fact that the Korean children grow up fully understanding that public service careers such as those of a government official, diplomat or public school teacher are not an option. This renders their ethics of socialization, aspirations for job attainment, and economic goals altogether different than those of Japanese children. Why these differences? It is because the situation of nationals and non-nationals are not comparable since non-nationals not only are denied access to many career avenues but are also excluded from many of the benefits provided to citizens in ways that differentiate class stratification. In sum, as long as Koreans in Japan have no national membership (not just in Japan, but also in Korea, North or South), they will be unable to fully enter the system of class stratification in Japan or Korea.

It is true that many local governments have opened the door to Koreans and non-Japanese, allowing them to obtain low-ranking civil service jobs—perhaps a first step in altering the excluded status of Koreans in Japan. But, a high hurdle remains in the quest for civil status, as Japan is not a federation or a union of states: as long as the central government strenuously excludes Koreans in Japan, there is little that local municipalities can do. It came as no surprise, for example, that the Japanese Supreme Court upheld the decision by the Tokyo Metropolitan Government to bar a civil servant from taking an exam for promotion to a managerial position due to her South Korean nationality; that is, her not being Japanese. In other words, Koreans can be civil servants so long as they stick to sweeping the floors and cleaning the bathrooms; if they wish to be supervisors or managers, they will need to be reminded of the fact that they are merely human and not citizens.

As long as the system of nation-states governs our world, refugees, immigrants, and other stateless persons have no place in the domestic class stratification within individual nation-states. This does not mean that it is not possible (for scholars) to classify them or measure them according to national socio-economic classifications and surveys. Neither does this mean that they do not have class consciousness. But in the case of Koreans in Japan, who in effect have no citizenship, or (South Korean) citizenship of a precarious kind, it is no wonder that their class position has been ignored (even by themselves). Similarly, it is not surprising that factors such as poverty, which could otherwise lead to class formation, are constantly ethnicized.

In the US, poverty is racialized with the result that unemployment, high crime rates, lack of education, drug abuse, and other paraphernalia that fill the closet of poverty are associated with non-whiteness and other ethnic markers. Nevertheless, poverty which disproportionately confronts people of color and other minorities, is a national problem, one requiring the attention of Congress, national and local government budgets, and the object of legal and institutional reforms. Such is not the case for Koreans in Japan who remain outside all of these categories and largely invisible. As such, their exclusion from Japan’s system of class stratification is not because they are discriminated against as an ethnic minority or as second-class citizens.
inside Japan, but because they are not there, inside: they exist outside Japanese society, that is, they are banished from it. Without bearing this point in mind, any discussion of ethnicity or class factors, or the shifting weight of importance between these with regard to Koreans in Japan, will prove to be one-dimensional.

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Notes

1 Kim (2008: 871).


3 Thompson (1964) and, more classically, Engels (1993).

4 Of course, the increasing numbers of homeless in Japan’s cities are outside the domain of popular perception.

5 I regard the view that facilely sees Koreans in Japan as “Korean Japanese” as unrealistic. See, for example, Tai (2004). Similarly, I include in this category authors who suggest that Koreans should simply acquire Japanese nationality. These include Tei (2001) and Lee (1997).


7 See Weiner (1989).

8 An array of historical and recent literary representations can testify to this effect, starting from writers such as Kin Kakuei (1970) and Ri Kaisei (1972), and later including Yang Seog-il (1998), and Kaneshiro (2000).

9 History testifies, however, that the Korean members had to work extra hard, risking their lives and proving their bravery, in order to earn the trust of their Japanese comrades within the party, while it was almost unheard of for a Korean to rise to high-ranking office within the trade unions or the party in Japan. See Iwamura (1972) for example.

10 Wagner (1951: 95).

11 Kim (1946).
12 Martial Law was proclaimed in Kobe, which witnessed the fiercest resistance. Three Koreans died—one teenager shot by the US military, one child dying from a head injury inflicted by the police, and one teacher murdered while in prison. See Inokuchi (2000) and Koshiro (1999) for some details.

13 The North Korean initiative failed. The Japan-ROK treaty was not signed until 1965. Until then, North Korea tried to preempt South Korea by making various gestures including the 1952 communiqués and the opening of repatriation in 1959. See text below and Ryang (2000a) with regard to repatriation.

14 Hiroyama (1955: 10).


16 Morris-Suzuki (2007). Morris-Suzuki discovered, by investigating newly de-classified papers, that the role played by the Japanese Red Cross was much more significant and decisive than had been previously thought.


20 An average of about 10,000 Koreans are naturalized each year as Japanese citizens. See Ministry of Justice statistics.


22 Agamben (2005). Much of Agamben’s ideas are derived from Schmitt’s notion of sovereignty (Schmitt 1922).


24 Pak (1969), Yoshitome (1979), and Pak (1983). Due to the South Korean government’s reluctance to accept any deportees from Japan, the camp was already overcrowded by the 1950s, and the Japanese government virtually gave up on the deportation of detainees (Tatsumi 1966). This intensified the nature of their limbo status.

25 See for example, Kurashige (2002).

26 Ryang (2004: Ch.1) for a discussion.

27 Today Ōmura Detention Center is one of three detention centers under the Ministry of Justice, Immigration Office, of Japan. Still based in Nagasaki, southwestern Japan, it functions as a confinement and examination facility for illegal immigrants in Japan. Detainees usually end up being deported. According to recent Ministry of Justice statistics, during the year 2006, 7,807 persons of Korean nationality, 2,987 Thai citizens, 850 Malaysian citizens, 658 Indonesian citizens, and 480 Sri Lankan citizens were deported. (Accessed May 9, 2008).

It needs to be added that there has been a huge increase in the number of Koreans in Japan being naturalized. In 1969, 1,889 Koreans became naturalized; by 1995, the figure had jumped to 10,000. In 2001, the total number of naturalized persons (not only Koreans) exceeded 15,000 (See an article from Japan & Politics, March 11, 2002. Accessed May 8, 2008). These individuals would be absorbed within Japanese census figures, but it must be emphasized that deep-seated prejudices in Japanese society would lead many to feel ambiguous and ambivalent about being considered part of the Japanese national polity.

My two visits in 1985 as a reporter for the Chongryun media organ, Choseon Sinbo (Korea Daily), attest to this. I was routinely tricked in relation to where I should meet my supervisor, where to go, and whom to talk to, while my hotel rooms were randomly changed every one or two days. I think this was done simply to confuse, exhaust, and harass me, so that I would not be able to properly complete my assignment covering the family reunions.

Ryang (1997) discusses this issue.

Ethnographic studies and other forms of research on Korean newcomers in Japan have been actively carried out in Japan. See Ko (1995), for example. See also Ryang (2000b, 2002b).

Kim (2003: 8).


Kim (2003: 12, 11).

I discuss this matter pertaining to ethnic ethics of care and justice in Chapter 4 “Diaspora and the Ethic of Care: A Note on Disability, Aging, and Vulnerability of the De-nationalized” of my Writing Selves in Diaspora: Ethnography of Autobiographics of Korean Women in Japan and the US (2008).

Ahn (2000).

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Pak, Sun-jo (1983) Kankoku, Nihon, Ōmura shūyōjo (Korea, Japan, the Ōmura camp), Osaka: JDC.


Ri, Kaisei (1972) Kinuta o utsu onna (The woman who filled clothes), Tokyo: Bungeishunjusha.


Tei, Daikin (2001) Zainichi kankokujin no shūen (The end of Koreans in Japan), Tokyo: Bungeishunju.


A large number of first-generation Zainichi Koreans came from Jeju Island off the southern coast of the Korean peninsula. Koh Sunhui wrote two groundbreaking works on the Jeju Islander Zainichi community based on extensive interviews. These works were published in Japan during the 1990s. Kate Barclay is a specialist on fishing communities in the Asia-Pacific region. This article includes some materials from Koh’s publications in Japanese and explores reasons why some people became Zainichi Koreans. It argues that Japanese colonialism and its exploitations played a crucial role in Jeju Islanders’ migration to Japan during the twentieth century.

According to the article, Jeju Island from ancient times had claimed autonomy from the ruling Korean kingdoms. Jeju Islanders were in a position similar to Okinawans in that they saw themselves - and were seen by mainlanders - as somehow different. The article argues that the mainlanders looked down on Jeju people as “wild and uncivilized” (p. 7) and that the islanders in fact lived differently, depending upon more nuclear and less patriarchal family structures. With the island’s main industry being fishing, including on the high seas, there was a longtime understanding that Japan also was a “part of Jeju Island’s cultural sphere” (p. 8). The islanders’ relationship with the Japanese intensified when Japan’s colonial period began, as the Japanese came to fish near Jeju Island in far larger numbers and depleted the fish stock.

The depletion of fish was a severe blow to the islanders’ livelihood, and the domination of Japanese fishing operations in the area became permanent thanks to the Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910. The article explains that the Japanese “fish catch from the colony of Korea grew ten-fold in the twenty-seven years” (p. 14) that followed. The islanders’ weakened economic position led to a wage labor migration to Japan. But Japan had positive attractions for them too. According to Koh and Barclay, “[m]odern Japanese cities were alluring prospect for young Jeju Islanders curious to learn about the world” (p. 15). Regular ferry service between Osaka and Jeju started in 1922, and by 1934, a mere twelve years later, “twenty-five percent of Jeju Island’s population resided in Japan” (p. 15). Jeju migrants to Japanese cities mainly worked in factories, where they came to participate in trade union activism and after the war, when it became legal in Japan, many became members of the Japanese Communist Party.

In the immediate postwar years, their left-wing sympathies provided one of the reasons that Jeju Islanders in Jeju initially rejected the South Korean police and military, which led to the massacre of the islanders in the April 3rd Incident of 1948. Many Jeju Islanders, following this tragic event on their home island, decided to remain in Japan afterward, thus constituting one main pool of Zainichi Koreans. Their autonomy as maritime people, alienating them from the center of both the Japanese and the Korean cultural spheres, nurtured the “multicultural” (p. 9) worldview they had carried for many
centuries. It remains a significant historical legacy that many Zainichi Koreans still carry today.
Traveling through Autonomy and Subjugation: Jeju Island Under Japan and Korea

Koh Sunhui and Kate Barclay

Summary

Despite centuries of subjugation by larger neighbours—Joseon Korea, Imperial Japan, and South Korea—Jeju island society has maintained a distinct identity and a measure of autonomy. Relations with both Korea and Japan have at times had devastating effects on the islanders, but also contributed to the dynamism of Jeju island society and opened up new routes for islanders to continue traveling as a vital part of their social life.

Map of the Western Pacific

Introduction

The centering philosophy of Chinese political culture (Zito 1997), in which space was imagined in terms of a centre and its periphery, contributed to the fact that island societies in northeast Asia, such as Jeju, were either ignored or dismissed as backwaters in the records kept by land-based larger powers on the Chinese mainland, Korean peninsula and Japanese archipelago. The actuality of lively intercultural contact in the maritime areas through fishing, trade and travel was thus elided from the historical record. In the modern era the centre-periphery political model has been replaced by the nation-state ideal. Nation-state ideology, which came to dominate political spatial imaginaries globally in the twentieth century, also acted to obscure travelling practices of maritime peoples, because in the normative system of nation-states, transborder communal identities are anomalous, and translocal ways of life existing across territorial borders are often treated as illegal.
Recent historical work has addressed these biases by turning the focus away from ‘nations’ to more local and regional social, political and economic entities, especially in (what we now call) China, Korea, Japan, and the Ryukyu Islands (Wigen 1999; Kang 1997; Smits 1999). This paper contributes to that body of work by adding a new historical perspective; that of Jeju Island. The paper highlights Jeju’s contact with its two most significant neighbours, Korea and Japan, and is organized chronologically into Joseon Korea, the Japanese Empire, Cold War South Korea and the contemporary era.

Socially and culturally Jeju Islanders have been open to the peoples with which they came in contact, while the island was politically subordinated by its larger land-based neighbours. This openness, in conjunction with political subordination, did not mean that Jeju Islanders assimilated. Rather, they managed their political and cultural relations so as to maintain a measure of autonomy and cultural distinctness. This history of Jeju Island contributes to the understanding of the nation-state from the perspective of minority ethnic groups, especially those living across territorial borders.

Map of the Korean Peninsula
Background

Jeju, made up of one main island with several small outlying islands, lies in the East China Sea, to the west of the southern part of the Korean peninsula, and north of Japan’s Kyushu. Jeju was first populated before the Bronze Age. In Jeju Island’s founding myth three men—Yang-ulla, Ko-ulla and Pu-ulla—are said to have sprung forth from the Three Sacred Caves. One day a king in Japan (which they called Pyongnang) sent an emissary with the king’s three daughters and five koku of seeds. The three mythic ancestors of Jeju Island are said to have married these three Japanese princesses, and with the five koku of seeds they founded the country. 4

Jeju’s original population has been added to by immigrants from China and the Korean Peninsula over the last thousand years. The waters around the island are rich in marine life, so fishing has always been a mainstay of the economy. Jeju was also one of the main hubs of the East China Sea trade routes from early times. It fell within the spheres of activity of the Ryukyu Kingdom (present day Okinawa) and the state called Yan in China’s Warring States period (323-222 BC) (Chun 1987). Around the period 14 BC to AD 23 the currency used by Jeju Islanders for maritime trade also circulated as far away as the Kansai region in Japan and the northern part of the Korean Peninsula (Chun 1987, 11-45).

From as far back as there is evidence of human habitation on Jeju Island, fishing was an important part of the economy. Archeological excavations of the island have found that fishing techniques in the Bronze Age involved boats and nets as well as coastal shellfish gleaning (Kim 1969, 138). Fishing as an aspect of Jeju society shares many historical connections with Japan. Japan and Jeju are two of very few places in the world where women have made a major part of their living by diving. From at least the fifteenth century Jeju women divers fished grounds around Jeju and the Korean peninsula. Japan’s Engishiki records that the tribute commodities presented to the Japanese Emperor by the countries of Higo and Bungo included ‘Tamla abalone’, a Jeju specialty (Amino 1994). 5 Jeju Islander kara-ama 6 travelled to the Japanese archipelago in around 900AD (Miyamoto Tsuneichi as paraphrased in Amino 1994, 95; Chun 1987, 37). Japanese writings on Jeju always discuss the women divers of Jeju Island, and Japanese researchers have explored Jeju for the origins of women divers as a regional social phenomenon (Tanabe 1990, 708-709). This has led Habara Yukichi to assert that it is likely Jeju Islanders and “at least one group of Japanese” share cultural origins. He feels that observing the women divers of Jeju “is like looking at ancient Japan or the customs of the Yamatai Kingdom or the Ryukyu Islands and the Wajinden” (Habara 1949, 309). 7 Jeju Islanders have also been represented as racially linked to Japan; Kim Tae Neung identified the indigenous Jeju people as “the same as the small people (indigenous Japanese) who are thought to have inhabited the Kyushu region of Japan” (Kim 1969, 140).

With a population of probably 10,000 – 20,000, Jeju was an independent country called Tamla for several centuries, until in 1105 the island was incorporated into the Korean peninsula’s Goryeo (AD918-1392) administrative district system. Politically Jeju was in a vassal relationship to Goryeo, and late Goryeo administrations used the island as a place of exile for political prisoners. For about a century, from 1273, Jeju was a demesne of Mongolia. Jeju supplied warhorses to the mainland and was also a place of exile for Mongolian criminals and Yunnan nobility.

In being simultaneously politically connected to both a government on the Chinese mainland and one on the Korean peninsula, Jeju was similar to another island society in this maritime region,
the Ryukyu Islands, which also juggled relations with polities on the Chinese mainland and Japanese archipelago. For these small island societies allowing the large land-based powers to claim political domination protected them from annexation attempts by other larger powers, but formal subordination to the land-based powers did not substantially affect the day-to-day activities of the islanders who retained functional autonomy.

Jeju’s status as a repository for exiles reveals that Jeju and its maritime world was viewed by its larger land-based neighbours as a desolate place for people from the centre (Chun 1987, 11-45). Ironically many of these exiles were prominent intellectuals from factions that had been on the losing side in power struggles, so through them culture and ideas direct from centres on the Chinese mainland and peninsular Korea diffused into Jeju society. But the (Neo-)Confucian imaginary, in which political and cultural civilization radiated out from centres of civilization, and agriculture was ranked over fisheries, made it difficult for the maritime areas to be seen as anything other than peripheral from the land based centres.

Since the only early written records are those in Chinese by Confucian literati, these biases peripheralizing the maritime areas permeate the historical record. Factual inaccuracies arising from these biases include representations of Jeju Islanders as hostile to outsiders, when Jeju Islanders’ travelling social life actually necessitated amicable contact with outsiders (Chun 1987). Record-keeping literati overlooked Jeju’s history as independent Tamla, representing it as always already a marginal part of the polity on the Korean peninsula (Chun 1987). The dynamic cosmopolitan nature of the maritime areas between the land-based powers was thus omitted from history.

**Joseon Era**

Despite having been annexed in 1105 Jeju remained quite independent of the peninsula throughout the Goryeo period. Parts of the Korean peninsula such as Silla, Baekje and Goguryeo had also been independent countries prior to unification under Goryeo, but their proximity to each other as neighbouring parts of the peninsula facilitated effective centralization into one polity. Jeju’s geographic distance from the peninsula enabled it to remain a somewhat separate entity. At the end of the Goryeo period in the late fourteenth century Jeju islanders instigated uprisings led by people of Mongolian descent against Goryeo government control of the island. Early rulers in the Joseon (or Yi) Dynasty (1392-1910) saw it as important to subjugate and Koreanize Jeju (Takahashi 1991, 41).

Sejong, the revered fourth Joseon king to whom the establishment of the Korean Hangeul language is attributed, set about integrating Jeju more closely with the peninsula through its system of governance. He established on Jeju a branch of the Hyang Gyo national Confucian school (Yang 1992, 191-193). This generated a class of Jeju Islander Confucian scholar elites, who formed a Confucian bureaucracy on Jeju, which was headed up by a bureaucrat sent out from the peninsula. Jeju bureaucrats were also recruited to a special Jeju Island department of the administration in the capital (the city now called Seoul). Other policies tying island elites to the peninsula included assembling the children of island elites in the capital several times (from 1394 to 1428) and involving them in the state apparatus in capacities such as court bodyguard (Takahashi 1987, 68).

This system of governance, however, failed to completely integrate Jeju into the Joseon political system. One cause of continued segregation was that Jeju Island was not included in the system
of the higher civil service examinations to enter the mainstream Joseon bureaucracy. Occasionally the first round of the exam was held on the island to offset the inequality resulting from geographical isolation, but not regularly enough to mainstream Jeju bureaucrats (Yang 1991, 98-99). Jeju bureaucrats mostly only worked with other Jeju bureaucrats, both on Jeju Island and in the Jeju department in the capital; they did not circulate throughout the administration as did other Joseon bureaucrats.

Another way Sejong’s Koreanization strategy maintained a level of segregation was that Jeju bureaucrats for the department in the capital were selected on the politically expedient basis that they were already leaders in Jeju society (Takahashi 1991, 41, 44). Instead of replacing indigenous authority structures, Confucianism was thus laid over the top of, and drew part of its authority from, indigenous authority structures. Indeed non-Confucian power brokers remained influential in many important local matters. Jeju leaders felt strongly that Jeju was a distinct polity under the Joseon administrative umbrella, so Jeju bureaucrats acted as intermediaries between the Joseon government and leaders on Jeju Island in ways that were designed to protect Jeju’s autonomy within the Joseon system. Koreanization policies that allowed Jeju Confucian scholars to become bureaucrats but then only to work in Jeju or in the special department in the capital, therefore, failed in important ways to reinforce the islanders’ sense of being part of the political entity and culture based on the Korean peninsula. The Jeju Island ruling elite accepted the Confucian thought that comprised Joseon political ideology, but had limited concrete experience of belonging to the same polity as the peninsular Koreans, and had vested interests in maintaining some measure of political autonomy.

Joseon attempts to Koreanize Jeju were limited not only in the extent to which Jeju Islanders felt assimilated, but also in Joseon identifications of Jeju Islanders. Some Jeju bureaucrats in the capital were greatly trusted by the kings of the time and rose to high prominence, being appointed to important official positions (Takahashi 1991, 40). These bureaucrats were regarded as part of the Joseon kingdom, but simultaneously treated as “people from overseas.” Jeju Islanders were seen by the Joseon kings as being neither Japanese nor “Yeojin” (Jurchen^{10}), but as constituting another group also somehow different from the people of the central and southern Korean peninsula, as bureaucrats from the country of Tamla, which was loyal to the Joseon Dynasty (Takahashi 1991, 55 - 57). If bureaucrats and intellectuals who were educated in Joseon thought and were nominally part of the Joseon government did not feel properly “Korean,” the general Jeju populace felt even less so. Jeju was politically subordinate to Joseon, but the islanders maintained an identity as people of Tamla. They were engaged with the Joseon administration as subordinate, but at the same time maintained a measure of autonomy.

The peripheralization of Jeju in peninsula Korean perceptions is visible in representations of Jeju’s Confucianism. Despite the fact that a Confucian education and political system was established on Jeju Island at the outset of the Joseon era, Joseon recorders represented Jeju as lacking Confucian yangban culture (Choi 1984, 12). The literati yangban class in Joseon society was the group privileged to hold high ranking military and civil posts in the government. Schools tended to be located in consanguineous villages that had the critical mass of yangban families to sustain a school. Consanguineous villages were thus seen as the basis of dynamic and sophisticated yangban society. In Joseon Korea yangban culture, Confucian education, and consanguineous villages were all synonymous with civilization. Joseon record keepers were predisposed to see Jeju as uncivilized, so it is not surprising that these record keepers failed to recognize yangban Confucianism on Jeju.
Jeju yangban

It is a matter of historical record that there were Jeju scholar bureaucrats throughout the Joseon era, but could Jeju society as a whole be characterized as yangban culture? Chinju county and Andong county on the peninsula were famous for having many yangban families and consanguineous villages. Statistics compiled by early Japanese researchers as part of the colonial administration indicate that by the late Joseon era Jeju had at least as many yangban as these districts, and the proportion of scholars in the population on Jeju was as high as anywhere on the peninsula (Zensho 1935, 511; Zensho 1927, 96; Office of the Governor-General of Korea 1927, 113-114; Office of the Governor-General of Korea 1928, 514-515). Although being a Confucian scholar did not mean upward social mobility within the Joseon bureaucracy for Jeju Islanders, learning through village schools was connected to local power structures and it brought prestige within the island society, so competition to acquire education functioned in Jeju as it did in other parts of Joseon Korea, as an important stimulus to internal development in consanguineous villages (Yang 1992, 203). As on peninsular Korea, Jeju’s consanguineous villages were associated with the governing elite yangban and with Confucian education (Zensho 1935, 666). Jeju Confucian scholars did not mix and compete with scholars from elsewhere in the Joseon bureaucracy, so we cannot assume their education was the same, but because Jeju hosted political exiles we can assume that Jeju scholars were exposed to learning from the heart of Joseon yangban culture.

In addition to peninsula predispositions to see Jeju as uncivilized and the fact that scholar bureaucrats were segregated from the mainstream Joseon bureaucracy, another reason Joseon recorders may have failed to recognize Confucian yangban culture on Jeju was that it looked different to that on the peninsula. On Jeju it was not unusual for non-yangban men to become scholars. On the peninsula it was theoretically possible for non-yangban men (warriors, farmers, artisans, or tradesmen) to become scholars (Zensho, 1927, 96), but wealth based on land ownership was consolidated amongst yangban families, so in practice non-yangban did not have the means to enable their sons to become scholars. On Jeju land holdings were not so concentrated among the elite yangban group but tended towards families owning the small piece of land they cultivated (Office of the Governor-General of Korea 1929, 83). Income was thus more evenly distributed and it was feasible for non-yangban men to study (Office of the Governor-General of Korea 1929, 148).

Family and gender relations were also vastly different on Jeju compared to the peninsula. Families on the peninsula were usually extended, whereas on Jeju they were usually nuclear, with each generation setting up house on their own. Jeju women divers, which to outsiders symbolized Jeju women as a whole, worked outside the house, earning money independently, and wearing minimal clothing while diving. Their husbands stayed home looking after the children when the women were out working. Jeju women could own property and often kept their income individually, using it as they chose. Before marriage Jeju women often travelled away from home to work and save money. Peninsula yangban women were segregated from men at an early age; men worked outside the house while women worked inside. Indeed, yangban women could not freely leave their houses, especially before they married, and were clothed with extreme modesty from head to toe. Peninsula yangban women did not own wealth independently from their families, and their husbands or male relatives undertook all economic activities external to the house on their behalf. From the perspective of the peninsula, Jeju society seemed wild and uncivilized; the women seemed to have no sexual morals and the families appeared to
have no structure. It was impossible for peninsula Koreans to conceive of civilized educated families allowing their women to behave as Jeju women did, so they concluded that there must have been a lack of civilization and education.

On the peninsula yangban society was associated with strict patriarchy, rigid hierarchies and great wealth differentials between socioeconomic strata. Since on Jeju gender relations were less patriarchal, wealth differentials less marked, and boundaries between socioeconomic strata more flexible, Jeju yangban culture looked different to yangban culture on the peninsula. Societies that adopted Confucianism did all not assimilate into some kind of homogenous cultural entity; rather Confucianism varied according to the social and cultural context in which it was adopted. Confucianism was imposed on Jeju by the Joseon polity to which the island was subordinated. It was, however, then indigenised and adapted to local social conditions. Not all aspects of Confucianism were altered through adaptation on Jeju in the same way as the educational political systems. Confucianism as it pertained to weddings and funerals was preserved for hundreds of years in virtually the same form as it was first adopted, without being noticeably localized (Kaji 1993). One of the major features of Jeju culture affecting their indigenisation of Confucianism was the fact that Jeju was a maritime society. Confucianism in other places was a philosophy of sedentary, agricultural, land-based society, but on Jeju it became the philosophy of a travelling maritime society.

**Kaijin: Maritime Confucians**

One way to think of the network of societies across the seas of the northwestern Pacific Rim is to think of them as sharing an identity as kaijin, sea people. The Japanese term kaijin as used by Tanabe Satoru refers to divers, fishers, salt manufacturers, and people who lived and traveled on boats; in short all men and women whose lives involved the sea (Tanabe 1990). From the perspective of a maritime society the sea is not a boundary that separates societies, but a force that connects them.

Jeju Island’s geographical location between the Korean peninsula, Japan and the Chinese mainland made it a point of contact for peoples from all these places in medieval times. Jeju Islanders moved outwards from their island base, and people from various places came across the sea to Jeju (Takahashi 1992, 169). According to Takahashi in the early centuries of the Joseon era Jeju Islander kaijin were called Todung Yagi. Takahashi’s study of records places the Todung Yagi traveling through the East China Sea, the Yellow Sea, as far south as Hainan and as far north as the Sakhalin Islands from the fifteenth century (Takahashi 1992, 177-181). More than twenty Jeju families were recorded as living on Herang Island, which lies on an extension of the boundary between Pyongan Province and the Liaodong Peninsula and which was at the time Ming territory. The Jeju Islanders on Herang were engaged in (illicit) trade with kaijin from Ming territory (Takahashi 1992, 185-186). Several thousand Todung Yagi were documented as appearing in the coastal areas of the peninsula in the Jeolla and Gyeongsang provinces and Sachon, Kosong and Chinju during Sejong’s reign (1418-50) (Takahashi 1992). The population of Jeju Island (including Jeju-mok, Jeongui-hyeon and Daejeong-hyeon) around this time was recorded as 18,897 (Office of the Governor-General of Korea 1927, 40). Censuses were carried out on an irregular basis during the Joseon Dynasty and their accuracy is questionable, however, if “several thousand” were moving around Jeolla and Gyeongsang this suggests that a high proportion of the population was mobile.
The Todung Yagi’s clothing was described as being similar to that worn by Japanese, and their language was described as being neither Japanese nor Chinese. Their boats were described as fast-sailing and sturdier than Japanese boats and their recorded occupation was diving for abalone. They lived a mobile life from their boats, always in search of the best fishing grounds. Abalone was an important tribute commodity so the Jeju abalone divers were protected, but it was noted that if attempts were made to regiment or control the divers they simply moved on. The land based powers surrounding the maritime area of the northwest Pacific Rim had limited influence in the coastal and sea-going world the kaijin inhabited (Takahashi 1992, 171). Their very mobility made it difficult for administrative authorities to extend control over the kaijin.

Records of shipwrecks trace the movements of Jeju kaijin. Jeju islanders were recorded as being shipwrecked in the Goto Islands, the Tokara Islands, the Ryukyu Islands and Chinese coastal areas (Takahashi 1992, 188). Kaijin met up with each other and interacted in this coastal world through shared aspects of kaijin culture. They built up relations of trust not constrained by territorially bounded political entities. The identification with Japan visible in Jeju Island’s founding myth shows that Japan has long been envisaged as part of Jeju Island’s cultural sphere. Jeju Islander identification with Japan may be seen as a form of regional kaijin identity. According to Takahashi, Jeju islanders who had been shipwrecked in the Ryukyu Islands expressed their gratitude for the kindness of the Ryukyuans in ways that identified with the Ryukyuans as fellow kaijin, rather than as Koreans or people of Tamla relating to the Ryukyuans as foreigners (Takahashi 1992, 193).

Sixteen shipwrecks (ten Japanese and six Qing ships) were recorded on Jeju between 1848 and 1884 (Koh 1993). One Japanese ship departed from Hirado Island in what is now Saga Prefecture, four from the port of Kagoshima, two from Satsuma castle town (in what is now Kagoshima City), two from Tsushima and one from the Abu district in what is now Yamaguchi Prefecture. One Qing ship departed from Guangdong, three from Jiangnan, one from Shandong, and one from Zhejiang, that is from provinces ranging from north to south coastal China. Most of these boats had been engaged in trade, with the remainder engaged in fishing, piracy, searching for missing people, or the transport of tax monies. The Japanese ships carried Japanese and Ryukyuans, while the Qing ships carried peoples of coastal Chinese groups, as well as French and Russians trading in the area. The kaijin world of the northwest Pacific Rim in the latter half of the nineteenth century was multicultural indeed.

Shipwrecks on Jeju were reported by the Jeju Island bureaucracy to the central Joseon bureaucracy. The Jeju policy was to provide shipwrecked people with provisions, clothing and fuel. On receiving word of a shipwreck, local bureaucrats set out with interpreters to investigate and provide assistance as needed. People from the nearest village prepared warm food, and provided survivors with clothing and shelter. Funerary rituals were performed for dead bodies washed ashore. In offering hospitality to shipwrecked people Jeju Islanders hoped the survivors would talk about Jeju favourably on their return home, to ensure Jeju Islanders would be similarly well treated when they were shipwrecked in their travels.¹⁶

But the kaijin world was not all cosmopolitan harmony. Piracy was an ongoing problem. Kang (1997) cites numerous records of the Joseon government raising the wako piracy issue with Japan, which was seen by the Joseon administration as not being tough enough on the pirates operating along their coastline. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries trade and fishing treaties were signed between the Joseon administration and Japanese officials as part of Joseon
attempts to suppress wako pirates. The policy was partly successful in that purely piratical activity declined, but enterprises that were a mixture of piracy, trade and fishing correspondingly increased (Yoshida 1954, 79-81). In addition, there was competition over fishery resources. From the late Goryeo period many Japanese lived in Busan, one of the major trading ports on the Korean peninsula (Yoshida 1954, 80). In 1418 permission was given by the Joseon King for Japanese people to reside in certain areas in waegwan (literally “Japan house,” meaning walled compounds for Japanese) in Gampo in Ulsan County and Karyangjin in T’ong Young County. In the same year the ports of Chaepo, Busan and Gampo were opened and waegwan established there, Japanese were given permission for fishing from these ports. Meanwhile, Japanese from Tsushima had established settlements in the Koje Island area, where they were involved in agriculture, fishing and the salt industry. They also traveled to other areas on the southern Korean peninsula.

Japanese fishers did not fish only within the approved area from the three port bases but traveled as far as the coasts of Jeolla and Chungcheong. Some Japanese fishing boats were armed and engaged in piracy as well as fishing (Yoshida 1954, 81). Tsushima fishers were given conditional fishing permission by the Joseon government in 1441, perhaps because the government realized that if they were not permitted to fish they would resort to the use of force (Yoshida 1954, 83). Most problematic of the Japanese fishing activities were those in the waters at the southwestern tip of Jeolla Province. This area was a treasure house of marine resources, and many fishers from the Korean peninsula also operated there (Takahashi 1992, 174). Japanese fishers repeatedly breached their agreements with Korea, both through illicit fishing outside the permitted area, and through piracy. Japanese fishers, especially abalone divers, were known for poaching around the southwest of the Korean peninsula, mainly Jeju (Yoshida 1954, 91-92). In 1608 a bilateral dispute arose from Japanese fishers involvement in violent incidents outside the area permitted under the treaty on the western side of the Korean peninsula (Yoshida 1954, 83). Problematic relations with some Japanese kaijin throughout the Joseon era presaged more serious competition over marine resources during Japan’s subsequent colonial expansion.

Japanese Empire

First Phase of Japanese Imperialism: Competition in Fisheries

Although Korea was not formally a Japanese colony until 1910, for the purposes of this paper imperial encroachments began much earlier, in the 1870s, when Japanese fishers started coming to Jeju Island in significant numbers (Yoshida 1954,159; Fisheries Bureau, Agriculture and Commerce Division, Office of the Governor-General of Korea 1910, 283). Since Japanese fishers from Tsushima in particular were unofficially operating off the Korean coastline since medieval times, we assume that Japanese fishers were visiting Jeju during the Joseon period. Jeju Island was a highly attractive fishing spot for Japanese fishers, being a major producer of abalone, turbin shells, bêches-de-mer, and abundant in species of fish Japanese consumers prized, such as bream (Kuba 1978, 169; Yoshida 1954, 207-208). Nakaya Tarokichi sailed with a group from Saganoseki in Oita Prefecture via Goto and Tsushima in 1870 (Yoshida 1954, 159). Takenouchi Genkichi from Nagasaki collected abalone from Jeju in 1874 and 1875 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 23, p. 283). Kuba Gokuro’s oral history includes a Japanese fisher who remembers his older relatives going to Jeju to fish for bream in 1877 (Kuba 1978, 169). According to one Japanese fisherman “long before the end of the war about one quarter of all Japan was apparently making money from Jeju Island—a whole quarter of all Japan. That’s what
I’ve heard. There’s probably nowhere in the world with such rich fishing grounds as Jeju Island” (Kuba 1978, 190).

When this wave of Japanese fishing commenced, the coastal reefs around Jeju were said to have been covered in abalone, with some weighing over 800 momme (1 momme = 3.75 grams) apiece. Japanese fishing boats were equipped with air compressors and hoses for breathing underwater, which meant they were devastatingly effective. Japanese divers had started using underwater breathing equipment around Nagasaki. They quickly over harvested, leading to resistance from local villagers, and it was against Japanese regulations in any case, so they moved on to new coastlines, including Jeju (Yoshida 1954, 207-208). Yoshimura Yozaburo from Hagi in Yamaguchi Prefecture, thought to have been the first Japanese fisher to use underwater breathing gear in Korean waters, commenced operations in the vicinity of Jeju in April 1879 (Yoshida 1954, 207-208). Jeju Islanders were no happier with the depletion of their resources than the Nagasaki villagers had been, so at first Japanese diving boats were refused landing rights in Jeju, and they had to base their operations in Tsushima.

Japanese fishers were armed on the pretext of defending themselves against pirates, but the distinction between pirates and fishers was far from clear. Japanese fishers frequently used arms against locals who resisted them. In the words of a Japanese fisher from this time: “I think it was after the Russo-Japanese war in the Meiji period … we used dynamite to catch fish [a practice prohibited in Japan at the time], and we argued with the Koreans. We were running wild like pirates” (Kuba 1978, 128). According to another: “Ku-Ryong-po was another world … It was a place where there were hundreds and thousands of ex-criminals. From all over Japan … Every morning there were three or five people lying dead on the road” (Kuba 1978, 172-173).
and threatened people with their swords. Some Japanese fishermen organized into armed bands of up to 200 to force islanders to obey them (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 20, 304). Occasionally islanders were killed. More than 300 families were recorded as having left Gapa Island because of these incidents (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 20, 304-9). The island was then used by the Japanese fishers as a base. Other islands off Jeju, such as U Island and Biyang Island, became Japanese fishing bases under similar circumstances.

A fishing access treaty between Japan and Joseon Korea was signed in 1883. After this the numbers of Japanese fishers in Korean waters rapidly increased. Diplomatic and trade relations between Japan and Joseon Korea in the Meiji era were formally established with the Korea-Japan Friendship Treaty concluded in March 1876, but this treaty contained no agreement on fishing. Japanese fishing in Korean waters was formalized after the implementation of Article 41 of the Japan-Korea trade regulations agreed on in July 1883 (Yoshida 1954, 160). By 1884 Jeju Islanders were suffering extreme economic hardship so they sought to have Japanese fishers banned from their waters. First they appealed to the Joseon Governor (Moksa) of Jeju, but he had no authority over Japanese fishers, so several tens of Jeju Islanders went to the capital to appeal directly to the Joseon government (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 17, 377-9). They managed to convince the Joseon government to take up their case with the Japanese government, arguing that Jeju Island should not be included the fishing treaty of 1883 that permitted Japanese fishing in four provinces—Jeolla, Gyeongsang, Gangwon, Hamgyŏng. The Japan side contended that it was absurd to claim that Jeju was not part of Jeolla Province (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 17, 379), but eventually agreed to exempt Jeju from the treaty in exchange for mining patents on the peninsula (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 20, 308-309).

Japanese fishers, however, ignored Jeju’s exemption from the fishing access treaty. They stopped using the bases they established on Jeju and based themselves at Tsushima, but continued to fish around Jeju. They also continued attacking Jeju Islanders. Islanders protested locally and lobbied in the capital (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 20, 300). The Joseon government made repeated requests that Japanese fishers should respect the ban on fishing around Jeju but the Japanese government refused to acknowledge that their fishers were flouting the ban. Indeed, Japanese fishers took advantage of their government’s position by asking their government for compensation for lost fishing due to the ban. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 23, 263). Furthermore, in 1891 the Japanese government proposed lifting the exemption, saying Jeju Islanders had enjoyed several years free of competition from Japanese fishermen and that Japanese fishermen had been warned against violence (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vol 23, 263, 267). But then it became clear that another Jeju Islander, Yang Jong Shin, the port official at Pae-ryung-ri (present-day Kum-rung-ri), had been killed by a Japanese fisher in 1890 (Kim 1987, 161). So the Japanese government agreed to extend the exemption by a further five months, but the situation did not improve. In June 1891 Yim Soon Baek from Keonip-po was murdered, and in July Yi Tal Kyum from Kim Nyong Ni was killed and 17 other people were wounded.

According to the records of the Jeju Governor of the time, the violence and economic hardship brought about by the Japanese fishers had brought the islanders to a state of “indescribably extreme wretchedness” (Kim 1987, 161). After the murder of Yang from Pae-ryung-ri, more than a hundred Jeju Islanders went to the capital and petitioned the Joseon government to enforce the ban, arguing that Jeju could not support itself or continue to provide abalone for tribute if over-exploitation of their fisheries by Japanese fishers were to continue (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 23, 285). Considering transport methods and costs at that time, the expedition of more
than a hundred people to the capital to lobby the government was an extreme measure. The Islanders were desperate.

Despite continuing violence, the Japanese government unilaterally lifted the nominal exemption of Jeju from the fishing access treaty in 1892, after which violence and forced occupation of small islands off Jeju by Japanese fishers escalated. In April 1892 Japanese fishers called Yamaguchi and Koyanagi led 144 fishermen to build a base at Seongsan on Jeju Island. As a result of this occupation many women were raped and a villager called Oh was shot (Kim 1987, 163). A group of islanders went to the capital and called on the administrative official to have the huts removed (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 25, 371). In this instance their demands were successful, and the huts were (temporarily) removed. Around the same time two men from Hwa Buk, Kim and Koh, were murdered, and in June two people from Tu Mo-ri by the name of Koh were killed. Armed Japanese fishermen attacked Jeju Islanders many times that year.

While all this was going on Japanese naval vessels patrolled the waters around Jeju Island. The main reason for the Japanese naval presence was concern for possible harm to Japanese fishers and traders, because of a belief that Jeju Islanders were a militant barbaric people (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 20, 302). The Japanese government’s views on Jeju Island reflected those of the Joseon government towards Jeju, and were exacerbated by the Japanese government’s own bias regarding Koreans and the inhabitants of islands they saw as “remote.” Contrary to Japanese government beliefs, however, Jeju Islanders did not respond violently to the Japanese fishing incursions they were trying to prevent. When Japanese government officials investigating complaints against Japanese fishers suggested that the islanders used violence in an attempt to get rid of Japanese fishers, the Japanese fishers themselves rejected this suggestion, saying: “no such thing occurred” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 25, 393-394). Japanese fishers said after the murder at Seongsan in 1892 a Jeju Island official had given the Japanese fishers a verbal instruction to remove their huts by a certain time, as has happened earlier with the huts on Gapa Island (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 25, 390). Japanese fishers said that they did not usually comply with these instructions and then the Jeju bureaucrats’ course of action was simply to come and repeat the verbal instructions, about every two weeks (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 25, 393-394).

And where Japanese fishing activities were peaceful Jeju Islanders responded to the fishers as openly as they always had to travelers. Takenouchi Genkichi from Nagasaki, who started traveling to Jeju Island to gather abalone in the mid-1870s, said that between 1887 and the murder of Yang in 1890 there were very few incidents in the areas of Jeju he frequented, and that relations between Japanese fishers and Jeju villagers were amicable. Jeju bureaucrats prohibited any support of Japanese fishing activities because it was their position that the fishing was illegal, but Japanese government records contain several references by Japanese fishers saying that Jeju Islanders provided water and fuel to Japanese fishers (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 23, 284).

The strategies employed by Jeju Islanders to resist incursions by Japanese fishers demonstrate that Jeju Islanders still felt themselves to be an autonomous polity within the Joseon administrative system. After the escalation of Japanese fishing activities on Jeju following the fishing access treaty of 1883, locals realized their local Governor had no power over the Japanese fishers and went to the capital to lobby the Joseon government. They approached the important pro-modernization figure Kim Ok Kyoon, who had close ties to the Japanese
government, and persuaded him to take up their case (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 17, 378-379). Islanders who had never been to the capital before were unlikely to have chosen such a canny target for lobbying, so it is likely they were advised by Jeju Islander bureaucrats in the Jeju Island department in the capital. Other coastal areas of the peninsula were suffering similarly from the onslaught by Japanese fishers, but none of them were granted a fishing treaty exemption. Jeju Islanders agitated so effectively they not only had the Joseon government demanding that Japan put an end to fishing in Jeju Island waters in August 1884, but that the whole fishing access treaty be reviewed because the benefits and costs of the treaty were unequal (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 17, 381; Kim 1987, 159).

Kim Ok Kyoon’s actions show that within late Joseon Korea Jeju was still considered somewhat autonomous. He accepted the lobbying Islanders’ position that they were not part of Jeolla Province but were a separate polity under the Joseon administration. Kim negotiated with Japan on this basis. Other government representations also show that Jeju was not seen as fully Koreanized or fully under the control of the Joseon administration. Joseon officials declared to Japanese officials that “compared with home [the Korean Peninsula], the people of Jeju are obstinate and difficult to reprimand” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 22, 376). A document from the Joseon government to Japanese fishers intending to fish around Jeju read: “Greetings. Fishing at Jeju Island in our country is not permitted—they are not yet civilized people, so will not obey orders from the our government.” The statement locates Jeju inside “our country” but also refers to Jeju islanders as distinct from Joseon Koreans in that they are “not yet civilized” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 23, 267). The Meiji Japanese government held a similar view that “the customs of Jeju differ from those in [peninsular] Korea, the people are obstinate and do not obey government orders” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 20, 301).

During this first phase of Japanese imperialism Japanese fishing incursions had the greatest impact on Jeju. Jeju Islanders’ strategies to cope with this onslaught included nonviolent and persistent official protests against Japanese fishers on Jeju, while unofficially trading with some Japanese fishers. They engaged with the Joseon administration as an autonomous polity loyal to the Joseon Dynasty, and were recognized as such, but ultimately were unable to protect their fishing grounds from Japanese fishers. As they lost this struggle their engagement with Japan moved into a new phase.

Second Phase of Japanese Imperialism: Wage Labor Migration

As Japan moved closer to annexation in 1910 Japanese fishing operations came to thoroughly dominate fishing all around the Korean peninsula. In 1899 there were 25,000 people working on approximately 1,000 Japanese fishing vessels along the coast of Gyeongsang and Jeolla provinces alone (Mountains and Forests Bureau, Agriculture and Commerce Ministry of Japan 1905, 28). The fishing was very good around the Korean peninsula; in 1908 the annual fish catch in Japanese waters was on average worth no more than 40 yen per person, whereas around the peninsula the average for Japanese fishers was over 195 yen, and Joseon Koreans averaged more than 45 yen (Yamaguchi 1911, 182). The fish catch from the colony of Korea grew ten-fold in the twenty-seven years following Japan’s annexation, and the catch of sardines in Korea multiplied eleven-fold in the six years between 1932 and 1937 (Aono 1984, 238). Japanese divers, mostly from western Japan, put in a great amount of effort, with 120 boats setting out in 1893, increasing to 400 by 1907 (Yoshida 1954, 207-208). As a result fishing grounds such as
Jeju Island and So An Island were exhausted. Jeju Islander fishers and divers were pushed further afield to make ends meet.

At the same time, Japanese traders were buying marine products from Jeju fishers and divers, and selling them Japanese products. This meant that Jeju Islanders, who had previously been largely self-sufficient, became ever more deeply enmeshed in the cash economy. This marked a new epoch. In their new weakened economic position Jeju fishers went from being self-employed to being the employees of Japanese companies, with lower wages than Japanese nationals. The empire thus subjugated Jeju Islanders, but also opened new opportunities for wage labor migration in Japan.

Jeju women divers joined male and female diving groups from various parts of Japan working the along the Korean peninsular coast (Kuba 1978, 205). When the colonial Korean fishing ordinance was enacted in 1915 the Jeju women divers’ union acquired fishing rights along the entire coast of the peninsula (Masuda 1986, 67, 83). The Jeju women divers received lower wages than the Japanese divers and were very productive, so by the early Showa period no Japanese divers were working the Korean coast. Japanese divers from Ise had been working the Korean coast at Pang Oe Jin in Gyeongsang Province and Pohang (Jeong Ja-ri) in Ulsan County since the mid-1800s, but after the Jeju divers went there in significant numbers in 1895 the Ise divers disappeared (Masuda 1986, 82).

Stories from Japanese people show the extent of the personal contacts being made across the region through Japanese colonialism. One Japanese fisherwoman had her first baby at her head family’s house, her second at an inn in Korea, and her third was born in Dairen (Kuba 1978, 183). Despite the colonial structure within which these personal relationships took place, they were often characterized by openness and mutual respect. A young Korean man jumped in to save a Japanese fisherwoman working in Korea who fell from a boat with her infant tied to her back (Kuba 1978, 198). When a Japanese fishing boat ran into pirates in Korean waters and most of the crew were killed, the only survivors were “a kind-hearted Korean mother [who] took a [Japanese] child on her back and ran away... We saw that child ourselves. And the Koreans were so good as to arrange funerals in their village” (Kuba 1978, 130-131). By 1911 fishing ventures were employing Koreans regularly and often took Korean people back to Japan (Kuba 1978, 185). These Korean workers included children, some of whom were reportedly abducted, others had been sold as domestic servants or fishing laborers by poverty-stricken parents (Kuba 1978, 131).

Jeju Islanders were part of this flux of people throughout the Empire. The earliest record of seasonal cash work in Japan by Jeju women divers is from 1903, when several went to Miyakejima. The earliest record of Jeju fishermen engaging in wage labor migration is 1910, when over 100 fishers arrived in Japan as crew on Japanese boats (Masuda 1986, 83, 108). Jeju Islanders were hired for the season’s fishing by Japanese fishing boats and went with the boat wherever the fishing took them; the Korean peninsula, Dairen, or Qingdao. When the boat was ready to return to Japan it stopped off at Jeju, setting down the islanders who wished to return home. Islanders who wished to go on to Japan simply stayed on the boat for the final night’s trip (Kuba 1978, 185-7).

Under the Japanese Empire Jeju Islanders’ travel and work settled into a pattern of seasonal work for cash away from the island, interspersed with time on Jeju doing other things. By 1915 women divers were spending six months or so out of every year away doing cash work (Eguchi 1915,
168). Jeju Islanders also spent periods of several years engaged in manufacturing and trading away from Jeju before returning home, while others remained on the island working in agriculture, fisheries or commerce (Fisheries Bureau 1910, 441). Given their long history of migratory kaijin lifestyles, it was not difficult for Jeju Islanders to adjust to this pattern of seasonal work away from home, and soon they branched out into new kinds of work available in the Japanese Empire.

Modern Japanese cities were an alluring prospect for young Jeju Islanders curious to learn about the world. Japanese recruitment of industrial laborers from Jeju Island started in 1914. They went particularly to Osaka but also to the Hanshin industrial belt and Kita-Kyushu. There was a shortage of labor in these areas and the practice of hiring Jeju Islanders was already established in the fisheries sector. Industrial labor migration was behind the establishment in 1922 of a regular ferry service between Osaka and Jeju called the Hansai ferry. There had been regular ferry services between Korea and Japan prior to that, but these were mainly a means of travel for Japanese. By contrast, the Osaka-Jeju service clearly functioned as a means of bringing Jeju islanders to and from Japan. Prior to the establishment of this route Jeju islanders moving to Japan had used the Kampu ferry between Shimonoseki and Busan, or fishing boats. The opening of the regular Osaka-Jeju service made it easy for islanders to move to Japan to work. By 1934 twenty-five percent of Jeju Island’s population resided in Japan (Masuda 1986, 111).

Although Jeju Islanders’ early efforts at resisting Japanese incursions into their fishing areas failed and they moved on to adapting to the new political situation, more bursts of resistance against Japanese rule followed in the 1930s (Yang 1996). Jeju’s women divers played a key role in some of these movements (Fujinaga 1989). By then they had fishing rights to the whole Korean peninsula and were used to organizing themselves economically, so although they had no formal schooling, it was a small step for them to form groups to actively agitate for change in areas where their rights were abused.
During the second phase of Japanese Imperialism over the first half of the twentieth century Japan had become an important place in Jeju Islanders’ translocal regional way of life. This posed significant problems for Jeju Islanders during the next historical phase examined in this paper, following the defeat of Japan, when South Korea was established as a postcolonial independent state and the Cold War started.

**The Cold War**

The Cold War brought about severe repression of Jeju Island within the Republic of Korea established in the south. Because of the historical nature of their engagement within the Japanese empire, which varied in important ways from other Korean experiences of being colonized, Jeju Islanders had complicated and shifting allegiances in the first few years after World War II, as the two Korean states came into being in a divided Korea. Jeju Islanders living in Japan were concentrated around the Kansai area and worked mostly in factories, whereas peninsula Koreans tended to work in construction. The Kansai factories were a hotbed of trade union activism in the decades leading up to World War II, in which Jeju Islanders participated. Some Jeju Islanders were active members of the Japanese Communist Party. Because the levels of education on Jeju were high and because many Jeju Islanders had the opportunity for schooling in the colonial system, the Jeju people in Japan were able to read newspapers and adapt to Japanese society quite easily. The peninsula Koreans in Japan tended to have less schooling and lived in communities that were more segregated from wider Japanese society. Before the war most of Jeju intelligentsia spent periods of time in Japan experiencing life in the big city and soaking up the newest ideas about social organization to take home to Jeju, including left wing ideas (Koh 1996b, life history volumes). At the same time, while Jeju Islanders had long fought for autonomy under the umbrella of the Joseon administration, Jeju Islanders felt allegiance to the peninsula as a polity, and were excited by the possibilities of an independent modern Korean state. Many Jeju Islanders felt strongly that the new Korean state should be unified, not divided by foreign powers, and the influence of left wing ideas in prominent families meant that many Jeju Islanders also strongly identified with the communist regime in the North [18]. Again, Jeju Islanders did not simply accept an unsatisfactory state of affairs but agitated against south-only elections. Some left wing groups took up arms left behind by Japanese military forces that had been based on Jeju.

US military advisors, in the context of the unfolding Cold War, supported the South Korean military and police in brutal retaliation against the islanders’ opposition to the elections. This occurred on 3 April 1948, and is often referred to as the 4/3 Incident (forth month, third day). It is difficult to know exactly how many people were killed, because the population of Jeju in the post war years is unclear. Many people had returned from Japan, and many of these then moved on again, but it is likely the population was around 300,000. Local records show 14,028 people were registered as killed or missing that day, and since many more deaths would not have been registered it has been estimated that 20-30,000 people were killed (Jeju 4/3 Research Institute 2005). A Korean security officer is reported to have said of Jeju at the time “if it’s for the good of the Republic of Korea, sprinkle gasoline over the whole island and wipe out all 300,000 in one go” (Jeong 1988, 61).

The South Korean military dictatorship was not only rigidly anti-communist, anti-Japanese anti-colonial sentiment was an important part of nation building in postwar Korea. In the immediate post war it was not easy to be clearly anti-Japanese because most of the Korean ruling class had
been educated in Japanese language, many in Japan. Nevertheless overt continuing connections to Japan were frowned upon. This had an effect on Jeju Islanders. As mentioned earlier, Jeju Islanders identified with Japanese as fellow kaijin. In addition, during the colonial era Jeju Islanders had established more connections to Japan through work, study and travel in the colonial period than other peninsula Koreans. Many of the islanders who settled in Japan before the war remained afterwards; proportionally Jeju Islanders made up a significant part of the ethnic Korean population who chose to continue to live in Japan after the war. Families with members living in Japan were seen as potentially traitorous by other Koreans, and many Jeju families fell into this category. Because of these close connections to Japan, as well as their suspected communist sympathies, Jeju Islanders were subject to surveillance by the South Korean government until the 1980s.

One of the life histories researched by Koh Sunhui (1996b, life history volumes) demonstrates the complex interaction of connections to Japan and communist sympathies that meant Jeju Islanders were viewed with suspicion by the South Korean regime. This Jeju man was an activist in the labor movement in Japan in 1928, becoming a member of the Japanese Communist Party in 1948, and continuing with left wing activism until the 1980s. He visited North Korea three times via ‘illegal’ routes. He assisted his younger brother to go from Jeju to Osaka (without a visa) and from there to North Korea to live. Arrested three times by the Japanese government for his activities, he spent time in prison, then was repatriated to South Korea. After his last visit to North Korea in 1980 he switched allegiance from the North to the South. Still, a committed socialist, he began supporting South Korean policies regarding zainichi Koreans in Japan and strengthening connections to his home village on Jeju, eventually taking South Korean citizenship.

**Contemporary Jeju Islander Identities**

Anti-communist nationalism and modernization in the latter half of the twentieth century brought about a greater degree of Koreanization of Jeju Island society than had been achieved by the Joseon administration. The authoritarian South Korean government imposed an official version of anti-communist Korean national identity on the islanders. Many aspects of culture that differed from those of peninsular Korea, such as local language, were suppressed and were not transmitted to younger generations. Mass education, mass media, economic development, the military draft system, and increased visits to and from the Korean Peninsula as a result of improved transport, all contributed to Koreanization. Bureaucratic centralization was strengthened under the military regime and rapid modernization was effected. More recently the South Korean government has moved towards decentralization, and there has been heightened interest in Jeju culture amongst Jeju Island public officials, the media and researchers. The strong devaluation of Jeju identity and culture during the post war military regime, which was internalized by Jeju islanders, has to some extent been recouped since the early 1990s.

The forceful Koreanization of Jeju during the Cold War pushed islanders beyond their historical cultural predisposition of openness to other societies, closer to assimilation. In the post war era Jeju culture came to be less distinct from culture on the peninsula. This is evident in a comparison of post war Jeju Islander identities. Contemporary Jeju Islanders see themselves as belonging both to Jeju Island—their country—and to peninsular Korea—their state. Which identity is foremost depends on the situation. In relations amongst themselves Jeju islanders identify as belonging to the same country. In relations with Koreans from the peninsula, Jeju
Islanders identify as belonging to the same state, while recognizing that there are cultural differences between themselves and other Koreans, and while recognizing that their status within Korea is stigmatized (Koh 1998a and 1998b). In some senses this dual identity is similar to the identity we have traced since annexation just before the beginning of the Joseon era. But when we compare Jeju Islanders who have lived on Jeju in the post war era with Jeju Islanders who left before the war and have since lived in Japan, the effects of political changes in Korea during the post war era on Jeju identities are revealed.

Jeju Islanders who went to Japan before World War II and stayed there, and their Japan-residing descendants, exhibit a vague and abstract sense of Koreanness. They have some sense of belonging to Korea due to having been regarded since the end of World War II as “Korean residents of Japan” by Chongryon (General Association of Korean Residents in Japan representing communist North Korea) and Mindan (Korean Residents Association in Japan representing South Korea), as well as by the governments and people of Japan, North Korea and South Korea. So if you ask these Jeju Islanders what their ethnicity is they usually answer “Korean.” But in interviews nearly every time they referred to “Korea” they were actually referring to Jeju Island. When asked about Jeju Island and what it means to be from there, their answers are detailed and acute, but when asked about peninsular Korea and what it means to be a Korean citizen their responses are vague. Islanders who have spent significant spans of time on Jeju in the post war era, however, have a much more concrete sense of identity with peninsular South Koreans, because of shared experiences in the education system, in military service, via the mass media, and so on.

Despite a certain amount of Koreanization, however, Jeju Islanders continue to exhibit an autonomous communal identity in their traveling practices. Contemporary Jeju migrants do not simply merge into local immigrant Korean communities but recreate their version of Jeju society wherever they are, by socializing together, and through establishing Jeju Island homeland societies. The homeland societies are not a strategic form of identity politics to distinguish Jeju Islanders from Koreans, since most Jeju Islanders consciously identify as Korean. Nevertheless, Jeju migration practices, including the homeland societies, sustain them as distinct from both mainstream Korean migrant groups and their host society (Koh 1998b).

Within contemporary imaginaries historical perceptions of Jeju Island as peripheral and uncivilized remain salient. One manifestation of this is that contemporary peninsular Koreans still tend to view Jeju Islanders as uneducated. Misinterpretation of different social educational practices have continued through the modern era. In Joseon peninsula Korea, as mentioned earlier, academic achievement was the only path to wealth and power. Education was thus unambiguously linked to material gain, and the cultural values surrounding education reflected the importance to strive for the highest formal qualification possible. In contemporary Korean culture this is played out in credentialism; a competitive drive to achieve formal academic qualifications. For Jeju islanders, however, academic achievement has historically not been the only criteria for social status, and in any case socioeconomic hierarchies were not so pronounced on Jeju. For these reasons Jeju Islanders have a more expansive and less competitive view of education. In the context of Jeju being a maritime society, education became entwined with travel across the sea. Travel itself came to be seen as a form of education. Forty-eight per cent of Jeju islanders residing around Tokyo in the early 1990s responded in questionnaires and in life history interviews that they came to Japan “to study,” although most of them were not enrolled in schools or university; they were working. They felt that traveling outside Jeju and living in
another society for a while was a form of education in itself (Koh 1996a, 50). This informal style of education, however, is not easily recognizable as education to peninsula Koreans.

During the twentieth century, especially with decolonization in the post-World War II era, the nation-state model came to dominate imaginaries of political and cultural space. The structures and ideology of the nation-state system constrained Jeju Islanders’ regional practices. While transport developments meant travel was technically easier in the post war era, the imposition of territorial borders between the states of the region meant that Jeju Islanders’ travel was actually more restricted than it had been in either the Joseon or Japanese Imperial eras. China and North Korea became effectively off limits. Officially Japan had become a separate state for which a passport was required, and the South Korean government restricted overseas travel until the 1980s.

Patterns of living translocally in Japan as well as Jeju were so entrenched by the end of the colonial era, however, that Jeju Islanders continued sojourning to Japan, despite this being considered illegal by the governments of South Korea and Japan. Jeju Islanders owned properties and businesses in Japan and had family members there. The economic situation in Korea was dire until several years after the Korean War and the political situation on Jeju was unbearable for many, especially around the 4/3 Incident. In continuing to sojourn to Japan, Jeju Islanders were travelling as a way of life, as they had been doing for centuries. Now, however, these practices were criminalized and pushed underground. In the words of Tessa Morris-Suzuki, state responses to unsanctioned travel to Japan in the post war era rendered that travel “invisible” (Morris-Suzuki 2004).

Conclusion

Contemporary Jeju Islander travels to and from Japan contain vestiges of Todung Yagi travels in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries along the Korean, Shandong and Liaodong Peninsulas. Jeju society has for centuries existed in a spatial network across the maritime region of northeast Asia. This network has expanded and contracted in various directions as political situations in the region changed through the rise and fall of Joseon Korea, the Japanese Empire, and the Cold War. The modes of travel and types of work have changed, as has Jeju culture, especially during the twentieth century; still Jeju identities persist and Jeju culture flourishes distinct from other cultures.
In Confucian philosophies maritime regions were peripheral to the land-based centres of civilization, and were thus ignored and/or misunderstood. The modern era’s territorial system of nation-states made transborder ethnic identities such as kaijin anomalous, and translocal practices of living across borders were criminalized and pushed out of sight. The significance of our failure to recognize these transborder identities and translocal practices is that we miss out on important historical lessons. The history of Jeju Island highlights some possibilities and dangers for small and marginalized ethnic groups. It demonstrates that contact with other peoples and cultures does not inevitably lead to homogenization, even for small politically subordinate societies. Jeju Islanders managed to retain much cultural autonomy. That autonomy was most threatened by state assimilation policies during the Cold War, and contemporary systems of education and media, but international norms have moved away from hard line anti-diversity nationalism for some decades, and the effects of this are being felt in the recent regeneration of local interest and pride in Jeju culture.

Being part of the Joseon administration, then the Japanese Empire and now the South Korean state has enabled Jeju to avoid invasion and domination by other powers. Administrative subordination has thus been in some senses expedient, and Jeju Islanders maintained some autonomy under that subordination. One way they did this was simply to carry on as they were without regard to the dominant administration wherever possible. Another way was through persistent and strategic lobbying through the dominant system. At times their activism was unable to protect them, such as during the early Meiji Japanese fishing incursions, and during the worst excesses of the South Korean military dictatorship. And these strategies were unable to protect Jeju Islanders from the material inequities associated with their subordinate status. But on the whole, the strategy of accepting formal subordination to a larger power, while actively maintaining some measure of autonomy, has met Jeju Islanders’ basic material needs, provided outlets for personal growth and cultural expression, and enabled Jeju society to thrive as a distinct system.
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Notes

1 Some of the historical material in this paper was first published in Japanese (Koh 1998a; and 1998b). Judith Wakabayashi worked on initial translation into English. Koh Sunhui and Kate Barclay updated and reworked the material for an English language audience. Translations from Korean to Japanese are by Koh Sunhui. Translations from Japanese to English are by Judith Wakabayashi and Kate Barclay. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at a joint University of Technology Sydney and University of Guadalajara workshop on Globalization and Regionalization in January 2004 and the annual Centre for Research on Provincial China workshop held in the Hunter Valley, New South Wales, Australia in June 2004. Thanks to John McPhillips, David S.G. Goodman, Guo Yingjie, Peter Shapinsky and Jennifer Gaynor who provided helpful comments on earlier versions of the paper.

2 For a brief discussion of histories focussing on this maritime region and references to longer treatments see Batten (2003, 39-40, 184-185). For discussion of Japanese adoptions of centre/periphery ideology see Part 2 ‘Centre and Periphery’ in Denoon (et. al. 1996), also Batten (2003, especially 28-48) and Kang (1997, 42). In addition to ideological influences, political developments on the mainland also affected perspectives on the maritime region. Ming Dynasty rulers had been politically engaged with the seafaring trade with other Asian countries, but from 1644 the Qing Dynasty rulers were more concerned with their territorial boundaries to the northeast and west, so they oriented government activities inland and left control of the sea trade to the merchants (Yanemoto 1999).

3 Over the period covered by this paper there were various polities on the Korean peninsula so it is problematic to speak of ‘Korea’ as if the current idea of a Korean nation was salient in those times. Where appropriate specific terms such as Joseon Korea, the Korean peninsula and Cold War South Korea are used. For want of a better term ‘Koreanization’ is used in discussion about both Joseon Korea and South Korea; we hope the reader will gather from the context what we mean by ‘Korea’ in these cases.

4 This myth of origin was recorded by Korean scholars in the early twentieth century. The fact that the scholars were from the peninsula, where inaccurate conceptions of the island abounded, and the fact that they had Japanese colonial education, could be expected to have influenced their representations of this myth. There have, however, been no significant refutations of the myth by Jeju Islanders, so we assume Jeju Islanders recognize the myth as theirs.

5 Abalone was a symbolically important tribute commodity in Japan. It has been the most prestigious of offerings for Shinto deities, and even today is presented at the Ise Shrine. Abalone from Jeju (Tamla) was considered especially precious.

6 Ama means women divers, kara means from the Korean peninsula.

7 Representations by Japanese academics of cultural identity between the Japanese and neighbouring peoples served strategic colonial purposes in the late 1800s and early 1900s. In Taiwan and Okinawa these kinds of representations were explicitly used to justify colonial invasion and domination by Japan.
The Ryukyu Kingdom also juggled relations with larger powers. It had informal trade relations with polities in what we now call China from at least the twelfth century, which were formalized into a vassal relationship under the Ming Dynasty, while concurrently the Japanese Satsuma domain extended political control over the Ryukyus from the late sixteenth century (Pearson 1996; Smits 1999).

A Concise History of Jeju Island (Kim 1969) and The Early Years of Tamla (Kim 1918) are canons of Jeju Island history, but both scholars were Confucian-educated and were unable to critically uncover the Confucian ideology in the records to extrapolate from them a Jeju-centred version of history; rather they transmitted the biases embedded in the original records, including factual inaccuracies. According to Chun (1987) these biases in the historical record were transmitted in histories of Jeju published as late as the 1980s. These biases in histories of Jeju were not only ethnic, but also gendered and class based. Confucian-educated writers of records were men, usually of higher socioeconomic status, although schooling was not as restricted by social strata on Jeju as it was on the peninsula. Women and lower status men were mostly illiterate and had their own forms of historical traditions through story-telling and folk songs, which continue today to be vital forms of historical transmission for illiterate Jeju Islanders. More Jeju-focused versions of history have emerged from studies of the language(s), folksongs and oral traditions of Jeju. See for example the annual Tamla Munhwa (Tamla Culture), produced by the Tamla Culture Research Institute of Jeju National University.

The Jurchen people from the northern part of the Korean peninsula had seen Goryeo as their suzerain but came under the influence of the Wan-yen tribe of northern Manchuria who wanted to unify all Jurchen people, so from the late 10th to early 12th centuries the Jurchen fought with Goryeo along its northern border (Lee 1984, 126-128).

Funerary culture developed from a form of Buddhism, and as such was not strictly ‘Confucian’ but, in that there was a heavy emphasis on ancestor worship that bolstered Confucian visions of sociopolitical order based in the structure of the family, these religious practices may be seen as part of the cluster of practices that constituted Joseon Confucianism. Shamanism and Confucianism co-existed at funerals before being syncretised in Joseon Confucianism.

A similar term kaimin has been used by Amino Yoshihiko (1994) to describe as aspect of Japanese society over history, which he feels has been as influential in shaping Japanese culture as wet-rice agriculture. The word min carries the connotation of ‘common people’, which in our view implies that maritime people were all of lower socioeconomic strata. Because this was not the case we use the broader term kaijin.

The records analysed by Takahashi contradict Masuda Ichiji who has stated that seasonal work on the Korean peninsula by the Jeju ama started only in 1895 (Masuda 1986, 79).
when they needed food they simply asked for it from the nearest house, and Jeju houses always had extra food on hand for this. “Compassion” was cited amongst the “good things about Jeju Island” in a questionnaire conducted amongst Jeju islanders living in Japan in the twentieth century by Koh (1998) in the 1990s.

17 The murdered Yang was a descendant of one of the founding families of Jeju Island and also a village official, and Pae-ryung-ri was a consanguineous village consisting of the Yang, Koh and Yi families. This was part of the reason his death galvanized such a strong reaction.

18 Jeju Islanders made up a significant proportion of the Koreans "repatriated" to North Korea in the 1950s from Japan, having made the choice that socialist North Korea was the right place for them to live (Morris-Suzuki 2006).

19 In fact, some of these long term Japanese residents and their descendants have not chosen Republic of Korea citizenship, for complicated reasons to do with the management of repatriation of ‘non-Japanese’ at the end of World War II, having lived outside Korea since the establishment of the Republic of Korea, as well as objections to a divided Korea and sympathies for the North through Chongryon, an organization that provided many practical and cultural supports for Jeju Islanders living in Japan (Morris-Suzuki 2004).

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Part III: Becoming Zainichi Koreans in Postwar Japan

Mark E. Caprio
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http://japanfocus.org/-Mark-Caprio/2962

One marked turn in recent Zainichi Korean studies is the new attention to the connections between prewar and postwar Japan. This has resulted in an understanding of Zainichi Koreans not only as victims but as agents playing a large role in asserting their rights and putting their lives in order in Japan. In this particular article, Mark Caprio emphasizes the agency of Zainichi Koreans as a group that stood up and contested policies they came to regard as unjust during the occupation era in Japan.

Caprio, a historian, wrote a major book on prewar and wartime Japanese assimilation policies in colonial Korea. In Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, he has written several articles on American and Japanese policies during the occupation era and how the conflicts between Zainichi Koreans and those policies begun, how they evolved, and why they matter to East Asian history. This article discusses the closing of the Korean ethnic schools in major Japanese cities in 1948 by the American authorities and the Zainichi Koreans’ protests against this policy. By using in part the letters sent home by Elizabeth Ryan, an American court reporter in Japan at the time, Caprio lays bare the prejudices of Americans of the period.

According to Caprio, Korean ethnic schools emerged in Japan immediately after Koreans in the mainland were liberated in 1945, meaning that Zainchi Koreans too were no longer forced to obey assimilation policies in place until then. The end of the war also resulted in a unilateral stripping of their Japanese nationality, made permanent through the San Francisco Treaty of 1952. Fortunately, however, the American authorities essentially accepted and reflected the discriminatory views of Koreans carried by the Japanese. Caprio writes: “SCAP (Supreme Command for the Allied Forces)’s education policies mirrored this colonial-era policy as they forced Koreans to accept a Japanese-centered existence while treating . . . the Koreans and their culture as inferior to the Japanese” (p. 7). The founding and running of those schools thus became the means for Zainichi to subvert such policies and to assert their ethnic identity.

In fact, the American authorities tried to suppress Korean ethnic education. The Americans increasingly came to identify with the Japanese view that the Koreans should be repatriated to the peninsula and those who wished to remain should conform entirely, as had been the case before 1945, to the norms of the Japanese. Caprio demonstrates that the rebuilding of Japan during the occupation era created “Zainichi Koreans,” who had few legal rights.
Mark E. Caprio

Summary

In March and April 1948 Koreans across Japan rose up in protest after the Japanese government began to enforce an order handed down to them by the American Occupation administration to close Korean ethnic schools. One such protest took place in Kobe on April 24 when Koreans stormed the Hyogo Prefecture offices in an attempt to get the governor to rescind the order to close the four Korean ethnic schools in the prefecture. American and Japanese administrations reacted harshly to the Korean actions. Police arrested thousands of Koreans and inflicted stiff penalties on the incident’s leaders. As was often the case, the Occupation administration misinterpreted Korean intention to keep the schools open as a leftist attempt to disrupt U.S. occupations in Korea and Japan. Here the incident is examined through the eyes of one Occupation employee, Elizabeth Ryan, a 31-year old court reporter who included detailed information on the incident and its participants in personal letters that she sent to her family in the United States.

At around 10:30 on the morning of April 24, 1948 four men, three Koreans and one Japanese, stormed into the Hyogo Prefecture Building (kenchā) and demanded an audience with Governor Kishida Yukio. Their purpose remained unchanged from previous attempts to see the governor—to discuss his April 10 order that the four Korean ethnic schools in his jurisdiction cease operations and that the students be transferred to Japanese schools. Kishida, who was at another meeting, informed their Japanese spokesman, Horikawa Kazutomo, that he would see them later. One half-hour later, the governor was told that about one hundred Koreans had forced their way into the building. He soon heard them yelling “Open up, open up. We will kill you,” as they destroyed one of his outer offices. Then 50 to 60 Koreans forced their way into Kishida’s office by breaking down the wall that separated his office from the outer office they had been destroying. They cut his telephone lines, trashed his furniture, and began roughing up the governor and the mayor of Kobe, who had been meeting with Kishida.

The intruders then sat the governor at his desk and the three negotiators, Kim Daisam [T’aesam], Kim Yongho, and Ryang Minseo [Minsō], presented their demands. Kishida was to rescind his order to close the Korean schools, release the 65 Koreans arrested during a previous incident at the assistant governor’s office, and see to it that no one involved in the present incident faced prosecution. At 12:30 three United States Military Police officers arrived and attempted to escort Kishida to safety. However, a crowd of Koreans who had gathered in the building prevented them from doing so. The crowd also roughed up the Military Policemen, lifting one “off his feet.” When one of the policemen drew his pistol a Korean woman bared her chest and baited him to “shoot here.” Negotiations finally ended around 17:00 when the governor agreed in writing to release those arrested during the previous incident.

Throughout the day a crowd had been assembling outside the prefecture building. Captain Roy M. Johnson reported that by 11:30 these people, who numbered over 3000, “had ceased to be a crowd; [they had formed] a mob.” Their presence prevented help from entering the building until a team of 150 policemen succeeded in physically dragging “actively resisting” people away and roped off the area. When at 17:00 one of the intruders announced from a window that the governor had rescinded his order to close the schools “the mob went crazy” and “marched down Illinois Avenue” waving the Korean flag.
Their jubilation was short-lived. That evening, SCAP [Supreme Commander Allied Powers], which had ordered the schools closed in the first place, issued its first (and only) state of emergency during its seven-year tenure in Japan. From midnight the Kobe police, acting on orders from Eighth Army Commander General Robert Eichelberger, went on a “Korean hunt” (Chāsenjin gari) that aimed to arrest anyone who “looked Korean.” The hunt rounded up 1,732 people, including Okinawans, Taiwanese, and Japanese, of whom 39 were tried for “leading demonstrations.” Later that day, Japanese police entered the Korean ethnic schools, physically removed the students, and nailed shut their doors.

Eichelberger also rescinded the promises that the governor had made to the Koreans on April 24. In total, 75 people (including one Japanese) were brought to trial and, save for four acquitted Koreans, all were found guilty of one or more of the following charges: unlawfully entering the governor’s office, destroying office furnishings, threatening the governor, detaining the governor, interfering with Occupation and Hyogo Prefecture communications, and assaulting Occupation force members. The four people who initiated the incident, along with three other Koreans, were tried by the U.S. Military Commission and received sentences ranging from 10 to 15 years of hard labor. Nine other Koreans, tried by the General Provost Court of Kobe, received sentences that ranged from three months to four years and nine months of hard labor. Fifty-two Koreans were fined 50 yen.

The court summary provided explicit details of the destructive and violent actions of the Korean participants, but failed to adequately consider the anger and frustration that fueled them. We learn of the intruders’ primary motivation—to make the governor rescind his order to close the schools—only through the demands that they issued to the governor. The court summary did not explain the reasons why SCAP ordered the schools’ closures. Nor did it offer explanation as to why the Korean people might react to this order as they did. It also neglected to note the attempts that Koreans had made to gain audiences with the governor prior to April 24, or the governor’s stonewalling—his office had told the Koreans that the governor was out of town—to avoid having to meet them.

The tone of the court summary reflected the negative attitudes that Americans and Japanese directed toward “uncooperative” elements in Japan at the time, among whom included Koreans residing in both Japan and Korea. As today, the over 650,000 Japan-based Koreans then represented the country’s largest alien population. The arrogant attitude that many Koreans had adopted at the war’s end toward their former colonial masters had gained them a reputation as troublemakers in the eyes of both American and Japanese authorities. Their insistence on educating their children in Korean ethnic schools irked particularly the U.S. administration in at least two ways. Americans first saw their recalcitrance as an insult to U.S. authority as it blatantly defied SCAP orders that they integrate their children into the Japanese school system. Secondly, it demonstrated again the generally uncooperative behavior that Koreans had displayed throughout the duration of the Occupation to date, be it through working in black markets or collaborating with the Japanese Communist Party. To many, the obvious solution to the Korean problem was that they all be sent “home.” Yet, this was not easy for a number of reasons, including the fact that many younger Japan-based Koreans knew of no other home than Japan.

Letters sent by Elizabeth Ryan, a court reporter stationed in Kobe from 1947-1948, to her family in Milwaukee, Wisconsin expanded on the court summary’s descriptions of the Kobe “riots” by
articulating general impressions that Americans and Japanese held toward the incident, the Korean participants, as well as the Korean people in general. Her writing thus provides a window that enhances our understanding of the incident from the Japan-based American perspective. Ryan’s letters also suggest outside influence from her colleagues. Their content thus informs us of the general conceptions (and misconceptions) that Occupation and Japanese administrations held toward Koreans in Japan, but also in southern Korea. Furthermore, these perspectives contribute to our understanding of how the United States viewed long-held conflicts between Japanese and Koreans, and the growing political unrest in southern Korea that contributed to the outbreak of civil war in 1950.

The Korean “Rioters” Slapped Uncle Sam in the Face

The details that Elizabeth Ryan entered into her letters reflected positively those recorded in the court summary outlined above, though she admitted that her information came primarily from a shortwave broadcast out of Los Angeles. She first addressed the “riots” in an April 27, 1948 letter that she sent to alert her family of her safety. Here Ryan described the incident and accused the Koreans of insulting the United States—by refusing to send their children to Japanese schools as required by Japan’s recently promulgated constitution:

What it boils down to is this. The Japanese constitution, under which they are now to run their country, was set up by SCAP (Supreme Commander Allied Powers, the organization revolving around Mac [MacArther]) and it called for a certain schools system with a certain curriculum, etc. The Japanese have accepted it and are putting it into effect, which means closing the 4 Korean schools in Kobe. The Koreans don’t want their children to go to Japanese schools and have protested. While that may be well and good, it is really not the Japanese idea in the school but the American, and so indirectly a slap in the face for Uncle Sam because the Koreans have rejected the school system. On Saturday morning 70 Koreans visited the Prefecture headquarters and really tore things apart. The Governor had them put in jail—and that set off the fire.

The incident spread concern, as indicated by the power display that SCAP demonstrated in its immediate aftermath, that it would spread throughout Japan. Ryan wrote that General Menoher’s declaration of “minor state of emergency” bought the Occupation’s top officials to Kobe. Soon after, orders went out to arrest “every last Korean.” Her observations here reflect the seriousness with which SCAP viewed the incident, perhaps because of its generally negative impression of Japan’s Korean population. She writes:

Headquarters Kobe Base (Shinko Bldg) looked for all the world like it might be the gold deposit for the world—all the cars lined up in front in “stand by,” guards with helmets and guns patrolling every 10 feet—an air of excitement all over. The order went out from the “brains” that every last Korean was to be arrested and by 4 o’clock last evening they had 1500 of them in jail.

Ryan predicted that the Koreans would be tried fairly, but then suggested that they may be made scapegoats so as to discourage the outbreak of similar incidents in the future:

Special courts and staffs of lawyers are coming down from Tokyo and Yokohama to assist in the speedy trial of these people. They will be tried in our Provost Court instead of the Japanese court—and they probably will get it, but good. I have heard from some of
the officers who were in the conference that it really wasn’t too bad, but if we let it go by
unnoticed, the way things have gone in the rest of the world, this could be only the
beginning.

Ryan returned home just as the trials reached their conclusion and thus she does not comment
further on the actual sentencing of those involved. Her short reports of the incident are as
informative for what they contain as they are for what they omit. Her suggestion that the Kobe
incident might serve as the first of a series of riots across Japan curiously ignores the fact that the
Kobe incident was just the most recent of a series of similar incidents that took place in
Yamaguchi (March 31), Okayama (April 8), Hyogo (April 10), Osaka (April 12), and Tokyo
(April 20). A second Osaka demonstration held on April 26 attracted 30,000 people.

Also striking is her contention that the Koreans violated United States, rather than Japanese,
law—by rejecting the constitutionally authorized Japanese school system they slapped Uncle
Sam’s face. She elaborated on this point in a May 4 letter where she wrote “SCAP…set up a
constitution which was accepted by the Japanese and the allied powers as workable. In the
constitution it stated that a certain school system would be set up—the whole curriculum has to
be changed to weed out their former teachings against democracy, etc. The Koreans had their
own schools, 4 of which were in Kobe, and would not move out of their school buildings.”

Her claim that Japan’s postwar constitution legitimized closing the Korean ethnic schools is
problematic in a number of ways. First, this document had much to say about promoting a
democratic education system but nothing to say about the curriculum that would guide this
education. The constitution’s “education clause,” Article 26, reads as follows:

\[
\text{All people shall have the right to an equal education correspondent to their ability, as
provided for by law. 2) All people shall be obligated to have all boys and girls under their
protection receive ordinary education as provided for by law. Such compulsory education
shall be free.}^8
\]

If anything, this document, in requiring “equal education correspondent to their ability”
legitimized the Korean ethnic schools’ continued existence. Indeed, after receiving orders to
close these schools Japanese lawmakers debated whether this action would constitute a violation
of this very document.\textsuperscript{9}

The Fundamental Law of Education (\textit{Kyāiku kihonhā}) passed in March 1947 reinforced the
rights guaranteed by Japan’s postwar constitution. Sometimes described as a revision of the 1890
Imperial Rescript on Education, this legislation’s preamble declared as Japan’s intention to build
“a democratic and cultural state” dependent on the “power of education.” It stipulated in Article
5 that Japan’s education system would be compulsory (\textit{gimu}), and that “nationals” (\textit{kokumin})
would be guaranteed free access to this education. It further stipulated in Article 4 that this
education would provide “nationals” with “equal opportunities without discrimination by race,
creed, sex, social status, economic position, or family origin.”

It was not until later that year, when the Japanese government passed the School Education Act
(\textit{Gakkā kyāiku hā}) that we find any mention of the language or content that this education was to
assume. Article 21, no. 5 of this legislation stipulated as a goal students being able to “correctly
understand the national language (\textit{kokugo} or Japanese) as necessary for their daily lives,” and to
understand the present conditions and history of their country and villages. It was the formation
of the postwar Ministry of Education, rather than legislation, which established the curriculum to which, in SCAP’s eyes, the Korean schools should adhere. In January 1947 the Ministry, acting under SCAP orders, notified prefectural governors of their inclusion. This order it had to repeat one year later after the prefectures refused to enforce it.\textsuperscript{10}

These documents specifying that their regulations applied to “nationals” (\textit{kokumin}) further complicated Ryan’s argument that the Koreans violated the constitution by refusing to send their children to Japanese schools. Her neglect alerts us to the precarious position that Koreans in Japan faced, particularly regarding their legal status. Ryan might have been aware that in May 1947, just months prior to SCAP’s January 1948 announcement that Koreans would be treated as “Japanese nationals,” SCAP reversed course by subjecting Japan-based Koreans and Taiwanese to its Alien Registration Ordinance. Mirrored after the U.S. Alien Registration Act of 1940, it required all non-Japanese over the age of 14 to register their alien status and carry with them at all times their alien registration passbook. It further stipulated that violators would face deportation. This legislation served as the forerunner for the more comprehensive Alien Registration Act of 1952 that introduced mandatory fingerprinting of foreign residents.\textsuperscript{11}

The Koreans’ options were limited. To avoid having their children enrolled in Japanese schools, the Kobe schools could have joined other Korean schools in applying for private school status. This would have permitted their children to study with their Korean, rather than Japanese, counterparts. They would have remained subjected to a Japanese-based curriculum as private schools, as well, were subject to Ministry of Education regulations. Their other option perhaps met the general intentions of the two seemingly contradictory legislative actions by SCAP—to rid Japan of its Korean problem. American residents in Japan, like Ryan, justified this response by claiming that Koreans had no desire to assimilate into Japanese society—they were simply interested in causing trouble—and thus had no business remaining in Japan.

\paragraph*{Koreans have been “Pains in the Neck”}

The harsh reaction by SCAP to the riots was partially fueled by their generally negative attitude toward the Korean people. Since the beginning of the occupation they had been rather uncooperative. Soon after the war’s end they, along with Japan-based Taiwanese, became active in black market activities. Many Koreans joined the left-wing \textit{Chaeil chosōnin yōnmaeng} (League of Koreans in Japan) that maintained ties with the Japanese Communist Party. Reports on the Kobe incident emphasized that its leaders belonged to this group, and that their followers, being people of limited intelligence, were easily swayed by this wayward influence. Elizabeth Ryan echoed these views in her letters. On April 27 she remarked that these troublemakers, who were driven by leftist agitators, provided the Japanese police with a test to prove their capacity to maintain law and order:

\begin{quote}
The Koreans have been a pain in the neck all along. They have some strange notion that they are the Occupationaires, and really give these Japs a hard time. They go into shops and board street cars with no intention of paying. The poor Jap was scared to do anything about it because he got beat up. So finally, we had to tell them to settle the thing with their own law enforcement agencies (have to let them stand on their feet) and we would back them up to quell rioting, etc. All this Korean business is Communist-instilled.\textsuperscript{12}
\end{quote}
In an undated letter she repeated the claim that “much [Korean] activity is Communistic” adding that the recent “uprising…among Japanese and Koreans” was hardly unusual—“It happened all the time.”

American images of Koreans had never been overly positive. Their negative views were evident in the U.S. being one of the first to recognize Japan’s paramount position on the peninsula in 1905, and among the first to bless its annexation of Korea five years later. Even after the U.S. went to war with Japan, calls could still be heard for Japan to be allowed to keep Korea. A report titled “Aliens in Japan,” completed before the end of the war, incorporated many negative attitudes frequently seen in Japanese writing on Koreans:

> The Koreans in Japan are, for the most part, a distinct minority group with a low social and economic position. Koreans generally live apart from Japanese, do not intermarry, and are not assimilated into Japanese life to any great extent. The traditional pattern of Korean migration was based on the seasonal need for labor in Japan and the migrants’ desire to return to Korea for the New Year holidays.

The report also borrowed images used by the Japanese (and other colonizers) to justify colonial annexation: The people lacked the “Japanese fever for hard work [and] appear to be slow-moving and lazy.”

American Consul Douglas Jenkins, who was stationed in Kobe, also viewed Koreans as left-wing troublemakers, and suggested that they marched to Moscow’s orders:

> There are between 60,000 and 70,000 Koreans in Kobe. The great majority of them were imported by the Japanese during the war for manual labor. They are of the low type generally, poorly educated and include among their number a high number of thugs and roughnecks…. This large, boisterous and dissatisfied, alien group in the population of the city is an easy prey to organizers and agitators. They are known to include among their leaders a number of communists and quasi-communists who probably receive instructions from Northern Korea or, if not that closely associated, certainly follow the party line.

Ryan and Jenkins’ appraisals of this minority suggest misconceptions of the people’s purpose for both coming and remaining in Japan. The contention that the “great majority” of them came as forced laborers is probably inaccurate. Among the estimated 2.4 million Koreans in Japan at the end of the war, about one-third (or 700,000) were forced to come to Japan to perform hard labor. After the war these people were given high repatriation priority. They thus lacked many of the reasons that prevented Koreans with a more established existence from returning: their inability to bring their entire estate to Korea and their insufficient knowledge of the Korean language and culture. Those who characterized the participants in the incident as “thugs” or “roughnecks” emphasized their actions over their general purpose, to say nothing of their frustrations. Korean frustrations stemmed from having endured forced assimilation during the four decades of colonial rule. To this people, SCAP’s education policies mirrored this colonial-era policy as they forced Koreans to accept a Japanese-centered existence while treating them and the Koreans and their culture as inferior to the Japanese.

The belief that the “rioters” were “communists and quasi-communists [who toed] the party line” also reflected an impression that SCAP officials had developed soon after the war’s end in
southern Korea, as well. In mid-September 1945, just weeks after the U.S. had established its Military Government in southern Korea, Political Adviser H. Merrell Benninghoff included the following in his “brief analysis of conditions in Korea”:

There is little doubt that Soviet agents are spreading their political thought throughout southern Korea, and several parades and demonstrations in Seoul have admittedly been communist-inspired. Communists advocate the seizure now of Japanese properties and may be a threat to law and order. It is probable that well-trained agitators are attempting to bring about chaos in our area so as to cause the Koreans to repudiate the United States in favor of Soviet “freedom” and control. Southern Korea is a fertile ground for such activities because USAFIK lacks sufficient troops to expand its area of control rapidly.\(^{17}\)

The connection with Japan came with the smuggling operations that Koreans and Japanese carried out across the East Sea/Japan Sea. Occasionally concerns were voiced in government documents as to whether these operations, in addition to illegally transporting rice, weapons, money, and even people, were solidifying Soviet-North Korea-Japan leftist connections.\(^{18}\)

These slurs on Korean character neglected to consider why this people objected so strongly to decisions that forced them to live under Japanese jurisdiction despite the hardships they endured under colonial rule. The majority had not been brought to Japan against their will, as Ryan claimed. While, as the “Aliens in Japan” article explained, many of Japan’s Korean minority had resisted assimilation over the last four decades, the actions and attitudes of Japanese had also discouraged those Koreans who wished to live as Japanese. Koreans attending Japanese schools faced discrimination, and upon graduating were generally limited to lower status jobs and positions. After the 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake the Japanese police spread baseless rumors that Koreans were committing acts of terror (such as polluting the well water) that encouraged the senseless slaughter of over 7,000 Japan-based Koreans. Koreans were also prohibited from entering their family registers in Japan and had to return to their Korean hometown whenever changes to this document were required.

Regardless of whether they planned to remain in Japan, as most eventually did, or return to Korea, for many, the most attractive short-term option was to enroll their children in the ethnic schools. Yet, this decision made little sense to American occupation administrators who saw the most efficient means of encouraging Korean assimilation (or repatriation) to be their studying alongside their Japanese counterparts. SCAP refused to see the Korean efforts for what they were—attempts to protect the aspiration that their children develop or maintain a sense of identity as Koreans. Rather, SCAP interpreted them as efforts to encourage a larger cause—international communist revolution. Ryan joined other American officials in tying the “riots” to the upcoming elections scheduled for May 10 in southern Korea. She wrote that SCAP had even drawn up evacuation plans should Korean actions threaten American residents:

The Korean elections certainly have been watched from here with much interest for a long time. The outbreak has been confined to the Communists and the Koreans, but for a time there was a great fear that the attack would be made on Americans and we were ready for it. Right after the first of the year hush-hush arrangements went on with preparations to evacuate all Americans from Korea if a riot broke out prior to the elections. Kobe naturally would be the first haven for them. Ships came over from the States loaded down with food and it was stored here…. A month ago all petroleum products were cut off so that in case of evacuation there would be nothing left for the
Reds to take over. Then Mrs. Keeney and her baby…got out of there the last part of March as did many others. Many ships were out at sea ready to put in at Seoul and other ports in case evacuation became necessary even at the 11th hour.

She expressed relief that her suspicions this time came to naught: after “the elections have passed that fear is over for the time being at least.”

Ryan’s opinions again reflected those of her peers in Japan, as we see in Douglas Jenkins’ letter to William J. Sebald. Jenkins suggested that Koreans were not especially concerned over the future of their ethnic schools, but saw SCAP’s actions as an opportunity to protest a more important issue, the upcoming elections:

With the elections in Southern Korea imminent, any clash between Koreans in Japan and the Occupation forces, which could be played up as demonstrating the Occupation supporting the Japanese against the Koreans, would serve as useful propaganda ammunition in Southern Korea, and could also be used throughout the world as a further example of ‘American imperialism.’

The Korean leaders were presented with a ready made cause for mass protest by the closing of Korean schools by the Japanese authorities for the failure of the schools to comply with recently enacted education legislation. No doubt, had this eminently satisfactory cause for protest not come to hand, the leaders would have invented another to obscure their underlying motive.19

SCAP officials might be excused for considering this possibility. The days leading up to the May 10 elections were filled with violence between left and right-wing factions. The G-II Periodic Reports of April 28, the day Ryan penned her first letter on the Kobe incident, listed the following acts of “civil unrest” in southern Korea. A “mob of unknown size threw a homemade hand grenade into the home of a local election candidate”; the “South Korean Labor Party (SKLP) has issued instructions that all myōn (village) offices, police boxes and registration offices must be burned to destroy election records. SKLP has also promised that arms sent by the North Korean Labor Party will be available by 10 May”; and “three members of the local election committee were killed and one seriously injured when attacked by a mob of 20 terrorists armed with spears and shotguns.” This report also carried news of mob attacks on school principals, village heads, leaders of right-wing groups, and police officers.20 In addition, Violent confrontations on a mass scale also broke out from April 1948 on the island of Cheju that left an estimated 25,000 to 30,000 of the islanders dead, and forced as many as 40,000 people to flee to Japan.21

While acts of violence committed by leftists against rightists received much more publicity in the U.S. reports, this bias probably better reflects the conservative tone of the reports than the actual situation. Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC), for example, included in its report similar acts of sabotage and violence that were instigated from both sides.22 The violence by left-wing groups no doubt also reflected U.S. general oppression of this element from as early as February 1946, when the Military Government passed the Political Party Registration Act (Chōngdang tungnok bōp), a law that Kim Kut’ae compares favorably to the colonial-era Peace Preservation Act.23 This oppression, and the fact that the election was limited to southern Korea strengthened the political divide between the two Koreas, led many left-wing groups to boycott them altogether.
Occupation officials interpreted the Korean actions as communist inspired. Koreans on the peninsula addressed the incident from a much different perspective. A CIC report noted that both left- and right-wing Koreans viewed this “oppression of Koreans in Japan” as U.S. backing for a renewal of Japanese expansion in East Asia. It paraphrased one left-wing newspaper article that reported “innocent Koreans [being] oppressed and murdered not only by the Japanese but also by the US Army Forces in Japan.” The report continued: “US leniency toward the Japanese is responsible for the renewal of brutality directed at the Korean people.” The future president of the Republic of Korea (ROK), Syngman Rhee added that Koreans would have no difficulty in choosing sides on this issue.24

“Send them all Back to Korea”

Elizabeth Ryan’s solution to the problem—send them all back to Korea, and if they do not want to return have them take out Japanese citizenship—was a simplistic solution to a much more complex problem. Yet, it was one frequently offered by many in the Occupation and Japanese governments. Upon arriving in Kobe, General Robert L. Eichelberger remarked that he wished he “had the Queen Elizabeth here to ship the whole lot of them [Koreans] to Korea.”25 Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru suggested in a letter to Douglas MacArther that the U.S. administration forcefully return all Koreans who were unable to “contribute to [Japan’s] reconstruction.” MacArthur, sympathized with Yoshida’s general aim to rid Japan of this problem, but was unwilling to force them to do so. He lamented that should he do so they “would have their heads cut off” by the South Korean government as they were all “North Koreans,” in other words, communists.26

Such suggestions were impractical for a number of reasons. First, the idea that Koreans should “return” to Korea made little sense to this people, many of whom had been born and raised in Japan. The Japan-based Korean population consisted of a large number of first-generation Koreans, but perhaps even more second- and third-generation Koreans. For these latter people Japan was the only “home” they knew.27 They had little or no knowledge of their ancestral language and culture. Indeed, some who had been raised as Japanese during the prewar and wartime periods did not learn that they were of Korean ancestry until after Korea’s liberation. These deficiencies complicated the efforts of many repatriated Koreans to integrate into Korean society, leading them to once again cross over (now illegally) into Japan. The 1947 Alien Registration Ordinance categorized all Japan-based Koreans as “foreigner” (or alien), even though SCAP expected the people to go to schools of “Japanese nationals.”28 Feeling unaccepted in both Korean and Japanese culture, the ethnic schools provided Koreans with an opportunity to reorient their children to their ancestral culture.

Ryan and Eichelberger might have recognized that U.S. policy also complicated their return to Korea. Occupation policy severely limited the amount of belongings returnees (both Korean and Japanese) could bring. One provision restricted them to bringing back just up to 1,000 yen in currency, not enough to survive a few weeks much less to restart their lives in a new environment.29 Additional problems awaited them upon arrival in southern Korea. The war’s end and Korea’s division interrupted economic networks that Japan had nurtured throughout its East Asian Empire. This caused acute shortages in food, energy, and natural resources in southern Korea, which further curtailed the ability of all Koreans to procure basic living essentials (housing and food), and critically limited their opportunities for employment. U.S. Military Government projections for improvement in these areas remained gloomy over its initial few
years of its administration of southern Korea. In addition, Koreans in Japan also received news of political unrest in southern Korea and military confrontation with northern Korea increased that also caused them to think twice before returning to the Korean peninsula.30

The Kobe “Riots” and SCAP’s “Reverse Course”

The question foremost on the minds of the Korean protesters—why the Japanese and Occupation administrations decided to close the schools at this particular time—was the question that Elizabeth Ryan and others failed to address in their commentaries. The Korean situation in Japan represents one example where SCAP’s otherwise farsighted decision to funnel its orders through a Japanese administration worked to its disadvantage. Having the Japanese government order the ethnic school to close only rekindled in Korean minds painful memories of Japan’s colonial rule, and the troubles that this regime had inflicted on this people over the past four decades.

The context under which these schools were closed cannot be divorced from other actions then taking place in Japan. From 1947 SCAP initiated what has come to be known as the “reverse course,” the U.S. rolling back occupation policies that promoted democracy and demilitarization in Japan to concentrate efforts on Japan’s economic and political development. These changes were influenced by the Truman Doctrine of March 1947. Truman vowed to “help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes.”31 In Japan, the Truman Doctrine was manifested in SCAP’s purging thousands of suspected leftists from positions of influence, and returning purged Japanese to these positions, including a number of Class A war criminals. It also ended plans to dismantle Japanese conglomerates (zaibatsu) and initiated discussions urging Japanese rearmament. The fear driving these changes was expressed by Director of the Policy Planning Staff George Kennan, who during a March 1948 visit to Japan questioned whether “Japan’s powers of resistance to Communism could be taken for granted.”32 As China slipped into communism, the United States came to realize the paramount position that Japan would play in East Asian political affairs. SCAP’s order to the Japanese to close Korean ethnic schools, which it believed served as a breeding ground for communist indoctrination, reflected the spirit of this policy reversal.

The upcoming elections in southern Korea may also have factored in the timing of the schools’ closing. The formation of a democratically elected national assembly, and the anticipated establishment of a Korean government, would offer Japan-based Koreans the opportunity to register as South Korean nationals, which in turn might expedite their repatriation. This scenario was anticipated in the “Staff Study Concerning Koreans in Korea” dated August 16, 1948, one day after the South Korean government was officially inaugurated. This study began by outlining the problem: “There are about 600,000 Koreans in Japan; most of them were born in Korea or in Japan of Korean parents. It is estimated that on a monthly average 650 Koreans enter Japan illegally and that 400 are repatriated or deported to Korea.” It then summarized the efforts that SCAP had made to repatriate Japan-based Koreans:

SCAP policy toward Koreans in Japan has been twofold: a) …Koreans have been treated as liberated people and therefore strenuous efforts have been made to repatriate to Korea all Koreans in Japan who wished to return; b) Koreans who voluntarily continued to reside in Japan have been presumptively considered for purposes of treatment as retaining their Japanese nationality and are to be considered until such time as a duly established Korean Government accords them recognition as Korean nationals.
However, those Koreans who remained in Japan were reluctant to return to Korea due in part to the uncertain prospects in both halves of the peninsula. Yet, at the same time their continued presence in Japan caused a number of problems:

Politically, Koreans have attempted to establish a large degree of autonomy in Japan. Many of them have tended more and more to participate in communist activity, so that now the League of Koreans Residing in Japan, the principal Korean organization in Japan, is largely dominated by communists. Koreans move illegally between Japan and Korea serve as the link between Japanese communists and those on the continent of Asia—Korean, Chinese, and Russian….Socially the Koreans represent a group which does not readily assimilate to the Japanese both because of the long-standing prejudice of the latter and because of the uneducated and generally underprivileged character of most of the Koreans in Japan….The recent riots in Osaka and Kobe arising from refusal by the Koreans to comply with orders of the Japanese Government afforded a test of the extent of Korean autonomy in Japan….The riots have of course increased the bitterness between Japanese and Koreans, and it is undeniable that the Japanese would be only too happy to see all Koreans leave Japan.

The study then recommended changes to facilitate Korean repatriation that included increasing the amount of currency with which they could return to 100,000 yen, offering better protection for the part of their estate that exceeded this amount, and providing more convenient transportation and better terms for repatriation. At the same time the Staff Study report acknowledged that these measures alone would be insufficient to encourage complete repatriation. Those who remained in Japan, it advised, should be treated as Japanese nationals even if they registered as Koreans and held dual nationality, or if they reentered Japan after resettling in Korea. The study did little to resolve the problems of Korean residents. With the lone exception of the recommendation to increase the amount of their estate with which Koreans could return to Korea, SCAP made no changes in policy. It washed its hands of the problem, leaving it for South Korean and Japanese governments to negotiate after Japan regained its sovereignty. It would be 1965 before Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) signed both a treaty to normalize their diplomatic relations and an agreement that set conditions for Japan-based Koreans to meet should they seek permanent residence in Japan. Japan-North Korea relations have yet to be normalized.

The shock of the violent response by Koreans to SCAP’s order to close the schools initially led to its harsh reaction. Yet, it also awakened SCAP to the need to negotiate with Korean leaders. On May 5, 1948 the *Asahi Shinbun* declared the problem solved when the Osaka and Kobe schools agreed to apply for authorization (*ninka*) as private schools.\(^3\) The Korean population could only view this result as defeat, a compromise that benefited the Japanese as it created separate Koreans and Japanese schools. Koreans, on the other hand, did gain the right to educate their children in a Korean environment and to offer them a limited Korean ethnic program. But it was also an education that remained subjected to Japanese Ministry of Education directives.

Tension heightened after the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) was established in September 1948. SCAP soon banned display of the DPRK flag at rallies, subjugating violators to arrest and deportation to the ROK. Exactly one year later SCAP began enforcing its April 1949 order for the League of Koreans to disband. On September 9, 500 Japanese police officers locked the doors of the organization’s headquarters. The Japanese
government again targeted ethnic schools by ordering 350 of them to close. Of those that applied for private school status, only three were accepted. Other schools gained recognition as “miscellaneous schools” that were freed from Japanese influence, and thus able to develop a Korean-based curriculum. A half-century later 90 percent of all Japan-based Korean children received their education as minorities in Japanese schools, many obscured by the use of Japanese names, fluent Japanese language abilities, and familiarity with Japanese culture and mannerisms.

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Notes


5 These letters, which totaled over 1000 pages, were recently discovered in a used bookstore in Nebraska. Japan Times staff writer Reiji Yoshida has written a series of articles on them. I am indebted to him for sharing with me the letters involving the Kobe riots along with other documents that he collected involving the incident. His articles can be found at

6 This was probably due to her and “the boys” being restricted to camp, as she reported in her April 27, 1948 letter.

7 Yi Wōlsun, “Zainichi Chāsenjin no minzoku kyāiku to zainichi Chāsenjin kyāiku” (Japan-based Korean ethnic education and Japan-based Korean education) in Pak Chongmyōng, Zainichi Chāsenjin no rekishi to bunka (Japan-based Korean history and culture) (Tokyo: Akashi shoten, 2006), 221.


Ibid., 450.

In another undated letter Ryan writes that the massive “Korean hunt” was a demonstration to the Russians (who were suspected as “behind all this unrest”) to make them, as she put it, “stay out of our play pen here.”

For example, Hugh Byas, Government By Assassination (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1942), 359-360.


H. Merrell Benninghoff, “The Political Adviser in Korea (Benninghoff) to the Secretary of State,” Foreign Relations of the United States VI (September 15, 1945), 1051. This attitude may have been influenced by communications sent by the Japanese to Okinawa, where the occupying army prepared for its new assignment prior to arrival. See Kobayashi Tomoko, “GHQ no zainichi Chāsenjin ninshiki ni kan suru ikkāsatu” (One consideration of GHQ’s perception of Koreans), Chāsenshi kenkyÅ«kai ronbunshÅ« 32 (October 1994), 165-192. for a summary of U.S. suspicions of communist influence in southern Korea. Bruce Cumings found little evidence to support the often-heard contention that Soviet or North Korean sources were supplying southern guerrillas. Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), 245. He writes that although from around the time of Syngman Rhee’s 1948 election southern communists began receiving guidance from North Korean communists, it “cannot be said [they] were mere creatures of Kim Il Sung” (ibid., 218).


G-2 Periodic Reports (April 28, 1948).

Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun, pp. 220-221.
22 CIC Reports carried statistics that suggested these acts to have been more balanced than the information included in G-II reports, which did not list right-wing acts against left-wing groups. In its May 16 report it recorded 162 deaths of which 43 were members of left-wing groups, and 59 members of right-wing groups. Counter Intelligence Corps Semi-Monthly Report (May 16, 1948), CIC Pogoso (1945.9 – 1949.1) 3 (Seoul: Hallym University, 1995), 406-407, 424.

23 Kim Kut’ae, Migunchōng Č’i Han’guk’i ongch’i (U.S. military administration’s rule in Korea) (Seoul: Pagyŏngsa, 1992), 151-152. The Peace Preservation Act acted as a model for South Korea’s National Security Law that is most frequently applied to anyone who demonstrates sympathy to communism or to North Korea.


25 Lee, “Koreans Under SCAP,” p. 82.


27 Richard H. Mitchell quotes Ministry of Justice figures to estimate that in 1950 just under half (49.9 percent) of Japan-based Koreans were second generation in his The Korean Minority in Japan (Berkeley: University of California, 1967), 159.

28 Lee, “The Legal Status of Koreans in Japan,” p. 138. This was in part a decision based on practicalities. Had SCAP granted Koreans the special status they demanded, they would have been eligible for special food rations and other privileges afforded peoples of United Nations states. The sheer size of the Japan-based Korean population made this option rather impractical. See Mark E. Caprio, “Resident Aliens: Forging the Political Status of Koreans in Occupied Japan.” In Mark E. Caprio and Yoneyuki Sugita, eds. Democracy in Occupied Japan: The U.S. Occupation and Japanese Politics and Society (London: Routledge, 2007), 178-199.

29 As I describe in “Resident Aliens,” more entrepreneurial returnees were able to circumvent this restriction by exchanging money en route to Korea with Japanese returning to Japan. As we shall see below, even SCAP officials recognized this restriction as a formidable barrier to Korean repatriation.


33 “Shiritsu de ninka shinsei: Chāsen gakkā mondai wa kaiketsu” (Korean school problem is solved: They will apply for authorization as private schools), Asahi shinbun (May 5, 1948).

Schools in Tokyo remained open but were absorbed by the Japanese schools system that supplied the schools with Japanese staff and teachers. (Inokuchi, “Korean ethnic schools,” p. 154.


Whereas some Koreans were coerced to work in Japan and elsewhere in the Japanese empire, many others voluntarily migrated to the Japanese mainland. This trend continued on a more limited basis into the postwar era. Tessa Morris-Suzuki has written on postwar migrations across Japanese borderlines in *Exodus to North Korea: Shadows from Japan’s Cold War* (2007) and *Borderline Japan: Foreigners and Frontier Controls in the Postwar Era* (2010). In *Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*, she has also offered her findings and thoughts on the subject; this article is one example.

The common understanding concerning postwar Japan is that its economy relied solely on its domestic labor force for four decades after the war, and that it was only after 1980s that its economy began to depend on labor from overseas. This article argues that while the ratio of foreign to domestic labor was low, it was not zero. Through careful study of both primary sources and secondary works about the immediate postwar years, Morris-Suzuki argues that a steady stream of Koreans entered or returned to Japan. Between 1952 when the Koreans were unilaterally deprived of Japanese nationality and the treaty of 1965 between Japan and South Korea, Koreans could only smuggle themselves into Japan.

Many Koreans who were forcibly recruited to Japan at first were later repatriated without the payments that were due to them and sent back without many of their possessions. This meant that they were seriously deprived of their means to survive back home. Consequently some came back to Japan, even though that meant entering and residing there illegally. As was the case in prewar and wartime Japan, they continued to occupy the bottom rung in the postwar Japanese economy.

Contrary to popular belief, the reports of the Japanese Immigration Bureau show a steady flow of illegal immigration that “soared in the period from 1945 to 1955, stabilized in the late 1950s, and started to decline gradually in the first half of the 1960s” (p. 12). Fear of arrest and deportation were constantly on the minds of those Koreans who entered Japan at the time. SCAP transferred oversight of those illegal migrants to the Japanese government in 1950, and in the same year the largest detention center was relocated to and expanded at Omura, near Nagasaki. A human rights group frequently complained about the center’s treatment of detainees.
Invisible Immigrants: Undocumented Migration and Border Controls in Early Postwar Japan

Tessa Morris-Suzuki

“We got on the boat in Busan. Don’t know where we got off… We came on a fishing boat. A little boat, it was. The waves were that high, and we went right over them. What month would it have been? Can’t remember now.

They say you really get to know people when you go on a boat with them, or live with them. It was so dark in that boat, you couldn’t even tell who was in there. Everyone jammed together in this little space - so small, we were sitting right on top of one another. When people said their kids were being smothered, they were just ignored. There were dozens of people—thirty or forty in that little boat. That’s why we were sitting on top of each other. It was so crowded you couldn’t eat rice or anything like that. Two nights we went without eating… Of course in those days it was a people-smuggling boat [yami no fune]. People came on those boats from Jeju or Busan—that was when I was twenty-nine.”

This story was told to researcher Koh Sunhui in 1993 by a woman, then in her late 60s, who had arrived in Osaka in 1955 and lived there ever since, raising her family and doing outwork, sewing slippers. When Koh interviewed her she had two grandchildren, and was attending night school to catch up on the school education which she had missed in her own childhood.

Growth Without Immigrants?

There is a theme which runs like a mantra through countless texts on Japan’s economy and society. It goes like this:

“Japan’s economic boom after the Second World War did not lead to the recruitment of foreign workers, as it did in western Europe.”

“Japan distinguished itself from many European labour importing countries by achieving economic growth without attracting foreign workers. It was not in the 1960s but in the 1980s that Japan’s economy became dependent upon foreign workers.”

“Unlike most European labour importing countries… Japan managed to achieve high levels of economic growth without relying on foreign manual workers until the early 1980s.”

“But recent encounters with many stories, among them the account by the woman in Osaka of her arrival in
Japan in 1955, have forced me to look again at that assumption. This article is a rethinking of the “blank space.”

Historians and social scientists weave words together like nets to catch the truth: and, like nets, the words leave spaces into which parts of the past continually disappear. The life of the woman interviewed by Koh Sunhui, and the lives of uncounted others like her, are among the stories which have slipped unnoticed through conventional accounts of Japan’s migration history. Looking more closely at these accounts, we can start to see some of the linguistic holes into which they have disappeared.

One major English-language study of migrant labour in Japan illustrates the problem well. The discussion moves smoothly from a statement that Japan’s economy did not become “dependent upon foreign workers” until the 1980s, to the question: “how could Japan have successfully achieved economic growth without importing foreign workers in the 1960s and 1970s?” In the process, two quite different assertions are elided. The first assertion, which still seems correct, is that the Japanese economy did not “depend” on foreign labour in the high growth era. While foreign workers formed a substantial proportion of the workforce in some European countries during the 1960s and 1970s, in Japan their number, in relation to the total size of the workforce, was far too small to bear the weight of notions like “dependence.”

But this is quite different from saying that Japan achieved its high growth “without importing” foreign workers. Migrants did come, and some also left again. Some stayed just a few months, others for a lifetime. Most worked in Japan, and their presence demands acknowledgement for several reasons. First, the experience of migration had a formative effect on many thousands of individual lives. Second, postwar immigration and official responses to that immigration shaped Japan’s migration and border control policies in ways which continue to have a profound impact to the present day. Third, although their influence on macroeconomic growth may have been very small, postwar migrants made important contributions to the destiny of particular industries and particular communities within Japan. Finally, a closer look at immigration to Japan between the late 1940s and the 1980s opens up new ways of thinking about the nature of borders and of Japan’s relationship with its closest neighbours.

The accepted narrative of Japan’s migration history, however, remains framed by that powerful image of Japan’s postwar development as “growth without migrant workers.” This narrative runs roughly as follows. The prewar colonial period generated large-scale movements of people, including mass emigration from Japan to the colonial empire and beyond, and the forced and voluntary entry of Koreans, Chinese and others to Japan. As a result, there were over two million Koreans, and smaller numbers of Chinese and Taiwanese residents in Japan at the end of the Pacific War. Of these almost three-quarters were repatriated after the war, but their places in the workforce were filled by the repatriation of more than six million Japanese from all over the former empire, and by rural-urban migration within Japan. During the 1950s and early 1960s there was a small outflow of Japanese emigrants to Latin America, and rather more significant outflow of people from US-occupied Okinawa to the same destination. Other than this, however, postwar Japan was characterized above all by its lack of international migration at least until the 1980s (though a few scholars also note that the post-1980 migration boom was prefigured by an inflow of female workers to the Japanese sex industry which began in the second half of the 1970s).
Immigration during the years from 1945 to the late 1970s is wholly missing from this story (as is the post-occupation emigration of foreign residents from Japan). Yet such immigration certainly occurred, and this essay seeks to explore its nature and its implications for our understanding of migration history in the Japanese context. The exploration is, of necessity, preliminary and incomplete. As we shall see, it is impossible to provide accurate statistics of migrants who entered Japan between 1946 and the late 1970s, but it seems clear that they numbered at least in the tens of thousands, and possibly in the hundreds of thousands. Documentary material is more readily available for the postwar occupation period and the 1950s than it is for the 1960s and 1970s: a fact also reflected in the coverage of the discussion presented here.

This discussion also focuses mainly on migration from Korea, which was by far the largest source of postwar immigrants. However, a variety of other smaller migratory flows also await scholarly study. The postwar repatriation of Taiwanese and Chinese residents in Japan, and the entry of Taiwanese and Chinese migrants in the postwar decades, are important and little-explored topics. Another neglected issue is cross border movement between Okinawa and the rest of Asia. Since Okinawa was under US occupation until 1972, it operated under a migration regime different from the one described here. Postwar immigrants to Okinawa included Taiwanese workers brought in to cultivate pineapple plantations, and workers from the Philippines employed in or around US military bases. The history of their lives both before and after Okinawan reversion remain important topics of study. Many of the questions about borders, nationality and Japan’s immigration policy raised in this essay are also of relevance to these further dimensions of postwar migration which, for reasons of space, are not examined here.

For similar reasons, it is not possible to provide a comprehensive comparison of Japanese policies with those of other countries. As I indicate, however, Japan’s postwar migration controls were not unique, but were in fact strongly influenced by US models. What was distinctive about the Japanese experience, however, was how migration controls and nationality policies interacted to produce a system that had particularly far-reaching consequences for the country’s largest foreign community.

**The Language of Invisibility**

Statistics themselves have the capacity to render people invisible. Consider this description of the background to contemporary migration issues in Japan, which accompanies a table showing the number of legally registered aliens in Japan between 1920 and 1991: “Since overrunning (but not completely exterminating) the indigenous Ainu and Okinawan cultures on the islands occupied by Japan, the Japanese have enjoyed centuries of ethnic and cultural stability… Between 1950 and 1988 the percentage of foreigners in the total population of Japan was consistently about 0.6 percent.”

The figures in the table support this image of stability: they suggest, to be precise, that the percentage of legally registered foreigners in the Japanese population was 0.72% in 1950, 0.68% in 1970, and 0.70% in 1985.

But constant percentages do not necessarily mean an absence of movement or change. For one thing, as we shall see, there was in fact a substantial exodus of over 70,000 Koreans in the years 1959 to 1961. At the same time, in a large and growing population, stable percentages represent a growth in the actual number of registered foreign residents in Japan by over a quarter of a million: by 109,852 between 1950 and 1970, and a further 142,064 between 1970 and 1985 (though this is partly accounted for by natural increase, since children born in Japan to foreign fathers were also foreigners).
Furthermore, reliance on the official figures raises important problems. Faith in government data is particularly evident in studies of Japan, where the presence of a well-organized and statistically-minded bureaucracy induces a ready acceptance of the official record. Yet in fact (as government officials themselves occasionally admit) the apparently precise figures for registered foreigners in postwar Japan bears an uncertain relationship to reality. The growth in the number of documented foreign residents in Japan between 1950 and 1970 was at least partly a result of the introduction of more rigorous registration procedures; more importantly, most immigration to Japan in the postwar decades took the form of undocumented “illegal” entry, and does not appear in the official record at all. Bearing that in mind, the postwar decades begin to look less like a time of stability and closure than a time of complex and poorly recorded cross-border flows.

The very words that we use to speak of migration also create their own silences. In the Japanese context, the debate about post-1980 immigration has been framed by a conceptual division between two groups. On the one hand, there are “old-comers,” Korean and other imperial subjects who came to Japan in the colonial period, and their descendants, many of whom are now third or fourth generation residents in Japan; on the other, there are recently arrived “new comers,” members of the post-1980 wave of immigration from East and Southeast Asia and beyond. These two groups, we are told, are “completely different from each other, not only in their ability to speak Japanese but also in the labour markets in which they participate.” This dichotomy leaves us bereft of words with which to speak about the immigrants of the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s, who (like the “oldcomers”) were mostly Korean, and in some cases had lived in Japan before or during the war, but who were also (like many of the “newcomers”) “illegal migrants,” often employed for low wages in small firms.

More generally, in debating global migration issues, scholars repeatedly speak of “immigrant labour,” “guest workers.” These terms dramatically simplify the complexity of the migrant experience, reducing migrants to labouring bodies whose function in history is to contribute to the growth of gross national product. Even in European countries with large “guest worker” programs, such terms obscure essential aspects of migration history. Applied to postwar Japan, they become even less helpful. The non-Japanese migrants who entered the country without official documentation between 1946 and 1980, mostly from Korea, did so for a great variety of reasons. Some came to join family already in Japan, some to escape poverty, others to enter high school or university, to evade conscription or to escape from war, social disruption or political persecution. Many came for a combination of several of these reasons.

Once in Japan, most became workers, generally employed for low wages and in small firms. They came to be disproportionately concentrated in the Kansai region of western Japan, and in manufacturing industries such as plastics, metal plating, garment manufacture, as well as in the entertainment industry, including the pinball parlour [pachinko] business—an industry which by the end of the twentieth century was estimated to be larger (in terms of annual sales) than the steel industry. Many undocumented migrants worked in companies run by other members of the Korean community, but some were employed by relatively large Japanese companies. In the early 1970s, for example, a Tokyo subcontractor producing steel products for a major Japanese corporation was found to be systematically recruiting dozens of “illegal immigrants” from Korea. A small number of such migrants even achieved promotion to senior managerial levels: in 1964, one of the leading managers of Coca-Cola Japan was “exposed” in the media as a Korean illegal migrant, who had held a post in the South Korean bureaucracy before fleeing to
Japan in a “people smuggling” boat at the time of the Korean War. Immigrants clearly contributed to Japan’s postwar growth. But they were not viewed at the time as “guest workers.” Rather, official documents and the popular media consistently referred to them as mikkôsha [stowaways, people who smuggle themselves into the country] or as senzai fuhô nyûkokusha [illegal entrants who live concealed lives], words laden with overtones of marginality, invisibility, lives lived beyond the reach of the law.

The Origins of “Illegality”

Postwar immigrants have thus remained “invisible” to large areas of officialdom and to many scholars of Japanese migration. Their absence from the official record was, of course, in part a consequence of the fact that most were “illegal.” Their “illegal” status means that they were never counted in government statistics, and that the migrants themselves - who lived in constant fear of discovery, internment and deportation - were unwilling to speak about their experiences. Even today, many migrants from this era and their descendants are reluctant to discuss personal histories in public. But there are nonetheless people both in Japan and in South Korea (from where most of the migrants came) who have always been aware of their presence. The postwar immigrants were generally conscious of being part of a complex and interconnected community, and their presence was often visible to neighbours—particularly to people (whether Korean or Japanese) who lived in areas of Osaka, Kobe or Yokohama with large immigrant populations.

Besides, “illegality” does not entirely explain the way that postwar migrants have been written out of history, for, interestingly enough, there has been very widespread public and scholarly discussion of post-1980s “illegal migration” to Japan. Since 1990, indeed, the government itself has regularly published seemingly meticulous data on the numbers of “illegal migrants” in Japan. In the year 2000, for example, the official figure was 224,067, the largest numbers coming from South Korea, the Philippines and China (though this figure too is of course a guesstimate based largely on the number of visa overstayers). To understand both the “illegality” and the “invisibility” of postwar migrants it is therefore necessary to begin by looking a little more closely at the historical context in which they came to Japan.

Japan’s prewar colonial expansion, as we have seen, generated enormous cross-border flows of people, both forced and voluntary. By the end of the Pacific War, there were not only over 2 million Koreans in Japan but also more than 2 million in Manchuria and other parts of China, and an estimated 30,000-40,000 in the former Japanese colony of Karafuto [Southern Sakhalin]. As well as these mass migratory movements, there was a great deal of short-term movement back and forth across the internal boundaries of the empire. For example, merchants from northern Taiwan regularly came to sell their wares in the southernmost islands of Okinawa Prefecture; divers from Jeju Island in Korea frequently crossed to dive for shellfish off Kyushu and Shikoku; and residents of the Japanese island of Tsushima often sent their children to school in the Korean city of Busan, which was nearer to their homes than any Japanese city.

After the War, large parts of Northeast Asia were occupied by the victorious Allies, and Japan was divided into two parts under separate occupation regimes. The major part of the country was placed under an allied occupation whose headquarters [the Supreme Command Allied Powers—SCAP] exercised control through a Japanese administration, while the “Nansei [Southwestern] Islands” were placed under direct US military rule. Meanwhile, the southern half of the newly independent Korea was also occupied by the United States, which proceeded to install the right-
wing regime of Syngman Rhee, while Soviet troops moved in to occupy the northern half of the Korean Peninsula.

The Allied occupation forces in Japan and South Korea tended to regard colonial migrants as “displaced persons,” and initiated massive repatriation programs to “re-place” them—to put them back where they belonged. It was generally assumed that repatriation would result in the return to Korea of almost all the two million Korean in Japan. In fact, however, it soon became clear that not all were immediately eager to return. Some had lived in Japan for most of their lives. Besides, the extremely chaotic and unstable situation in postwar Korea meant that many had no homes or jobs to return to.

Indeed, by the early months of 1946 it became obvious to the occupation authorities that a considerable number of Koreans who had been repatriated were actually re-entering Japan in small boats. As concern mounted about this uncontrolled cross-border movement, occupation forces commissioned a Korean resident in Japan, Cho Rinsik, to examine the reasons for this influx of “stowaways” from Korea. After visiting a camp in Kyushu where “stowaways” were detained, Cho reported that “these stowaways are all former residents of Japan, and 80%...come to Japan on account of hard living and for the procuration of daily food.” In particular, Cho pointed out that people repatriated from Japan to Korea had been forced to leave behind “real estate, property or savings and deposits in Japan,” and were permitted to take with them only 1000 yen in cash: “and what is more, they had to pay up to 1000 yen for half a bushel of rice [in Korea]. This means that they could not live a month with the money they had brought with them.” About 10% of the re-entrants, according to Cho, came to buy goods which were in scarce supply in Korea, while a further 10% came because of “impelling circumstances.” Typical of these circumstances was the situation where “prior to their repatriation to Korea, a husband, parent or son first repatriated, leaving the family in Japan, in order to prepare family repatriation en bloc. So the ‘harrings’ naturally wish to return to Japan after preparation is done or if they find that living in Korea is impossible.”

In retrospect, the Occupation Authorities’ response to the “stowaway” problem seems extraordinary. It is common for the break-up of empires to result in large cross-border movements of people, particularly when colonizing power and colony are geographically close to one another. In many cases, special provisions have been made to allow the reunion of families divided by new post-colonial borders. The occupation forces in Japan and Korea, however, made no such provisions. On the contrary, during the first seven months of 1946 they issued a series of ordinances prohibiting cross border movement between the two countries without the express permission of the Supreme Commander Allied Powers. In practice, this meant that it became impossible for ordinary Koreans to enter Japan, and this blanket ban applied even to the re-entry of people who had lived all their lives in Japan, and who had left their families behind there when they returned to Korea for visits that were supposed to last only a few weeks or months.

The tough approach to border controls was initially justified on public health grounds: in the summer of 1946 there was an epidemic of cholera in Korea, and SCAP felt it necessary to close the border to prevent this spreading to Japan. (Given the fact that large-scale repatriation of Japanese from the colonies continued unabated, however, it was not surprising that several hundred cholera cases were also reported in Japan in 1946). But (as I have noted in an earlier essay) once in place, the border controls remained long after the cholera scare had ended.
Increasingly, they came to be justified, not in terms of public health, but in terms of the need to prevent the cross border movement of black-marketeers and, above all, of Communists and other “subversives.”

The practical problems which the closing of the border created for Koreans in Japan and their families are vividly illustrated by individual stories from a group of some 280 “illegal immigrants” from Korea, arrested by Japanese police on the coast of Shikoku in October 1948. One of those in the group, a 51-year-old man from Jeju, had come to collect the ashes of his elder brother, who had lived and died in Osaka, for burial in his home village. Another, a 34-year-old sewing machine salesman from Osaka, had returned to the family home in Jeju to visit his dying mother, and was now trying to make his way back to the city where he lived and worked. Among the others were an eight-year old girl and her seven-year-old brother, trying to rejoin their mother who lived in Japan. All, along with the rest of the border-crossers arrested in the same area, were interned in Hario Detention Center near Nagasaki, and summarily deported to South Korea without trial.28

As Cold War tensions heightened, indeed, the border between Japan and both halves of the Korean peninsula became barricaded by restrictions from all sides. Both the Kim Il-Sung regime in North Korea and the Syngman Rhee regime in South Korea imposed tight constraints on exit, making it impossible for most Koreans to obtain passports for overseas travel, while the Japanese government, which regained control of immigration policy (except to Okinawa) from 1952, maintained sweeping restrictions on entry. In 1947, urged on by SCAP, the Japanese government introduced an Alien Registration Ordinance requiring foreigners in Japan (other than members of the occupation forces) to carry identity cards at all times.29 Both SCAP’s entry controls and the Alien Registration ordinance, it should be noted, were applied to Koreans and Taiwanese despite the fact that they were at that time Japanese nationals in terms of international law. In the colonial period, Korean and Taiwanese colonial subjects had possessed Japanese nationality (although this did not bring with it equal rights as citizens). Those who migrated to Japan and remained there after the war retained their Japanese nationality throughout the occupation.

By the end of the occupation, however, two measures had radically undermined their legal position: these measures were the Migration Control Ordinance and the abrogation of the Japanese nationality of former colonial subjects. Japan’s 1951 Migration Control Ordinance [Shutsunyukoku Kanri Rei], drawn up after close consultation with US immigration experts, made entry relatively easy for short term business migrants, journalists, missionaries and others, but almost entirely prohibited the entry of foreign workers. It also said nothing at all about the status of Korean and Taiwanese residents in Japan, because they were not officially “foreigners” at that time. Meanwhile, intense debates were taking place about the future nationality of former colonial subjects living in Japan. Occupation authority legal advisors argued that Korean and Taiwanese residents should ultimately be given a choice of retaining Japanese nationality or taking the nationality of their newly independent homelands.30

However, in part because of the complexities surrounding the division of the Korean peninsula, this choice was never offered. Instead, in April 1952, on the day when the implementation of the San Francisco Peace Treaty ended the occupation, the Japanese government unilaterally revoked the Japanese nationality of Taiwanese and Koreans in Japan. Those who lost their nationality simultaneously lost a wide range of rights (including rights to public-sector employment and to many forms of welfare). They were also left without any clearly-defined residence status or any
Morris-Suzuki: Invisible Immigrants

assured right to re-enter Japan if they travelled abroad. Their position was defined only by a vaguely worded supplementary regulation passed in 1952, which allowed those who had lived in Japan continuously since colonial times (and their children born between 1945 and 1952) to remain until their status was determined under some other law.\(^{31}\)

It was this “Catch 22” relationship between immigration law and nationality law which gave the postwar Japanese migration regime some of its unusually repressive characteristics. In this context, it is worth stressing that post-colonial settlements in a number of other parts of the world made special provision for the residence rights of former colonial subjects who had migrated to the colonizing power.\(^{32}\)

**Stolen Voices**

Yet despite draconian border-control policies, the flow of people across the frontier continued. Between April and December 1946, 17,787 “illegal entrants” to Japan were detained by police or members of the Allied Occupation Forces, and although the number fell in subsequent years, by 1951, the last year of the Allied Occupation, a total of 48,076 “illegal entrants” (45,960 from Korea, 1,704 from the “Nansei Islands,” 410 from China and 2 from elsewhere) had been arrested.\(^{33}\) The authorities were well aware that the real number of entrants was much higher, since many undocumented entrants escaped detection. As SCAP officials noted with concern in 1948, “statistical studies indicate that approximately 50% of the illegal entrants are not apprehended, and only 25% of the ships involved in this traffic are captured.”\(^{34}\) Given the chaotic nature of the times, the quality of the “statistical studies” is open to question, but there can be no doubting the fact that a high proportion of “stowaways” escaped detection.

In the first two years of the occupation, a very large share of these undocumented migrants appear to have been Korean residents in Japan who had been repatriated to, or made a visit to, Korea after the end of the war, and were now trying to re-enter Japan. As time went on, however, the motives for entry became more diverse. With Korea sliding towards civil war, a growing number of people fled to Japan to escape political persecution or economic and social disruption at home. A large number of migrants came from the southern Korean island of Jeju, which had particularly close social and economic connections with western Japan. After an abortive uprising against the Korean government in April 1948, the island was plunged into prolonged and bloody conflict in which tens of thousands of people were killed. The great majority of the “illegal entrants” arrested in western Shikoku in October 1948, for example, came from Jeju. The police report on the interviews with those arrested made the following analysis of the migrants’ main reasons for entering Japan: 40% came to join relatives already in Japan; 16% to “escape unsettled conditions in their own country”; 10% to escape bad economic conditions; 11% because they were invited by friends or others; 8% because of better working conditions in Japan; 4% in order to study and 11% for other reasons.\(^{35}\)

Some brief but vivid insights into the migrant experience during these years come from the mass of private correspondence opened and read by SCAP officials during the occupation. According to John Dower, SCAP’s Civil Censorship Detachment, in the course of its four-year existence, “spot-checked an astonishing 330 million pieces of mail and monitored some 800,000 private phone conversations.”\(^ {36}\) Amongst these were many letters sent between Korea and Japan. The authorities assiduously translated and recorded passages which they believed contained evidence of illegal entry, smuggling, or the unauthorized remission of money to Korea, before (in most cases) re-sealing the letters and forwarding them to the unsuspecting addressees. The censorship
records therefore contain some of the very few available traces of the voices of occupation-period undocumented migrants. But these are stolen voices—words never meant for public consumption, which the historian sees (as it were) only by looking over the shoulder of the anonymous censors as they pursue their shadowy trade. I quote them hesitantly and selectively. Much of the historical archive is produced by police, migration officials and others who viewed undocumented entrants as a menace or a nuisance to be controlled, suppressed and excluded. These ordinary everyday voices of the migrant experience, by contrast, can speak to the present-day in a way which, I hope and believe, may help to redress, rather than to compound, intrusive and dehumanizing process through which they were recorded.

Most of the extracts preserved in the SCAP archive are quite brief. They offer glimpses of connections to a network of friends and relatives in Japan, of determination to earn money or to obtain an education: “I landed in Kyushu on 30 August, two days after my embarkation from Masan. Now I am staying at Mr. A’s... If I get money here, I will return to Korea by October, but, if I cannot get it, I must put off my departure by two or three months.” “Though it was risky on the sea, I arrived safely in Japan by a secret ship the other day. I will return home to South Korea by the end of the year after finishing my business here. So I hope you will take care of my children during my absence.” “It was risky indeed to enter Japan by a secret ship, but I did it at the risk of my life, keeping it secret from my parents in South Korea. I will study hard at school here.” “I took a ship from Busan and reached Hakata. On board the ship, I had a very hard time because I had no money. Although I have been living in E. for about two months, I came to Osaka and entered the training school for technicians. Now I am living in a dormitory of the school. Until I succeed, I will never return home. After graduation, I will enter some training college.”

Many letters indicate how remittances from migrants were used to help support families in Korea: “as to the money you sent to aunt on 5 July 1949, uncle bought a paddy field with part of it”; “my father bought a paddy field for you and even completed the registration of it with the money you sent here.” They also speak eloquently of the hardship faced by undocumented migrants who, without official Alien Registration cards, were unable to obtain rations, medical care or basic services: “Since my arrival in Japan I have been staying at X’s... I have no prospect of returning for the time being. I am now in distress as I have no winter clothes, ration certificate, Foreign National [i.e. Alien Registration] certificate. If there is any means of coping with my difficulties, please let me know”; “I failed in my business at Y, Korea, so I came to Japan by smuggling ship, but I cannot find a job here and am at a loss to know how to make a living. I regret that I came to Japan. Please send me some traveling expenses. I shall return to Korea.”

Migration in the High Growth Years

As the records make clear, the cross-border movement was two-way: many migrants came for relatively short periods, to earn money, study or rejoin relatives. Some crossed back and forth between Korea and Japan many times. In her detailed study of the Jeju Islander community in Japan, for example, Koh Sunhui recounts the story of a man who was born in Osaka in 1943 and taken back to Jeju as a small child in 1946. In 1963, he tried to re-enter Japan to see his mother and other family members who had remained there, but was arrested as an illegal immigrant and forcibly returned to Korea. In 1964 he tried again, and managed to enter Japan, where he married a fellow immigrant from Jeju. However, in 1971, his illegal status was discovered and he was arrested, interned and deported, although his wife and children (who had voluntarily given
themselves up to the migration authorities) remained in Japan. The family was thus broken up and his wife disappeared. In 1976, he again entered Japan illegally to look for his wife and managed to find her. However, it proved impossible to restore their relationship, and his wife later voluntarily returned to Korea. In the late 1970s he remarried in Japan to another woman from Jeju, and they had a child. A few years later their small child was injured in a fall, and when they sought medical treatment for the child, the father’s “illegal” status was discovered and he was arrested. He was again deported to Korea. However, with the support of local residents in the Osaka community where he had lived, and because his second wife had Treaty Permanent Resident rights (discussed below), he was finally able to obtain a resident’s visa and return to Japan legally in 1987.\(^\text{38}\)

Such post-Occupation border-crossings, however, are particularly difficult to document because, by contrast with the disconcerting abundance of information contained in the SCAP records, Japanese government official records contain very little publicly available data on the topic. The issue of the treatment of Korean and Taiwanese residents in Japan, and particularly of postwar “stowaways,” clearly caused the government some embarrassment. The status of all Korean former colonial subjects living in Japan remained insecure until 1965, when Japan signed a treaty normalizing its relations with the Republic of Korea. Under the terms of the treaty, colonial-period Korean migrants to Japan (and their descendants) were offered special status as “Treaty Permanent Residents” [Kyōtei Eijûsha].\(^\text{39}\) This status provided a greater measure of security than normal permanent residence status and enabled them to re-enter Japan after traveling or studying abroad. It also made it possible (for the first time) for family members to visit them in Japan, and generally provided protection from deportation except for those found guilty of serious offences.\(^\text{40}\)

However, “Treaty Permanent Residents” did not receive access to welfare, public housing etc.\(^\text{41}\) More importantly, individuals had to apply to become “Treaty Permanent Residents,” and could acquire this status only if they were South Korean citizens. The new system therefore excluded large numbers of Koreans in Japan who continued to identify themselves with the North Korean regime, or who chose to define themselves as nationals of “Korea as a whole” rather than of South Korea, and who remained stateless.\(^\text{42}\) The Treaty also did nothing to help the many Korean residents who had “illegally” entered or re-entered Japan in the postwar period: indeed the agreement specified that the only people eligible to apply for Treaty Permanent Residence were those who “have lived in Japan permanently from before 15 August 1945 to the date of their application.”\(^\text{43}\) The Japanese government seems implicitly to have acknowledged the injustice which this did, particularly to those who had been transformed into “illegal migrants” because they had traveled to Korea during the chaotic period of the early occupation. In June 1965, at the time of the signing of the normalization treaty with South Korea, it announced its intention to make “special provision” for Koreans who had entered Japan between 1945 and 1952.\(^\text{44}\) However, perhaps because border-crossers were still associated in the official mind with fears of subversion, the agreement ultimately negotiated between the Japanese government and the Park Chung-Hee regime in South Korea was cautious and ambiguous, merely stating that Japan would “accelerate the processing of regular permanence resident permission for postwar entrants to Japan.”\(^\text{45}\)

The numbers of such undocumented “postwar entrants” remains a matter for speculation. The published figures of arrests and deportations of “illegal entrants” from 1952 onward are low. Between 1952 and 1974, there were 31,622 arrests for illegal entry to Japan, an average of
around 1,400 per year, with the number generally falling during the 1960s, but rising again slightly in the early 1970s (see Table 1). Even government officials, however, acknowledge that the actual numbers entering the country were much higher. According to an article published in the Asahi newspaper in 1959, the Japanese Immigration Bureau unofficially estimated the number of undocumented migrants from Korea living in Japan in the late 1950s at 50,000 to 60,000, while the police estimate was almost 200,000. A 1975 Japanese Immigration Bureau report on migration controls, which contains an unusually frank discussion of “illegal entry,” noted that, although reliable statistics were unavailable, “tens of thousands” of undocumented migrants were believed to be living “secret lives” in Japan, most in the Osaka and Tokyo/Yokohama regions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946 (Apr.–Dec.)</td>
<td>17,737</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>1,773</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>6,192</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>1,467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>8,167</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>1,359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>8,702</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>1,802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>2,858</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>1,485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>4,420</td>
<td>1966</td>
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<td>2,975</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>875</td>
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<tr>
<td>1954</td>
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<td>1969</td>
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<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>1,434</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>1,130</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>806</td>
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<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>2,074</td>
<td>1972</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1,457</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>1,062</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>1,196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>1,878</td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>77,337</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The report stated that “illegal immigration” had soared in the period from 1945 to 1955, stabilized in the late 1950s and started to decline gradually in the first half of the 1960s. After the
normalization of relations with South Korea in 1965, as legal entry to Japan became easier, there had been a further decline in undocumented migration. However, “just in the last two or three years there have been striking cases like the apprehension at sea of one boat carrying 50 stowaways. If we consider these together with the results of investigations of illegal migrants [senzai mikkôsha] and of various other studies, we can assume that now as before a substantial number of stowaways are slipping through the hands of the investigating authorities and entering the country in secret.” 47

The same point was re-emphasised by Sakanaka Hidenori, a Ministry of Justice official who has played an important role in shaping Japan’s migration policies. Writing in the second half of the 1970s, Sakanaka noted that “despite the considerable energies devoted to controlling illegal immigration to date, today there are said to be tens of thousands of illegal immigrants living in secret, and furthermore illegal immigrants continue unceasingly to arrive, particularly from Korea. Since we are surrounded by sea, have a long coastline and many ports, and have an inadequate number of immigration control officials, our capacity to apprehend illegal immigrants at sea can not be described as satisfactory, and the vast majority of them join the pool of illegal immigrants living in secret in our national society.” 48 Taniguchi Tomohiko, one of the few independent researchers to examine the issue during the 1970s, tried to follow up these published claims by interviewing immigration bureau officials. Although he failed to obtain any more detailed figures, he argued that the references to “tens of thousands” of illegal migrants was probably a bureaucratic underestimate, and that the real figure was more likely to be around 100,000.49

Both the 1975 report and the Ministry of Justice’s Sakanaka Hidenori point to a gradual shift in the motives for migration. In the early 1950s, family connections to Japan and the impact of the Korean War were major factors. The Korean War stimulated an economic boom in Japan, further widening wealth gaps between the two countries. From the late 1950s onward, therefore, the search for better-paid employment became an increasingly important reason for undocumented entry to Japan. For migrants from Jeju and other parts of the far south of Korea, after all, Japanese cities like Osaka were nearer than Seoul, and it was likely that many migrants had closer networks of relatives and friends in Osaka than they did in the Korean capital.50 By the mid-1970s, Sakanaka claimed, over 80% of undocumented migrants were coming to Japan for employment purposes,51 though such stark figures probably do little justice to the complex motivations involved in the risky decision to migrate to Japan.

The great majority of “illegal migrants” were said to be “stowaways” who came on cargo vessels or fishing boats from Korea, often paying brokers hundreds of thousands of yen for the journey.52 According to the Migration Control Bureau, the border crossings were generally run by “people smugglers” based in points of departure such as the Korean port of Busan. “Some of [the organizers] are men, but in many cases it is middle-aged women who act as the main intermediaries in people-smuggling, making contact with people who want to enter our country in secret. After an agreement has been reached, these women, together with the ship’s crew, conduct the stowaways to the people-smuggling boat.” Once in Japan, the Bureau noted, the migrants tended to find work in very small firms (often with less than five employees) producing such things as plastic goods, slippers, machine parts, plate metal and vinyl. A 1974 survey of 279 “illegal migrants” who gave themselves up to the Osaka migration authorities found that 70% had lived in Japan for between 15 and 20 years and most had very low incomes, although a handful were relatively wealthy people with assets of over 100 million yen.53
Special Permission to Stay

One of the striking points to emerge from the data given in the 1975 report is the fact that a large proportion (around one-third) of “illegal migrants” apprehended by the authorities were actually people who handed themselves in to police or the Immigration Control Bureau.\(^{54}\) This fact sheds important light both on Japan’s postwar border control system, and on the likely scale of undocumented migration to Japan during this period. Studies like Taniguchi’s make it clear that Japanese immigration officials and police exercised very wide-ranging discretion in their dealings with undocumented migrants. Many cases of suspected “illegal entry” brought to the notice of the authorities did not result in arrests.\(^{55}\) Besides, Japan’s immigration law contains a clause enabling the Minister of Justice to grant discretionary “special permission to stay” [zairyû tokubetsu kyoka] to deserving cases. “Illegal migrants” who voluntarily reported to the authorities were often hoping to obtain such “special permission.” According to the Immigration Control Bureau’s figures, in all 27,563 “illegal immigrants,” and a further 12,218 foreigners convicted of criminal offences, succeeded in obtaining such “special permission” between 1956 and 1979, with the figures peaking in the early 1960s and falling thereafter.\(^{56}\)

Extensive administrative discretion was indeed a key feature of Japan’s postwar border control system, and was in part a legacy of occupation policy. In the final years of the occupation, SCAP had gradually transferred immigration control functions to a Migration Control Bureau \(^{57}\) attached to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1951 they also brought to Japan a retired senior official of the US Immigration and Naturalization Service, Nicholas D. Collaer, who advised on the drawing up of Japan’s postwar migration law. The resulting Migration Control Ordinance of October 1951 (renamed the Migration Control Law after the end of the occupation) reflected Collaer’s intense concerns about the “subversive” potential of immigrants at a time of rising Cold War tensions. The law gave the authorities sweeping powers to deport, not only illegal migrants and those with criminal convictions, but also any foreign resident who suffered from leprosy or had been admitted to a mental hospital, as well as those whose “life has become a burden to the state or local authorities by reason of poverty, vagrancy or physical handicap” and anyone “determined by the Minister of Justice to be performing acts injurious to the interests and public order of the Japanese nation.”\(^{58}\) In practice, it seems that provisions for deporting the destitute or mentally and physically ill were hardly ever applied to Koreans in Japan, but the very existence of these legal provisions must surely have increased the sense of uncertainty which surrounded the lives of Zainichi Koreans.

Soon after the end of the occupation, in August 1952, migration control functions were transferred from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to an Immigration Control Bureau [Nyûkoku Kanrikyoku] located within the Ministry of Justice. The Bureau had branches in all major cities and at key entry points to Japan, and was also responsible for the running of Japan’s migrant detention camps. Immigration Control Officers [Nyûkan Keibikan] worked closely with the coastguard, police, and the local officials responsible for implementing the Alien Registration system.\(^{59}\) All local government officials were supposed to report anyone whom they suspected of being an illegal immigrant, and members of the public were offered a 50,000 yen reward for reporting people who were found to be liable for deportation.\(^{60}\) The immigration authorities also repeatedly conducted campaigns in coastal areas, mobilizing the local population to be on the watch for suspicious strangers.\(^{61}\)
More broadly, Japan’s postwar migration system can be seen as encompassing a range of other individuals and groups: courts and lawyers who were responsible for handling disputed cases; community groups like the South Korean affiliated League of Korean Residents in Japan (commonly known by its abbreviation Mindan) and the North Korean affiliated General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (commonly known as Sôren in Japanese or Chongryun in Korean), who intermittently lobbied for migrants’ rights and took up the cases of individual members; and NGOs such as the Japan Red Cross Society and the International Committee of the Red Cross. The last two bodies worked to improve the conditions of detained “illegal” migrants, but the Japan Red Cross Society also played a central, complex and morally questionable role in the mass return of Korean residents to North Korea (discussed below).  

The postwar migration control system combined comprehensive controls with great discretionary power, which allowed authorities to deport anyone they considered “undesirable,” while taking a more “benign” approach to others. It is important to emphasise that the discretionary power given to the state to determine individual cases was not unique to Japan. Similar discretion was built into the Cold War era immigration laws introduced in a number of countries, including the United States. Indeed, Nicholas Collaer’s influence ensured that many aspect of Japan’s Migration Control ordinance resembled the 1952 US Immigration and Naturalization Law (more commonly known as the McCarran-Walter Act), an early draft of which was being debated by Congress while Collaer was in Japan. What was distinctive about the Japanese system was not so much the Migration Control Ordinance itself, but rather the way in which migration controls and citizenship policy interacted. The restrictive features of the ordinance were magnified by the presence of large groups of people who had been Japanese nationals when the ordinance was introduced but were unilaterally defined by the state as “foreigners” soon after.

When former colonial subjects were stripped of their Japanese nationality at the end of the occupation, the Japanese government hastily issued “Law no. 126,” stating that Koreans and Taiwanese who had entered Japan before the start of the Allied Occupation would be “allowed to remain in Japan, even though they still had no official residence status, until such time as their residence status and period of residence has been determined.” In effect, this situation left the authorities free to choose which clauses of the Immigration Control Law they would apply to Koreans and Taiwanese in Japan, and which they would not.

The resulting system was highly arbitrary: official responses to undocumented migrants varied, both from individual to individual and from one immigration office to another. As an official who served in the Immigration Control Bureau during its first years later recalled, “in those days I think the Bureau lacked the actual capacity to carry out thorough investigations. Treatment of people varied hugely. For example, Yokohama and Tokyo were said to be lenient in giving people residence permission, but Nagoya and Kansai were said to be relatively strict.” The official went on to suggest that although regulations later became more rigorous, in the early 1950s it was relatively easy “even for people who had smuggled themselves into the country” [mikkô shite kita mono demo] to obtain residence documents “just by completing and submitting some sort of questionnaire.”

Even in the late 1950s and 1960s, when the bureaucracy of border controls was more firmly established, there is evidence of the exercise of wide discretion by officials. In 1962, for example, immigration control officials received 28,531 reports of suspected “unlawful” foreign residents. Of these 1,710 reports were found to be without foundation, and 4,853 were
investigated further, ultimately resulting in deportation orders being issued in 589 cases. Of the rest, a small number of cases were dismissed after further investigation and some were referred to other departments, while over 70% of the total - 20,106 cases - are listed as “investigation stopped or given special treatment.” Special treatment included some of the 2,500 cases where undocumented migrants were granted “special permission to stay,” but what happened in the remaining cases is unclear.

These intriguing figures suggest two important points. The first is the possibly substantial number of undocumented migrants in Japan. While some of the reports received by the police were probably mistaken or malicious, it is also likely that the actual number of undocumented migrants in Japan would have been several times the number reported to the authorities in any given year. The second point to note is that official diligence in pursuing investigations varied greatly from case to case, and that, as well as the official granting of “special permission to stay,” simply dropping an investigation in mid-stream, appears to have been a rather common practice.

Bureaucratic discretion is a double-edged sword. At times it was undoubtedly used to resolve cases of real personal hardship. The story recorded by Koh Sunhui of the thrice-deported migrant from Jeju is just one of those cases. As Koh notes, a heartening feature of such stories was the way in which friends, neighbours, employees and workmates—Japanese as well as Korean—sometimes rallied round to support undocumented migrants in their struggle to obtain “special permission to stay.” The material she collected in her research on Jeju migrants includes several examples of such grass-roots community support for individual immigrant families.

Typical of this support are letters addressed to the immigration authorities in 1984 by the neighbours and employer of a man who had been detained as an “illegal migrant,” and then temporarily released pending determination of his fate. The man, a farmer from Jeju, had entered Japan as an undocumented migrant in 1969, and now lived in Osaka with his wife and young daughter. He had joined a very small printing works as one of its three employees in 1979. The firm’s owner writes in his letter of testimony, “we start work at 8.30 am and finish at 5.15 pm, but X was always at work by 8.15 am, and did overtime every day until about 6.30pm. Moreover, in the five years he has worked here he never had a day’s sick leave, and of course was never absent without reason…It came as a bolt from the blue to hear that X had been detained. I want X to continue working for me, and have re-employed him since his release from detention.” Occasionally, local people initiated public campaigns, involving petitions and rallies, on behalf of undocumented migrants threatened with deportation.

However, the complete absence of clear guidelines surrounding “special permission to stay” meant that the outcome of such campaigns was always uncertain, and must often have been influenced by the personal whims of the officials involved the case. Most of the immigration officials interviewed by Taniguchi in the 1970s insisted that requests for special permission were judged entirely on a “case-by-case” basis. One official, though, observed that decisions were in practice influenced by “the extent to which [immigrants] have a fixed attachment to Japan: for example, whether or not they have blood relatives here.” Letters from migrants and their supporters appealing for special permission to stay often stress integration into the local community—the fact that undocumented migrants had lived in Japan for years, had children at local schools and were active in events like street-cleaning and crime prevention campaigns. All of this suggests a perception that officials were likely to look more
favourably on individual cases if they could be persuaded that the migrants were not only “good citizens” and model workers, but also highly assimilated into Japanese society. But assessments of such things as “degree of fixed attachment to Japan” were inevitably subjective, and the lack of transparent guidelines for obtaining permission to stay left many postwar migrants profoundly insecure.

Sakanaka Hidenori observed that “for illegal migrants, whether they are deported to their own country or are able to remain in Japan is an issue which determines the entire course of their lives. They therefore take desperate measures such as seeking to have influential power-brokers [yûryokusha] take up their cases in order to obtain the special permission to stay from the Minister of Justice.” This situation must have made some migrants highly vulnerable to pressure from the very authority figures whose help they sought. Besides, as Sakanaka observed, it might mean that “even though the period of their illegal entry and their family circumstances are almost identical, one foreigner may obtain special permission to stay because of lobbying by a member of parliament or other power-broker, while another foreigner is forcibly deported. If such things take place, it is obvious to everyone that this must cause the foreigners concerned, and citizens in general, to experience an almost irreparable loss of confidence in the migration control system.”

**Detention and Deportation**

Yoon Hakjun fled from South Korea to Japan in 1953, during the political turmoil following the Korean War. He arrived on a five-ton fishing boat along with some 35 other “stowaways.” However, even before they could set foot on Japanese soil, their boat was stopped by the coastguard and they were arrested and taken to Karatsu in Kyushu for questioning. While they were being held on the second floor of the local coastguard headquarters, Yoon escaped by climbing out of a window and sliding down a roof to the ground. After his escape, he managed to make contact with members of the Korean community in Japan, who eventually helped him to obtain work in a pachinko parlour. He also succeeded in obtaining an Alien Registration Document under a false name. With this, he entered college in Tokyo, and later married and had a daughter.

Like many of the other tens of thousands of undocumented migrants in postwar Japan, however, Yoon lived in constant fear of discovery. As he later wrote, “I would want to run away the moment I saw the shape of a policeman, even in the distance, and I was startled even if I encountered the uniformed figure of a guard on a train.” In the 1970s, after his daughter entered primary school, she began to question why her father had two names. Concerned at the prospect of raising a family under a false name, in July 1976 Yoon went to the immigration office in Tokyo’s Shinagawa Ward and handed himself in to the authorities. Eventually, after paying a 300,000 yen bond, Yoon was allowed to stay in Japan, and became one of the very few postwar “stowaways” to publish an account of his experience. Although he was one of the “lucky ones” who obtained permission to stay, Yoon’s account sheds important light on the fear of detention and deportation which haunted undocumented migrants. Those who handed themselves in to the authorities were, like Yoon, questioned at length about their entry to Japan. Since this had often occurred many years earlier, it was not always easy to provide the information desired by immigration officers. While Yoon was detained, waiting for his wife to pay his 300,000 yen bond, his belongings, belt and tie were removed and he was
thoroughly body-searched before being placed for observation in a holding pen surrounded by iron bars. It was, he observes wryly, “a most valuable experience.”

For those who were unable to obtain permission to stay, this experience was just the beginning of a long odyssey. Official regulations stipulated that illegal migrants arrested by police could be held for between twelve and twenty-two days before being indicted. They were then to be brought to trial within a year. If found guilty, they might be sentenced to a maximum punishment of three years’ hard labour, though in practice sentences often seem to have been commuted. During or after these police proceedings, the Immigration Control Bureau conducted its own inquiries which consisted of a preliminary investigation, an oral hearing by a senior Immigration Control Officer and (in some cases) an appeal for clemency to the Minister of Justice. Those who were able and willing could take the option of speeding the process by paying for their own deportation. But those whose appeals for “special permission to stay” were rejected and who were unable or reluctant to pay for their own deportation would ultimately be transported by train, handcuffed and under heavy police guard, to the detention center where they might remain for weeks or (in some circumstances) for years, waiting to be included in one of the mass deportations organized by Japan’s Immigration Control Bureau.

Between October 1950 (when the Japanese government took control of deportations) and 1979, 45,210 foreigners were deported, of whom 33,598 were Korean and 4,516 were Chinese. Of these, 19,847 people (all Korean) were returned to South Korea as part of mass deportations. The largest number were illegal migrants, although the figure also includes a number of people expelled after completing sentences for criminal offences.

The reasons for the heavy security surrounding deportees on their journey to detention were vividly explained by one official who worked as a detention center guard in the early 1950s: “the so-called ‘criminals’ had actually served their sentences, and the illegal immigrants—well, they hadn’t done anything so terrible. They were less trouble than ordinary criminal defendants or convicts. The real problem was something much more serious than that. If they were deported, their futures would be destroyed. It was better to commit a crime in Japan and serve two or three years in prison than to be deported. Or in some cases, though this wasn’t publicly discussed, they had committed political crimes or thought crimes. If they went back there [to South Korea], the approach of the Syngman Rhee regime, which was in power then, was to take a very tough line with political criminals or thought criminals. So there were many deportees who had deep inner feelings that we guards didn’t know about. Well, for some people it was better to die than to return…”

Japan’s first postwar migrant detention centres were established in great haste by the allied occupation authorities, as they sought to clamp down on the surging return flow of migrants from Korea in 1946. The two main camps were at Senzaki in Yamaguchi Prefecture and at Hario near Sasebo, the latter being just part of a much larger centre which was also used to process Japanese being repatriated from the former empire. Conditions, particularly in the Senzaki camp, which was run by the British Commonwealth Occupation Force, soon became chaotic, as facilities were overwhelmed by an influx of “illegal migrants.” By the end of July 1946 the camp, designed to hold 400 detainees, contained 3,400, of whom 1000 were being held on a transport vessel in Senzaki harbour. Hygiene conditions had become appalling, and dozens of detainees contracted cholera. Soon after, the Senzaki camp was closed and its inmates were moved to Hario, which was run by the US 8th Army.
In 1950, as SCAP transferred border control duties to the Japanese authorities, the running of Hario Detention Centre was handed over to the Japanese government, and in December of that year the camp was relocated to Omura, near Nagasaki. A second detention centre was established in Yokohama, but the functions of the two camps were distinct: as an Immigration Control Bureau report states with startling candour, “while Omura Migrant Detention Centre was established for intern ing Korean deportees, Yokohama Migrant Detention Centre was set up to intern other (mostly European, American and Chinese) detainees.” After inspections by foreign consular officials, who complained that the its facilities were not up to international standards, the Yokohama camp was relocated to a new site in Kawasaki city, and housed in a “two storey steel-framed building with beds, a refectory, shower rooms, an infirmary and clinic etc.” thus becoming a “detention centre which would not cause embarrassment even before the eyes of international observers.”

Not many international eyes, however, were directed at Omura. The handover of detention powers from the Occupation forces to the Japanese authorities took place in great haste and some confusion. Omura, a former naval airbase, was rapidly converted to house an influx of detainees. Since it was officially intended only as a temporary holding-place for people soon to be deported, facilities were initially basic. The camp, which was surrounded by a barbed-wire fence, had large common living and sleeping areas shared by all detainees—men and women, ex-convicts and undocumented migrants, adults and children. Some attempted to gain a small measure of privacy for themselves and their families by using blankets to create a curtain around their living space. The detention centre guards had received little training, and their senior ranks were largely recruited from the “foreign service police” who had helped to maintain political order in China and other occupied territories during the war.[80] In the words of one Omura inmate, who fled to Japan after deserting from the South Korean army to avoid fighting in the Vietnam War, the camp’s atmosphere was permeated by “the dark shape of Japan’s past imperialism.”

But the process of deporting Korean detainees from Omura proved more difficult than the authorities had anticipated. Until the normalization of relations in 1965, Japan and South Korea had no formal agreement about the treatment of Korean residents in Japan. In May 1952 the Japanese authorities attempted to deport 160 “illegal migrants” and 125 Koreans convicts from Omura to Busan in South Korea. However, the South Korean government refused to accept those with criminal convictions, claiming that they were the responsibility of the Japanese government. The Japanese side was left with no option but to ship them back to Omura. At this point protest demonstrations broke out, as the 125 detainees and their supporters demanded their release. These were, after all, people who had already completed their sentences in Japan. While it may have seemed acceptable to accommodate them in the detention centre while they awaited deportation, protestors argued that it was wholly unjust to return them to detention when there was no certainty when or if they could be deported.

From 1952 on, therefore, Omura began to hold a growing number of Koreans who had served prison sentences and were now caught in a limbo between the policies of two governments, with no clear prospect of an end to their detention. Some ultimately spent as long as five years in Omura. As the number detained grew, from 118 at the end of March 1952 to 549 at the end of October of the same year, authorities recognized the need to expand the camp. Between 1952 and 1953 Omura was extensively rebuilt: the old barracks were replaced by ten new buildings capable of housing a thousand people, and the barbed wire fence gave way to a five-meter high
ferro-concrete wall. Worsening relations with South Korea, however, intensified the conflicts surrounding deportation. In the second half of 1954 and again in 1956 and 1957 Korea temporarily stopped accepting all deportees, including undocumented migrants. As a result, by December of 1957 the number in detention had soared to over 1,700, and some detainees were being held in a hastily-created overflow camp at Hamamatsu. After a settlement with South Korea in 1960, which saw the Korean government agree to resume accepting deported “illegal immigrants” in return for a Japanese commitment to release many of the convict detainees “on parole,” numbers fell again. (See Table 2). However, by September 1970 22,663 people had spent time in Omura detention centre. By 1965 sixteen babies had also been born there.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Mass deportations from</th>
<th>No. in detention at end of month</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Mass deportations from</th>
<th>No. in detention at end of month</th>
<th>No. released on parole</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>Dec.</td>
<td>955</td>
<td>302 (23)</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>Feb.</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>1201 (351)</td>
<td>2223 (135)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>273 (26)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mar.</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>1120 (350)</td>
<td>2484 (385)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>156</td>
<td></td>
<td>Apr.</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>1130 (350)</td>
<td>2732 (598)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>305 (99)</td>
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<td>May</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>1050 (350)</td>
<td>2689 (595)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Dec.</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>1020 (350)</td>
<td>2658 (599)</td>
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<td>Mar.</td>
<td>405 (68)</td>
<td>118 (28)</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>Dec.</td>
<td>1653 (493)</td>
<td>1435 (87)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>June</td>
<td>479 (86)</td>
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<td>July</td>
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<td>351 (229)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oct.</td>
<td>415 (66)</td>
<td>541 (324)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nov.</td>
<td>308 (82)</td>
<td>502 (347)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dec.</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>541 (387)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>Mar.</td>
<td>508 (89)</td>
<td>118 (28)</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Dec.</td>
<td>1736 (475)</td>
<td>2223 (135)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May</td>
<td>285</td>
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<td>July</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sept.</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>541 (324)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Oct.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Nov.</td>
<td>232</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Dec.</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>541 (387)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>Jan.</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>303 (387)</td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>Feb.</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>1113</td>
<td>2610 (20)</td>
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<td>229</td>
<td>503 (395)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mar.</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>979</td>
<td>2664 (17)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Apr.</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>488 (388)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Apr.</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>783</td>
<td>2679 (21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>433 (235)</td>
<td></td>
<td>May</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>616</td>
<td>2649 (20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>July</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>572 (287)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Dec.</td>
<td>113</td>
<td></td>
<td>2659 (18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aug.</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>548 (340)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sept.</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>518 (321)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oct.</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>310 (529)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nov.</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>518 (321)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dec.</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>310 (529)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>Jan.</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>413 (362)</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>July</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>1464 (18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mar.</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>491 (375)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Aug.</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>855 (13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>591 (352)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sept.</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>775 (14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>June</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>523 (347)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Oct.</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>440 (13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>214</td>
<td></td>
<td>Dec.</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>126</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures outside brackets are totals; figures in round brackets ( ) are those with criminal convictions; figures in square brackets [ ] are those held in Hamamatsu. Homusho Nyukoku Kanrikyoku ed., Shutsunyukoku Kanri to sono Jittai—Showa 39-nen, Tokyo, Okurasho Insatsukyoku, 1964, p. 114.
The conflicts with South Korea over detainees also had another cause, reflecting the division of the Korean peninsula. Although the vast majority of Koreans in Japan came from the southern half of the peninsula, a substantial proportion chose to identify themselves with the North Korean regime, which many viewed as having greater political legitimacy than the US-backed Syngman Rhee regime and its successors, and which optimists of that period envisaged as offering a prospect of socialist equality and development. Omura detainees who were known opponents of the Syngman Rhee regime were terrified of deportation to South Korea, where they feared imprisonment or even execution, and some pleaded in great desperation to be deported to North Korea instead. This problem became connected with a wider movement, which emerged within the Korean community in 1958, for return to North Korea.

Though there can be no doubt that a considerable number of Koreans saw North Korea as offering an escape from the discrimination and legal uncertainties surrounding the position in Japan, recently declassified documents have shown that the Japanese government, working closely with the Japan Red Cross Society, covertly encouraged the return movement, which it saw as a means of reducing the size of an unwelcome ethnic minority. Between December 1959 and the end of 1961, 74,779 people (the vast majority ethnic Koreans, but also including several thousand Japanese spouses) left Japan for a new life in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and the total number of those who had “returned” to North Korea by the end of the repatriation scheme in 1984 was over 93,000. Among those who “returned” to the North were over 200 deportees from Omura. From the late 1960s onwards, many of the “returnees” from Japan became the targets of political repression in North Korea. A considerable (though uncertain) number disappeared into labour camps or were executed.

As struggles for the political allegiance of detainees raged within Omura, authorities tried to retain control by increasingly draconian regulation of the lives of its inmates. In many cases, this meant holding politically vocal detainees (particularly those identified as supporters of North Korea) in “protective custody” in Block 6, the camp’s isolation unit. A Korean student held in Omura in the 1960s, in a letter addressed to a Japanese university newspaper, described how one such detainee was held in isolation for over 150 days, unable to speak to fellow inmates and denied the right to leave Block 6 even for medical treatment in the camp clinic.

Yoshitome Roju, a journalist who visited Omura three times between the 1950s and the 1970s, noted that, although the detention centre continued to be officially defined merely as a gathering place where people awaited deportation boats, not as a place of punishment, a significant transformation took place over time. While the solidity of the buildings and the range of facilities improved, “the realities of the detention camp became ever more prison-like.” The concrete walls of Omura came to be plastered with a mass of rules and regulations which governed everyday life: everything from prohibitions on gambling and the use of matches or lighters to the instructions, “do not make unnecessary requests and demands to the authorities” and “unless you have received permission, it is forbidden to make contact, meet or have private conversations with inmates from other blocks.”

In the enlarged and reconstructed camp, detainees were held ten to a cell, with a space equivalent to one tatami mat space per person. Describing the camp in the late 1960s, Itanuma Jiro reported that the cells, whose windows were heavily barred by metal grills, each contained a basic toilet and wash place, but that hot water was in short supply and available only for brief periods. Women and children were held separately from men: an arrangement which may have increased
their security, but also resulted in the separation of families. Men were allowed to be reunited with their wives and children for approximately 30 minutes once every two weeks, during which time they were instructed to communicate in Japanese. During the 1960s and 1970s, Omura Detention Centre was the subject of repeated complaints by human rights groups, who pointed to poor food standards, inadequate medical care and dehumanising treatment of detainees, and in 1969 the camp became the target of large demonstrations by Japanese student and peace groups.

Oguro Shuntaro, who was a guard at Omura in the 1950s, later recalled - apparently with amusement - a letter which had arrived at the camp during his time there. The writer, a Korean, had addressed the letter to “Omura Detention Centre” [Omura Shuyojo], but had inadvertently used the wrong characters to write the word Shuyojo, whose literal meaning translates roughly as “receiving and holding place.” On the envelope, the syllable shu was written with the character meaning “prisoner,” and the syllable yo with the character meaning “to rear animals.” Oguro adds, “It doesn’t seem that they were poking fun at us. Koreans actually gave [the centre] that name.”

**Enduring Legacies**

Debates about “migrant labour” and “guest workers” are commonly based upon several assumptions. They assume that there is a firm line distinguishing “nationals” from “foreigners”; that there is a clear distinction between “legal” and “illegal” migration; and that political refugees and economically motivated “immigrant workers” can be unambiguously placed in separate categories. But in Japan’s postwar history, there were moments when each of these assumptions was destabilized.

Japan’s postwar migration control system was part of a wider world order. Like migration controls elsewhere, it was shaped by the concerns of the Cold War and, as we have seen, was strongly influenced by US models. However, the particular circumstances surrounding the transition from colonial empire to Cold War in East Asia resulted, in the Japanese case, in a migration control system with distinctive features, many of which survive to the present day. In this essay, I have sought to suggest that the distinctive features of the Japanese system were much less the products of a unique “Japanese culture” than they were of the specific historical and geopolitical circumstances in which Japan’s postwar immigration laws were framed.

During the occupation period, the treatment of former colonial subjects as “foreigners” was legally dubious, and the process by which returnees to Japan were transformed into “illegal immigrants” was highly arbitrary. These problems were compounded, rather than resolved, by the Japanese government’s post-Occupation decision unilaterally to revoke the Japanese nationality of Korean and Taiwanese former subjects, and to impose tight migration restrictions, which prevented family reunions. In practice, the very harshness of the official policy made it impossible for the letter of the law to be strictly enforced. Rounding up and removing every “illegal immigrant” who had crossed the border between Korea and Japan from 1946 onward would have been both extremely inhumane and utterly impractical. In tacit recognition of this fact, the Japanese authorities therefore developed a system where a highly restrictive official policy on immigration went hand in hand with a great deal of “administrative discretion.” Officials quietly accepted the presence of tens of thousands of undocumented migrants, and developed informal channels through which at least some could eventually acquire legal residence rights. In this way, the events of the postwar decades laid the basis for Japan’s contemporary “illegal immigration policy”: a policy under which official entry requirements
remain highly restrictive, while the government selectively turns a blind eye to the entry of hundreds of thousands of “illegal migrants” whose presence serves economic or other purposes. Post-1980 “illegal migrants” from Korea, China, Southeast Asia and elsewhere have followed paths blazed by the postwar “stowaways,” often finding employment in similar small factories producing metal goods, machine parts etc. There is even evidence of a “globalization” of the very routes which brought undocumented migrants from South Korea to Japan in the 1950s and 1960s: today some Chinese, Iranian, South Asian and other migrants go first to Korea before crossing by boat from Busan to Japan.

Meanwhile, though Omura remains in operation, it has become just a small element in a wider archipelago of detention centers. In June 2001, for example, 1,262 people from a diverse range of countries were being held in Japan’s four main migrant detention centers: 453 in Tokyo; 302 in the Eastern Japan Migration Control Centre in Ushiki, Ibaraki Prefecture; 269 in Omura and 240 in the Western Japan Migration Control Centre in Osaka. There were also smaller temporary detention centers such as Narita Airport’s controversial “Landing Prevention Facility,” while in 2003 the Migration Control Bureau opened a new and greatly enlarged detention center in Tokyo’s Minato Ward, capable of holding 800 people.

During the 1950s and 1960s, the difficulties of enforcing Japan’s exclusionary immigration policies were compounded by the fact that considerable numbers of entrants from Korea were to all intents and purposes refugees as defined by the Geneva Convention of 1951. However, until 1967 the Convention did not cover events such as the Korean War and its political aftermath—it applied only to displacements caused by “events occurring before 1 January 1951” and its coverage was largely restricted to Europe. Besides Japan did not ratify the Convention until 1981. As a result these migrants were not officially acknowledged as refugees, and many joined the pool of labourers working for low wages in small firms. While circumstances in postwar Western Europe made it possible to maintain a (partly fictional) conceptual distinction between “migrant workers” and “refugees,” public discourse in postwar Japan melded all into the shadowy category labeled mikkôsha—“stowaways.” Today, as the circumstances of the post Cold War world again erode the political boundaries between “migrant worker” and “refugee”—and as recurrent panics over “people smuggling” become a worldwide political phenomenon—it is important to look back at Japan’s postwar experience and consider its lessons for the present.

“Bureaucratic discretion” may be used with compassion and imagination to mitigate human suffering. But the combination of a highly restrictive formal immigration policy with arbitrary and non-transparent “discretion” can also be a source of injustice, violence and (potentially) corruption. By the 1970s, some of those familiar with Japan’s migration control system were calling for reforms which would liberalize immigration law and offer a blanket amnesty to “stowaways” who had arrived before a certain date, while also making the guidelines surrounding the implementation of the law more transparent. In spite of incremental reforms since 1981, however, the official framework of migration policy remains highly restrictive, while the day-to-day practice of border controls and the treatment of migrants remain realms of enormous discretion and considerable arbitrariness. More fundamental reform is a still unfulfilled task for the twenty-first century.
Perhaps the most profound source of problems in the treatment of postwar Korean migrants to Japan was the nature of relations between the governments of Japan and the two Koreas. A full account of undocumented migration in postwar East Asia, indeed, would require a close examination of the sending communities, and particularly of the South Korean government’s policies towards emigrants. It has been impossible within the scope of this essay to explore that side of the story. However, the history outlined here indicates some important aspects of the role of international relations in determining the fate of migrants. Relations between Japan and North Korea were non-existent, while the relationship between Japanese and South Korean regimes was strained for much of the period. Both the South Korean and the Japanese governments regarded border crossers as an irritation and a likely source of subversion, and neither showed any serious interest in protecting their rights. Undocumented migrants and others (like the Omura detainees) intermittently became pawns in wider power-games between the two states. These postwar problems highlight the need, not just for global treaties to protect the rights of migrants, but also for regional collaboration between migrant sending and receiving countries: collaboration which creates scope for the voices of migrants and their communities to be heard, rather than simply providing a means for governments to cooperate in sealing borders against the subversive potential of mobile populations.

Despite the confusion and denial surrounding postwar migration, and despite the individual sufferings which it often involved, the continuing cross-border movement of people has sustained a close network of personal connections linking particular parts of Osaka and other Japanese cities to particular regions of Korea, such as Jeju. In the past decade, the vitality and future possibilities of these cross-border social networks have begun to be acknowledged.\(^1\) As such networks come to link Japan more closely to Korea and to many other parts of Asia, they may provide a basis for increasing collaboration, not just between national governments, but also between the local communities which send and receive migrants, and between the local groups which advocate and support migrants’ rights. These developments might in turn provide a starting point for a more imaginative, less oppressive and less opaque approach to the crucial contemporary issues of migration and border controls. They might also open the way for a future in which migration can be recognized as a part of Japan’s postwar history, and in which the memories of the postwar migrants can more readily be spoken aloud.

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Notes

1 Interview recorded in Koh Sunhui, Seikatsuushi no Shiryo 3: 1946-nen iko Rainichi, unpublished appendix to Koh Sunhui, 20 Seiki no Tainichi Chejudojin: Sono Seikatsu Katei to Ishiki, Tokyo, Akashi Shoten, 1998, pp. 127-128. I am very grateful to Professor Koh for allowing me access to this material.


7 Mori, Immigration and Foreign Workers in Japan, p. 32.


10 I have calculated these percentages by comparing the figures for legal registered aliens given in Cornelius loc. cit. with the figures for the total Japanese population given in Tsuneta Yano Memorial Foundation ed., Nippon: A Chartered Survey of Japan 1989-1990, Tokyo, Kokuseisha, 1989, p. 43.


12 As we shall see, more rigorous registration also made it more difficult for “illegal migrants” to obtain residence documents. However, its principal effect seems to have been to ensure the registration of previously unregistered “legal” foreign residents.


14 ibid., p. 131.

15 Ochiai Eishu, Ajiajin Rodoryoku Yunyu, Tokyo, Gendai Hyoronsha, 1974, p. 22.


17 See for example Sugihara Toru, Ekkyo suru Tami: Kindai Osaka no Chosenjinshi Kenkyu, Tokyo, Shinkansa, 1998.


21 Sugihara, Ekkyo suru Tami, p. 80.


23 The Nansei Islands included the Amami Islands and the Ryukyu Archipelago [Okinawa]. The Amami Islands were re-united with Japan in 1953, but the Ryukyu Archipelago was not returned until 1972, and even then the US retained a large network of military bases in the Archipelago.


25 For example, after Ireland obtained its independence, free movement across the border between Ireland and the UK continued to be permitted, while the 1962 Evian Accord between France and Algeria acknowledged the right of Algerians to enter the former colonial power.

26 See for example Homu Kenshujo, Zainichi Chosenjin Shogu no Suii to Genjo, Tokyo, Kohokusha, 1975, 76-77.


28 “CSDIC Translations BCOF – Illegal Entry into Japan,” AWM 114, 423/10/42, 1948, Australian War Memorial, Canberra.

29 For further details of SCAP’s role in the introduction of the Alien Registration Ordinance, see Tessa Morris-Suzuki, “An Act Prejudicial to the Occupations Forces.”


32 The British Nationality Act of 1948, for example, allowed former colonial subjects to enter, live and work in Britain on the same terms as all other British citizens. This measure was, of course, designed as a means to maintain Britain’s political influence over its former colonies, and the rights it bestowed were gradually removed from the 1960s onwards. However, the Act did in practice protect former colonial subjects living in Britain from some of the dislocation and insecurity experienced by Koreans and Taiwanese in Japan. For further details, see Kathleen Paul, “Communities of Britishness: Migration in the Last Gasp of Empire,” in Stuart Ward ed. British Culture and the End of Empire, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2001, pp 180-199.


34 Memorandum for Chief of Staff, 8th Army, “Suppression of Korean Illegal Entry,” 15 May 1949, in GHQ/SCAP Records (RG 311, National Archives and Records Service), Box no. 380, Folder no 15, Korea File no. 3, 1 April 1949 to 31 December 1949.


37 Extracts from Civil Censorship Detachment intercepts, held in the GHQ/SCAP archive.


40 However, the treaty specifically provided for the deportation of those involved in offences against foreign governments or embassies—a measure clearly designed to be used against Koreans in Japan who engaged in political acts hostile to the South Korean government.


42 Ibid., p. 208; see also Sonia Ryang, “Introduction: Resident Koreans in Japan,” in Ryang ed., Koreans in Japan, 1-12; citation from p. 4. The nationality of Koreans in Japan was divided between Kankokuseki—citizenship of the Republic of Korea (South Korea), and Chosenseki. Those with Chosenseki include people who define themselves as citizens of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) and a substantial number who defined themselves above all as nationals of a future re-united Korea.

43 Quoted in Yoshitome Roju, Omura Chosenjin Shuyojo, Tokyo, Nigatsusha, 1977, p. 38.


47 Homusho Nyukoku Kanrikyoku, Shutsunyukoku Kanri: Sono Genkyo to Kadai, Tokyo, Okurasho Insatsukyoku, 1975, pp. 120-121.


50 Koh, 20 Seiki no Tainichi Chejudojin, p. 184.

51 Sakanaka, Kongo no Shutsunyukoku Kanri Gyosei, p. 129.

52 The Immigration Control Bureau claimed that in the mid-1970s some “stowaways” were paying up to one million yen for their journey to Japan; Homusho Nyukoku Kanrikyoku, Shutsunyukoku Kanri: Sono Genkyo to Kadai, p. 119. However, another source gives a figure of about 100,000 to 200,000 yen as the going rate; Ochiai, Ajiajin Rodoryoku Yunyu, p. 22.


54 Ibid. p. 127.


56 Homusho Nyukoku Kanrikyoku, Shutsunyukoku Kanri no Kaiko to Tenbo, p. 157; 5,109 people also received “special permission to stay” between 1952 and 1955, but at this stage published figures do not show what proportion were “illegal immigrants” and what proportion were people convicted of other offenses.

57 Shitsunyukoku Kanricho, renamed the Nyuûkoku Kanricho in 1951.


59 The Justice Ministry took over migration control functions from the Foreign Ministry, which had operated an Immigration Control Office [Nyûkan Kanrichô] from October 1951; see Homusho Nyukoku Kanrikyoku, Shutsunyukoku Kanri no Kaiko to Tenbo, pp. 266-268.


61 Ochiai, Ajiajin Rodoryoku Yunyu, p. 24; see also Morris-Suzuki, “An Act Prejudicial to the Occupation Forces.”

62 I have discussed the role of the Japan Red Cross Society in these repatriations in more detail in Tessa Morris-Suzuki, “Tokubesushitsu no naka no Chinmoku: Shinhakkutsu Shiryo ga Kataru Kota Chosen Kikan Jigyo no Shinso,” Ronza, November 2004, pp. 172-182 and Tessa Morris-

63 Quoted in ibid., p. 207.

64 Nakamura Shokichi, former head of the Immigration Control Bureau’s Yokohama office; quoted in Homusho Nyukoku Kanrikyoku, Shutsunyukoku Kanri no Kaiko to Tenbo, p. 377.


67 Taniguchi “Senzai Kyojusha ni Zairyukan o!,” p. 31.

68 Ibid p. 32.

69 See for example Koh, Sensai Kyojusha Shiryoshu, p. 111.

70 Sakanaka, Kongo no Shutsunyukoku Kanri Gyosei, p. 137.

71 Yoon Hakjun, “Waga Mikkoki,” Chosen Kenkyu, no. 190, June 1979, pp. 4-23, quotation from p. 5.

72 Ibid., p. 5.


74 Homusho Nyukoku Kanrikyoku, Shutsunyukoku Kanri no Kaiko to Tenbo, pp. 158-159. In addition to mass deportations and those who paid for their own deportation, a small number of deportees—usually sailors who had failed to reboard their ships—were deported at the expense of the transportation company which had brought them to Japan.

75 Tanaka Tomizo, former head of the Osaka Migration Control Office, quoted in Homusho Nyukoku Kanrikyoku, Shutsunyukoku Kanri no Kaiko to Tenbo, p. 351.

76 Laurie Broklebank, Jayforce: New Zealand and the Military Occupation of Japan 1945-1948, Auckland, Oxford University Press, 1997; Telegram on “Epidemic of Cholera on LST Q076,” from 9th NZ Inf. Brg. To 8th Army, 6 August 1946, the file “[BCOF, Japan – General:] Communications and Reports Dealing with Illegal Entry of Koreans into Japan,” Series no. AWM114, Control symbol 130/1/34, 1946-147, held in the Australian War Memorial archives, Canberra; see also Morris-Suzuki, “An Act Prejudicial to the Occupation Forces.”


79 Tanaka Tomizo, quoted in Homusho Nyukoku Kanrikyoku, Shutsunyukoku Kanri no Kaiko to Tenbo, p. 362.
Oguro Shuntaro, former head of the Yokohama Migrant Detention Centre, quoted in Homusho Nyukoku Kanrikyoku, Shutsunyukoku Kanri no Kaiko to Tenbo, p. 343.

Quoted in Yoshitome, Omura Chosenjin Shuyojo, p. 9

See account by Tanaka Tomizo, who was at that time in charge of deportations from Omura, in Homusho Nyukoku Kanrikyoku, Shutsunyukoku Kanri no Kaiko to Tenbo, pp. 360-361; also Yoshitome, Omura Chosenjin Shuyojo, pp. 46-47; Homusho Omura Nyukansha Shuyojo ed., Omura Nyukansha Shuyojo 20-Nensi, p. 95.

See Homusho Nyukoku Kanrikyoku, Shutsunyukoku Kanri no Kaiko to Tenbo, p. 370.


Oguro Shuntaro, quoted in Homusho Nyukoku Kanrikyoku, Shutsunyukoku Kanri no Kaiko to Tenbo, pp. 377-378.

See for example Herbert, Foreign Workers and Law Enforcement in Japan, pp. 72-75.


100 For example Taniguchi. “Senzai Kyojusha ni Zairyuken o!”

Part IV: Living as Zainichi Koreans in Postwar Japan

“Zainichi Recognitions: Japan’s Korean Residents’ Ideology and Its Discontents”
John Lie
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http://japanfocus.org/-John-Lie/2939

Sociologist John Lie has written extensively on multiculturalism in Japan and elsewhere. He authored two books on Zainichi Koreans in 2008, and this article is adapted from a chapter in Zainichi (Koreans in Japan): Diasporic Nationalism and Postcolonial Identity. His other book is Diaspora without Homeland: Being Korean in Japan, which he edited with Sonia Ryang, whose article is also included in this course reader.

Lie’s understanding of Zainichi Koreans stands in contrasts to one of Ryang’s key arguments. Ryang writes that Zainichi Koreans need to be understood primarily in terms of their ethnicity and their collective circumstance. She understands that Zainichi Koreans all experienced systematic exclusion by the Japanese government, and that this experience gives them a shared identity. However, Lie argues that such a view totalizes Zainichi Korean identity, and that this supposedly “shared identity” could not and should not subsume all of the forms of subjectivities and identities that this ethnic group carries.

Lie categorizes views such as Ryang’s as “Zainichi ideology,” which he sees as having appeared first in the 1970s in Japan. He understands it as a form of diasporic nationalism that is a reaction to the racism the Zainichi faced in Japan. According to Lie, the problem that such an ideology carries is this: “Zainichi ideology erects a prison-house of Zainichi-ness, a collective confinement to ethnic essentialism. Beyond establishing the fundamental pillars of Zainichi identity, it also projects an idealized Zainichi self that mirrors Zainichi historiography: the dialectics of oppression and resistance, poverty, and struggle” (p. 9).

Lie believes that such an ideology was necessary at one point, but that it came to suppress the voices of some Zainichi Koreans who were minorities in their community, voices that are now rapidly becoming mainstream. To make his argument, Lie brings up a colorful and varied array of Zainichi writers that includes authors of fiction such as Kaneshiro Kazuki, Yu Miri, Gen Gegetsu, and Ijuin Shizuka, as well as Zainichi intellectuals such as Yoon Keun Cha and Kyo Nobuko. Through them he argues that the neglect of Zainichi in Japan started to recede in the 1980s and that third- and fourth-generation Zainichi Koreans developed various forms of dissent from “an idealized Zainichi self,” which had been a pillar of Zainichi ideology.

Lie is “skeptical that ethnicity has a determining impact on one’s self or personal identity” (p. 21), and he stresses multiple points of view and identities. Although the harsh historical circumstances that produced Zainichi Koreans should not be forgotten, and some Japanese express anti-Zainichi opinions in the twenty-first-century (see Rumi Sakamoto’s article included in this course reader), Lie’s view reminds us to recognize and to accept contradictions, differing points of view, and varying identities among Zainichi Koreans.
Zainichi Recognitions: Japan’s Korean Residents’ Ideology and Its Discontents

John Lie

In Kaneshiro Kazuki’s *Go* (2000), the protagonist, Sugihara, opens the novel with a description of his communist, North Korean father, the Japanese colonization of Korea, and the family’s desire to visit Hawaii—a vacation that requires switching their nationality from North Korean to South Korean (and shifting their membership from North Korea-affiliated Soren to South Korea-affiliated Mindan). The stuff of the novel’s first five pages has been recounted countless times by Japanese and Zainichi writers, but no one would have imagined that it would make a best-selling novel. Reciting Bruce Springsteen’s “Born in the U.S.A.”—though observing that Springsteen grew up in a poor family whereas his family is well-off—Sugihara sings his own refrain of “Born in Japan.” At once erudite and violent, he is highly individualistic and antiauthoritarian; he is the proverbial nail that should have been hammered in. In the 1960s and 1970s, Zainichi was all seriousness and suffering: as the pejorative slang would have put it, “dark” [kurai]. The unbearable burden of Zainichi being traumatized, Zainichi life-course and discourse. Instead, Kaneshiro’s prose and protagonist exemplify a striking mode of being cool [kakkoii] in contemporary Japanese culture.

Who Am I?

Kaneshiro’s book—made a year later into an acclaimed film—capped decades of Zainichi ethnic ferment in which the question of identity was paramount. Inevitably one reflects at times on existential and ontological questions: “Who am I?” “Where do I come from?” “Where am I going?” Such questions are, as I argued in *Modern Peoplehood* (2004), essentially irresolvable. Only the dead may aspire to definitiveness, but since the deceased cannot represent themselves, even that aspiration is foreclosed. Any adequate narrative of a life, moreover, demands nothing less than a Victorian triple-decker (and what truly matters often eludes even the longest memoirs or biographies), yet most readers, most of the time, require brevity: vita longa, ars brevis. That questions of identity may be irresolvable may merely make them all the more urgent, and they are especially pressing for people whose place in society is challenged and whose belonging is unsettled. The soul frets in the shadow as it struggles to recognize itself and to be recognized by others. The self invokes collective categories and public discourses even if its ultimate task is to express the private. In the age of modern peoplehood—when membership in an ethnonational group is at once legally mandated and emotionally indispensable—it is not surprising that extant nations should be the principal predicates of identity claims. For Zainichi, it left three plausible identity possibilities in the postwar period: North Korean, South Korean, or Japanese. The implausibility of return, the obstacle of naturalization, and the naturalness of nationalism made other solutions politically infeasible or conceptually anomalous. Zainichi identity arose as the Zainichi population transcended the division of the homeland and the binary of Korea and Japan.
The inevitable instability and complexity of identity paradoxically generate expressions of ethnic fundamentalism: the notion that one’s ethnic background should disclose profound and meaningful truths about oneself. It would be bizarre to believe that one’s peoplehood background was irrelevant; the country, the people, and the life produced the self for which any expression cannot possibly expunge them. The condition of disrecognition tempts the disrecognized to reverse the imputed, indubitably pejorative attributes and to crystallize them as the memory of the struggle itself and the essentialist template of recognition. What remains in the first instance is the recollected and rehearsed history of disrecognition and the struggle for emancipation. Furthermore, just as Japanese disrecognition of Koreans portrayed them in the general, the Korean recognition of themselves capture themselves in the general, though the substantive judgments are antipodal. Thus, some Zainichi would articulate a short litany of essential Zainichi-ness, such as the history of enforced migration and the reality of discrimination, which constitute what I call Zainichi ideology: the flip side of Japanese disrecognition and a generalized solution to the question of Zainichi identity.

The quest for a simple and fixed notion—the desire for definitiveness and certitude—is no less common among social scientists. Consider the straitjacket of identity offered in the most elaborate Anglophone social-scientific work on Zainichi: De Vos and Lee claim that Koreans in Japan “tend to feel more conflict about committing themselves to any purpose,” but several pages earlier they assert that “Koreans in Japan have responded to their present conditions by an ethnic consolidation not dissimilar . . . to . . . the black American population.” Elsewhere they write: “The maintenance of Korean identity invariably implies some conflict over assumption or avoidance of responsibility and guilt.” This would apply to virtually any group. Beyond contradictory assertions and banal generalizations, they note that “the family relationships themselves become bonds of aggressive displacement, of mute frustration, and of inescapable ignominy. The family is not a haven but a place of alienation.” One may quote the poet Philip Larkin—“They fuck you up, your mum and dad. / They may not mean to, but they do”—as a reminder that family alienation is commonplace, but De Vos and Lee blithely assert its specific attribution to Zainichi.
The condition of possibility of Zainichi identity was the transcendence of the two received binaries: the stark choice between repatriation (exile) or naturalization (assimilation), and the conflicting allegiances to North and South. That is, ethnic Koreans in Japan regarded Japan as home, rather than as a place of exile, and tended to conceive of themselves as a coherent entity.

As a form of diasporic nationalism, Zainichi ideology fractured precisely at the point of its crystallization.

**Discriminated Fingers and Lost Names**

By the early 1980s Zainichi had become a “problem” that was no longer ignored outright or discussed *sotto voce*. As books and articles on Zainichi proliferated, the anti-fingerprinting (or fingerprinting refusal) movement sought to transform the gaze of disrecognition to that of recognition. Recognition entailed not only distinction—the categorical autonomy of Zainichi from Japanese and Koreans—but also connection—the solidarity of diasporic Koreans in Japan. That is, recognition at once cleaved Zainichi from Korea and Japan (repatriation or naturalization) and allowed Zainichi to cleave together. Zainichi movements and discourses transformed the population into a peoplehood identity that was also acknowledged and accepted by Japanese people.

The anti-fingerprinting movement began with a “one-man rebellion” by the Zainichi Tokyo resident Han Chongsok in September 1980. The narrow contention was that forced fingerprinting [*shimon onatsu*] during alien registration was a violation of human rights and dignity. The wider concern was the systematic discrimination against Zainichi and other non-ethnic Japanese people in Japan. If Pak Chonsok’s suit against employment discrimination by Hitachi had opened the possibility of legal struggles to combat disrecognition, then the anti-fingerprinting movement denoted its popular political realization.
For Zainichi and other long-term foreign residents in Japan, a passport was necessary to navigate life within Japan: the Certificate of Alien Registration (gaitoshō). Often reviled as “dog tags,” Zainichi noncompliance frequently led to harassment and even arrest by police officers. As one Zainichi man told me in the mid-1980s: “One thing I hate most about being Zainichi is the fear of police harassment. If I forget my ‘dog tag,’ then I am a goner [hotoke, or Buddha].” In a scatological scene in Yan Sogiru’s *Takushu kyosokyoku* [Taxi rhapsody, 1981], a barroom brawl ends in a police arrest. After finding two ethnic Koreans without their certificates, police officers threaten them with arrest and deportation. One of the Zainichi men ponders: “The memory, attentiveness, and behavior themselves of Zainichi are already seen as criminal.” The other merely daubs his fresh defecation over all the police files: Zainichi shit over bureaucratic bullshit.

The certificate was a reminder at once of Zainichi criminality and illegitimacy. The mandatory nature of the “dog tag” and the literally incriminating character of fingerprinting were often at the forefront of Zainichi consciousness as emblems of Japanese disrecognition. The Japanese authorities claimed the authority of science—Henry Faulds had developed the first classificatory system of fingerprinting while working in Japan—to justify fingerprinting for identification purposes. The inevitable question was why Zainichi needed to be identified beyond the ways in which ethnic Japanese were identified. The all-too-common answer pointed at once to the Japanese presumption of Korean criminality and the Zainichi presumption of Japanese tyranny. Han Chongsok, the “one-man rebel,” observed that the Alien Registration Law was “nothing but an instrument to suppress Zainichi.”

The growing incidence of civil disobedience—refusing to be fingerprinted during alien registration—generated media coverage and even popular debate. As one middle-aged Japanese woman said at the time: “If Koreans don’t like discrimination, then why don’t they [fingerprinting refuseniks] go home?” The compelling xenophobic logic had been shared by the mainline ethnic organizations. The acceptance of Zainichi status as foreign explains in large part the general compliance with forced fingerprinting in particular and the alien registration law in general. Coming to terms with their present and future in Japan, however, some Zainichi, with others sympathetic to their cause and to general human rights and dignity, engaged in the symbolic and legal struggle to resist the fingerprinting. Attending several rallies to support the fingerprinting refusal movement in the mid-1980s, I was struck most by the preponderance of second- and third-generation Zainichi in their twenties and thirties. Most of them said that they were seeking at once to eradicate their shame—being a member of an inferior group or hiding one’s ancestry—and to assert their ethnic pride as Zainichi.

The anti-fingerprinting movement generated momentum through the 1980s, gaining the support of the major ethnic organizations. Ethnic Korean organizations in Japan began tentatively to engage with diasporic concerns from the 1970s. In the last three months of 1983, Mindan waged a campaign that collected 1.8 million signatures—90 percent of them by ethnic Japanese—protesting the fingerprinting. Soren also entered the campaign. Eminent Zainichi intellectuals, such as Kim Sokpom, became “refuseniks.” Kim stressed the unification of Korea as the ultimate goal, but the momentum of the movement prompted him to participate in a domestic ethnic movement.
The resistance to fingerprinting was bound up with other means of asserting ethnic existence. As early as the late 1960s there were sporadic initiatives to use ethnic Korean names in Osaka, and individual “comings-out”—to use one’s “real name” [honmyo] instead of Japanese name [tsumei]—occurred throughout the 1970s. As a 1970s pamphlet stated, “the use of tsumei itself is clearly a form of ethnic discrimination.” Arguing against the practical benefits of passing, activists sought not only to promote ethnic pride but also to extirpate discrimination. The “real name” initiative marked the limits of passing in the struggle for recognition. As one man told me, he decided to use his real, Korean name in high school because he wanted to claim pride in his ancestry. Son Puja reclaimed her “real name” as she became involved in a Kawasaki group to fight ethnic discrimination. For most ethnic Koreans, “coming out” would occur either at graduation from high school or at college, where ethnic groups and friends, as well as progressive climate, would encourage and support “real name declaration” [honmyo sengen]. Another dimension of the “real name declaration” movement was the use of Korean pronunciation. In 1975, a Zainichi minister requested the Korean reading of his Korean name, but NHK, the main television network, refused and used the Japanese reading. It was only in 1983 when the South Korean singer Cho Yong-p’il was introduced by that name that NHK had relented from its rigid practice of using the Japanese reading of Chinese characters in Korean names.

The “real name” initiative was diffuse and sporadic; its first organizational manifestation appeared belatedly in 1985 when the Association to Take Back Ethnic Names [Minzokumei o Torimodosukai] was formed in Osaka. One of its members exemplifies some of the background that spurred Zainichi activists in both the anti-fingerprinting and “real name” movements. Pak Sil was born in Kyoto in 1944. Haunted by discrimination and passing in Japan, he believed that Korea signified inferiority. His sister’s job offer was rescinded after her school reported her Korean name to the company. In order to marry his Japanese girlfriend, he was naturalized. Learning about Japanese imperialism, he realized that he had committed a major fault [ayamachi] and betrayed his mother. After his child was born, he decided to assert his Korean identity. “Nationality is Japanese, name is Japanese, I didn’t know Korean, and I don’t know the taste of kimchi. I have nothing in the form of ethnicity.” He therefore resolved to learn the Korean language and to participate in Korean cultural activities. Although other Zainichi did not welcome him—he was even accused of being a spy—he participated in the movement to use ethnic names as Japanese. By 1987 he won a court victory to use his Korean name. Pak Sil thereby achieved the hitherto oxymoronic idea of being a Japanese citizen with a Korean name. Similarly, in 1989, Yun Choja, who had grown up with her Japanese mother’s name as a Japanese citizen, won the right to use an ethnic name: “If there were no discrimination, my father would have been legally married and I would have my father’s surname. . . . Because there was discrimination, I became a ‘bastard’ [shiseiji] and was given Japanese koseki [household registry; and effectively nationality].”

The mid-1980s ethnic political mobilization capped at least a decade’s worth of the Zainichi civil rights movement. If Pak’s 1970 employment discrimination suit was the first well-publicized use
of legal mechanisms to protect and advance Zainichi rights, it was followed by Kim Kyongdok’s effort to become an attorney and Kim Hyondon’s struggle to receive the national pension, denied to Koreans on the ground that they lacked citizenship. There were other, less-heralded attempts to protect and promote ethnic Koreans’ rights and benefits in Japan, from the establishment of Seikyosha in Kawasaki in the 1970s to the rise of the “rights and benefits” movement by Mindan in the late 1970s. Numerous local initiatives—ranging from Osaka teachers’ 1971 proclamation against ethnic discrimination and assimilationist education to progressive local authorities’ attempts to ensure access to welfare benefits and public housing in the mid-1970s)—bound concerned Japanese citizens with ethnic Korean individuals and organizations. By the early 1980s, Osaka, with the highest concentration of Zainichi, among other local authorities, started to hire Korean nationals for civil service positions—a right that was denied immediately after the end of the war.

Along with the anti-fingerprinting movement and the effort to use Korean names, some sought to create a Koreatown—emulating Chinatowns and Koreatowns in the United States—in Kawasaki, whereas others sought to win local suffrage rights for Zainichi. Each step of the way, the Zainichi legal and political struggle for legitimacy and recognition pricked the conscience of ethnic Koreans and ethnic Japanese. Zainichi disrecognition in Japanese public life was clearly in retreat by the 1980s.

Zainichi Ideology

In the context of ethnic ferment, there was something close to a party line that emerged in the 1970s that I call Zainichi ideology. Informed by an internal critique of Soren ideology—the ideology of return—it sought to supplant the ideology that had dominated the Zainichi population in the 1950s and 1960s. The notion that Zainichi constituted a relatively autonomous community was alien to the dominant ethnic organization’s homeland orientation, which was a systematic misrecognition of Zainichi actuality. The disjuncture is encapsulated in the question of language. Against Soren’s espousal of the mother tongue, the primary language of the postwar Zainichi population had always been Japanese, as evinced by early postwar ethnic Korean literary periodicals such as Chosen bungei and Minshu bungei. The subjugation of literature to politics, which included the question of language, incited some of the earliest resistance to Soren by the late 1950s, for instance among writers around the journal Jindare. Kikan sanzenri continued in spirit the work of Jindare, but these critics’ intellectual formation and ethnonational worldview were profoundly shaped by Soren and would leave their mark in Zainichi ideology. Like its leading proponents, men of the left such as Kim Sokpom and Lee Hoesung, Zainichi ideology retained a strong link to the North Korean homeland even as it came to embrace and at times celebrate the Zainichi population’s place in Japan.

Zainichi ideology fractured almost from the moment it crystallized not only because of the impossibility of formulating an essentialized identity but also because it was an intellectual construct that faced the withering criticism of rapid obsolescence and ultimate irrelevance. As a product of parthenogenesis—albeit with the long genealogy of Soren and ex-Soren
intellectuals—it was disengaged not only from the dominant ethnic organizations but also from the experiences and longings of the people who sought to counter Japanese disrecognition, such as those who participated actively in the fingerprinting refusal movement and the ethnic name movement. Zainichi ideologists retained faith in intellectuals as the secret legislators and representatives of the people when it was no longer fashionable or viable to do so in Japanese life.

Let me discuss the work of Yoon Keun Cha, born in 1944, because of its systematic and paradigmatic character. In “Zainichi” o ikirutowa [To live as Zainichi, 1992], Yoon locates the appearance of the very term Zainichi in the late 1970s. It “has been recognized as a particular philosophy [shiso], demonstrating a young generation’s way of living and ideology, including historical meaning.” As “the historical product of Japanese rule of colonial Korea,” that meaning is in a chronicle of vexing events from colonial rule, the division of the homeland, and the Korean War: “Up to today it is unhappiness itself. For the second- and third-generation Zainichi of today, the suffering and the sadness of poverty, losing the family, the inability to meet departed parents again constitute the heartache, which is nothing but ‘chagrin’ [kuyahisa].” As colonial subjects and their descendants, Zainichi belong to the category of oppressed Third World people. Bereft of a stable home and a place of repose, they are also “liminal people” [kyokaijin]. After criticizing Soren and the unsavory character of South Korea in the 1960s and 1970s, he bemoans the division not only of the homeland but Zainichi society.

Yoon defines the first generation as those “who spent their childhood in Korea and came to Japan before the defeat of Japan in August 1945. . . . In essence, the major part of their spiritual formation was ‘Korea,’ and not ‘Japan’ as ‘imperial subject.’” The first generation was defined by “anti-Japanese sentiments of the colonial period” and “strong ethnic consciousness.” Reprising the received Zainichi historiography—its pioneered by intellectuals critical of Soren—he characterizes Koreans in colonial Japan as being “pushed into the context of absolute discrimination in terms of ethnicity and class. . . [as] low-waged workers at the very bottom of Japanese society.” Japan, in short, was “hell.” Living in Korean ghettos [Chosenjin buraku]—he identifies the first-generation as “the period of ‘Korean ghetto’”—they longed for the ancestral homeland but lived with “discrimination and oppression.” The heroic narrative begins, then, from their suffering and “naked labor” and supported by the philosophy [shiso] of “work twice or thrice as hard as Japanese, don’t give in to discrimination, protect your rights, let’s create school, let’s unify homeland.” For them, “ancestral land [sokoku] or ethnicity, Heimat [kokyo], family were dream and hope. . . . That’s all they had.” In fact, many equated ethnic organization, especially Soren, with ethnicity and homeland. Although he acknowledges diversity—the Japanized Koreans who supported the Japanese war effort and the entrepreneurially successful Mindan members—he is committed to the singular narrative of exploitation, suffering, and resistance. He can only describe the first-generation Zainichi “who were forced to remain in Japan” as having led lives of serious “suffering in the situation of Japanese political and economic confusion.” When he points to the problems of the Zainichi community, such as patriarchy and the dysfunctional family, he is quick to trace their cause to Japanese imperialism.
Generational transition began in the early 1970s. The idea of “to live as Zainichi” criticized the first generation’s homeland orientation and emerged as a self-conscious appellation in the late 1970s. Recognizing that there was no realistic possibility of return in the immediate future yet insisting on the impossibility of naturalization, Yoon had earlier advocated a “permanent” status of permanent residency. Neither Japanese nor Korean, Zainichi constitute a relatively autonomous diasporic culture. The category of the diaspora is appealing precisely because it points to the possibility of an independent existence. Zainichi ideology, then, is a form of diasporic nationalism.

Yoon is acutely conscious of the economic and social diversity of younger Zainichi and their contrast to the first generation: better educated but largely ignorant of the Korean language, increasingly atomized and fragmented rather than being concentrated in the Korean ghettos, and much more diverse than the largely monochromatic first generation. He speculates that Zainichi consciousness is based less on genealogy or tradition and more on the “strongly rooted discrimination of Japanese society.” “To live as ‘Zainichi’ is to live in opposition to discrimination,” though he again traces its cause to Japanese imperialism.

Unification of the two Koreas and of the Zainichi population remains the essential goal for Zainichi in particular and Koreans in general. Some Zainichi intellectuals insist on the category *Chosen* as a nationality. As Kim Sokpom argues, unification is the “ultimate task” of Zainichi and the advocacy of *Chosen* nationality is an expression of the Zainichi commitment to unified Korea. Knowing full well that such a country does not exist, a character in Lee Hoesung’s story “Ikitsumodoritsu” admits that it is “simply a sign,” but one that seeks to “transcend the era of division [bundan jidai].” The commitment to unification in theory is in turn related to greater ideals that were once associated with Marxism and communism, such as peace and progress. Rather grandiosely, Zainichi ideology strives for the ethnic sublime: the desire for praxis and ultimate universalism.
In summary, Yoon suggests two basic preconditions for being Zainichi: first, “to think about the meaning of being Zainichi, to protect the pride of ethnicity, and strive to gain citizens’ rights”; and, second, “to be involved in some way in unification.” To be Zainichi means to reflect on Zainichi-ness and to seek unification: to retain historical memory and critique of Japanese imperialism, to sustain oppositional consciousness that is tantamount to anti-Japanese sentiments, and to resist assimilation and naturalization. Zainichi ideology inherited the Soren critique of Japanese imperialism and fervent essentialist ethnonationalism, but rejected its partisan loyalty to the North and homeland orientation.

Yoon’s formulation of Zainichi ideology does not command universal assent, but many of his points were reiterated by leading Zainichi intellectuals in the last quarter of the twentieth century. An overview of Zainichi history, for example, discusses the “common consciousness” forged by the historical experience of liberation and independence, the shared desire to repatriate and to build a new country, and the overarching goal of unification. Beyond a consensus on Zainichi historiography—the narrative of forced migration, exploitation and discrimination, and heroic resistance—there are shared political goals. In seeking an alternative beyond repatriation (at least in the short run) and assimilation, the impetus is to create, promote, and protect a distinct Zainichi culture. Sustaining ethnocultural pride means rejecting repatriation and assimilation.

**Zainichi Ideology and Its Discontents**

Zainichi ideology is a form of diasporic nationalism. Like Japanese or South Korean monoethnic nationalism, it envisions the ethnonational group as homogeneous. The conflation of the individual and the collective—ontogeny recapitulating phylogeny—and the inevitably political nature of Zainichi existence that legitimate propounders and protectors of Zainichi identity to prescribe and proscribe Zainichi belief and action.

As an ethnic imperative, Zainichi ideology defines the terms and theories of Zainichi identity. Private meditations necessarily draw on historically and sociologically given categories and concepts. The very prevalence of Zainichi identity rests on the dissemination of Zainichi as a category of both population and thought. There are, then, inevitably ethnic entrepreneurs or identity intellectuals who propose what it means to a representative member of the proposed group. They are *tuteurs* of the people: at once teaching them and protecting them. Inventors and guardians of identity prescribe and proscribe actions and beliefs, even going so far as to judge who belongs to the group in the name of the people. In the case of formal organizations such as Soren, there were explicit norms and institutional means to mandate conformity. Dissidents were reprimanded and even expelled. In the case of Zainichi ideology, however, there were no formal organizations to articulate beliefs or to supervise behavior. Instead, identity intellectuals spoke and wrote on behalf of their co-ethnics to the mainstream Japanese media and organizations, which in turn purveyed their ideas to the co-ethnic audience. Zainichi ideology was widely discussed and disseminated in informal clubs and groups or by isolated individual readers, most frequently in universities. The declining hold of the mainline ethnic organizations generated an audience to receive the reformed ideology of Zainichi identity.
In promoting diasporic nationalism, Zainichi ideology erects a prison-house of Zainichi-ness, a collective confinement to ethnic essentialism. Beyond establishing the fundamental pillars of Zainichi identity, it also projects an idealized Zainichi self that mirrors Zainichi historiography: the dialectics of oppression and resistance, poverty and struggle. It also prescribes, like Soren ideology, cultural nationalism, such as learning Korean language, history, and culture, and retains instinctive suspicion of Japan and discourages assimilation.

Whatever the individual articulation of the ideal Zainichi self, it is clear that many fell short of it. It was something of a common sense among Zainichi in the 1970s and 1980s that there was a natural hierarchy. In one classification, the top are the activists, with a command of Korean; the middle are those with ethnic pride and a knowledge of Zainichi history and ideology; and the bottom are the vast majority, with Japanese names. In one of Lee Yangji’s earliest essays, she writes of “not knowing true poverty, the shame of not knowing.” Reminiscent of Simone Weil, Lee in fact confesses her deviation from what she takes to be the prototypical Zainichi experience of poverty and discrimination that she missed as a middle-class, naturalized Japanese girl. Even as Zainichi may have faced harassment from classmates or police officers, the specter of Panchoppuli—of being incomplete, or failed, Zainichi—weighed heavily, at times forcefully pounded in by bullying fellow Zainichi students at Soren schools. Many Zainichi, in effect, failed to be Korean or Zainichi. Language was an insurmountable hurdle for many. The second-generation Zainichi Kim Hiro, who “speaks Japanese better than Japanese” but did not know any Korean, regarded his “generation” as a “deformity.” If the Korean language proved to be an unrealistic parameter of Zainichi-ness, then the critical criteria were the adoption of one’s ethnic name and the resistance to naturalization.

The presumption that any “decent” Zainichi should use one’s Korean name led the critic Takeda Seiji to use a Japanese pseudonym: his act of resistance to Zainichi ideology. Kyo Nobuko found the argument against naturalization—the impossibility of maintaining ethnic Korean, or Zainichi, identity as a Japanese citizen—deeply problematic.

Zainichi ideology valorizes and validates some people at the expense of others. Prewar, pro-Japanese ethnic Koreans are uniformly reviled, as are those who do not condemn the evils of Japanese imperialism. Ethnic Koreans who have become Japanese citizens are also beyond the pale. Just as the postwar ethnic Korean organizations sought to distance themselves from the crimes of Ri Chin’u and Kim Hiro, Zainichi ideologists criticize or exclude those who do not fit into their scheme of Zainichi history and identity. The hold of Zainichi ideology can be seen in the received understanding of Zainichi literature, which almost always excludes the author Yasumoto Sueko, even though her Nianchan (1958) is the book by a Zainichi writer on Zainichi life that has reached the largest Japanese readership. Japanese literary scholars, to be sure, make a cardinal distinction between “pure” [jun] and “popular” [taisho] literature; Nianchan, if only because of its vast readership, is not really literature in this line of thinking which valorizes the Dear Pyongyang: an award-winning documentary that is part of a reconsideration of Zainichi affinity toward North Korea
“pure”. Yet it is nonetheless surprising to find a systematic effacement of the best-selling postwar book by a Zainichi author.

Much the same can be said about Ijuin Shizuka’s Bildungsroman *Kaikyo* trilogy [Strait, 1991–2000]. Although peopled by non-Japanese characters and written by a self-identified ethnic Korean, Ijuin’s œuvre is usually excluded from the discussion of Zainichi literature because of its overtly apolitical nature and popular orientation. The mystery writer Rei Ra is similarly excluded from the ambit of Zainichi literature. The valorization of the political and the collective eschewed the stress on the personal and the private: hence, the critical praise for the work of Kim Sokpom and Lee Hoesung over that of Kin Kakuei. Not surprisingly, the champion of Kin’s work has been Takeda Seiji, a self-conscious rebel against Zainichi ideology. Yet those who remained faithful to Soren, such as Yi Unjik (1967–68) and his epic trilogy on the politics of Korean liberation, are also neglected. Narrow is the gate to Zainichi-ness.

As a form of diasporic nationalism, Zainichi ideology, like Soren ideology, rejects the category of ethnic minority. Soren ideology postulated that ethnic Koreans were to repatriate. Zainichi ideology does not share the ideology of return (at least in the short run) but it also rejects Japan as *Heimat*. Indeed, anti-Japanese sentiments may be more fiercely expressed among Zainichi ideologists than Soren ideologists, presumably because Soren ideology beckoned Zainichi to look to North Korea whereas Zainichi ideology forces Zainichi to consider Japan as a more or less permanent domicile. Kim Sokpom regarded anti-Japanese sentiments as a critical pillar of his life philosophy. Suh Kyung Sik characterizes Zainichi as “half” refugees in the title of his book. Elsewhere, he categorizes them as “nation” rather than “ethnicity.” Beyond the conceptual confusion, the category of ethnic minority is rejected in order to avoid the incorporation of Zainichi in Japanese society. Yet the ideological resistance faces the recalcitrant reality of cultural assimilation. The similar distance between ideology and reality can be seen in Zainichi ideology’s valorization of unification.

The misrecognition characteristic of Zainichi ideology, with its essentialist categories, extends to its genealogy and development. Generational distinctions and transitions are Zainichi clichés,
which of course means that the thesis has a grain of truth. Most obviously, first-generation Zainichi with roots to the Korean peninsula—and the mastery of Korean language—are differentiated from second-generation Zainichi without any experience growing up in Korea or having Korean as the natal tongue. Yet these schematic classifications obfuscate more than illuminate. Kim Dalsu, born in colonial Korea in 1919, in fact had no choice but to write in Japanese. Kim Sokpom was born only six years later but in Osaka. Though Lee Hoesung and Kin Kakuei are coevals—born in 1935 and 1938, respectively—their attitudes toward ethnic identification could hardly be called alike. Kin presciently pointed to a position beyond repatriation or naturalization and uncannily illuminated the instability or even the impossibility of solid and stable identity. At the same time, Lee Hoesung sounded nationalist and socialist tunes. Yet one does not necessarily reprise youthful melodies. By the mid-1990s, Lee registered completely different notes, singing paeans to diasporic solidarity. A few years later, he became a naturalized South Korean. Yan Sogiru’s thinly veiled fictional double muses, “I was born in Japan, a second-generation Zainichi who grew up in Japan,” but is baffled to be taken as a first-generation figure. He concedes that perhaps he is close to the first generation, though he does not speak Korean well and feels viscerally different from them. Concrete but fluctuating self-conceptions and the inevitable diversity of the population hew poorly to the line of Zainichi-ness adumbrated by Zainichi ideology.

**Zainichi Ideology, Zainichi Diversity**

Against diversity and dynamism, Zainichi ideology posed a party line that was impervious to deviations and transformations in Zainichi thinking about themselves and their places in Japan. Quite simply, the majority of the Zainichi by the late 1970s did not belong to Soren; they also had little interest in homeland politics. The modal Zainichi existence by then was not one of pathetic poverty and corrosive disrecognition. Far from being a solidaristic and homogeneous population, Zainichi were separated and diverse.

Ancestry is a rather thin and fragile basis to build an identity and a culture. Hence, the stress remained very much on imagined commonalities, such as the history of enforced migration, the sociology of ethnic discrimination, and the political ideal of unification. Yet a more solid, thick foundation for identification was lacking. In the prewar period, Korean language was the lingua franca among immigrants who lived in relatively isolated communities. In the immediate postwar decades, ethnic organizations, especially Soren, provided the infrastructure to protect their rights or facilitate sociality and uplift. By the 1970s, however, language or community, religion or culture did not unite ethnic Koreans. Hence the importance of clinging to shards of the remembered past and the declining but undeniable reality of discrimination constituted Zainichi solidarity. Yet the path of ex-Soren intellectuals and movement participants was often orthogonal to that of the silent majority who were neither professional intellectuals nor committed activists. There is more: whereas the Soren leadership could legitimate, whether through North Korea or itself, its right to represent the membership (and at a stretch the Zainichi population), there was no compelling rationale for Zainichi ideologists to represent the Zainichi population. Those who grew up before the war were, with some frequency, unschooled and even illiterate. They may be highly articulate and eloquent but, whether by inclination, habit, or force, they rarely expressed their idiosyncratic outlooks ahead of those of the mainline ethnic organizations. In contrast, those who came of age in the 1960s and later were not only schooled and literate but—sharing in the prevailing Japanese belief in democratic rights and individual
dignity—were willing and capable of expressing their own views. They could and did represent themselves.

Recent Zainichi narratives corroborate the systematic deviation of Zainichi voices from Zainichi ideology. They are exemplary not in the sense of expressing a random or representative sample, or of being the best and the most noble expressions of Zainichi people, but, rather, because they articulate individual experiences without excessive recourse to preconceived categories or received formulas.

Hwang Mingi grew up in a poor area of Osaka notable for a concentration of ethnic Koreans. Living in a tenement house [nagaya] in an ethnic enclave, his family and their neighbors experienced a strong sense of community, remarkably devoid of a sense of victimization or of what some social scientists call the culture of poverty. He is critical of poverty tourists, who portray the Korean neighborhood as a site of otherness. Beyond the conglomeration of ethnic Koreans, unlike Chinatown in Yokohama or Harlem in New York, “the town has no special characteristics.” For him, the area is simply where he grew up and for which he has fond memories.

Hwang nowhere discusses his Korean or Zainichi identity, but his childhood cannot be understood apart from the situation and concern of the Zainichi population. The news of the 1958 Komatsugawa Incident deeply disturbs his father, and affects him and his buddies enough to stop them when they see the image of Ri Chin’u on television in the streets. Teachers in his school appear to know the real (Korean) names of Hwang and his friends, even though they use Japanese names. Although the four “heroes” of his childhood are all ethnic Koreans—”Queen” Misora Hibari (singer), “Emperor” Kaneda Masaichi (baseball star), “Don” Yanagigawa Jiro (a local yakuza boss), and “Japan’s brilliant star” Rikidozan (wrestling champion)—they are not explicitly identified as being of Korean descent. It is difficult to discern whether they are heroes because of their Korean ethnicity, or because they are able to succeed in “ordinary” Japanese society in spite of their ethnicity. Certainly, the fact of Korean descent marks the lives of Hwang and his friends. One boyhood acquaintance takes part in the repatriation project, another commits suicide (possibly over the breakup of a relationship, which may have been due to his Korean descent), and yet another joins an ethnic Korean yakuza.

Nonetheless, Zainichi life is immersed in the larger Japanese society. Popular culture references in fact would not have distinguished Hwang and his friends from most other Japanese youths at the time. They constantly talk about the popular superhero series Gekko kamen [Moonlight mask] and Hollywood movies and stars such as Elizabeth Taylor and Audrey Hepburn. Explicitly Korean names and events are “foreign” to them: the North Korean Foreign Minister Nam Il becomes “nameru” [to lick or, as slang, to make fun of]. Even the adoration of violence and the allure of gang life give way to the valorization of the intellect and educational attainment in the context of “the extinction of ‘dirtiness’ and ‘poverty’” in the neighborhood in particular and Japan in general during the era of rapid economic growth. From their seemingly unpromising beginnings as juvenile delinquents, some of
Hwang’s friends become successful: one becomes a medical doctor, Hwang becomes an “intellectual of sorts.” As one of his friends tells Hwang: “At the funeral, I felt first that I am not Korean [Chosenjin]. And confirmed that I don’t want to and couldn’t die like my father. . . . I haven’t chosen Japan. I merely ceased being Korean [Kankokujin].”

Having come of age in the late 1950s, Hwang and his friends are unquestionably Zainichi, even as meditations on Zainichi identity remain peripheral. He claims that he is far from special; he was neither physically powerful nor intellectually brilliant. His childhood is characterized by experiences of boyhood solidarity—jokes and pranks. Growing up in an ethnic neighborhood, he experiences Korean and Japanese people and cultures. Yet when he returns to his hometown, he finds massive changes in the neighborhood, which is replete with “new Zainichi from South Korea and Japanese people with Korean interests.” This disappearance of the past is the background of Gen Getsu’s “Kage no sumika” [The habitat of shadows, 1999], where the patriarch is one of the few prewar Koreans left and the past is literally crumbling. Yet, as Hwang realizes, what remains are uncertain recollections: “I learned that my memory of place names, personal names, and of the time was almost completely unreliable.”

Unlike Hwang, Kyo Nobuko was reared in an affluent Yokohama household. As a child, she had virtually no knowledge of the Korean language, very little familiarity with Korean culture, and little contact with other ethnic Koreans. Celebrating New Year’s Day with her ethnic Japanese husband, she can only count the Korean-style rice cake and a diluted form of ancestor worship [chesa] as marks of her Koreanness. She cannot, for example, answer elementary questions about Korean culture. She cannot, for that matter, eat “authentic” (i.e., spicy) Korean food.

Kyo cannot but ponder the meaning of being Zainichi (more accurately, Zainichi Kankokujin, associated with South Korea), but in temporally distinct ways. She harbored distinct emotional reactions to her ethnic identity. As a child, she was thrilled to learn that she was a “foreigner,” but by the time she reached fourth grade she reckoned: “Perhaps it is a bad thing that I am Korean. Perhaps I should hide it.” She was never bullied in school, but she used a Japanese name. When her classmate suspects that she may be of Korean descent, she lies about being “mixed-blooded” [haafu], from a Korean father and Japanese mother. Slightly later, she begins to “avoid and forget” about South Korea and “becomes angry at Japanese.” By the time she is in high school, she feels close to, but “fears that she would be beaten up” by fellow ethnic Korean high-school students. At the University of Tokyo, she uses her Korean name and becomes interested in Korean affairs and culture. However, she is alienated from the prevailing enthusiasm for Marxism, nationalism, and the “deification” of ethnicity. She disagrees with other Zainichi students who advocate unification and condemn assimilation.

Kyp’s narrative places her apart from Koreans, Japanese, and Zainichi. She becomes “conscious of the long distance between South Korea and her” when she realizes that “surprisingly, the place name of my grandfather’s place of origin has disappeared.” She is ignorant of both North and South Korea; both are “foreign countries.” She is comfortable in Japan but she can neither shed the past—stories of Japanese misdeeds toward South Koreans that her grandmother told her—nor stop worrying about the future—such as the possibility of worsening Japanese–South Korean relations. In between, her friends drop derogatory comments about Zainichi. She finds herself in trouble when she confronts the authorities without her Certificate of Alien Registration. Her desire to become a teacher is dashed when she realizes that non-Japanese nationals are excluded from the profession. She faces employment discrimination despite her stellar academic record as
a graduate of the prestigious Law Faculty at the University of Tokyo. As much as she feels close to her ethnic Japanese husband, she is aware of how ignorant he is—and, by extension, other ethnic Japanese are—about such Zainichi issues as employment discrimination. Yet she cannot identify with other Zainichi students, especially those who are proud of their “ethnicity” [minzoku]. One of them exclaims: “I cannot forgive those who naturalize. They are not human beings. They shouldn’t live.” She is aware that some Zainichi believe that, along with naturalization, “marrying Japanese is to betray ethnicity,” but she hesitates only briefly before marrying her Japanese husband.

Kyo’s “policy is to live naturally without hiding my Zainichi status.” And she insists on the desirability of living “normally” [futsu]. “It is not my style to raise my voice in protest or to live quietly without saying anything. I don’t pretend to be Japanese, and I don’t stress my ethnicity. I want to lead an ordinary life in Japan as Zainichi.” She goes so far as to regard her group as a “new species of humanity,” despite her alienation from many other Zainichi youths. At one point, she regards the difference in their nationality as something akin to “being tall, looking good in green, having an extroverted personality.” Her attempt to downplay ethnic distance or to live “normally” [futsu] is problematic. If nothing else, her Tokyo University diploma makes her even more distinct from ordinary Japanese people than the fact of her Korean descent. She nonetheless insists on her identity as a not particularly exceptional individual. As in the title of her book, she is an “ordinary Zainichi,” although she considers herself to be quite different from other Zainichi college students.

Yu Miri’s 1997 narrative Mizube no yurikago [Cradle by the waterside] begins in doubt and ends by affirming the fictive nature of the past. She is born into a family of secrets; she is not sure of her father’s age or whether her mother was born in Japan. Her parents’ past is a “dark tunnel” that is closed on both ends by “silence.” Her family life, which is a constant theme in her plays and stories, was tempestuous—a violent father, a mother who runs off with another man—but she acknowledges that she was loved by parents, even incurring her sister’s envy. She grew up playing with Rika-chan dolls (Japanese Barbie dolls), but her childhood was marked by her exclusion from group life. Other pupils bullied her from early on, the first time in kindergarten when she came with a different hairstyle. In part she blames herself for being unfit for group life. “I was conceited and I thought that I was a chosen person. I thought I was special.” At the same time, bullying seems inextricable from her Korean ancestry: “For me, bullying and kimchi are somehow linked.”
Yu characterizes herself as a runaway [*toposha*], as someone who flees not to hide but simply to run away. Her adolescence—though common enough among adolescents—is a series of shameful, embarrassing moments and memories. She is ashamed of her aunt, whom one of her friends mistakes for a beggar, as well as the meager lunch she takes to school. She is troubled by her mother taking up a lover and abandoning home for days at a time. Enrolling in a prestigious middle school at her mother’s request, she merely yearns to leave. Although she finds friends from time to time, she feels closer to dead writers than to any living people. “I was closer to the dead than to the living. In my bag were books by [the poet] Nakahara Nakaya and [the novelist] Dazai Osamu, and I could only talk easily with the dead. The living inevitably hurt me, but the dead forgave and cured me.” She develops a crush on a classmate but is rebuffed: “I don’t know what I wanted from her. It was not to become closer or to touch her body or to be touched. Thinking about it now, perhaps I was inviting her to die with me.” She “woke up every morning with self-hatred and regret. I didn’t know what I hated and regretted but in any case I hated everything. I wanted to cut my ties to family and school and drop out of life.” The desire to drop out manifests itself in skipping school, running away from home, and attempting to kill herself. After she is expelled, she contemplates immigrating to the United States.

Yu’s memoir is motivated by a long-standing desire to bury her past. When she moves from her elementary school, her homeroom teacher gives her an antique music box and a handkerchief. She buries them, because “I wanted to change, to become a different person. I didn’t need souvenirs.” Certainly, there are many eminently forgettable memories: a neighbor who molests her, classmates who engage in vicious pranks, and other acts of inhumanity and betrayal. But she also writes in part because she wants to create her own “reality.” Joining a theater company, she discovers the “possibility of rewriting my past.” She decided to write her memoir while in her twenties because she wanted to “leave herself far behind,” to entomb the past. She ends on an ambiguous note: “everything is a fact, everything is a lie.” Her memoir is a “sedimentation of words.”

These narratives are Japanese not only in the (by no means trivial) sense that they are written in Japanese, but also in the deeper sense that they presume broad familiarity with Japanese culture. Precisely because popular-culture names, events, and objects are ephemeral and particular, they provide robust sources of identification with a concrete time and place. Furthermore, they exemplify Japanese cultural repertoire. The postwar idea of cultural homogeneity valorized the ideal of normalness or ordinariness [*futsu*], at once an expression of egalitarianism and a rejection of prewar heroics. Kim Hyandoja, for example, opens her book by stating that there is “nothing particularly special about my way of living or thinking. . . . I am a particularly ordinary [*goku futsu*] Zainichi.” However far apart in their upbringing and outlook, Hwang and Kyo both regard themselves as not just “ordinary” but “particularly ordinary.” Around the time Kyo wrote her recollections, I was at a Tokyo restaurant where my affiliation with the University of Tokyo was mentioned. Middle-aged women at the next table promptly stopped their conversation, turned to me, and then begged me to tutor their children. My fifteen seconds’ worth of celebrity
expresses the unusually high regard in which that university has been held in the postwar era. Hwang’s childhood is also anything but “ordinary” for contemporary Japanese people. Only Yu is conscious of her difference and her alienation from group life, but her life is unusual from any perspective.

What in fact unites these three writers beyond their Japanese provenance? The pervasiveness of disrecognition seeps into various spheres of social life. But the reception of discrimination is far from uniform. Neither Hwang nor Kyo mentions being bullied. Although Yo is convinced that bullying and her Korean ancestry are intertwined, she is far from certain that ethnic discrimination is primary. Recall De Vos and Lee’s generalization about Zainichi family alienation. Yu appears to be a paradigmatic case. The violent father is an enduring character type in Zainichi literature, but Yu’s love for him differentiates him from Kin Kakuei’s or Yan Sogiru’s patriarchs. But Hwang’s and Kyo’s narratives do not fit very well into De Vos and Lee’s scheme. Kyo’s seems deviant precisely in achieving the exalted but rarely realized state of agape among family members.

The structure of biography is biology: a prosaic and predictable trajectory from birth to death. It would be odd indeed not to encounter numerous points of similarity among coevals in the same society. Yet diversity, not uniformity, marks the narratives. Consider the question of ethnic identity. Although Kyo struggles with it, she feels alienated from Zainichi who are passionate about Zainichi causes. Hwang, in contrast, is keenly aware of being Korean, but because he grew up in a Korean neighborhood he does not probe its significance. In a different way, YÅ‘s sense of self literally makes her a character from a play, endowed with certain propensities, such as the desire to flee, but unmarked by her ethnic heritage or Japanese racism.

If we consider the impact of Korean or Japanese culture, then we again find no obvious commonality. In Hwang’s world, Korean and Zainichi cultures and events appear here and there. In contrast, Kyo grew up ignorant of Korean and even Zainichi culture. Yu grew up playing with Rika-chan dolls and communicating with dead male Japanese writers. Although almost always described as a Zainichi writer, her literary ancestry betrays almost no Zainichi influence. Diversity also manifests itself in naming preferences. Hwang is a Korean pronunciation of a Korean name. Yu is a Japanese rendition of a Korean name. Kyo Nobuko has a Japanese reading of a Korean surname and a common Japanese given name (though possibly Korean) in Japanese pronunciation. Another woman uses the Korean reading of a Korean surname with a more or less purely Japanese given name: “although my identity is Korean, I am completely different from Koreans in the homeland. I am Zainichi. I am almost like a different ethnicity. And I have Japanese nationality.”
Hwang, Kyo, and Yu are Zainichi, but they reveal little commonality. Surely, we can seek their differences in part in their divergent backgrounds: gender, region, class, and so on. These social differences exist alongside different courses and contours of their lives. But this is precisely the point. Beyond the sheer diversity of Zainichi professions and personalities, genders and generations, likes and dislikes, we should not forget that an individual is neither unitary and homogeneous nor stationary and unchanging. Virginia Woolf observes in *Orlando* that “a biography is considered complete if it merely accounts for six or seven selves, whereas a person may well have as many as a thousand.” Although “the conscious self . . . wishes to be nothing but one self . . . ‘the true self,’” it cannot squelch distinct moments and conflicting recollections, ambiguities and multiplicities. Kyo would expend considerable time studying and living in South Korea, and thereafter exploring the distinct trajectories of the Korean diaspora across Asia. Yu would also learn Korean and go on to write novels and stories with strong Korean and Zainichi themes and characters. In other words, temporal transformation is commonplace. Kim Kyongdok, who was the first non-Japanese citizen to become an attorney in postwar Japan, wrote when he was thirty-six years old that he was only thirteen years old as a Korean. This is because “I used a pseudonym (Japanese name) until I was twenty-three and pretended to live as a Japanese person”; he was, then, “non-Korean” for the first twenty-three years of his life. Only in college did he come to affirm his ethnic ancestry and identity. After becoming an attorney, he spent over three years studying in South Korea “as the next step to regaining my ethnicity.” Kim Hiro is often regarded as a hero of ethnic pride or a criminal of violent sensibility. After 1968, he spent some thirty-two years as a “model” prisoner and seemed to be leading a fulfilling life in Seoul when he committed another violent crime. Recidivism notwithstanding, he married again and sought to seek “love” as a way of life. Whatever the truths about Kim Hiro, it doesn’t make much sense to call him essentially this, that, or other.

Zainichi diversity goes well beyond these narratives. Whereas Lee Chongja articulates Zainichi identity through classical Japanese poetic forms, other Zainichi writers avoid the question altogether. Among the latter, some, such as Ijuin Shizuka, do not hide their Korean descent, while others do. Some Zainichi writers explore the historical legacy of Japanese imperialism, but others wish to transcend the past. Consider music. Some Zainichi eagerly take up traditional Korean music and recite *sinse t’aryong*. Kyo feels that *sinse t’aryong* “that is full of ethnic feelings is not for her,” but she would also explore traditional Korean music after her initial meditation on her Zainichi identity. Chon Wolson, a second-generation Zainichi who attended Soren schools, is an opera singer, whereas Ryu Yong-gi, a third-generation Zainichi who studied at a seminary, is a hip-hop singer. Both experienced discrimination as Zainichi but it would be difficult to generate useful generalizations from their shared background or experience. To say that they are musicians is rendered nearly meaningless by the distance separating the two genres of opera and hip-hop.
The search for the least common denominators of Zainichi identity is futile. Although certain common questions are raised, they are answered in distinct ways. To the extent that there are convergences, they teeter on becoming rather generic to all human beings. Zainichi ideology, like the earlier nationalist allegiance to North or South Korea, proffered an essentialist understanding of the self, such that Kim Dalsu could write: “In my case, experience in literature means, needless to say, experience as Zainichi.” The confident “needless to say” contrasts with the brash pronouncement of post-Zainichi self-representations in writers such as Gen Getsu or Kaneshiro Kazuki. Rather, beyond Korean ancestry, what dominates Zainichi writings is the broad background of Japanese society. Viewing the animated manga “Kyojin no hoshi” [The star of the Giants], Shin Sugok experiences a shock of recognition viewing a paradigmatic scene I mentioned earlier—the drunk and violent father overturns the dining table and slaps the protagonist—and wonders whether the family is not in fact Zainichi. Wherever Zainichi turned, there was Japan. Although many commentators see in Zainichi suicides their secret anguish as Zainichi, suicide is much more in the Japanese cultural repertoire than in the Korean. Most encompassing was the language. When the pioneering Zainichi writer Kim Dalsu observes that “experience in literature means, needless to say, experience as Zainichi,” he elides the fundamental condition of his authorship: his inescapable reliance on the Japanese language. As the Zainichi poet Kim Sijong remarked: “Japanese—Japanese that is a foreign language—created the foundation of my consciousness.”

Paradoxically, the absence of essences does not abjure the necessity of cognition and recognition. Repressing the inevitable questions of identity in a society of disrecognition is liable to generate the revenge of the repressed or, more mundanely, misrecognition and disrecognition. The protagonist of Gen Getsu’s Oshaberina inu [Talkative dog, 2003] insists, “For me, it doesn’t matter ‘who I am.’” As much as he attempts to be a former Zainichi—though he insists that he is “not ‘former’ anything”—he cannot help but conclude that his impotence is related to his status as a “former” Zainichi. The aforementioned Kim Kyongdok recalls that: “[I] could not comprehend the background of Koreans’ poverty and fighting, the illegitimacy of Japanese discrimination. . . . [I] wanted merely to flee from everything Korean.” Certainly, the “inferiority complex” of being Korean or Zainichi in Japan is a commonplace recollection among the Zainichi baby boomers.

If we can identify Zainichi essences, they reside in the two terms of their category—Korean descent and Japanese livelihood—and in the persistence of Japanese discrimination that does not allow people of Korean descent to be legitimately Japanese or assume a new form of hybrid identity. The dominant belief in Japanese monoethnicity stipulates that to be Japanese means inevitably to be ethnic Japanese. Pace Kyo’s title, then, it was impossible to be “ordinary” (Korean) Japanese when she was growing up in the 1960s and 1970s. Given that hybridity and heterogeneity had no place in the dominant Japanese discourse in the postwar period, the fact of Korean descent renders necessary the individual and collective struggles for a viable place and identity in contemporary Japanese society for Zainichi. That Zainichi sometimes struggle together does not mean, however, that there is a simple, static, and homogeneous ethnic identity.

Identity as Diversity

Why should we expect perhaps a million people of Korean descent in Japan to be homogeneous? What more can we say than that they share the category of Korean descent and their cultural
citizenship in Japan? And how important should these factors be in the personal definition of contemporary Zainichi people? How many people would have their epitaph be “Zainichi”?

There was a growing group of Japanese-born Koreans already by the late 1930s. As self-serving and culturally imperialistic as prewar Japanese policies were, efforts to integrate and assimilate ethnic Koreans engendered a cadre who identified themselves as Japanese government officials, military officers, and intellectuals. Class differentiation, not surprisingly, separated the privileged and educated Koreans from their impoverished and illiterate counterparts. Gender and generation, region of origin as well as of destination, fractured the presumed unity of ethnic Korean identity. Whether one considers the length of stay or the vagaries of individual experience, it is bewildering to believe that there should be anything so singular about the Korean experience even during the colonial period. As a youth (around 1940), O Rimjun read a Japanese book that depicted virtuous Koreans. He was moved by the story—and could not detect any racial prejudice—but he also empathized deeply with ordinary Japanese people in other stories. It would be facile to consider O as a brainwashed pro-Japanese traitor, but there is no doubt that that category included many ethnic Koreans. The eminent South Korean poet Kim So-un spent some thirty-two years in Japan and recalls “good Japanese people” who redeemed the country for him, despite colonial racism and the dominant anti-Japanese ideology in South Korea of the 1970s and 1980s. O and Kim are hardly a small minority of national traitors and ethnic betrayers.

By the early twenty-first century, there were still significant barriers in terms of employment, marriage, and civic participation for Zainichi. However, it is safe to conclude that they did not constitute a uniformly inferior group. Furthermore, many of them were second-, third-, and even fourth-generation Japanese residents who grew up speaking Japanese, watching Japanese television, playing with Japanese children, attending Japanese schools, and so on, such that virtually the sole source of social differentiation from ethnic Japanese is the fact of Korean descent. Even in the case of those who attended and still identify with the North Korea–affiliated schools and organizations, the overwhelming cultural influence was often no different from that of other Japanese children. As the North Korea orientation of Soren-affiliated schools waned, the fact of cultural Japaneseness became all the more inescapable. For all the incidents of Japanese intolerance and even racism—such as the 1994 Chimachogori Incident, in which female ethnic school pupils’ ethnic costumes were slashed—Soren schools were known and even admired by the Japanese public for their athletic prowess.

In making sense of a racial, ethnic, or national group—categories of modern peoplehood—one usually looks to language, religion, or custom and culture. Yet Zainichi lacked these elementary bases of distinction from the larger Japanese society by the 1970s. Second-generation Zainichi were Japanese speakers. Although Soren school graduates knew a great deal of the Korean language, they effectively spoke the Soren language, thereby distinguishing themselves from both native North and South Koreans. The basic fact, however, was that they were inevitably much more comfortable in wielding their native Japanese-language facility. By the time a new generation of Korean migrants arrived from South Korea in the 1980s, there were no major concentrations of ethnic Koreans where Korean was the lingua franca.

Religion did not separate Zainichi from ethnic Japanese, either. One may plausibly suggest that Soren followers practiced a form of secular religion, but in the postwar decades there were many committed Japanese communists who were at once like Soren communists and unlike other
Japanese people. Although Shinto adherents were unlikely to be Zainichi, the major world
religions, ranging from Buddhism to Christianity, had faithfuls among both ethnic Korean and
ethnic Japanese populations. First-generation Koreans engaged in ethnically distinct Buddhist
temples and other ritual practices, but they were clearly on the wane by the 1980s. Prewar ethnic
Koreans tended to practice rituals of ancestor worship [chesa]. Although almost universally
practiced by the first generation, the Confucian ritual became vitiated and transformed under
successive generations. Younger Zainichi either simplified or abandoned chesa.

Finally, custom and culture—from food and clothing to material and cultural consumption—
poorly differentiated ethnic Koreans from ethnic Japanese. Already by the 1940s, ethnic
Koreans’ public appearance was similar to their ethnic Japanese counterparts. Ethnic costume
was primarily worn by the elderly and women, who tended to stay within the perimeters of
ethnic Korean ghettos. The Zainichi novelist Lee Hoesung wore traditional Korean clothes
[hanbok] for the first time in his mid-sixties, in 2001. The propensity to use garlic and chili or to
barbecue meat rendered Korean cuisine distinct from the Japanese. The Japanese-born Korean-
Canadian writer Ook Chung has the narrator remark: “I understood that I was Korean the day I
discovered that I couldn’t do without kimchi.” Or, as the Zainichi writer Shin Sugok notes, the
desire to eat kimchi is “the proof of my grandmother’s existence.” To be sure, we have already
encountered Pak and Kyo, who did not consume kimchi regularly, and it is a common Zainichi
experience to find “real” Korean food too “spicy.” Sagisawa Megumu retrospectively identifies
her family’s signature dish as a permutation of the Korean p’ajon (savory pancake): an
unacknowledged trace of her hidden Korean ancestry. Yet in the course of the postwar decades
there was a striking convergence. Ethnic Koreans adapted to local produce and cuisine; ethnic
Japanese, especially after the 1980s, found foreign cuisine delectable. By then, ethnic costume
was worn on special occasions and by female students attending Soren schools. Although there
were ethnic Korean publications and media, most second-generation Zainichi were weaned on
Japanese popular culture. The prevalence of Zainichi stars in sports and music may have
generated co-ethnic preferences, but Rikidozan and Miyako Harumi were representative
Japanese celebrities.

The undeniable source of distinction was ancestry, recorded in family registries and official
documents, and the readily available marker was name. Koseki and tsumei constituted the two
weak links in any Zainichi effort to pass as ordinary Japanese. Furthermore, given the pervasive
prejudice and discrimination against people of Korean descent in Japan, the fact of Korean
descent has a significant impact on Zainichi identity.

Yet ancestry or descent do not pass on as a homogeneous trace. Many Zainichi belong to ethno-
political organizations, but many are regionally based, such as those for Zainichi people from
Chejudo. The relative autonomy of Chejudo identity—certainly distinct culturally from their
mainland Korean counterparts—manifests itself frequently in assertions of difference from other
Zainichi and Koreans. Regional diversity made a mockery of the essentialist claim of
Koreanness.

Other social conditions, such as economic or regional background, vary tremendously. What
unites Son Masayoshi, Japan’s wealthiest man of Korean origin, and a homeless, and socially
faceless, Zainichi man? Or consider regional diversity within Japan: a Zainichi man who grew up
in Tokyo writes of Zainichi in Osaka as people “who are clearly a different species, an alien
cultural group.” When he first went to Ikaino (a Korean area in Osaka), he wondered whether he
was still in Japan. Yet Ikaino proclaimed itself to be “Koreatown” in 1987 and a spiritual home for the Zainichi population.

The diversity of Zainichi identification also excluded traditionalists who continued to embrace Korean identification and exilic status. Soren Koreans have long rejected the very label Zainichi. Ko Yon-i, who teaches French literature at the Soren-affiliated Chosen University, writes: “I reject Japanese people calling me ‘Zainichi’ [because I am] essentially Korean [Chosenjin].” In contrast, Sagisawa Megumu was not alone in rejecting ethnic identification altogether: “I personally think that ethnicity is fiction.” Gen Getsu says in an interview that Zainichi “don’t have any identity” and likens it to “floating weed.” Disidentification from Zainichi identity—perhaps the dominant identification among ethnic Koreans from the 1980s—was commonplace from its very birth.

Thus, ethnicity in and of itself cannot in any sense predict the concrete contours of individual identity. Needless to say, their lives variously reflect the traces of ancestral genes or memes and the persistence of Japanese disrecognition against ethnic Koreans, but it would be difficult to conclude that ethnic ancestry and experience leave consistent marks on individual lives, and provide insights into Zainichi as a singular group. I am skeptical that ethnicity has a determining impact on one’s sense of self or personal identity. It is a factor—and it can become the dominant factor for some people at some time—but only one among many. And self-identification may change dramatically over a life course. The usual social-scientific approach—to use social backgrounds or factors as the independent variables and individuals and their identities as the dependent variables—does not work very well. Concrete lives resist simple, reductionist, and essentialist characterizations. Zainichi ideology mischaracterized and misrecognized Zainichi realities.

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While other articles in this course reader treat the earlier forces that created and framed Zainichi, Rumi Sakamoto’s article deals with the discourse in contemporary Japan concerning Zainichi Koreans. As John Lie recognizes in his article, many Japanese still view Zainichi Koreans with racist animosity; this is also the case in cyberspace.

Sakamoto analyzes the racism and xenophobia in Japan posted online by the Japanese users in the twenty-first century. Many of the authors do not condemn the Zainichi Koreans per se, as they do not bother to distinguish Zainichi Koreans from mainland Koreans. But some groups, such as Zaitokukai (Citizens’ Group against Special Rights for Korean Residents in Japan), make Zainichi Koreans their special objects of wrath. Zaitokukai argues that reverse racism is occurring and that Zainichi Koreans viciously dupe, exploit, and take advantage of the Japanese.

Sakamoto’s article singles out 2-channeru as the popular online site where such racist postings predominate, and she analyzes the postings as well as their origins. Sakamoto argues that very little rational discussion takes place on such sites, and that the postings are characterized by cynicism and fragmentation. Many of those postings, moreover, are marked by a dichotomy of Japanese versus non-Japanese “Others.” Sakamoto sees the insecurities of the Japanese economy circa the 1990s and a decrease in the number of stable jobs as significant contexts behind the postings.

This article was posted in March 2011, and things have evolved since then. The article argues that unlike online nationalism in China, Japanese online nationalism rarely spills out into the street, but that is no longer the case in 2013; some groups, including Zaitokukai, have started to demonstrate in Korean areas in some large Japanese cities, expressing anti-Korean messages and shouting insults such as “Koreans, get out of our country!” With the recent deterioration in relationships between Japan and its East Asian neighbors, anti-Korean (and anti-Chinese) xenophobia is something that is mirrored by some right-wing Japanese mainstream media. Restraining that hate speech has become an issue for some concerned Japanese legislators and activists. The future contours of contemporary Japanese nationalism and hostility toward the Zainichi, in cyberspace and outside of it, are matters of grave concern to many in Japan and those outside the country.
On 18 September 2009, a person using the online name of ‘xegnojw’ posted a four-minute video on YouTube entitled ‘Japanese Racists Hoot Down Korean Tourists in Tsushima’. It depicted members of a Japanese nationalist group harassing Korean tourists on Tsushima, a Japanese island 138 km from Fukuoka and 50km from Busan. This island has been attracting attention from Japanese nationalists because of the increasing presence of Korean tourists and Korean investment since the 2002 opening of high-speed ferry service between Busan and Tsushima. Nationalist campaigns over the island intensified when Korea’s Masan City adopted the ‘Tsushima Day’ bill in 2005, claiming that Tsushima should be a Korean territory, thereby countering Shimane prefecture’s ‘Takeshima Day’, establishing Japanese claim to Korea’s Dokdo island. The YouTube video in question captured several flag-holding Japanese men and women yelling: ‘Go home, Koreans!’ and ‘We won’t allow a Korean invasion!’ at tourists fresh off the ferry from Busan. Though not physically violent, the atmosphere was tense and disturbing.

This episode is just one expression of Japan’s new grassroots nationalism, which has gained force over the last decade against the backdrop of increasingly vociferous historical revisionism and neonationalism. As seen in the recent conflict over the Senkaku Islands as well as Japan’s hard-line response to the North Korean attack on South Korea, nationalistic sentiments seem to be increasingly dictating Japan’s foreign policy and public opinion. Contrary to what is sometimes assumed, contemporary Japanese nationalism is not a monolithic entity, for it is produced by multiple participants and groups with different ideas and modes of communication. The kind of blatant jingoism and narrow-minded xenophobia seen above, though still largely marginalised in the official discourses of the state and public media, has found a niche in Japan, especially in cyberspace. New groups such as Zaitokukai (Citizens’ Group against Special Rights for Korean residents in Japan) and Shuken kaifuku o mezasu kai (Citizens’ Group that seeks Recovery of Sovereignty), however outlandish their stances, have successfully extended influence through effective use of the Internet, incorporating YouTube and its Japanese equivalents such as Niko-niko dōga (‘smiley videos’) and PeeVee TV to spread their messages and publicise their activities. Channeru Sakura (2004-), which distributes conservative and nationalistic content via satellite TV and Internet, also provides a significant virtual space for neonationalist perspectives. Without the Internet, it is doubtful that an extreme nationalist group’s foray into direct action on the peripheral island of Tsushima would have reached an audience beyond the group itself. As it happened, however, the video clip was immediately taken up by Japan’s largest online forum, 2-channeru, prompting a barrage of nationalistic responses there. A site ‘not for the faint of heart’, this unmoderated forum is known to be the main outlet for revisionism and xenophobic neo-nationalism of the internet generation.

This article offers an analysis of the online discourse of anti-Korean nationalism sparked by the aforementioned YouTube video on 2-channeru. It aims to examine the characteristics of the nationalistic postings and the online construction of Korea as Japan’s other.\textsuperscript{10} The case offers insight into contemporary Japan’s so-called \textit{netto-uyo} (net right-wingers . . . uyoku) phenomenon, which has rarely been discussed in English language scholarship.\textsuperscript{11} It is often pointed out that today’s Japanese youths are increasingly nationalistic and that the Internet is playing a part in this trend.\textsuperscript{12} In considering how the technology and culture of the Internet influenced the formation of nationalism in cyberspace, this article engages with the idea of a ‘cyber public sphere’. What internet-specific elements have contributed to the particular \textit{netto-uyo} shape of nationalism? How might we understand the paradox of the borderless technology of the Internet producing an insular community and xenophobic nationalism?

To answer these questions, after a brief look at 2-channeru and the \textit{netto-uyo} phenomenon, this article offers a content analysis of nationalism in the Tsushima threads, focusing on the construction of ‘Korea’ as Japan’s other. It then considers this case’s implication for the notion of a ‘cyber public sphere,’ and discusses some Internet-dependent factors relevant to the \textit{netto-uyo} formation of the nation as an imagined community before finally considering some unique characteristics of Internet nationalism in contemporary Japan. But first, let us briefly look at some existing approaches to nationalisms in cyberspace to put this study into a context.

\textbf{Nationalisms in Cyberspace}

In the early days of the Internet, some predicted that, as a global and borderless technology, the Internet would become a homogenising force that challenged and eliminated chauvinism and narrow-mindedness. Today’s optimistic observers also emphasise the potential of cyberspace to provide something akin to Habermas’ ‘ideal speech situation’ and ‘autonomous public sphere,’\textsuperscript{13} in which citizens/individuals communicate rationally and democratically, without the constraints of ethnic, gender, class or other real-life inequalities. If we follow these insights that the Internet provides an ‘autonomous public sphere’ and ‘eradicates differences,’ then we may conclude that the Internet challenges, and might even eventually end, sectarian nationalisms. Nicholas Negroponte in \textit{Being Digital}, for one, famously stated that with the Internet ‘there will be no more room for nationalism than there is for smallpox’.\textsuperscript{14}

Such a prediction, however, seems, at best, decidedly premature. While the Internet has certainly created an extensive global network and promoted the exchange of ideas, it has hardly created a global democratic consciousness. Even a cursory survey reveals that nationalistic and xenophobic commentaries thrive on the Internet. And yet, in contrast to the abundant scholarship on nation and nationalism, Internet nationalism remains an understudied phenomenon. In particular, the important question of how the Internet as a new medium affects the nature of nationalism and national imaginary deserves further investigation.

One strand of current scholarship on Internet nationalism focuses on the diasporic communities’ online ‘long distance’ nationalism.\textsuperscript{15} Such studies look at how, for example, the Palestinians, Kurds, or overseas Chinese maintain and reinforce their national identities through the Internet. As Thomas Eriksen points out, the aims of ‘virtual nations’ are ‘of a classic nation-building kind’.\textsuperscript{16} In other words, they aim to create and sustain the nation as a unified entity in the context of geographical dispersion of the population beyond national borders. Japanese \textit{netto-uyo} internet nationalism, on the other hand, has no agenda for creating a transnational national identity among the overseas Japanese. It is much more inward-looking and far less inclusive. \textit{Netto-uyo’s}
‘we the Japanese’ does not even include all ethnic Japanese, as those who do not share their values (liberals, left-wingers, feminists, supporters of non-Japanese residents’ rights, Korean TV drama fans etc.) are all considered potential enemies of the nation.

Another relatively well-publicised and studied case of Internet nationalism is Chinese online nationalism that emerged around the 2005 anti-Japanese movement.\textsuperscript{15} Japanese Internet nationalism is quite different from the Chinese counterpart. First, while Chinese online nationalism has been widely viewed as supporting or enabling on-street nationalism, the \textit{netto-uyo} variety of Japanese Internet nationalism this article addresses has largely stayed within Cyberspace, rarely spilling out onto the street. Secondly, scholars of Chinese online nationalism have (in somewhat Habermasean spirit) typically located it within the framework of civil society and citizens’ activism, reading online activities as a sign of Chinese civil society as an independent sphere from the communist state. As one scholar put it, ‘civil society and the Internet energise each other in their co-evolutionary development in China’.\textsuperscript{18}

As we will see, however, one can hardly suggest that Japanese internet nationalism embodies a democratic civil society. Not only does it fall short of producing on-street politics, but it is also confined within niche online communities, hardly representative of civil society. Perhaps for these reasons, Japanese Internet nationalism has received much less attention than Chinese ‘civil’ nationalism has done in English-language scholarship. Though less visible than the Chinese examples and definitely not mainstream, Japanese Internet nationalism is a significant recent phenomenon that indicates the formation of a shared space where people engage with xenophobic nationalism and offers an opportunity for exploring the interface between the Internet and nationalism. Besides, even though much scholarship on Chinese online nationalism focuses on its role in offline activism, it is quite conceivable that there also exist a large number of Chinese Internet users who participates in, for example, online anti-Japanese discussions without ever taking to the street. If so, this study could offer a framework for comparison with such phenomenon.

\textbf{2-chanmeru and Netto-uyo}

\textit{2-chanmeru}, or \textit{2-chan} for short, is Japan’s most popular online community, with around ten million users accessing it each day.\textsuperscript{19} In this community the majority of posters post as ‘anonymous’.\textsuperscript{20} \textit{2-chan} does not require user registration or email verification – a standard practice for many English-language online forums. There is hardly any moderation, either. The forum consists of about 700 ‘boards’ such as ‘cooking,’ ‘business news,’ or ‘hacking’. Each ‘board’ contains several hundred ‘threads,’ with a maximum of 1,000 posts per thread. Once the number of posts reaches 1,000, a new thread is created, and the old thread is archived. Some discussions are serious; many aren’t. Depending on the board, posts can be utterly banal, discriminatory or extreme, hence \textit{2-chan}’s nickname as ‘public toilet graffiti’. At the same time, with more users than any other single media site in Japan,\textsuperscript{21} \textit{2-chan} is an important medium, with considerable social influence. It has had impact on mass media, too, as mainstream journalists sometimes use \textit{2-chan} as a news source.

Since its establishment 10 years ago, \textit{2-chan} has developed an idiosyncratic online culture, vocabularies and styles of interaction. Racism and nationalism have been part of this \textit{2-chan} culture; participants of certain boards have developed an explicitly nationalistic discourse (in particular, ‘World History,’ ‘East Asia News,’ ‘News Far East’ and ‘Hangul’), earning themselves the collective name of \textit{netto-uyo}, or ‘net right-wingers’. While this does not mean
that the majority of the users share such sentiments, there is a clearly noticeable subculture within this site shared by those who gather on specific boards. Mirroring the post-1990s historical revisionism, netto-uyo exhibit xenophobia towards immigrants, depict Korea and China negatively, and uphold revisionist history, justifying and glorifying Japan’s wartime actions. They also support political leaders’ official visits to Yasukuni Shrine, revision of Article 9 of the constitution, and patriotic education. Although netto-uyo is not exclusive to 2-chan, 2-chan is the main playground for netto-uyo, where this phenomenon developed. They became visible through a number of Internet-generated controversies that erupted around 2002-2004 such as those over the World Cup Soccer hosted by Korea and Japan, ‘Hate-Korea’ comic books, the so-called ‘Nanjing Massacre comic book’ and Dokdo/Takeshima, to name just a few.

Though it is hard to establish who they really are, netto-uyo are generally thought to be individual ‘heavy’ net users who are sympathetic to right-wing/nationalist views, but few are real-life activists or members of right-wing/nationalist organisations. While they are extremely vocal online and clearly identifiable as a discursive group, when it comes to real-life political actions, netto-uyo’s involvement is limited to occasional net-driven phenomena such as dentotsu (‘phone attack’ – organised phone complaints on specific issues to government offices, left-leaning media etc.), matsuri (sudden and extreme concentration of postings in a specific thread for a limited time) and enjō (rush of critical or accusatory comments and trackbacks to a specific blog or SNS site) targeting left/liberal opinions and sites. Netto-uyo essentially remain genron-uyoku [‘right-wing by speech’] in cyberspace; in fact, some action-oriented right-wingers have criticised netto-uyo for their lack of action and hiding behind anonymity.

**Netto-uyo as an Expression of Social Anxiety of Post-recession Japan**

Since the emergence of netto-uyo coincided with the marked lowering of the average age of 2-chan users in 2003-2004 as well as the deepening of social problems related to Japanese youth (e.g. NEET, freeter, hikikomori [withdrawal from society]), netto-uyo nationalism has often been associated with unemployed, low-income or reclusive youths. Linking netto-uyo and young unemployed people is common among Japanese commentators. For example, a Japanese sociologist, Takahara Motoaki, has suggested that recent youth nationalism – including Internet nationalism – is an expression of the social anxiety of marginalised and discontent youths who are struggling in the recession and the resultant social marginalisation. According to him, nationalistic youths displace their anxiety onto imaginary external enemies, while identifying with the fantasy of strong Japan temporarily relieves their anxiety.

During the 1970s and 1980s, when the Japanese economy was strong and life-time employment and seniority systems were widespread, ‘company’ identity served as a reservoir for Japanese men’s national identity, as loyalty to the company was conflated with loyalty to the state as the protector of the prosperity of the companies they worked for. The majority of today’s youths, however, are denied secure ‘company’ membership because of the new norms brought by the recession. Downsizing, restructuring, outsourcing, flexible employment systems – these strategies that companies have introduced in response to the recession that followed the bursting of the bubble have meant that many young people fail to obtain stable jobs on completion of their education. They have come to constitute a large ‘new lower class’ sector notable for casual service labour, which is unstable and badly paid. Under such circumstances, constructing and attacking the external enemy figure in cyberspace seems to offer one way of dealing with social frustration and anxiety. I would, however, add that the ‘nationalistic’ identity of netto-uyo is not
a direct or necessary consequence of the forum participants’ economic circumstances or their pre-constituted identity as the ‘new underclass’. Rather, I believe that their netto-uyo identity is constructed discursively, by engaging in the types of practice I will describe in the following.

The Tsushima Threads

Consider the nationalistic postings on the threads that started with the YouTube video mentioned earlier. These threads appeared in September 2009 on the ‘East Asia News+’ board, one of several netto-uyo boards. At the time of the research, most of the threads on these boards were on Korea-related topics. The Tsushima thread in question started with a posting on a Korean-language site Kukinews report on a Youtube clip of the aforementioned incident as the increasing number of Korean tourists agitated right-wingers. Normally insignificant in Japanese minds, this small island came to attract the attention of some popular media and the netto-uyo especially following a report on the Korean territorial claim on the island in reaction to Shimane prefecture’s ‘Takeshima Day’ and continuing conflict over Dokdo/Takeshima issues.

The thread I examined attracted 7,000 postings extended over seven threads in 4 days. The usual limit for postings per thread is 1,000 and the majority of topics stays well within this limit; so 7,000 reflects a significant level of interest. In many ways, these postings were typical netto-uyo chatters. First, the thread started with a report of minor news that involved Korea, rather than any major international news widely reported on national mass media such as TV and newspaper. 2-chan ‘news’ boards often have a different pattern of framing and agenda setting from those of TV and newspaper news, partly because of its self-awareness as an ‘alternative media’ that challenges mainstream media and their ‘hypocrisy’. Typically, a small ‘news item’ like this one is found in a Korean, Chinese or sometimes an English language source, and is translated into Japanese and posted. The preferred source is popular global media, in this case the YouTube video clip. This particular clip was uploaded with an introduction in three languages: Japanese, English, and Korean. Secondly, the discussion quickly turned into a repetition of well-rehearsed netto-uyo stances, issues and concerns, not necessarily related to the original posting. This is exactly what happened with the Tsushima thread, as we will see. Certain vocabularies, enunciation patterns and discursive structures define netto-uyo chatters, and we can find them regardless of the thread. The presence of visual content that points to emotionally potent issues (in this case the Youtube clip of a xenophobic protest), is also very common.

‘Us’ and ‘Them’

Netto-uyo postings on this thread were intense, many exhibiting unrestrained hostility towards Korea and Koreans. Given 2-chan’s lack of regulation and total anonymity, the tone is often extreme. Taboo derogatory terms are routinely used. Koreans are associated with excrement, rubbish, public urination, stealing, prostitution, violence, illegal activity and obscenity. Vulgar and callous statements that would not be found in the mass media and other public spaces abound. Typical postings read: ‘Koreans are cancer of Japan and should leave Japan’; ‘Koreans are the world’s shame; ‘parasite rubbish race Koreans should die’, and even ‘let’s massacre the stupid Koreans now’. Such virulent statements were abundant throughout the 4 days I observed this particular thread, and are commonplace in netto-uyo chatter in general.

Collectively, the 7,000 postings produced and reinforced the negative image of Korea and Koreans far beyond the Tsushima issue. Forum participants brought up a multitude of Korea-related issues which had nothing to do with Korean tourists on Tsushima: the ‘special tax and
welfare privileges’ that zainichi Koreans allegedly enjoy, the ‘illegal occupation’ of Takeshima Island’, kimchi with parasite eggs, or crimes by Koreans in Japan and overseas. Links were made to a TV news item about a Japanese boy who was attacked in Korea, snapshots of anti-Japanese artwork by Korean school children, a Youtube clip on a rape by a zainichi Korean, 2-chan threads on zainichi pension entitlement and welfare benefits, shocking images of anti-Japanese demonstrators slaughtering pheasants (Japan’s national bird) in front of the Japanese Embassy, and many more. These and other unrelated events and images are linked together under the unifying but empty sign of the ‘Koreans’.

The result is to depict Koreans as violent, unethical, overly emotional and irrational people, who are a ‘threat’ to Japan. In comparison, ‘we Japanese’ are portrayed as a moral, rational, polite and too tolerant people who are being taken advantage of—and victimised by—the Other’s aggression, slyness and lack of morality. There is a certain irony here, of course, that while accusing the Other of lacking morality, such posts are rife with crude xenophobic verbal abuse of the Korean Other that is hardly moral. ‘Koreans’ in this forum are a symbol of negativity and a repository for its participants’ hostility, rather than real ‘Koreans’ in the sense of the citizens of South Korea. Its function is to construct antagonisms between ‘us’ and ‘them’. The ‘Korea’ or ‘Koreans’ simply operate as a sign that carries negative values such as ‘inferior’, ‘dirty’, ‘shameless’, ‘primitive’, ‘violent’, and ‘irrational’. The posts served as triggers for invoking and repeating a clear and antagonistic us/them relationship.

In reality, this ‘us’ and ‘them’ boundary is a product of rewriting history, for Japan and Korea have a deeply intertwined history dating back to ancient times; Tsushima Island itself is a repository of numerous traces of extensive Korea-Japan relations.35

As Oguma Eiji has emphasized, Korea was part of the Japanese Empire until 1945.36 But the netto-uyo posts conveniently forget the colonial history, favouring ahistorical and essentialised representations of homogeneous ‘Koreans’ as Japan’s inferior Other. This is consistent with the
postwar myth of homogeneity and general hostility towards Koreans and zainichi Koreans. It is also consistent with recent revisionist-neo-nationalist promotion of anti-Korean xenophobia.

The participants typically blurred distinctions between South Koreans, North Koreans and zainichi Koreans (Korean residents in Japan, mostly second, third, and even fourth generation). Just eight minutes after the original posting about the YouTube video, someone wrote: ‘Zainichi Koreans should get out of Tsushima Island’. This is an odd thing to say because the Korean tourists captured in the Youtube video stepping off the ferry are most likely South Koreans, not zainichi Koreans. The right-wing activists on the video themselves certainly seem to think so, judging from what they are screaming. But no one points this out. Far from it, people join in accusing zainichi of heinous crimes. As the days pass and comments accumulate, more and more postings assert zainichi should leave Japan and go back to their ‘homeland’.

Over the course of the four days, the forum’s participants extended the target of xenophobic commentaries from Koreans to foreigners in general. Some postings criticised North Koreans. Even ‘Chinese’ were attacked a few times. They repeated crude messages like ‘Japan belongs to the Japanese. Korea belongs to the Koreans. Koreans, go home’ and ‘foreigners should stay out of Japan’. Some pointed out how European nations that had accepted immigrants are now suffering the consequences. Others argued against granting suffrage to non-Japanese residents.

Of course, the threads were not entirely homogeneous. Some marginal minorities did attempt to insert different views. For example, one participant says of the rightist activity: ‘Japan’s shame; I cannot accept such a stupid action that will lower Japan’s international standing’. But this kind of statement is curtly dismissed, ignored, or identified as intrusion by a ‘Korean spy’. The conversation then goes on as if they did not exist. There is no engagement, no argument, and no discussion. This partly has to do with 2-chan’s culture of cynicism, where taking other posters’ opposing views seriously and engaging them is considered uncool. Engaging or taking things seriously is a common ‘mistake’ novice participants are often caught making. In this forum participants are expected to ‘read the air’ and carry on by adding to the existing conversation with slight variation of themes. To use a 2-chan net slang, the quality of mattari—or being laid back, slow, and not causing trouble—is valued.

‘Race’

Interestingly, although racism and xenophobia characterise 2-chan’s netto-uyo discourse, its construction of ‘us’ and ‘them’ contains very few comments on racial traits of Korans or Japanese. Race is assumed but not argued for. This is noteworthy in light of the fact that historically, Japanese nationalism and national unity have been conceptualised around the notion of ‘racial’ homogeneity and purity, in particular, stressing the notion of blood.

Even though Japanese and Koreans are both ‘Asians’ and therefore racial markers are less clear than those for ‘whites’ and ‘blacks’, for example, historically speaking, attempts to decipher and articulate subtle ‘racial’ differences between Japanese and Koreans have not been uncommon. It is always possible to read differences into real or imagined slight shades of skin colour or the shape of eyes and essentialise them into racial differences. Indeed one might argue, as with Freud’s “narcissism of small differences”, that the desire and obsession for locating subtle differences could even be stronger when two groups are apparently alike. 2-chan posters, however, do not seem interested in discussing ‘racial’ features, possibly because their ‘Koreans’ are largely symbolic, and not real-life flesh and blood ‘Koreans’.
Being an online community, 2-chan lacks corporeality and any physical marker of racial differences. This means that there is no way of knowing for certain whether participants are in fact racially ‘Japanese’. What’s on the screen, ultimately, is digitised data and text, not flesh and blood. It is impossible to identify the participants’ ‘racial’ or ‘ethnic’ identities. The posters to the Tsushima threads showed considerable suspicion and paranoia over cyber ‘racial passing’. They seemed particularly vigilant toward trolling—anonymous non-Japanese participants planting provocative postings to stir up and disrupt online discussion—and other identity deceptions along racial lines. For example, fear over the Other’s seeping into the online community was expressed in their speculations that some posters were pretending to be Japanese, to be Koreans or even to be Japanese pretending to be Koreans pretending to be Japanese.

In their attempt to identify the infiltrating Other, participants sometimes said to the suspected posters: ‘What’s your passport number? [a non-Japanese, passport number would look different]’ ‘Your grammar is a bit funny [therefore you must be non-Japanese]’. ‘No Japanese would specially claim that to be Japanese [since you say you are Japanese you must be non-Japanese]’ and so on. There was even a posting suggesting that the original YouTube clip was planted by zainichi Koreans, thus rendering the whole thing a kind of joke played on the Japanese.

Such suspicions on one level reflect the fact that the Internet is a deterritorialised space that is open to the whole (IT-literate) world; information, images, and participants themselves can come from anywhere, their origin and identity blurred, hidden or unknown. Unlike the physical world, ‘Japanese’ identity online is easy to perform and assume, as long as linguistic competency exists. In addition, the anxiety over the ‘true’ identities of the participants is further promoted by the aforementioned 2-chan culture of anonymity and cynicism, which makes pretending and other identity plays an accepted practice in this particular online community. The use of ‘Korean’ voice and stance by Japanese users to achieve an ironical and mocking effect (say, by inserting Korean words like うりなら or ない here and there) for example, is fairly common in nettouyo postings. Uncertainty of ‘Japanese’ identity thus plagues the seemingly confident nationalist voice.

**Does History Matter?**

While the posters regularly refer to historical and political issues between Japan and Korea, many do not seem to have much interest in actual history or politics. For example: ‘Korea is an enemy country that is invading Takeshima; Japan is at war with Korea’; ‘In Tsushima Koreans are doing every evil thing imaginable, including raping Tsushima women’, ‘Koreans have a history of massacring Tsushima people … Historically you Koreans owe Tsushima Islanders more than you can ever repay’. Clearly, accuracy is not a major concern for these participants; it seems that these statements are not even meant to be a representation of reality. Strong words like ‘evil’, ‘war’, ‘massacre’, ‘rape’, and ‘invasion’ are exchanged as empty signs without any historical or evidential basis. Disturbing visual images are also circulated, for example, bleeding pheasants laid on a rising-sun flag, Korean children’s ‘fuck Japan’ art exhibition, or a YouTube clip of ‘a Korean attacking a Japanese boy’. However, it is unclear which war, which invasion, or which massacre these postings refer to. In many cases they have no referent to reality and no one seems to mind. The comments are discursively productive, consolidating the ‘us’/‘them’ antagonism and maintaining the moral superiority of the Japanese who are constructed as a victim.
It seems that dehistoricised and decontextualised images and symbols are gathered together not to represent reality but to produce new humiliation, new trauma, and new victimhood for Japan. In this sense they are similar to Baudrillard’s ‘simulations’ or ‘self-referential signs’, which are ‘objects and discourses that have no firm origin, no referent, no ground or foundation’ other than their own.\(^4^0\) They operate outside the logic of representation, and hence are immune to rationalist critique.\(^4^1\) Baudrillard’s point was that simulation proliferated as a result of the new media like TV, but the Internet as a participatory medium carried this trend even further. 2-chan users are not just passive consumers of such signs provided by the mass media but are producing, performing, and exchanging referentless, decontextualised signs to generate a sense of belonging to a cyber community and a fantasy ‘Japan’.

With the Internet, gathering and producing information and images is easy, fast and cheap. We can access far more information far more quickly than we could before, and we do not have to rely on mass media. If one wants to find out how “terrible” Koreans (or any other group) are, such information is only clicks away, within seconds. Information is available for ‘superdistribution’ to anyone interested, where the content spreads quickly and effortlessly via digital technology without being limited by national borders, defamation laws or distribution costs.

**Not Quite a Public Sphere**

As briefly mentioned earlier, advocates of the so-called ‘virtual public sphere’ have emphasised the Internet’s potential to promote liberatory practices.\(^4^2\) Building on Habermas’s notion of public sphere, defined as a network for communicating information and points of view, they have argued that electronic communication media have ‘unique capacities to create democratic, participatory realms in cyberspace devoted to information and debates’.\(^4^3\) Many studies of cyberactivism around human rights, peace movements, racial equality and so on, seem to suggest the democratic potential of the Internet technology.

Our example from 2-chan, however, makes clear that the technology and culture of the Internet, far from promoting public value or mutual understanding, sometimes contributes to the formation of a unique expression of nationalism. As we have seen, 2-chan online exchanges appeared highly regulated and patterned, allowing little room for democratic discussion. On the one hand, the potential for democratic communication certainly seems to be there, as the 2-chan forum clearly provides an infrastructure for an information network and open communication, and it has a large number of participants who speak anonymously, free of class, gender and other constraints. The participants seemingly have political interest and intent, too. And yet 2-chan is a far cry from a ‘virtual public sphere’. It does not function as a communication network for exchanging information and viewpoints to promote democratic values. If anything, what goes on there resembles private in-group gossiping, insulated from competing views and reinforces insiders’ identity by excluding/ostracising outsiders. It seems similar to what Rheingold has called ‘single-niche colonies of people who share intolerances’.\(^4^4\)

2-chan’s xenophobic nationalism could be a product of a phenomenon known as ‘group polarisation’, which refers to a pattern where discussion among people who share similar views tend to radicalise each individual’s original position, leading the group as a whole to thinking the same thoughts in a more extreme fashion. According to one study, group polarisation is especially strong with anonymous online communication.\(^4^5\) This may at least partially explain what we have observed: that netto-uyo are individuals with xenophobic and racist sentiments
who gather on specific online forums, where their views are reinforced via interacting with others of the same persuasion.

At the same time, we need to caution against seeing 2-chan nationalism merely as a more intense version of pre-existing, real-life nationalism. Human behaviour is influenced by the environment in which it occurs, and the Internet offers a unique environment, where people often behave differently from the way they do in the real world. Correspondingly, discourses that develop on the Internet may exhibit different characteristics from those that form outside the Internet. In the following I look at how internet-related elements have contributed to the specific articulation of 2-chan nationalism and point out that online nationalism challenges us to rethink our standard understanding of nationalism.

**The Internet’s Role in the Formation of 2-chan Nationalism**

Nationalism is usually associated with modernity and nation-states. The collective identity of national ‘we’ emerged with industrialisation to support the newly unified nation-states in Europe, and this model spread to the rest of the world from the late 19th century onwards. In this process, modern national media has played a significant role. Benedict Anderson’s classic study of modern nationalism, *Imagined Communities*, for example, analyses nationalism in terms of the national and territorial imagination supported by nation-wide print capitalism. Reading a newspaper each morning, Anderson suggests, is an (imagined) shared experience, which contributes to the formation of national consciousness.

In contrast, the nation imagined via the subculture of online netto-uyo community is deterritorialised and does not exactly coincide with the national boundary. And the media content 2-chan users consume can be quite different from that of national media. As mentioned earlier, 2-chan users are highly critical of mass media, and tend to gravitate towards alternative and extreme perspectives that have little place in national newspapers or TV.

Today’s digitised media environment means that we are no longer reading the same newspaper in the same way. As Cass Sunstein suggested with concepts such as the ‘Daily Me’ and ‘customisation’, with the Internet and portable digital devices such as mobile phones, laptops and iPhones, each of us is constantly clicking away to ‘filter in’ what we want to see and ‘filter out’ what we do not want to see. Every time we access the Internet we are customising and personalising our exposure to topics and viewpoints that fit our interests and proclivities. This is a different activity from the ritual of reading the same ‘national’ newspaper with everyone else, every morning. With the personalised media of ‘Daily Me’, we are unlikely to be creating a single imagined community for a single nation-state. Chances are, by accessing a customised and personalised set of news and information each day, we are producing many, partially overlapping—but never identical—imagined communities both within and without the physical border of a single nation-state.

As Yoshimi and Kan have argued, digital media have eroded the national imaginary maintained by national media such as TV and newspaper. Mobile phone, laptop, iPod and other portable devices let people constantly access information of their choice and encourages non-territorial and/or deterritorialised imagination. Further to this, the new digital environment means that we are no longer passive consumers of media; unlike mass national print media, which offers one-way communication, the Internet allows each of us to create our own set of information and even feed it back to the public space of the Internet for others to consume, process, and pass on, all in
bite-size. And unlike the national newspaper, in which we inevitably encounter news that we did not intend to read, or ideas we do not agree with, each of our ‘own set of information’ we collect online can be highly personalized, narrow and fragmented.

2-chan nationalism can be seen as one such technologically mediated small-scale site of imagination. It is not a nation-wide imaginary that is supported by national media and stretches as wide as the national territory. Rather it is a fragmented and customised ‘Daily We’ nationalism, representing a small sector and an extreme view. With the Tsushima threads, by constantly monitoring, gathering and consuming Korean news of an anti-Japanese nature, its participants were customising their information so as to reinforce the view that ‘they’ hate ‘us’, in turn justifying that ‘we’ hate ‘them’. The Internet’s role here is crucial, because without digitised electronic communication, it is difficult to efficiently access and distribute the small, in many ways insignificant, news articles and images that have become central to netto-uyo chats.

2-chan Nationalism as Postmodern and Subcultural Nationalism

Implicit to many theories of nationalism is the existence of the modern subject who voluntarily identifies with and commits to the nation. For example, one of Japan’s most influential political thinkers, Maruyama Masao, asserted that ‘modern nationalism is characterised by its members’ autonomy and subjectivity’.51 When Anderson talked about the ‘will to kill and die for the nation,’52 he was alluding to the same point that nationalism arises out of a modern subject with a commitment to national solidarity.

In contrast, what we find on 2-chan is a postmodern subject characterised by fragmentation and cynicism. Even though the netto-uyo discourse has a strong affinity with revisionist politics, there is little sense of netto-uyo commitment collectively to any fixed position (that is, beyond the basic xenophobia discussed earlier), including nationalist and right-wing positions. In fact, the posters in the Tsushima threads tended to distance themselves from the existing right-wingers and nationalist organisations. The occasional attempts of such organisations to recruit netto-uyo via 2-chan were largely ignored. Announcements of right-wing demonstrations did occasionally appear in Tsushima threads; but they never produced enthusiastic responses. Netto-uyo are far too cynical. In response to invitations to join right-wing activities outside cyberspace, they suggested things like ‘right-wingers are in fact zainichi Koreans’ and ‘right-wingers and Koreans should both leave Japan’, maintaining a distance from real-life nationalists.53 Netto-uyo’s anti-Korean sentiments do not necessarily mean they identify with nationalist political activists, as is seen, for example, in the following comment on the original YouTube video of the right-wing demonstration on Tsushima: ‘There go the bloody right-wingers again. They are no different from the crazy Korean guy who set a rising-sun flag alight’.

Overall, the Tsushima threads were dominated by fragmented, decontextualised and bite-sized images and statements. Despite the abundant nationalistic vocabulary and sentiments that positioned ‘Japan’ over ‘Korea’, these fragmented postings did not develop into a coherent narrative that legitimates and promotes the modern nation-state.54 There was a strong undercurrent that everyone and everything be relativised rather than committed to or taken seriously, which renders 2-chan nationalism postmodern. The historical lack of a modern subject in Japan has often been pointed out. Masao Miyoshi, for example, has observed that ‘the dispersal and demise of modern subjectivity … have long been evident in Japan, where intellectuals have chronically complained about the absence of selfhood’.55 It is possible that 2-chan nationalism is simply reproducing this ‘Japanese’ tendency online. It is also likely that this
is combined with the Internet’s tendency to promote a postmodern subject. Mark Poster’s work, which examines the link between postmodern subject and electronic media, for example, suggests that ‘electronic communications constitute the subject in ways other than that of the major modern institutions,’ rendering them ‘unstable, multiple, and diffuse’ (Poster 1995). In Cyberspace, markers of social belonging such as ethnicity and gender are invisible and irrelevant (as they say, ‘On the Internet nobody knows you are a dog’). Subjects are virtual and disembodied. One can assume and experiment with multiple subjectivities, and Cyberspace has become a ‘significant social laboratory for experimenting with the constructions and reconstructions of self that characterise postmodern life’, where one could try on different identities and personalities. Such an environment encourages speaking from a position without full commitment and without letting that position subsume one’s sense of identity and belonging. With 2-chan, too, the possibility that some of the posters are ‘experimenting’ with nationalist subjectivities there, while trying out other types of subjectivities on other sites, cannot be entirely rejected.

The lack of modernist commitment and weak sense of subjectivity means that perhaps we can see 2-chan nationalism as a ‘subcultural’ and ‘apolitical’ nationalism that is akin to a leisure pursuit, hobby or style that functions to create an in-group feeling of belonging to this online community. The obsession and attachment to the fantasy Japan in this discourse, I suspect, is not the real, existing nation-state, Japan, but ‘nation as a fetish,’ which is highly media-led, and image-oriented. It is not the classic kind of nationalism based on national pride and belonging to the imaginary community of fellow Japanese. Rather, the driving force behind it is the failure to enter the mainstream resulting in frustration and anxiety, which is then projected on the ‘enemy’ figure and imaginary fictionalised and idealised Japan.

**Conclusion**

To conclude, netto-uyo nationalism is aggressive and shrill, but fragmentary. Its coherence mainly comes from the symbol of the ‘Koreans’ as Japan’s detested Other. While the hostility towards Korea, as well as towards China and North Korea is a shared trend among all variants of neo-nationalism and revisionism in post-1990s Japan, there are some elements that are unique to netto-uyo nationalism: it is a postmodern and subcultural nationalism aided by digital media and global accessibility to information. A product of borderless Internet technology, 2-chan nationalism also exhibits parochial principles of nationalism. Rather than a virtual public sphere, the global and transnational electronic network has in this case produced an inward-looking and xenophobic nationalism with little awareness of the outside world. The oft-pointed out democratic potential of the Internet has, in this instance, been aborted.

While I am hardly suggesting that the Internet ‘caused’ nationalism, I hope to have shown that certain Internet-specific elements (such as anonymity, speedy information exchange, easy monitoring of global news) have contributed to the particular style of online nationalism. Netto-uyo nationalism is not the archetypal unifying ideology of the nation-state that is reproduced through a different channel and challenges us to rethink our understanding of nationalism in the age of global electronic media. As electronic media and the global information network is turning the imagination into a global affair, Japan as an ‘imagined’ community is also being deeply affected.

Of course, the bigger questions of if, and how, such a subcultural, postmodern and online nationalism is linked with more directly political nationalist ideas and movements outside
cyberspace, needs to be examined further to assess its political efficacy. Although netto-uyo nationalism currently remains largely within cyberspace, and although cynicism seems to prevail over modernist commitment to a fixed meaning, the potential for its politicisation and mobilisation exists. As Slavoj Zizek argued in his work on ideology and postmodern cynicism, the lack of conscious commitment does not stop one from acting as if there is such a commitment: ‘even if we do not take things seriously, even if we keep an ironical distance, we are still doing them.’ As one of the many strands of nationalisms that constitute contemporary Japan’s neonationalist landscape, 2-chan online nationalism should not be dismissed as mere chatter.

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**Appendix:** typical netto-uyo chats – from a thread about the rejection of Korean rescue team to enter New Zealand following an earthquake in February 2011.

1 : [―{}@{}@{}]-] Korean Monkeys φ ★ : 2011/02/25(Fri)

ID: ???

Earthquake-hit New Zealand rejects Korean rescue team due to a concern with foot and mouth disease.

660 : **Rokudaimhamadadenzaemon◆AKUMA/.c.o** : 2011/02/27(Sun) 10:22:22.44
ID:Cg4n2goz

This shows that today’s Korea is a real source of trouble.

661 : (´・ω・`) (´∧´) : 2011/02/27(Sun) 10:24:56.64
ID:H4GeBAxG

The Japanese are ostracising us Koreans. (partially written in mock Korean)

662 : (´・ω・`) (´∧´) : 2011/02/27(Sun) 13:12:29.58
ID:FqpSFtNYw

Koreans will behave disgustingly to get praise, which will only lead to their bad reputation. If accepted help from Korean, NZ will forever demanded to thank Korea. New Zealand knew this and that’s why they rejected Korean team.

Korean monkeys have vanity, but not sincerity, modesty, respect towards others.

Even though half of Korean population are Christians, their Christianity has produced evil Christians who are totally different from Christianity.

There are no other shameful people like this.

663 : (´・ω・`) (´∧´) : 2011/02/27(Sun) 13:20:48.40 ID:iYOJxnTz

No country wants Koreans to come.
Concern with looting, rape, rescue dog eaten, using pet medication.

Japan should ban Koreans.

You exposed us. (in mock Korean)

Let’s ban Koreans from Japan.

No, now just now but also the past.

There was a Korean who died in trying to save a Japanese person at a train station. I have not intention to speak badly of him.

We don’t need looters.

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References


Zainichi Koreans: The Past, the Present and the Future


Notes

1 Link (Accessed on 19th Feb 2010; this video has since been removed due to a copyright claim by the nationalist group that organised the Tsushima campaign.)

2 Tsushima is about 700 square kilometres in area, and has a population of about 30,000 (as of 2010). It is the closest Japanese territory to any foreign country; on a fine day, one can actually see Busan from Tsushima (it is, in fact, the only place in Japan one can see a foreign territory with the naked eye.). For an example of recent conservative/nationalist take on Tsushima as a ‘national defense issue’, see Miyamoto (2009); Yamamoto (2010)

3 The city council in Masan passed the ‘Tsushima Day’ bill, commemorating June 19 as the day when a 15th century general led forces to take over Tsushima.

4 See Oguma and Ueno (2003) for Japan’s grass-roots nationalism; for Japan’s historical revisionism, see Iwasaki et al. (2008).

5 McCormack 2011.

6 *Zaitokukai* was established in 2007 and now boasts several thousand members (according to its website) and many branches throughout Japan. Its original focus was the so-called ‘special privileges’ of Korean residents in Japan; but their target has now expanded to foreigners in Japan.

7 *Shuken kaifuku o mezasu kai* was established in 2006, with a stated goal of ‘fighting against the attempts of China and communism to invade and colonise Japan’ (from the group’s website).

8 Tanimichi 2005.

9 In Appendix I have provided a short translation from a typical anti-Korean thread on another topic, to show 2-channeru’s style, visual quality and subcultural mode of expression.
While China and North Korea, too, are routinely othered and demonized, Korea is 2-chanmeru’s favourite other. Responses to Korea-related topics are almost guaranteed on 2-chanmeru. This focus on South Korea in contrast with offline neo-nationalists’ focus on China and North Korea (and the US) as Japan’s threat, is likely to be a product of the earlier context for the emergence and crystallization of netto-uyo. Examples include 2-chanmeru users’ heated online indignations at South Korea’s rough play and the referee’s bias towards South Korea in the 2002 World Cup Soccer, Korean netizens’ 2004 cyber ‘attack’ on 2-chanmeru over Dokdo/Takeshima in 2004, the phenomenon of the ‘Hate-Korea’ web comic in 2005 which was largely about 2-chanmeru users’ backlash against the extreme popularity of Korean TV drama and other cultural imports in early 2000s (Sakamoto and Allen 2007).

An important exception is Mark McLelland (2008), who challenges the ‘Anglophone’ understanding of the online discourse of ‘race’ by closely examining the 2-chanmeru discussions on Korea and Koreans. He concludes that 2-chan racial thinking is more preoccupied with the link between ‘blood’ and ‘cultural competence’ than that in multicultural societies like the US or Australia, where ‘Asian race’ is conceptualised as a single category.

Sasada (2006); Honda (2007).


For example, Bakker (2001); Chan (2006); Eriksen (2007); Candan and Hunger (2008).


Gries (2005); Zhou et al. (2005); Liu (2006).

Yang (2003: 405-406). Another view is that the Chinese government manipulates cyber nationalism to put pressure on Japan without letting anti-Japanese demonstrations get out of hand.

From 2003 IP addresses of the users have been recorded, so strictly speaking 2-chan is no longer entirely anonymous. A vast majority still post as ‘anonymous’, while some choose to use pseudonyms.


Tsuji (2008: 11).

Motomiya Hiroshi’s historical comic, Kuni ga moeru (The Country is Burning), which included depiction of the Nanjing Massacre, became a target of criticisms from netto-uyo and some conservative politicians, ending with an apology, termination of the series and deletion of references to the Nanjing Massacre when the comic was published in book form.


2-channeru (2006: 177). A majority of 2-chan users are said to be youth and young adults (Sasada 2006: 119; Nimiya 2003: 5); but this view has been challenged by one recent survey that found that the largest age group of the users has gone up to 33-44. See J-cast News (2009).


Kondo and Tanizaki hold a similar view (2007: 156-165). For a general discussion of youth employment problem, freeters and NEETs in Japan, see Kosugi (2006) and Slater (2010).


These are examples of jobs often taken by immigrant workers in countries like Europe, USA, UK, New Zealand and Australia.

A city council in Masan passed the ‘Tsushima Day’ bill in 2005, commemorating June 19 as the day when a 15th century general led forces to take over Tsushima (Card 2006). For an overview of the Takeshima-Dokdo issue, see Wada (2005). Following the nationalists-right wing campaigns and publicity via right-leaning media, there have been mainstream reports about the Korean presence on the island, too.

Often minor news starts the netto-uyo conversation. Examples include an anti-Japanese statement made by a Korean blogger; a Korean media’s critique of a YouTube video of Korean ‘foul play’ in the 2002 World Cup; or someone crossing out ‘Japan Sea’ and writing ‘East Sea’ on a world map exhibited in a museum in Berlin.

In this respect it is interesting to note that the Korean presence in Tsushima is regarded as external pollution and invasion, despite the historical Korean presence in Tsushima. Contemporary nationalist discourse seems to be attempting to purge the historical presence of Korea and the islands’ memory of it by newly reconstructing Korea as an external figure.

Oguma (1995). War-time multiculturalism was quickly forgotten after the war. See Morris-Suzuki (2011), for example, for Japan’s postwar border control against illegal Korean entry in the immediate postwar period. Even though many such Koreans were former residents returning to Japan after decolonisation, they were treated as problematic outsiders and foreigners.

If indeed netto-uyo are economically and socially disadvantaged young people, as has been suggested, this type of anti-Korean sentiment may share something with the well-documented pattern of the underprivileged national self blaming the immigrant Other – ‘they’ are stealing ‘our’ jobs.

A Korean word for ‘my country’.

A Korean word to mark a polite ending of a sentence.

Poster (2001: 1).

Rheingold (2003); Langman (2005).


Rheingold (1993: 207).

Sia et al., 2002.

In this article by ‘real-life’ I simply refer to non-electronic environments outside cyberspace.


Sunstein (2001).


Maruyama (1964).


This attitude is reciprocated by the traditional neonationalists, who tend to be dismissive of netto-uyo for their lack of rigorous ideology as well as their hiding behind anonymity, which they consider to be a sign of netto-uyo’s lack of commitment.

A number of core posters attempted to do this, but they failed to define the overall discourse.


While Korea is constructed as Japan’s Other in the Tsushima threads discussed here, ‘China’ and ‘tokutei-ajia’ (‘certain Asia’; a 2-chan slang that refers to China, South Korea and North Korea) appear similarly othered in netto-uyo discourse in general.

In the 1990s East Asia experienced a turn toward nationalism that includes an extremist, xenophobic wing, which expanded further during the 2000s. This is true in all three of the major countries in the region; Japan, China, and South Korea. In Japan, for example, Abe Shinzo, whose platform calls for hawkish foreign policies and the rewriting of the postwar constitution based on cultural nationalism, returned as the prime minister in 2012. The anti-Korean slanders that were limited earlier to cyberspace, as discussed by Rumi Sakamoto in her article earlier in this reader, have since taken to the streets in Japanese cities. How to deal with such a phenomenon, described by Tessa Morris-Suzuki as a kind of “mass retreat to the psychological fortresses of ethno-nationalism and racism” (p. 5), is becoming an ever more pertinent issue for all East Asian countries and their nationals.

This second article by the noted professor Kang Sang-Jung uses the framework of political science, but it is based entirely on Kang’s own experience as a Zainichi Korean. Kang sees expanding nationalism and a heightening of insular ethnocentrism as a kind of “disease.” Relying on the thoughts of Immanuel Wallerstein, Ernest Gellner, and Hannah Arendt, among others, he uses Arendt’s notion of verlassenheit, a state of loneliness or abandonment felt by the masses, as the base on which the turn toward nationalism takes place.

Kang starts by explaining that he can identify with this state and sentiment, because “it bears a close resemblance to the situation of the Zainichi Korean ethnic minority in the 1970’s” (p. 13). Alienated in Japan, many Zainichi Koreans came to blindly identify with either South Korea, which was virtually a military dictatorship at the time, or North Korea, which through “self-help” (Juche) ideology indoctrination posed as a savior of the Korean diaspora in Japan. Such identification resulted in the isolation of Zainichi Koreans and their lack of dialog with the communities that surrounded them. This ethnocentrism resulted in disillusionment as the reality of North Korea came to be exposed, writes Kang. Thereafter the only recourse left for Zainichi Koreans was “to tunnel down and discover a passage that will lead us out, on to the far side, beyond nationalism” (p. 13).

And that is also a path that other East Asians can take. Kang believes that Zainichi Koreans, who could no longer identify with narrow-minded nationalism, came to identify with a new kind of regionalism in East Asia that will be relevant to other East Asians. The article articulates one such new regionalism as a “North East Asian Common House” with Japan, China, and South Korea at its center. Kang envisions such a community as creating a broader coalition and space “for the free interchange of people and information” (p. 14). Whereas some Japanese right-wing organizations such as Zaitokukai single out Zainichi Koreans as villains, Kang’s article attributes positive roles to the Zainichi: because they already have experience in negotiating among nationalist groups and being a minority.
everywhere they go, they are the future of East Asia, as the region increasingly turns toward intraregionalism and multiculturalism.
Tunneling Through Nationalism: The Phenomenology of a Certain Nationalist

Kang Sangjung
Introduced by Tessa Morris-Suzuki
Translated by Mark Gibeau

Introduction

Throughout the modern era, issues of nationalism and national identity have lain at the heart of intellectual debate in Japan, but the contours of the debate have repeatedly changed over time.

From the 1950s onward, as Japan rose from the ashes of defeat to become an economic superpower, visions of ethnic homogeneity and unique culture were widely propagated by the Japanese state and media, and were embraced by a number of commentators in the US and Europe as well as in Japan itself. During the 1990s, this economic and cultural nationalism came under sustained criticism, triggered in part by the collapse of the economic bubble. Yet, far from hastening the demise of nationalism, the two decades of relative economic stagnation from the early 1990s onward were marked by the rise of new and more overtly politicized nationalist ideologies, and by impassioned debates over the nation and its destiny. More recently, some commentators have suggested that a rightward shift is occurring in Japanese intellectual life, bringing together people from opposite ends of the political spectrum into a new nationalist consensus.

For the past two decades or so, Kang Sangjung, who is a second-generation member of the Korean community in Japan and a professor at the University of Tokyo, has been an active and influential participant in debates about nationalism in Japan and beyond. In this article, he reflects on the shifting context and nature of nationalism in Japan, and on changes in his own view of nationalism over the period from the 1970s to the present day. Nationalist discourse (he suggests) needs to be seen in the broader context of economic and political transformations, not only within Japan itself but also on a regional and global scale. From this perspective, the intense debates surrounding nationalism that erupted from the 1990s onward reflect a profound transformation in the relationship between “nation” and “state”: a transformation that demands a deep rethinking of nationalism in the twenty-first century context.

As he explains in the article translated here, Kang’s approach to political ideas has been shaped by his experiences both as a Korean born and brought up in a Japanese provincial city, and as a scholar of political thought (particularly of the ideas of Max Weber) who conducted part of his graduate work in 1980s (West) Germany. His first major contributions to controversies over national identity were a series of articles on the identity of Zainichi Koreans, published in the 1980s, and he has since published widely on ideas of nationalism in a global and in a Japanese context.

I first encountered Kang’s ideas on nationalism in a recorded conversation (taidan) between Kang and the scholar of social thought Murai Osamu, published in a special issue of the Japanese journal Gendai Shisō entitled Minzoku Mondai no Kigen e [To the Roots of the Problem of Ethnicity]. In retrospect, the timing and content of this special issue seems significant. It appeared in May 1993, at almost exactly the same time as the original version of Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations. The Soviet Union had recently collapsed, and the Balkans Conflict was reaching its peak. This, in other words, was the moment of the emergence (at least
in Europe) of a “post-Cold War” order, when many observers were predicting a decline in ideologically-based global tensions and a revival of conflicts based on ethno-nationalism.

The early 1990s, however, were also the period when new constructivist and post-structuralist ideas were encouraging radical critiques of nationalism. The May 1993 Gendai Shisō i issue included translations of critical writings by Jacques Derrida and Étienne Balibar, as well as essays by a number of scholars who would play key roles in the deconstruction of nationalism within Japan (among them Ukai Satoshi, Takahashi Tetsuya and Ueno Toshiya). Kang and Murai’s taidan, meanwhile, used Harry Harootunian’s recently published essay “America’s Japan/ Japan’s Japan” as a starting point for exploring the ways in which Japanese ethno-nationalism was entangled and complicit with US power and western orientalism.

By 1993, then, the stage was set for the intense debates over nationalism discussed in Section 4 of “Tunneling through Nationalism.” The temperature was further raised two years later by controversies surrounding the fiftieth anniversary of Japan’s defeat in the Asia-Pacific War. Timid steps by some Japanese politicians towards apologies for the events of the war were followed by a fierce backlash from the right, who revived an ethno-nationalist discourse reminiscent of the 1930s and early 1940s. At the same time, though, the 1990s saw the publication of outstanding Japanese critiques of nationalism, exposing the ideological underpinnings of the myths of cultural uniqueness, and highlighting the paradoxical complicity of Japanese nationalist rhetoric with political subordination to the US. Among these were works like Nishikawa Nagao’s Kokkyō no Koekata [How to Cross National Borders] and the collection of essays Nationaru Hisutorī o Koete [Transcending National History], edited by Komori Yōichi and Takahashi Tetsuya.

The 1990s critique of nationalism in Japan was not simply a matter of intellectual debate, but involved a strong element of political activism. The teaching of history had already emerged as a political battleground from the 1960s onward, and many of the key participants in the 1990s debates campaigned energetically against the adoption of new nationalistic history and civics textbooks in schools, and against the enforced singing of national anthem at graduation ceremonies and other public occasions. The battle lines, however, were far from simple. This was not a dichotomous divide between nationalists and their critics, but rather a more complex field in which pro- and anti-nationalism was interwoven with diverse attitudes toward issues including Japanese history, the constitution and the security alliance with the United States. Some of these complexities were brought to the surface in 1995, when liberal literary scholar Katō Norihiro published his immensely controversial essay Haisengoro [After Defeat], in which he argued that Japan required a clear sense of national identity in order to be able to apologize to other Asian nations for the wrongs committed in wartime. The fierce arguments provoked by this proposal exposed a range of intellectual and emotional dividing lines amongst people seen as being on the liberal-left of the Japanese political spectrum.

Nationalist sentiment in Japan was immensely strengthened in 2002, when revelations about the kidnapping of Japanese citizens by North Korea (the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, DPRK) led to an outpouring of media fear and hostility towards the DPRK, in some cases triggering threats and physical attacks on Koreans in Japan seen as sympathetic to the North. The rising tide of nationalism during this period was also influenced by social anxieties stemming from the prolonged economic recession which followed the bursting of the “bubble” in the early 1990s. At the level of state politics, the nationalist ascendancy appeared to reach a peak with the
Prime Ministership of Abe Shinzō (who served for one year, from September 2006 to September 2007). Abe’s hawkish foreign policy (particularly towards North Korea) and determination to revise Japan’s postwar constitution and education laws were underpinned by an intense cultural nationalism, spelled out in his widely sold paperback *Utsukushii Kuni e* [To the Beautiful Country].

Throughout this period, Kang Sangjung actively participated in debates on Japanese nationalism from several angles. His writings included *Orientarizumu no Kanata e* [Beyond Orientalism, 1996] and *Nashonarizumu* [Nationalism, 2001], both of which offered critical re-examinations of modern nationalist thought in Japan, but also works like *Nicchō Kankei no Kokufuku* [Overcoming Japan-North Korea Relations, 2003] and *Higashi Ajia Kyōdō no Ie o Mezashite* [Towards a Common House in East Asia, 2001], which argued, in terms of practical contemporary policies, for the normalization of relations with the DPRK and the creation of a Northeast Asian regional community. The second of these themes, closely related to Wada Haruki’s proposals for Northeast Asian regionalism, forms an important element in the article translated here.

His approach, however, has always been a distinctive one. As a South Korean national born, brought up and resident in Japan, he directs his critique of nationalism towards Korea as well as towards Japan, often pointing to the complex ways in which Japanese and South Korean nationalism are historically intertwined and re-enforce one another. (Although, as in this article, his criticism also recognizes the power relationships which differentiate the nationalism of former colony from that of former colonizer). He strongly believes in the importance of communicating with a broad popular audience, and much of his work, particularly in the past ten years, has appeared in media outlets (local as well as national) that lie outside the normal circuits of academic debate. His popular writings have included recorded discussions with a wide range of people, including those with political views far removed from his own, and also increasingly include works written in novelistic semi-fictional form. Kang’s works (including the article translated here) also express a multi-layered response to the complex phenomenon of nationalism: a desire to understand its economic and social wellsprings; a profound hostility to state mobilization of ethnonationalist symbols and passions; but also a recognition of, and a certain sympathy for, the human desire for community and the longing for a place to call home.

If the early 1990s marked the start of a new phase in Japan’s ongoing *nashonarizumu ronsō* [nationalism debate], the period from 2009 onward may come to be seen as marking a shift to a further phase whose outlines are not yet clearly defined. Events on the political stage have had a deep impact on the contours of public discourse in Japan. The 2009 advent of a Democratic Party government, after over half a century of almost uninterrupted Liberal Democratic Party dominance, was welcomed by many people as opening up new domestic and international possibilities for Japan. But the rapid collapse of the Hatoyama administration and the problems that have beset the Democratic Party regime ever since have left many feeling deeply disillusioned. In global terms (as Kang emphasizes) US hegemony seems in irreversible decline, yet the Japanese government appears unable to find any policy alternative to the US strategic embrace.

In some respects, the power of cultural nationalism seems to have diminished since the 1990s. Japanese audiences enthusiastically embrace the Korean and Chinese popular culture which reaches them via expanding cross-border media flows. Within the sphere of mass culture,
interaction between Japan and its Asian neighbours is far closer than it was ten or fifteen years ago. But cultural transnationalism co-exists with the rise of populist nationalism, particularly at the level of prefectural and city governments, and has recently triggered an overtly racist backlash, played out above all on the social networks of the Internet age. Meanwhile, efforts to resist the state imposition of obeisance to the national symbols of flag and anthem are repeatedly frustrated. The 1990s critique of nationalism could, indeed, be said to have triumphed in the realm of logic, only to fail in the realm of practical politics. The fact that nations and ethnicities are constructed rather than natural, and that national symbols and traditions are invented, is now widely accepted. But people continue to hate and fight in their name regardless.

In Japan, the disaster that has unfolded since the tsunami of 11 March 2011 has added a new twist to the nationalism debate: on the one hand, deepening many people’s mistrust of the national government, while on the other evoking the rhetoric of national community – ganbare Nippon! – as a rallying cry for recovery.

In his media comments on the disaster, Kang Sangjung has not only exposed failures in the company and government response to the nuclear crisis and called for regional cooperation to develop alternatives to nuclear power, but has also sought to shift attention from the national to the local human dimensions of the event, which he defines not as a “national disaster” [kokunan] but as a “people’s disaster” [minnan].

US power declines; the global financial system sinks further into crisis; regional power shifts challenge Japan’s economic dominance in East Asia. In this uncertain world, how can we find effective ways to resist a mass retreat to the psychological fortresses of ethno-nationalism and racism? The essay translated here provides no simple answers to this question, but offers both theoretical and personal reflections on the changing forms and persisting power of nationalism in Japan, while also pointing to the outlines of one possible path beyond the ethnonationalist hatreds of an age of globalization.—Tessa Morris-Suzuki
What is nationalism? How does one answer such a primitive yet essential question? As a member of one of Japan’s ethnic minorities, to me it is both an academic and an existential problem.

In this essay I will draw on the world systems approach of Immanuel Wallerstein and other theories to trace the transformation of the East Asian order in the post war period while simultaneously discussing my own transformation from pre-nationalist to nationalist and post-nationalist. I will outline the processes by which an East Asia baptised into nationalism might tunnel through that nationalism to emerge on the far side, into what we may call an East Asian Common House: a loose, cooperative regionalist community connecting North East Asia and South East Asia. The conclusion I reach in the present essay is that this kind of regional integration has the potential to attenuate nationalist rivalries in East Asia.

1. From Gesellschaft to Gemeinschaft

Why must we begin any examination of nationalism with the question of what constitutes the object of enquiry? What is the object of enquiry? The problem is not simply that the object is unclear at the start of the examination; even at its end we cannot expect a single, univocal definition to emerge. Still, what is clear is that the concept of nationalism does exist, and that it contains within it an excess of images. Nationalism is known to all as a household word: yet it lacks definition. Why does nationalism in particular embody such paradoxes? It would seem that simply labelling a phenomenon as “nationalism” is sufficient to bring nationalism into existence. Whether you define nationalism as a discourse or see it as a specific form of social consciousness, it remains nonetheless a highly volatile phenomenon. Like a mercurial, explosive liquid, the phenomenon of nationalism is unstable, fleeting and transitory.

If nationalism is such a volatile phenomenon, why do nationalists see it as an unshakable and eternal “destiny”? We can liken nationalism to the shimmering of the air on a hot day: ephemeral and trembling, rising like a flame from diffracting light. Yet, as we all know, these heat shimmers are only the product of warm air, rising from a patch of earth heated by the sun’s rays. They live for but a moment. When air of a different density is introduced into the rising flow, the light passing through is diffracted into an array of colours. It is as though the display were designed specifically to deceive the eyes of the onlookers. If nationalism is akin to these heat shimmers, what are the powerful rays of light that cause the shimmering?

Even if nationalism is not solely a product of the modern era, but is predicated on the “ethnies” of previous ages, there can be no denying that the constructivist approach is highly effective when analysing this phenomenon. Whether one stands in opposition to nationalism or supports it, there seems to be a consensus regarding the efficacy of constructivism as a framework of understanding. Despite the rhetorical emphasis on the persistence and immortality of nationalism, there remains a shared understanding that nationalism was discovered at a specific point in time, and that it was created and is constantly being re-created. With that in mind, how do we go about developing an argument about nationalism’s origins, development and movement? If nationalism can be likened to the shimmering of the air, perhaps we ought to look outside of nationalism for the source of that iridescence.

The best-known version of this somewhat external, objective explanation can be found in the world systems theory developed by Immanuel Wallerstein and others. According to Wallerstein, the modern world system (the global capitalist economy) was formed as a class-based society
[gesellschaft]. Yet, to justify its own structure, while destroying a range of historically extant communities [gemeinschaften], this world system simultaneously constructed new forms of gemeinschaft which resembled status groups (race, nation, peoples, ethnic groups, religious groups, etc.). Thus the modern period is not, as one might expect, a movement from gemeinschaft to gesellschaft, but rather the opposite: it is a movement from gesellschaft to gemeinschaft.

If the above holds true, then the cultural role of nationalism in the construction of difference must be reconsidered. However much we may emphasise the role of nationalism in ethnic identity creation, language revival and cultural differentiation, in situations where such phenomena do not serve class interests, status group formation may take non-ethnic forms, such as the creation of religious identity groups. So (for example) we can see cases of shifts within a few decades from pan-Turkic to pan-Islamic movements, and then to nationalist- or class-based movements. Thus we cannot simply look at one section of the process and conclude that it is an “ethnic revival.”

Still, nationalism is not simply a reflection of the social reality of the world system. Like the shimmering produced by the diffraction of light, nationalism too appears in an almost infinite number of different guises. That is, unified forms of shared status identity such as ethnicity are not unequivocally fixed. Rather, they are given their specific form by the adhesive force of the subjective moment. The result is a broad spectrum of innumerable gradations.

On this point Wallerstein makes the half-ironic comment that, “Far from gemeinschaften dying out, they have never been stronger, more complex, more overlapping and competitive, more determinative of our lives. And yet never have they been less legitimate... Our gemeinschaften are, if you will, our loves that dare not speak their names.” Research on nationalism must untangle these cryptic paradoxes from within as well as from without.

Here, as a preliminary approach to this kind of internal/external understanding of nationalism, I would like to talk about my personal transitions against the backdrop of the various historical stages of nationalism in Japan and East Asia. Setting aside the question of whether or not ontogeny (the development of the individual) recapitulates phylogeny (the development of the whole group or system), I believe that discussing shifts in personal experience in the context of the world system social reality will highlight the contradictions inherent to nationalism. It is also for this reason that I have selected “Phenomenology of a Certain Nationalist” for my subtitle.

2. Pre-Nationalist

It is necessary to pass through a number of different intermediary stages before the nation or state and their traditions and histories come to occupy a central position in one’s self-consciousness, endowing one with a sense of affiliation and difference from others. I was born during the Korean War and I passed my youth—until my adolescence—in the age of the Pax Americana. The world economy was being run according to the Bretton Woods system, with post-war America and the overwhelming power of the U.S. dollar at its centre. A Keynesian welfare state with a Fordist system of production and consumption at its core accompanied the spread of Americanism throughout the world. This system pushed the former Axis powers of Japan, West Germany and Italy to unprecedented levels of growth and by 1968 Japan had surpassed West Germany’s GNP and had become the number two economic power in the Western camp.
At the same time, the U.S. superpower became bogged down in the Vietnam War and was shaken by the turmoil brought on by the growing civil rights and student power movements. The intensification of the Cold War and the prosperity of former Axis powers gave Japan a highly strategic position in Asia. In the United States the views of such people as Edwin Reischauer and Walt Rostow gained traction as they promoted Japan as a model case of Asian modernization and of the spread of American-style mass consumerism. In this way, as Japan grew increasingly dependent upon the U.S. both militarily and politically, it also came to occupy a central position in the world system hierarchy, and was resurrected as a major regional power in Asia.

Standing in stark contrast to Japan’s re-emergence was the former colonial state of Korea. Impoverished by civil war and its subsequent partition, it was only after the military coup d’état of 1961 that a developmental dictatorship style of modernisation finally commenced. This divided nation on the periphery of the world system was, as a result of pressure from Japan and the U.S., positioned at the front line of anti-communism and was subjected to the violent oppression of state-sponsored information politics. America, Japan, and Korea, with an “imposed anti-communist internationalism” in the latter, served as the base for the peculiarly stable postwar international hierarchical order of centre, semi-periphery and periphery.

This Cold War structure concealed postcolonial histories and forced former colonizing states and former colonized states alike to adopt unitary national identities. Thus Zainichi Koreans, who existed as a minority stranded in their former coloniser’s state, were put in an excruciatingly difficult position. In Japan they were discriminated against as “history’s refuse” and forced into a pariah-like role. At the same time, they were scorned by Koreans as “half Japanese” (panchoppari) or “ethnic dropouts.” Born in the state of their former coloniser and speaking Japanese as their native tongue, second-generation Zainichi Koreans found themselves caught in a crushing vise, trapped in ambivalence between the suzerain and the colonised state.

At the time, the towering shadow of Pax Americana continued to loom over East Asia despite the U.S. becoming increasingly trapped in the quagmire of the Vietnam War. America retained its hegemonic position in virtually every field: politics, military, the economy, culture, etc. Under America’s protection, and thanks in no small part to special military procurements during the Korean and Vietnam Wars, Japan continued with its transformation into an economic regional power. Thus, despite being castrated militarily, Japan was on its way to becoming America’s greatest ally as East Asia’s dominant regional power.

While Japan underwent its transformation, Korea—located on the periphery of the world system—became a satellite state as an American military supply base. With the conclusion of the Japan-Korea treaty of normalization in 1965, it also began to receive economic assistance from its former coloniser and to embark on its project of modernisation via the developmental dictatorship model. In contrast to Japan’s interaction with South Korea, however, there was no attempt to settle accounts with North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) and diplomatic relations between the two countries remain severed.

Thrown into this tumultuous environment, Zainichi Koreans found themselves being twisted and bent as the opposing powers grated and shoved against one another. While existing as an ethnic minority in Japan, they nonetheless precisely reproduced the Korean North-South division. Not only were Zainichi Koreans forced to continue to occupy a subservient colonial position in Japan and survive in a situation that replicated the North-South division of their homeland, they also had to deal with a wide range of unresolved problems within their own community such as a
lingering paternalistic social structure, gender inequality and so on. The pariah-like existence of the Zainichi Koreans was further disrupted by sensational incidents of self-destructive violence: the Komatsukawa Incident\textsuperscript{26}, whose central figure was Yi Jin-U, and the Kim Hi-ro Incident\textsuperscript{27}. It was inevitable that the unresolved postcolonial issues of postwar Japan should erupt into such periodic criminal incidents.

Amidst this oppressive reality I sought only to escape from all things ethnic or national. At the same time I felt internally incomplete. I found myself overcome by a sense of drifting--not unlike what one senses in lachrymose, romantic sentimentality. Drifting aimlessly in this faintly ironical sorrow, unable to decide on a course of action and unbound by any commitment, I had a freedom which seemed like that of the prewar so-called “leisured intellectuals” \([kōtō yūmin]\). Of course, in my case, that freedom was confined to a small space with a radius of only a few meters. I ensconced myself in that space and peered out at the world through a tiny gap in the wall. I rejected the world even as I ceaselessly and desperately sought for something to connect me to that world. So, consumed and troubled by ambivalence, there was no room for even the smallest particle of nationalism in that second generation Zainichi Korean.

3. A disease called Nationalism

As I slumbered, lulled by my counterfeit feelings of romanticism, the 1970’s arrived. I visited Korea at the moment when it was being dragged into the orbit of a developmental dictatorship. It was then that I experienced an important transition. The distant seeds of our present-day financial crisis were then being sown in the form of the “Nixon shock.” The postwar economic system was under assault and confidence in the standard currency--the US dollar--was beginning to wobble. The suspension of the direct convertibility of the dollar into gold, the ultimate bastion of support for value, the drain of the Vietnam war on the value of the dollar, and the consequent chronic deficits in US account balances all served to reveal that the framework of the economic superpower was being shaken. The move to a variable exchange rate system enhanced the incentive for the international flow of capital, and we began to understand the powerful influence that currency, finance, exchange policies and the like hold over the real economy.

At the same time, in economic terms, the world was becoming multipolar. The emergence of Western Europe and Japan supported a tri-polar structure of global capitalism centred on the US, Japan and Europe. With the summit meetings of the mid-1970s, this cooperative structure took on a more concrete form. Japan occupied a privileged position in world finance and was largely unaffected by the stagflation that swept across Europe and the United States, leaving long-term economic malaise in its wake. The country was therefore able to overcome the oil shock of 1973 and focused on making its position as an economic superpower permanent. The result was that cultural nationalism, now linked to economic nationalism, resonated throughout Japan as consciousness of Japan’s superpower status grew.

This was not a statist nationalism that focused itself on the political realm, but rather it was an anti-political or apolitical nationalism embedded in the economy, society and culture. It was a nationalism grounded in the newly-emerging fields of consumer culture and popular culture--themselves products of Japan’s rapid transformation into a mass-consumption society. It was, in other words, the sediment of a national consciousness atomised by consumerism, which settled and came to form the foundation upon which long-term conservative rule was established. In Korea, by contrast, the split between dictator and people was becoming clearer and the country
was approaching a season of intense politics. The echoes of that season reached the ears and minds of the Zainichi, resulting, for many of them, in an “ethnic awakening.”

In Japan, the protest movements against the renewal of the US-Japan Security Treaty of 1970 were dying down and violent political eruptions on both the radical right (the Mishima incident\textsuperscript{28}) and on the radical left (the Red Army incident\textsuperscript{29}) were breathing their last. With radical political factions receding into the background, political forces began to collapse into a more general, centrist position. A new, “catch-all” system of politics was coming into being: a system that sought to encompass everything while simultaneously maintaining internal discrimination and difference. Zainichi Koreans, excluded from this catch-all system, were brought together by what Benedict Anderson calls “long distance nationalism.” They had no choice but to try to find their own escape route by becoming attached to a quasi-conceptual democracy.

I too was drawn in by this force, and recited the mantra of “ethnic nationalism = democracy = reunification.” I bade farewell to my gloomy fixation on romantic sentimentalism and threw myself into student movements opposing the dictatorship and supporting an ethnically unified democracy in Korea. At the time “ethnicity” \([\text{minzoku} / \text{minjok}]\) seemed to be a magical word, capable of solving all of our problems. To liberals and the left our support for an ethnically-based nationalism no doubt seemed like an absurd anachronism. However, to Zainichi Koreans the word “ethnicity,” remote though it may have been from everyday experience, shone with a bright and inviting aura.

My bias toward ethnicity and my increased consciousness of belonging to a specific ethnic group allowed me to construct an internal barricade, separating me from the outside world. I moved from what I felt to be a “false” identity to a “true” identity. To exaggerate somewhat, you could say that I experienced this as a Copernican revolution, as something akin to a religious conversion.

So was this spiritual elevation simply a temporary “illness”? Does it deserve the scornful label, to misquote Lenin, of “right-wing infantilism”? No, I do not think so. Even were we to see it as an “illness,” that does not make it mere delusion, nor does it make the ideas empty words. What other means remained to the Zainichi Koreans, besides the “illness” of nationalism, to affirm their own existence? We had been discriminated against, excluded, forcibly uprooted and expelled from the community. Ought we to have assimilated into the majority? Should we have assimilated into a class that transcended ethnicity and race? Or should we have tried to better ourselves and transformed ourselves into cosmopolitan global citizens? To the extent that we were not in a position to choose those options it was quite natural that we should have been attracted to the “illness” of nationalism.

However, this raises the question of why, knowing that it was an “illness,” I chose nationalism in the first place and clung to it with such resolve. At that time I did not see nationalism as an “illness.” On the contrary, it seemed to me the very embodiment of health. Over time, however, I came to realise that nationalism was an “illness” that drives its sufferers mad. This awakening was not unlike a patient discovering a portal to a new world and, by means of this new perspective, becoming aware for the first time of the unnatural “illness” with which he is afflicted.
For me, this transition occurred when I left Japan to live in a small corner of Europe. There I was able to witness directly the tragic aftermath of the diasporas, the dispersal and coalescing of peoples and races. I came to appreciate that the “sufferings” \((\text{leiden})\) of Zainichi Koreans was not specific to Koreans. Rather, it was a tragic condition into which myriad peoples throughout history have fallen. It was at this moment that I first became aware of the “the world” as well as its past as “world history.” That is, for the first time, I was able to view the history of the Korean people from a new perspective and in a new light. It was as though I were peering through the wrong end of a telescope. From this vantage point, the individual sufferings of the Korean people retreated into the distance and merged with the sufferings of other peoples. It was as though the innumerable individual streams of suffering of all the different peoples joined together to form the river of “world history.” When I realised this, I distanced myself from nationalism and made a different choice.

As it happens, it was right around this time that the Keynesian welfare state was in decline and the neo-liberal reforms that sowed the seeds for the current global financial crisis were emerging. Then, ten years later socialism crumbled and, as though to fill the subsequent void, Islamic fundamentalism appeared and the Iranian Revolution was played out on the world stage.

### 4. Beyond Nationalism

After the oil shock of the 1970s made the shift from Fordism to Post-Fordism irreversible, capital, money and information transcended national boundaries, moving freely throughout the world. Nationalism seemed to become something of a throwback: the ghost of a previous age. From the mid-1980’s I also began to put down roots in the locality where I lived and, in the process of “implanting” my family in that locality, I gradually came to distance myself from my previous partiality for “ethnic nationalism.” Additionally, through my readings in sociology, history, literary criticism and post-colonialism, I encountered a variety of critical discourses on the nation state and national culture. I turned this critical evaluation of paradoxes onto myself and embarked on a kind of self-dissection.

Yet the path of history is unpredictable. At the very moment I was embracing the subjective problem of “dis-enchanting” nationalism, a new phenomenon one could call nationalism began to sweep across Japan. It could, I suppose, be seen as a “virtual phenomenon”--dependent as it was upon the media and the Internet. In this sense, simply by defining it as a nationalist phenomenon may make it a sort of “self-declared nationalism.” Or, though we characterise it as nationalism, perhaps we are just dressing up a variety of phenomena in the garb of nationalism. In some cases this may have involved an ironic acceptance of media phenomena as nationalism when, in reality, what we were seeing was the manifestation of a variety of individual and social demands. In any event, there can be no denying that some sort of nationalism more firmly focused on the state was beginning to spread. Why did this phenomenon appear? To understand this we must first revisit the classical definition of nationalism.

To borrow from Ernest Gellner, nationalism can be thought of as a political principle that attempts to match the political unit with the cultural unit.\(^{30}\) Gellner’s analysis is obviously predicated on the assumption that the state emerged in the form it did so that it could deal with industrialisation, the one underlying force from which so much else emerges. In contrast to agricultural societies, the modern industrial society is defined by an egalitarianism that is itself a by-product of the social fluidity of industrial societies. All members of this society are expected to possess basic skills: literacy, numeracy, basic work habits and technical skills, familiarity with
essential social skills. A new trans-personal mode of communication, which does not depend on social context, is necessary to cultivate these skills. That is to say, these skills can only develop where a shared, standardised written and spoken language exists. Clearly it is the modern nation state that develops high culture based on the ability to speak and write the common language. Through instruction in language and culture, the nation state holds a monopoly over the “quality control” of the production of useful and adaptable people (through education). It is for this reason, Gellner asserts, that without the existence of the state, the question of nationalism would never arise.

In this sense, a nationalism in which human communities are organized into large, collectively educated and culturally homogeneous units is not the result of an ideological misstep or an impulsive excess, but rather is the inevitable product of the attempt to match the political with the cultural. State and society are joined, and a fictive system called “unified national culture”--in which all members live, talk and produce--is constructed.

One aspect of this fictive unification, in the case of Japan, was the identification of centre and region, and the assumption that one’s native locality (patrie) was equivalent to the nation as represented by the centre. In the modern nation state, and particularly in the Meiji state, there were in fact ongoing frictions between centre and regions. But during the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars the state prospered, and regional societies supported that prosperity. Thus for a while the optical illusion was established that the prosperity of the nation state and the prosperity of local regions operated in harmony.

To be sure, Gellner’s analysis of the origins of nationalism relies on a highly rational interpretation. It does not address the irrationality of nationalism. How nationalism spurs people to such zeal that they willingly go to their own deaths in its name is not explained. Nor does he account for the temporal lag that exists between the emergence of industrialisation and the sudden rise of nationalism. Having said that, however, Gellner’s important contributions to our understanding of nationalism are beyond question. His analysis presents us with the processes by which the political unit of the modern world has become legitimised as the “nation-state” (two elements joined by a hyphen): from the social policies and corporatist bureaucratic state of Germany’s Second Reich, to the Anglo-Saxon welfare state in the period of total war (under the Beveridge Plan) and to the postwar Fordist regimes of accumulation and the Keynesian social welfare state. In this sense, Gellner’s analysis is very compelling.

If we see Gellner’s nationalism as “classical nationalism,” then we are confronted with another problem: that the very foundations of the society he describes are now being dismantled. The spreading anxiety and malaise that accompanies globalisation is the result of globalisation’s “liquefaction” of social foundations and the resultant collapse or vanishing of society. Under classical nationalism, legitimacy depended upon the union of state and society. Now that legitimacy is collapsing as societies fall to pieces and disperse like so many atoms. It seems that the universal “regime of desire” better known as “the market” has brought about a situation where the state and society can be unified, if at all, only by external pressure.

The homogeneity cultivated and imposed by the irresistible, objective demands of industrialisation can be seen as having been expressed in the form of nationalism. But now the homogeneous social infrastructure that underpins nationalism is on the brink of utter collapse. So, why is it that nationalism seems to be on the rise? To answer this we must first recognise that when we discuss nationalism, its meaning will inevitably differ depending upon what we
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emphasise. It will mean one thing if we stress the concept of “nation” implied by Benedict Anderson’s “imagined communities” and something quite different if we focus instead on Weber’s “state” as an “anstalt” [institution] with a “monopoly on the use of legitimate violence.”

This element of ambivalence can be seen in the hyphen that links the two words “nation-state,” and it extends to cover the area of the “nation”–a space that can be seen as roughly identical with society. In order to meet the demands of industrialisation, the state sought to integrate itself with society and mobilise human resources by promoting universal literacy, numeracy, and technical skills, as well as a general “improvement” of the population. While serving as a model for economic development and regimes of accumulation, postwar Fordism and Keynesianism also functioned as the integrating principles behind unified national economies.

As I have mentioned, however, we are already at a stage where, in the embrace of globalisation and the liberalisation of finance in particular, we are busily dismantling the foundations upon which the unified national economy is based. The link between state and society is crumbling. The state is separating itself from the nation and transforming itself into an agent for the global regime of accumulation. As a result, not only is the state withdrawing from its monopoly on the “quality control of the production of people” (education), it is also cutting the umbilical cord connecting it to society by withdrawing from welfare and medicine, superannuation and employment, and other areas essential to the reproduction of social life. It is moving, in short, from “government” [seifu] to a form of “rule” or “control” [tōchi], involving a wider structure encompassing both the state and key figures in civil society. What we have is not a “credit crunch” but rather the phenomenon of a “public crunch.” Nationalism as the glue which once transcended class and unified the people is being weakened at its very foundations.

Hannah Arendt saw this kind of situation, in which the masses have “lost their connection with others and become defined by their rootlessness,” as the indispensable precondition for totalitarian rule. Arendt defines this condition of the masses as “verlassenheit,” loneliness, or the state of being abandoned:

What prepares men for totalitarian domination in the non-totalitarian world is the fact that loneliness [verlassenheit], once a borderline experience usually suffered in certain marginal social conditions like old age, has become the everyday experience of the ever-growing masses of our century. The merciless process into which totalitarianism drives and organises the masses looks like a suicidal escape from this reality. The “ice-cold reasoning” and the “mighty tentacle” of dialectics which “seizes you as in a vice” seems like the last support in a world where nobody is reliable and nothing can be relied upon.31

In Japan, the national broadcaster NHK’s special documentary entitled The Working Poor depicts the plight of a thirty-five year old homeless man who is reduced to spending his days sifting through rubbish bins. He searches for magazines in the hope that he might convert them into enough money for a cup of convenience store instant ramen. It is a telling story that reveals the spread of “verlassenheit” among the younger generation of that ostensibly wealthy country: Japan.

I am overcome by a sense of déjà vu when I consider the predicament of these young people: abandoned by society and left no alternative but to abandon themselves. It bears a close resemblance to the situation of the Zainichi Korean ethnic minority in the 1970’s. This recent social phenomenon of the working poor is nothing more than a new manifestation of the
“verlassenheit” of Japanese citizens who are now becoming “Zainichi-fied,” turned into pariahs. This repetition indicates that the principle of a single, homogeneous unity upon which the nation is based has become virtually meaningless and that another kind of invisible apartheid is emerging.

If that is the case we have no choice but to recognise that the social foundation for the “nation” no longer exists in contemporary nationalism. Rather we are left with a “nationalism without nationals” or a “post-national nationalism.” All we have is a nationalism with the state at its centre. Ironically, the socially unifying force of “state nationalism” is left as the only force that can contain both the anti-social conditions created by verlassenheit and the “organized verlassenheit” that destroys all social relationships (i.e. the violence and terror of totalitarianism).

But the national state, transformed into the agent of neo-liberal capitalist plunder, now no longer has the least iota of justification for its claim to unite the people of the nation. Today, the social basis of the nationalism on which citizens relied is destroyed, and forcibly imposed loyalty to the state alone is lauded as “patriotism.” What a distortion, what a deception this is! We are confronted by the spectacle of desolated home communities (patries), rural areas being torn apart, the land of the nation laid waste, and at the same time, servile and blind obedience to the state, accompanied by xenophobic nationalism.

As this transformation in the nature of nationalism has become obvious, I have finally come to think that it might be possible not so much to overcome or transcend nationalism, but rather to burrow through it, to tunnel down and discover a passage that will lead us out, on to the far side, beyond nationalism. That is, it is not simply a matter of repudiating nationalism as an “illness” or of unthinkingly embracing it. Rather, by digging the well as deep as it will go, I believe that we might find ourselves on another path to the other side of nationalism.

**Conclusion: The Northeast Asian Common House**

With the current enormous shifts in global capitalism, which may be described as the prelude to global economic crisis, what transformations will be wrought on existing states and nationalism? This is the question I find myself thinking about most often. At the end of this phenomenological examination of a nationalist, this question of future destinations is a particularly critical one.

The perilous situation of global capitalism, perched on the brink of world crisis, is an indisputable indication that the “Pax Americana” is drawing to a close. The age of Americanism that so defined the twentieth century is coming to an end. The end of the Cold War was not the end of history, but rather the end of the Pax Americana. At the same time, the financial crisis has shown us—quite unexpectedly—how utterly powerless states are to control the arrogant movement of capital as it straddles national borders. Indeed the crisis revealed that the state, in its new role as an agent for capital, can and will operate against the interests of the nation.

Yet, despite all this, the end of the state has not begun. The nation, as before, remains the most critical, the most important embodiment of gesellschaft and the most important embodiment of gemeinschaft. So, what will be the future of nationalism? If nationalism is a complex of ideas and movements that aims to maintain the existence of the nation and that gives shape to the state (as political protective membrane of the nation), then nationalism must be prepared to deal with the greatest threat to the nation: capitalism run amok.
Unless this issue is addressed it will not be possible to avoid the fate of utter collapse that has already been visited upon those small and mid-sized states once lionised as models of globalisation.

So, it is not simply a matter of rejecting nationalism. We must consider how we can both integrate nationalism and take its core ideals to a different level. Surely a way of doing this is through a regionalism which would create a broader space for the free interchange of people and information, capital and technology across borders; for such regionalism would maintain the sovereignty of the state while, at the same time, attenuating ethnocentric nationalism and opening up the state to a wider shared ownership. One part of this process of regionalisation involves digging down as deep as possible into the well of local home communities – patries – and thus opening up tunnels to a region-wide transnational network of patries.

At the beginning of the post-America era the world is divided into four poles: a regionalism emerging from the loose solidarity between the EU and Russia; the regionalism surrounding North and South America; African regionalism; and finally the regionalism of East Asia. Might not this era be a time when those four poles begin to negotiate and cooperate with one another on a global level? Of course, it goes without saying that Japan and Korea belong to the East Asian pole. Through the cooperation of South East Asia and North East Asia, and with the contributions of Japan, China and Korea in North East Asia in particular, the East Asia pole will prove to be immensely important to the future of the region.

An important possibility here is the notion of a “North East Asian Common House,” which refers to the structure of a regionalist order with these three countries at its centre. The three countries at the core of Northeast Asia – China, Japan and South Korea – by themselves produce some 20% of the world’s GNP. There has never before been a region that has experienced such rapid economic growth. Besides, trade within the region and particularly between Japan and China has already exceeded Japan-US trade in scale. With investment and trade expanding, there can be no doubt that sooner or later this region will become a single economic sphere, even if in an informal rather than in an institutionalised sense.

Yet there are few places in the world where the political rivalry between nations is as intense as in Northeast Asia. On the one hand, the economic interdependence and cultural flows are rapidly growing, but on the other profound conflicts over security and resources are becoming more and more evident year by year. Why has it so far been impossible to establish a regional security framework and mechanisms to promote mutual trust in Northeast Asia? One reason has been discord in terms of historical consciousness. I have discussed this problem in greater detail elsewhere, so will refer only briefly to it here. However, it is worth mentioning simply that with the rapid spread of democratisation and new information networks, it becomes easier for nationalism to be popularly disseminated, and this has aggravated the problem.

The second reason for the failure to create common security frameworks is the fact that in Northeast Asia the Cold War has not yet fully come to an end. Since the Korean War armistice was signed at Panmunjom on 27 July 1953, more than half a century has passed without progress towards the signing of a peace treaty. In other words, Northeast Asia’s “post-war world” was created without coming to terms with the history of what might be termed an ongoing “semi-world war” situation. In this postwar regional order, the United States served as a hub, and the only relationships that developed were an agglomeration of bilateral relationships between the US and Japan, the US and South Korea, the US and North Korea, the US and China etc. There
are many situations where negotiations between the neighbouring countries of the region cannot proceed smoothly without the US acting as intermediary: a situation that Columbia University professor Carol Gluck has termed “the bilateralism syndrome.”

In 2003, however, an important experiment in creating a multilateral framework for security and for promoting mutual trust was established. This was the Six Party Talks on North Korean denuclearisation. If the framework established by the Six Party Talks (themselves a move toward the end of the Cold War) can be mobilized in the future, we can envision the creation of an ANEAN (Association of North East Asian Nations), consisting of Japan, China, North and South Korea, the U.S. and Russia, and serving as a counterpart to ASEAN. If this can be achieved, then the contours of the East Asia pole will become visible.

With the inclusion of America (as an Asia-Pacific nation), Russia (as part of the Far East) and North Korea, the North East Asia Common House would surely constitute a core entity in East Asia. If each nation, while sharing their national sovereignties, created a broader regional base, we might see nationalism finally released from the yoke of ethnocentrism. The result, one imagines, could be a transformation from ethnocentric nationalism to a kind of shared nationalism premised on coexistence. Of course this vision of the future could be criticised as being over-optimistic. Yet, we cannot use reality as a tool for criticizing reality. It is in ideals that we find an alternative; and as we stand on the precipice of global crisis, confronted by unprecedented dangers, we should not dismiss those ideals out of hand as a “fool’s dream.”

*An earlier Japanese version of this essay was published in Ōsawa Masachi and Kang Sangjung eds., Nashonarizumu Ron Nyūmon, Tokyo, Yuhikaku, August 2009. The version published here is revised and expanded.*

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**Notes**


2 For example, Kim Gwang-sang, “‘Sato Masaru gensho’ hihan,” *Impaction*, No 160, November 2007


Komori Yōichi and Takahashi Tetsuya, Nashonaru Hisutorī o Koete, Tokyo, Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1998.

From 1965 onward, historian Ienaga Saburō filed a series of suits against the Japanese Ministry of Education, which had demanded changes to history textbooks that he had authored. During the 1980s, the textbook controversies became international, as China and other Asian counties protested reported plans by the Japanese government to replace the word “invasion” in descriptions of Japan’s role in the Asia-Pacific War with the word “advance.” These controversies formed the background to the protests over nationalist textbooks in the second half of the 1990s. See Ienaga Saburō (trans. Richard H. Minear), Japan’s Past, Japan’s Future: One Historian’s Odyssey, Lanham, Rowman and Littlefield, 2001; Laura Hein and Mark Selden eds., Censoring History: Citizenship and Memory in Japan, Germany and the United States, Armonk, M. E. Sharpe, 2000.

Katō Norihiro, Haisengoron, Tokyo, Kōdansha, 1997; the three essays contained in this book were originally published as journal articles between 1995 and 1997.

Abe Shinzō, Utsukushii Kuni e, Tokyo, Bungei Shunjūsha, 2006; Kang Sangjung’s Aikoku no Sahō (Tokyo, Asahi Shinsho, 2006), published a few months later, can be read as a response to Abe.

Kang Sangjung, Orientarizumu no Kanata e, Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten, 1996.


For Kang Sangjung and Hyun Mooam, Dai-Nihon, Manshū Teikoku no Isan, Tokyo, Kōdansha, 2010.


For example, Kang Sangjung, Omoni, Tokyo, Shūeisha, 2010. This is a novel closely based on the life of Kang’s mother.


See, for example, Kang Sangjung, “Minnan ga Tsuzuite iru,” *Shinano Mainichi Shimbun*, 17 June 2011.


Komatsukawa Incident – A Zainichi Korean man named Yi Jin-U (Ri Chin’u) was tried and found guilty of raping and murdering a high-school girl and a young woman in 1958. Yi was a highly intelligent young man, whose letters reflecting on his crime and impending execution evoked a strong response, and became (amongst other things) the subject of Ōshima Nagisa’s film *Kōshikei* [Death by Hanging]

Kim Hiro Incident – In 1968, Kim Hiro, a Zainichi Korean from an impoverished background, shot two gangsters and then held eighteen people hostage in a siege at a guest house before surrendering to police, an event that attracted massive nationwide media coverage in Japan.

Mishima Incident – the ritual suicide in 1970 of novelist Mishima Yukio and an associate following a far-fetched attempt to carry out a right-wing military coup d’état.

United Red Army Incident – A siege at Mount Asama in 1972 which resulted in the arrest of five members of the extreme left-wing United Red Army [*Rengō Sekigun*]. It was subsequently revealed that fourteen other members of the group had been killed in internal purges by their comrades.


Recommended for Further Reading

Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus Articles Recommended for Further Reading

“The Forging of Alien Status of Koreans in American Occupied Japan”
Mark E. Caprio
January 2, 2008
http://japanfocus.org/-Mark-Caprio/2624

Together with the other article authored by Caprio in this course reader, this article explains the circumstances during the occupation era that created the status of Zainichi Koreans in postwar Japan. It argues that American occupation policies were responsible for the later plight of Zainichi Koreans. The article contends that there were several reasons Americans distrusted Koreans in Japan at the time. One was that, lacking a direct channel between themselves and the Koreans, the Americans largely mirrored and accepted the Japanese attitude of looking down on Koreans. Moreover, the Korean activities in the black market as well as communist sympathies among many Koreans made Americans keen to repatriate them immediately to the Korean peninsula. The emerging Cold War mind-set made them view Koreans as affecting Japan only in bad ways.

“The Future of Japan’s Immigration Policy: A Battle Diary”
Sakanaka Hidenori
Introduction by Andrew Taylor and David McNeill
http://japanfocus.org/-Sakanaka-Hidenori/2396

Sakanaka Hidenori (1945– ) is a former director of the Tokyo Immigration Bureau, and this article is a translation of an excerpt from his 2005 publication Immigration Battle Diary (Nyukan senki). Sakanaka argues that Japan has two major options for its future: one, the “Small Option,” is to keep its borders tightly closed to foreign immigrants and allow the population to rapidly decline. The other, the “Big Option,” is to allow a gradual influx of foreign migrants into Japan and offer them equal rights and privileges. Sakanaka thinks the “Big Option” is the only realistic alternative for Japan, despite knowing that some hostility toward migrants will arise in the process. He argues that the question of how to deal with Zainichi Koreans is one of the important issues for the future of immigration in Japan; they are “a litmus test for the relationships Japan would need to build with new arrivals if it were to accept a large number of immigrants” from elsewhere in the world. (p. 2).

“Guarding the Borders of Japan: Occupation, Korean War and Frontier Controls”
Tessa Morris-Suzuki
February 21, 2011
http://japanfocus.org/-Tessa-Morris-Suzuki/3490

In this article, a companion piece to another article authored by Tessa Morris-Suzuki, she discusses the significant inflow of Koreans into Japan during the immediate postwar years.
Here, drawing on her readings of the records left by the vessel *Hatsushima*, which traveled between Jeju Island and Japan in 1948 and in the following years, Morris-Suzuki describes the circumstances that surrounded the Korean passengers who entered Japan illegally. The article argues that the ill-prepared repatriation program implemented by the Japanese and occupation authorities made it virtually impossible for repatriated Koreans to remain in Jeju or elsewhere in Korea. Without recognizing the confusion that reigned in Korea, however, both the Japanese and the Americans continued separating the former colonials from the Japanese. Jeju Island, meanwhile, became a battleground in the struggle between the right-wing mainland Koreans and the Jeju Islanders who rebelled against them, resulting in the April 3rd Incident in which between 20,000 and 30,000 were murdered (p. 13). The Japanese authorities neglected to protect the Koreans after the massacre, however, and continued to categorize them as potentially subversive aliens who should be extradited at the earliest opportunity.

“Legal Categories, Demographic Change and Japan’s Korean Residents in the Long Twentieth Century”  
Yoshiko Nozaki, Hiromitsu Inokuchi, and Kim Tae-young  
September 10, 2006  
[http://japanfocus.org/-Kim-Tae_young/2220](http://japanfocus.org/-Kim-Tae_young/2220)

This short and succinct article outlines the history of Koreans in Japan during the twentieth century and in the early 2000s. The article depicts how Japanese legal approaches changed during that time period as well as demographic changes occurring at that time. The Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910 instigated the inflow of Koreans into Japan, and the abrupt transformation of Japanese policies after 1945 made these Koreans into “stateless” people. Also significant is the fact that the number of Zainichi Koreans has been steadily declining since the early 1990s. At that time, it became easier for them to naturalize as Japanese citizens as interethnic marriages became common. The article argues that despite this gradual decrease, it is important to recognize the Zainichi Korean heritage in order for Japanese to understand that their nation is no longer mono-ethnic – indeed, that it never was.

“Names, Bones and Unpaid Wages: Repatriations for Korean Forced Labor in Japan”  
William Underwood  
September 10, 2006  

Pak Kyong-shik wrote a seminal study on Korean forced labor in wartime Japan in 1965 and there has been a steady flow of studies on this topic since then, by scholars such as Tonomura Masaru. In *Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*, William Underwood has written a series of pertinent articles. This one describes the coercion of Koreans to work in wartime Japan, as well as painstaking efforts made by today’s activists in Japan and Korea to compensate the victims of that coercion. The activists are targeting both the Japanese
government and some major Japanese corporations such as Mitsubishi and Aso Corporation who used the forced labor, but both groups have done very little to redress the situation. The former Prime Minister Aso Taro is a former chairperson of Aso Corporation and he serves as a foreign minister in the Abe cabinet formed in 2012.

Other Recommended Readings


