White Peril/Yellow Peril and Japan’s Pan-Asian Visions, 1850-1930

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**Introduction**

**Pan-Asianism in Historical Context**

Sven Saaler and Christopher W. A. Szpilman


**Cemil Aydin**


**The Yellow Peril in War, Economics, and Popular Culture**

Owen Griffiths


**Daniel A. Métraux**


**Richard Bradshaw and Jim Ransdell**

**White Peril/Yellow Peril and Japan's Pan-Asian Visions, 1850-1930**  

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**The Contradictions of Empire**  

**Tessa Morris-Suzuki**  


---

**Erin L. Murphy**  


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**Paul A. Kramer**  


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**Asia-Pacific Journal Articles Recommended for Further Reading**  

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Introduction

The 19th century collision of nationalism and imperialism is one of the defining processes of modern world history, the consequences of which endure even today.\(^1\) While much has been written on this subject it is nonetheless instructive to reexamine it from the perspective of Japan’s modern history. Because Japan was the only country to have been both imperialized and imperializer, its experience provides a unique perspective on the tensions between the emergence of nationalism as a defense against perceived foreign threats, and imperialism, which was a more aggressive way to solve the same problem. This tension expressed itself in many ways but two in particular stand out in the case of Japan. The first was pan-Asianism grounded in the assumption that common cultural experiences would form the basis of political unity. Japanese pan-Asianists dreamed of such unity under Japan’s leadership to protect against imperialist incursions while also providing the necessary resources to modernize Asia’s economies and societies. The second was expansionism, pan-Asianism’s more predatory cousin. It aimed to secure territory beyond Japan’s borders, to provide access to raw materials and markets, to enhance Japan’s status as a great power, and to protect its borders with a buffer zone. Linking these two strategies were the concepts of blood and race that arose in Europe at the very moment of Japan’s forced emergence on the world stage. Both pan-Asianism and expansionism offered new ways of thinking about national and pan-national unity, justifying inclusion or exclusion in these new visions according to Japanese dictates.

The common thread running through both of these was the seemingly irresistible force of the West, which simultaneously represented a model for Japan’s nationalist and imperialist goals and a clear and present danger to those very same ambitions. Despite the many competing visions of Japan’s national and imperial future from mid-19th century onward, the West remained a constant: a model from which to borrow ideas, practices, and institutions selectively; an example of what great power was; a goad to ever greater imperialist endeavours; a threat to Japan’s ambitions; and a constant reminder of Japan’s backwardness under a Western gaze. As Japan proceeded to revolutionize itself and then project its power outward under such slogans as rich nation/strong military (fûkoku kyôhei), it became, in turn, a threat to the nations of the West as well as a model for others to follow from China and the Philippines to India and the Ottoman Empire.\(^2\) These responses then fuelled even grander Japanese visions of pan-Asianism, both benevolent and predatory.

\(^1\) Readers are encouraged to understand this collision as a process because it was the product of many intersecting forces and, most importantly, because it unfolded over time.

\(^2\) One example of this was Japan’s influence on pan-Arab nationalism in the Ottoman Empire at the turn of the 20th century. For a good discussion on this topic, see Renée Worringer, “Japan’s Progress Reified: Modernity and Arab Dissent in the Ottoman Empire,” Japan Focus, September 2008, ID: 2896, http://japanfocus.org/data/Japan%20Reified%20Worringer.pdf.
In the short century between Commodore Perry’s “black ships” of 1853 and Japan’s defeat in 1945, a variety of groups and individuals constructed their own visions of Japan’s pan-Asianist future. Despite the lack of official sanction until the 1930s, and the absence of clear strategies and objectives, these activists all shared a profound antipathy toward the West. Japan’s pan-Asianists believed that without some form of overarching unity, the peoples of Asia – Japan included – would succumb to the rapacious greed of the Western nations. In this, the Japanese were not alone. Others in Asia also shared this image of a materially obsessed, spiritually barren West. In China, for example, organizations such as the Red Swastika Society (Hongwanzihui) and the Fellowship of Goodness (Tonshanshe) emerged from the early 20th century stirrings of Chinese nationalism claiming that humanity could only be saved from a hedonistic West by the spiritual and moral redemption of the East. Other Asian writers went even further in their analysis, identifying nationalism itself as the principal cause of human suffering. In a series of lectures delivered in the United States and published as a book in 1917, Bengali intellectual and Nobel laureate Rabindranath Tagore argued that nationalism was “one of the most powerful anesthetics that man had invented.” For Tagore, nationalism was a product of Western commerce and science that turned out “neatly compressed bales of humanity” in its insatiable quest for power. He called this the “Nation of the West,” a mechanistic monster of “organized self-interest” driven to seek power for its own sake through conflict and conquest. In both book and lectures Tagore devoted a chapter to Japan, which he commended for its inner strength and deep sense of human obligation. But he worried that the Japanese were in the process of voluntarily submitting to the “trimming of their minds and of their freedom[s]” through “their nervous desire to turn themselves into a machine of power called the nation, and emulate other machines in their collective worldliness.” However, Japan still had a chance to carve a different path, one that would bring East and West together in a spirit of cooperation, not competition. “Of all the countries in Asia,” Tagore declared, Japan had the freedom to use what it had gathered from the West. But with this came great responsibility, “for in your [Japan’s] voice Asia shall answer

3 The term “black ships” is the English translation of the Japanese original kurobune. It refers to the black smoke pouring from the funnels of Perry’s coal-fired steamships. There is some evidence, however, that the term originated in the 16th century, referring to the colour of the hulls of Portuguese ships that were covered in black pitch.

4 For arguments about the lack of unity among Japanese pan-Asianists and a lack of support from official circles, see the articles in this reader by Cemil Aydin, and Saaler and Szpilman.

5 For a good discussion of these associations in China, see Prasenjit Duara, “Transnationalism and the Predicament of Sovereignty: China, 1900-1945,” The American Historical Review, 102:4 (Oct., 1997), 1030-1051. Duara used the term transnational rather than pan-Asian because many of these Chinese associations preached a redemptive message that was founded on a combination of Buddhist, Daoist, and Confucian moral principles, but one that spoke to all humans, not just Asians.


7 Ibid., 17.

8 Ibid., 39.
the questions that Europe has submitted to the conference of man.”9 When Tagore uttered these words in 1916 Japan had already begun to “emulate” the West with its own colonial empire. Yet, he still believed Japan could avoid the temptations to which Europe had succumbed.

Like his Japanese and Chinese counterparts, Tagore believed that pursuing wealth and power as ends in themselves threatened the future of humanity. The West had lost its way, he said. Tempted by Indra, Lord of the Immortals, it sought immortality through wealth and power rather than through penance and humility. Yet there was still hope in what Tagore called “the spirit of the West,” especially its universal ideals of justice and, above all, human freedom. In contrast, Japan’s pan-Asianists and China’s transnationalists argued that only the moral East could overcome the commercial and mechanistic West.10 Herein lay the origins of Japanese spirit/Western learning (wakon yōsai).11 Many Japanese, pan-Asianists among them, believed that a skillful and selective grafting of Western knowledge onto a foundational and unchanging Japanese essence would result in a powerful modern nation, one that would become the light of Asia and an example to the world. Western science and philosophy (yōsai) could therefore be separated from the moral turpitude of the Western nations and be successfully transplanted into the fertile environment of Japan’s own moral traditions (wakon). As a metaphor for modernity, wakon yōsai was both a solution to Japan’s quest for great power status and a problem to be overcome. The difficulty was twofold: how to import foreign ideas without changing Japan’s essential nature and, at the same time, how to import those ideas free of the predatory impulses and moral depravity inherent in the West. In this sense, Japanese pan-Asianism was at its core anti-Western or, at the very least, fearful that without some form of overarching unity, the peoples of Asia, Japan included, would weaken themselves and succumb to the rapacious greed of the Western nations. That insecurity, ironically but understandably, also fueled Japanese nationalist dreams of imperial dominion over Asia, if only in the name of national security.

Often unnoticed in this story is the fact that the West itself was a relatively new concept, a product of the mid-19th century when Euro-American global domination truly began in earnest. From this time on, the West came to embody, in the eyes of both insider and outsider, the epitome of progress, civilization, modernity, and, above all, power. This claim may seem audacious to those raised in a tradition that understands the West and Western civilization as timeless concepts dating back hundreds or even thousands of years. Yet, when we examine the etymology of the West, at least in the English language, we find its origins in the mid-19th century.12

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9 Ibid., 74-5.
10 Ibid., 110.
11 The Chinese had their own version of this phrase, Zhong xue wei ti, xi xue wei yong (Chinese learning as the principle, Western learning for the application), as did a little later the Koreans, Dongdo seogi (Eastern way, Western tools).
12 According to the complete Oxford English Dictionary, the earliest usages of the West in the sense we are familiar with today go back only to the mid-19th century. For an
Like all concepts, of course, the West had its antecedents, Christendom, the Occident, and Europe among them. It is also true that many Europeans saw themselves as superior to other peoples long before European global domination was manifest. It was only in the 19th century however, during what some historians have called the second industrial revolution, that the will to dominate was finally and fully matched by ability. The mass productive forces of industrial capitalism and the infrastructural power of nation-states, together with rapid advances in science and technology, coalesced into an irresistible force that made European, and later American, global domination possible on a scale unprecedented in human history. Ideologies that justified domination quickly gained force too. As the epitome of civilization, modernity, and progress, the West was the senior partner to the subordinate East in one of the most powerful binary constructions in human history. In this sense, it is no exaggeration to say that the West and the East (Asia) not only grew up together but also emerged from the same geopolitical milieu at the same time. Earlier, people thought of themselves as Gauls or Swedes, on the one hand, or as Chinese or Khmer, on the other, but not as members of two fundamentally different civilizations, or even as Europeans and Asians. Just as there were few self-conscious Asians in Asia until about 150 years ago, neither were there many Westerners in the West. The melding of the will to power with the ability to wield that power over immense space not only created the West but also the entire modern world as we know them today.

Here, again, Japan is a most instructive case. Japan’s modern history often begins with Commodore Perry’s arrival in Uraga Bay in 1853. This is a convenient, albeit incomplete, beginning for Japan’s modern transformation and one that is certainly flattering to Americans and other Westerners: There but for the grace of the West went modern Japan. However, as much as this was a beginning, Perry’s mission was also the end of a succession of British, Russian, and American attempts to engage Japan dating back to the late 18th century. All these earlier efforts failed – as did the McCartney mission to China in 1792 – for a variety of reasons, not the least of which was inability or lack of motivation on the part of the Europeans and Americans to impose their will on the Chinese and Japanese. Fifty years later all that had changed with the gunboat diplomacy of the first Opium War and Perry’s arrival in Japan 12 years after that. These were the beginnings of the West as an unstoppable force in East Asia. The Japanese understanding of this change is aptly captured by the speed with which they moved from a position of absolute opposition (sonnô jôî: revere the Emperor/expel the barbarian) to one of resigned argument that the West as a political idea shorn of its racial edge began even later in the 20th century, see Alastair Bonnett, *The Idea of the West: Culture, Politics, and History*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.

13 This phrase is an intentional play on the original “There but for grace of God goes John Bradford,” attributed to the English reformer and martyr of the same name. It highlights one of the major narratives in Japanese and Western writing about Japan until the last 20 years or so that characterized Japan as a follower, a latecomer, and an imitator. In this story the West was Japan’s opposite: a leader, a pioneer, and a creator.
accommodation (wakan yôsai: Japanese spirit/Western learning) with the Westerners.

One of the most important developments that gave rise to the West was the rapidly expanding power of science, both in terms of its rhetorical authority and its practical value. Professionalization, too, assisted this process as new infrastructural power (the research institute, the academy, and the state) gave scientific inquiry in all its forms a legitimacy to weigh in on all aspects of human life. From the family kitchen and the firm to government bureaucracies and the marketplace, scientific thinking reigned supreme and quickly became central to the definition of Westernness. To think or act scientifically was not simply to be modern and progressive. It was, in a word, to be Western. While it conflicted at times with the received truths of Christianity, science just as frequently meshed with religion into a progressive story of salvation by promising to lift the pagans of the world out of their self-imposed ignorance. This is particularly evident in the 19th century missionary legacy. There is considerable evidence that the peoples of Asia were more interested in science than in Christianity and, in fact, were able to comfortably separate the two. As a result, Christian missionaries in Asia were far more successful in building schools, orphanages, and hospitals based on the progressive scientific theories then emanating from Europe and America than they were in winning converts.

In practical terms, rapid advances in scientific discovery and technological innovation, coupled with machine-driven mass production techniques, more than matched the rhetorical power of scientific discourse. It was in these fields that the ability to project power finally matched the will to do so. This was particularly true in military affairs where the screw-driven ironclad steamship, the breech loading gun, and the exploding shell gave tremendous advantages to any who could build or buy them. All of these were developed in the 19th century but constructed on many incremental improvements from earlier times. Here, again, Perry’s “black ships” are a useful measure of the speed with which industrial capitalism and scientific discovery were transformed into tools of power. When James Biddle and James Glyn sailed to Japan in 1846 and 1849 respectively, they did so aboard sail-driven wooden warships armed with smoothbore cannon. Matthew Perry arrived in Uraga Bay in 1853 on the USS Mississippi, a wooden paddle-driven steam frigate brandishing ten French-made Paixhans guns that fired exploding shells. The Mississippi represented a dramatic improvement in naval warfare, yet it too was rendered obsolete within a decade by screw-driven ironclad steamships. Mao Zedong is usually credited with the phrase, “political power flows from the barrel of a gun.” However, mid-19th century Japanese didn’t need Mao to interpret what they experienced directly from Perry onward. This was the world into which the Japanese were thrown, a decidedly dangerous world in which progress, indeed survival, was measured in terms of the ability to project power on whatever object a nation’s gaze was fixed.

The application of scientific thinking to the world of human affairs led to new justifications for using such power. The physical sciences provided insight and
understanding into the laws that governed the inanimate world. Similarly, the newly emerging human sciences seemed to many people to offer comparable insights into relationships among people as well as those between states. As with the physical sciences, these ideas about human behaviour, class, and race did not emerge fully formed but coalesced in the mid-19th century into a powerful discourse about linear progress buttressed by scientific authority. Among the many questions addressed by Europeans and Americans at that time were those concerning human origins, the age of the world, and the mechanisms by which progress occurred.

Of the new ideas circulating at the time none was more powerful than Charles Darwin’s evolutionary theory. As compelling as it was controversial, evolution offered an evidence-based explanation for how some species survived, reproduced, and thrived and others did not. According to Darwin, any slight change or variation in a species, if useful to it in the endless struggle for existence, would be preserved and passed on to its offspring. This was the principle of natural selection at work. Thus, not only did organisms change over time – a controversial enough idea in itself – they did so through the invisible hand of nature, which, by privileging useful variations, gave reproductive success to some and not others. As with all ideas, the power of concepts like evolution and natural selection lay not only in elegant explanation grounded in evidence but also in the ease with which others were able to adapt them to new circumstances. Natural selection proved particularly malleable. Among its many interpretations perhaps the most famous is Herbert Spencer’s “survival of the fittest,” which is often mistakenly attributed to Darwin himself. However, whereas Darwin originally defined fitness in terms of reproductive success in the natural world, Spencer and the many who followed this thread defined it as mental and physical productive success in the human world.

14 Although we credit Charles Darwin as the father of modern evolutionary theory, we should not forget that Alfred Russel Wallace independently derived the same idea from his work in the Amazon and Southeast Asia. In fact, knowledge of Wallace’s theory was the final push that drove Darwin to publish On the Origin of Species in 1859. A year earlier, the now-famous Darwin-Wallace paper was read at the Linnean Society of London by Charles Lyell and Joseph Hooker, The full text of this is available at http://wallacefund.info/the-1858-darwin-wallace-paper. Readers should also note that both men were deeply influenced by Thomas Malthus’ An Essay on the Principle of Population, J. Johnson, 1798, available online at http://www.econlib.org/library/Malthus/malPop.html.


16 While Darwin did not use this term in the first four editions of his famous work, he did cite Spencer’s phrase approvingly in the fifth edition, saying it was "more accurate [than natural selection] and [was] sometimes equally convenient." On the Origin of Species, 5th edition, John Murray, 1869, 72. Available online at http://darwin-online.org.uk/content/frameset?pageseq=1&itemID=F387&viewtype=text.
This move toward analyzing human society through evolution and natural selection marked the beginning of what we now call Social Darwinism, particularly when linked from the 1880s onward with definitions of race that were specifically based on skin colour. Ultimately, these ideas provided new ways of understanding power and why the West should wield it as it did. It was a moral tale in which individuals, races, and nations engaged in endless struggle for survival, a zero-sum world with only winner and losers where the fittest prevailed to write and re-write the story of progress. This was the West in full bloom, an existing concept now grounded in new scientific theories about racial purity and fitness. Long before the advent of National Socialism in Germany, Europeans and Americans generally accepted the link between race and nation, and the idea that imperialism was an expression of a nation's fitness. So too did the Japanese.

In the European story of progress, which meshed so well with Social Darwinist ideas of struggle and survival, the Japanese found themselves at a distinct disadvantage as one of the “inferior races.” However, much like Marx and Engels’ argument that class struggle was the motive force in historical change, the story of progress and Darwin’s story of evolution driven by natural selection could provide both an explanation for Japan’s current position in the world and a blueprint for improving that condition. To that end, Japan’s Meiji leaders dedicated themselves to forging a strong national polity united by race and culture, powered by industrial capitalism, and protected by military might. Initially these objectives aimed to eliminate the unequal treaties Japan’s shogunal government was forced to sign in the wake of Perry’s “black ships.” Diplomatic parity and international respect from the great powers would lift Japan from its subordinate position in the European story of progress and demonstrate to the world that being modern, civilized, and powerful was not exclusive to the West. By the beginning of the 20th century these goals had been achieved. Japan had diplomatic parity, economic and military power, and a strong national polity. Most importantly Japan’s victories in its wars with China (1894-5) and Russia (1904-5) and the territories that came with the victor’s justice of the time demonstrated its ability to project power outward, an absolute prerequisite for great power status. This was truly a remarkable achievement. In only 40 years Japan had transformed itself into an industrial hub – about the same length of time it had taken England to complete the first phase of its own industrial revolution.

As with the English, the costs of this achievement for many Japanese were considerable. Abuses of labour in the factories, thread mills and mines were widespread, as was growing poverty and tenancy in the countryside. Another cost, this one very much tied to race, nation and struggle, was that Japan’s success in the international arena had made it a threat to the very powers from which it wished to gain parity and respect. In the world of all against all, a binary world of grow or perish, Japan’s ascendancy to near-great power status altered the balance of power.

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in Asia and, in the eyes of Westerners, turned Theodore Roosevelt’s “plucky little Jap” into a yellow menace whose buck-toothed, squint-eyed gaze struck fear into the hearts of “good white folk” until well after the Pacific War. This was, of course, the “yellow peril,” a phrase attributed to Kaiser Wilhelm of Germany but one that resonated powerfully in all the nations of the West and found popular expression in laws, legislation, education, and the media. At the heart of yellow peril fears lay visions of teeming Asian hordes overrunning the civilized white world. These visions lent truth to the idea that race as a biological category mattered. They also revealed the centrality of skin colour in the definition of race. Finally, yellow peril rhetoric also blurred the lines between Darwinist and Social Darwinist conceptions of evolution and selection. The yellow peril preoccupation with reproduction actually brought it closer to the original Darwinian idea rather than the Social Darwinist emphasis on productive fitness. The fluid movement between one kind of fitness and the other, however, illustrates the many ways these concepts could be adapted to different situations, all seemingly grounded in scientific authority.

Western images of Japan and China revealed this tendency clearly. China was the object of Western yellow peril fears primarily due to the “fecundity of its loins,” to use Jack London’s phrase. Japan, on the other hand, represented a double threat. As a formidable military power and the only non-Western participant in the great power game, Japan had demonstrated both the will to power and the ability to wield it in the international arena. But a modern, militarized Japan also represented a special danger because of its potential to awaken the Chinese “sleeping dragon” and unleash its teeming masses. Thus, for many in the West, Japan was the spearhead of yellow peril fears precisely because of its pan-Asian rhetoric. This was evident in Euro-American writings as early as the 1880s, particularly in future war fiction. As part of the emerging East/West binary, yellow peril and white peril fed on each other, creating a self-sustaining discourse of fear and loathing. Yellow peril anxieties were articulated through literature, scientific study, and anti-Oriental legislation, all of which provided compelling evidence to Japanese and other Asians that the West was a threat to their own existence. As Singhalese Buddhist Anagarika Dharmapala wrote in 1913, "[i]t is a political trick of the Europeans to keep harping about the yellow peril... It is the white peril that Asiatic races have to guard against." In this

18 Jack London, “The Unparalleled Invasion,” in *The Strength of the Strong*, MacMillan, 1910, 60-80. In this chilling tale, set some 70 years in London’s future, he recounts how the nations of the world, led by a brilliant American scientist, exterminate the entire Chinese race through biological warfare due to fears of China overbreeding. It is the earliest form of fiction I have found that treats both germ warfare and genocide.

19 Future war is also known as military science fiction or simply science fiction. However, it was a genre of adventure stories for boys in Japan in the early 20th century known as *mirai sensô* (future war). For more on this genre, see my article in this reader.

way, yellow peril fears helped to drive pan-Asianist visions of the Japanese and other Asians.

The articles that follow offer a variety of perspectives on Japanese thinking about pan-Asianism from its earliest formations in the mid-19th century to its eventual official adoption as Japanese policy in the 1930s. While the approach and focus of each article differs, they share some understanding that the motive force behind all forms of Japanese pan-Asianism was a powerful antipathy to the West.

This is what I have called the “white peril” even though in my research thus far I have found no Japanese use of the term. Of course they did have many derogatory names for Westerners, from “long noses” and “butter stinkers” to the “evil British and Americans” (aku O-bei) common from the 1920s through the 1940s. The earliest references to the “white peril” may actually come from the West itself. The first was a novel by Anatole France entitled *The White Stone (Sur la pierre blanche)* published in 1905. In the shadow of the excavation of ancient Roman ruins a group of Frenchmen gathered each afternoon to discuss politics, philosophy and history. During dinner, conversation turned to the rise of Europe with one young man, Nicole Langelier, inverting history by remarking that “[t]he white kingdoms joined issue over the extermination of the red, yellow, and black races, and for the space of four centuries gave themselves up madly to the pillaging of the three great divisions of the world. This is what is styled modern civilization.”21 In an even more damning indictment, Langelier went on to say that “[i]t was not the yellow men who hunted up the whites… We created the White Peril. The White Peril engendered the Yellow Peril.”22 France’s inversion of civilized and barbaric was echoed later that same year by American journalist Sidney Gulick who argued that Japan’s victory over Russia marked the beginning of a new era, “a readjustment [in the balance of power] that promises to halt the territorial expansion of white races and to check their racial pride.”23 In an almost exact reproduction of France’s fictional character, Gulick went on to say that “[s]ince the discovery of America, the dream of conquest, of empire and of unearned wealth has intoxicated the white people of the earth and made them the scourge of all the world…Surely the outstanding fact in the relations of the West to the East has been the peril to the yellow and brown races through the presence of the white man, whose assumption has been the theory that might makes right.”24

These examples powerfully illustrate how the “Nation of the West,” in Tagore’s words, became the goad for Japanese pan-Asianism. In a short poem penned on the last day of the 19th century, nearly 20 years before his lectures on nationalism, Tagore portrayed the West as a monster whose “naked passion of self-

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22 Ibid., 162.
24 Ibid., 19-20.
love” and “drunken delirium of greed” had burst forth “in a violence of fury from its own shameless feeding. For it has made the world its food.”25 Here, we see the self-criticism of Western hypocrisy (France and Gulick) converging with Eastern perceptions of Western greed and rapaciousness (Dharmapala and Tagore). This was the world historical context in which Japanese pan-Asianists operated, a world in which pan-Asian unity under Japanese leadership became for many the only protection against the West. However, just as Tagore saw the West consuming itself, Japanese pan-Asian visions also ran the risk, now all too clear in retrospect, of becoming just like the enemy they struggled to resist.

25 Rabindranath Tagore, “The Sunset of the Century, 1899. The poem was written in Bengali on the last day of that year and translated and reprinted in English in 1917 in Nationalism.
Pan-Asianism in Historical Context

Pan-Asianism as an Ideal of Asian Identity and Solidarity, 1850–Present
Sven Saaler and Christopher W. A. Szpilman
http://www.japanfocus.org/-Sven-Saaler/3519
April 25, 2011

Japan’s Pan-Asianism and the Legitimacy of Imperial World Order, 1931–1945
Cemil Aydin
http://www.japanfocus.org/-Cemil-Aydin/2695
March 12, 2008

These two articles examine the formation of Japanese pan-Asian visions from their earliest stirrings in the mid-19th century to the end of the 20th century. Saaler and Szpilman offer a historical account of pan-Asianism that was grounded in assumptions of common culture and language as well as racial ideas imported from the West. They also reveal the powerful antipathy many pan-Asian proponents had toward the West. At the same time, they show that pan-Asianism provided a useful set of tools that the Japanese used to displace centuries-long Chinese authority. Their article, an abridged version of the introduction to a two-volume edited book, also provides important historical context for understanding discussions of East Asian regional and global integration in the 21st century.

Saaler and Szpilman begin by pointing out that pan-Asianism poses a challenge for scholars, not only because of its ambiguity and lack of definition, but also due to the discrediting of the concept through Japan’s own actions in the 1930s and 1940s. This is where Aydin’s article fits nicely. He analyzes why Japanese political elites embraced pan-Asian ideas in the 1930s after having rejected or ignored them, especially as tools of foreign policy, in earlier periods. Aydin explains that pan-Asianism’s malleability, being both ill defined and unsystematic, transcended domestic left/right political ideologies, rendering it useful both as a peaceful tool of Asian unity and as a rhetorical device for Japan’s own imperialist endeavours. Internationally, the Manchurian Incident of 1931 and Japan’s withdrawal from the League of Nations in 1933 marked a turning point when Japanese foreign policy adopted the radical pan-Asianist rhetoric of racial struggle against the imperialist West. Even here, however, pan-Asianists exhibited little unanimity, with some like Okawa Shumei arguing against war and for greater trade with the United States.

Both articles provide a wealth of primary voices, Japanese and non-Japanese, all united to some degree in their opposition to the West. In addition to Okawa and Ishiwara Kanji, readers are introduced to the ideas of Rabindranath Tagore, Qurban Ali, W. E. B. DuBois, and An Chung-gun – Ito Hirobumi’s Korean assassin – who wrote a pan-Asian tract while in prison awaiting his execution. An, along with Chinese revolutionaries like Li Dazhao, are important to this story not only because their pan-Asian visions rejected Japanese leadership but also because they illustrate
the breadth of anti-Western pan-Asian sentiment throughout the entire Asian region.
Pan-Asianism as an Ideal of Asian Identity and Solidarity, 1850–Present
Sven Saaler and Christopher W. A. Szpilman

This is a revised, updated and abbreviated version of the introduction to the two volume collection by the authors of Pan-Asianism. A Documentary History Vol. 1 covers the years 1850-1920; Vol. 2 covers the years 1850-present, link.

The economic and political power of Asia, the world’s largest continent, is increasing rapidly. According to the latest projections, the gross domestic products of China and India, the world’s most populous nations, will each surpass that of the United States in the not-too-distant future. China’s economy, like Japan’s, is already larger than that of any single European country. With this new economic might comes growing diplomatic influence. The twenty-first century, many pundits agree, will be an Asian century. This undisputed Asian success story, together with its accompanying tensions and discontents, has attracted much media and scholarly attention. Yet for all this talk of Asia, there is no consensus on what Asia actually stands for as a whole. Is the vast Asian landmass a single entity? There has never been—and perhaps never will be—universal agreement on this question.

Where is Asia?
Attempts to define Asia are almost as old as the term itself. The word “Asia” originated in ancient Greece in the fifth century BC. It originally denoted the lands of the Persian Empire extending east of the Bosphorus Straits but subsequently developed into a general term used by Europeans to describe all the lands lying to the east of Europe. (The point where Europe ended and Asia began was, however, never clearly defined.) Often, this usage connoted a threat, real or perceived, by Asia to Europe—a region smaller in area, much less populous, poorer, and far less significant than Asia in terms of global history.

The term “Asia” arrived in East Asia relatively late, being introduced by Jesuit missionaries in the sixteenth century. The term is found, written in Chinese characters (亜細亜), on Chinese maps of the world made around 1600 under the supervision of Matteo Ricci (1552–1610), one of the founders of the Jesuit mission in China. However, it took two more centuries before the name gained wide currency in the region. For it was only with the resumption of European colonialist expansion in the nineteenth century that “Asia” ceased to be a technical term used by East Asian cartographers and, in reaction to the threat of Western colonialism, came to represent a specific geopolitical space bound together by such commonalities as a shared history, close cultural links, a long record of diplomatic relations, trade exchanges, and the notion of a “common destiny.” Although the definitions of Asia were diverse and often contradictory, the real or perceived Western threat caused an increasing number of intellectuals, politicians, and activists throughout Asia to argue for strengthening “Asian” solidarity in relation to “the West.”
These arguments about the definition and nature of Asia in reaction to the impending Western threat marked the beginnings of Pan-Asianism as an ideology and a movement. Vague sentiments about strengthening Asian solidarity were gradually developed into concrete policy proposals for a united defense of Asia against the encroachments of Western imperialism. In many cases, such calls for Asian solidarity, integration, and unity were accompanied by endeavors to create an Asian identity by postulating commonalities and identifying traditions of interaction and interrelationship. Some thinkers took for granted the existence of an Asian identity. Others argued that such an identity must be deliberately forged as a necessary condition for realizing the ultimate objective of unifying Asia. Although individual writers in different places and at different times advocated a wide variety of strategies and views on the nature of Asian unity, we can nonetheless observe a certain degree of uniformity in the development of pan-Asian rhetoric from the nineteenth century down to the present—a pattern discussed below.
In this way, then, a pan-Asian worldview or “style of thought” became established and diffused throughout the region. It can be identified in the writings of intellectuals, political statements, popular slogans, and even in songs and poems in a number of Asian states and nations. A representative selection of such texts, all of which are of great significance in the history of Pan-Asianism and Asian regionalism, are included in this collection. They were written or collected in various parts of Asia, from Japan, through Korea, China, Indonesia, and India to the Ottoman Empire, over the past 150 years. These texts, most of which have been translated into English from a number of Asian languages, are brought to the Western reader for the first time in an easily accessible form. Each source is accompanied by a commentary that provides essential information, such as a biographical sketch of the author and the historical context of the document under consideration.

A number of collections of pan-Asian texts have been published in Japanese. The most important of these is Takeuchi Yoshimi’s (1910–1977) volume Asianism, which, in addition to providing a selection of sources, examines the significance of Pan-Asianism and attempts to place it in its historical context. Much less useful is the recently published three-volume anthology, Ajishugishatachi no Koe (Pan-Asianist Voices), which merely reproduces snippets of texts seemingly at random without any critical contextualization. Pan-Asianism, however, receives scant attention in widely available English-language source collections on Asia such as the volumes in the Introduction to Asian Civilizations series—Sources of Japanese Tradition, Sources of Chinese Tradition, Sources of Korean Tradition and Sources of Indian Tradition.

The end of the Cold War in 1989 produced a surge of interest in issues of regionalism and transnational identity in contemporary East Asia. This new interest in contemporary regionalism was followed only a decade later by the recognition of the long-term historical developments underlying the geopolitical formation of the East Asian region and the idea of Asian solidarity (i.e., the ideology of Pan-Asianism) as important research subjects. Few works on Pan-Asianism were published before 2000 in any language. But since the beginning of the twenty-first century there has been an upsurge of interest in the historical development of Pan-Asianism, reflected in a stream of book-length publications on various aspects of Pan-Asianism. In addition, a number of important articles have been published on the subject over the years. Notwithstanding these publications, however, knowledge of Pan-Asianism and its role in modern Asia remains fragmented, unsystematic, and unbalanced.

This collection aims to remedy the situation by providing readers with the seminal documents of Pan-Asianism and thus a comprehensive overview of the development of the ideals of Asian solidarity and regionalism in the hope of stimulating further research and providing the foundations for a synthesis of earlier work. The major difficulty with researching Pan-Asianism is a linguistic one, for it would be very difficult, if not impossible, for any one scholar to master all the languages necessary for a comprehensive study of the subject. So, while the community of scholars interested in issues of Asian regionalism continues to grow, linguistic difficulties and the barriers of specialization have prevented them from studying Pan-Asianism
as an ideology that transcends linguistic boundaries and national narratives and examining the processes of regional integration in East Asia from the perspective of the longue durée. We hope that this collection, with its comprehensive approach, will help scholars to look beyond the scope of their narrow specializations and open new possibilities for transnational cooperation in research on Asian regionalism.

**The Origins of Pan-Asianism: Macronationalism and Transnationalism**

The term “Asia” came into common use in East Asia only in the mid-nineteenth century in response to the increasing diplomatic, military, and economic presence of the Western powers, and their territorial expansion in East Asia. The Opium War of 1839–1842 was a watershed in the history of Asian–European encounters. The British victory led to the recognition, throughout East Asia, of Europe as a common threat, and it was at that time that intellectuals and politicians throughout the region began to consider the questions of “Asia” and Asian solidarity. With a view to giving the concept of solidarity substance, they began exploring Asian cultural commonalities and the common historical heritage of the continent. It is of course true that, as Hamashita Takeshi and other scholars have pointed out, East Asian countries had a long history of interaction before the nineteenth century. This took the form of an interstate system, centered on China. It was this Sinocentric system (sometimes also known as the tributary system) to which the Western powers had to accommodate when they first came into contact with East Asian states. But it was the acute sense of crisis brought about by the Chinese defeat in the Opium War that forced Asian writers and thinkers actively to pursue the agenda of a united Asia, an Asia with a common goal—the struggle against Western imperialism.

Ideas of Asian solidarity came in a large variety of forms, as did the geographical definitions underlying claims for regional solidarity. Some forms of the concept were based on assumptions of racial unity, following, curiously enough, racial notions that had originated in the West (Hannaford 1996; Dikötter 1997). Others tended to emphasize commonalities in culture and language (more accurately written language). This was especially the case in East Asia, often referred to in the West as the “Orient” (Japanese: Tōyō; Korean: Tong'yang; Chinese: Dongyang), a region which, for thousands of years, had been under the powerful influence of Chinese civilization. (The term “East Asia” was used from the late nineteenth century on [Japanese: Tōa; Korean: Dong-a; Chinese: Dong-ya].) In this context, some thinkers saw the new quest for solidarity as a strengthening of the existing networks of economic and cultural exchange. Others were inspired by pan-movements emerging almost simultaneously in Europe and America. The various approaches to Pan-Asianism, however, all shared a common emphasis on transnationalism and Asian unity.

Pan-Asianism was at times used to legitimize Japan’s territorial aggrandizement and colonial expansion. One of the few detailed studies of pan-movements in general, Louis Snyder’s *Macro-Nationalisms*, characterizes pan-movements as “Nationalism Writ Large” or “extended nationalisms.” However, as the present volume shows, advocacy of Pan-Asianism also reflected reservations about the concepts of nation
and nationalism, which were also imported in their modern forms to Asia from the West in the nineteenth century. The popularity of a transnational Pan-Asianism and the transnational political activities of revolutionaries show that the nation was not, as is often believed, an absolute and unquestioned value in Asia. (The rise of pan-movements in other parts of the world, too, has been seen as an expression of skepticism over the absolute character of the “nation.”) To be sure, in a number of Asian countries protonationalism had already developed before the arrival of the European powers in the region. Within the Sinocentric international order, the elites of tributary states in East Asia had developed their own sense of nationhood. However, in the nineteenth century new forms of nationalism developed in East Asia. In the same way as Pan-Asianism, they represented a reaction to Western colonialism and over time developed into national independence movements. Yet again, these nationalist aspirations and the independence movements they spawned were characterized by strong transnational links, alliances that were apparent in the activities of Asian revolutionaries described in this volume: Indians, Vietnamese, Indonesians, Filipinos, and activists from other Asian countries who went into exile in Japan, where they exchanged ideas, promoted pan-Asian solidarity, developed networks, and worked together to achieve national independence. Benedict Anderson has brilliantly traced the process by which the elites of colonized nations developed a sense of national identity and a desire for independence from their colonial masters during periods of residence in the metropole. It could be argued that a similar process was at work in the case of the revolutionary members of Asian elites. Particularly those who found themselves in Japan, whether as students or exiles, interacted with other Asians and in this way developed a common Asian consciousness.

In Japan they came also into contact with Japanese pan-Asianists, many of whom supported independence movements throughout Asia. The Japanese triumph in the war with Russia in 1904–1905 was an important turning point, an event that accelerated the spread of pan-Asian ideas throughout the continent. Many Asians now believed that Japan would soon assume leadership in the struggle against the tyranny of the Western imperialist powers. Even in distant Egypt, a delighted Arab announced the news of the Russian defeat to the Chinese revolutionary leader Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925), who was traveling by boat through the Suez Canal. “The joy of this Arab, as a member of the great Asiatic race,” Sun recalled many years later, “seemed to know no bounds”. However, disillusionment with Japan soon set in when it embarked on a program of carving out its own colonial empire at the expense of other Asian nations and justified these expansionist policies with pan-Asian rhetoric.

Pan-Asian cooperation was institutionalized in the form of numerous pan-Asian associations founded all over Asia and was also reflected in pan-Asian conferences that took place in Japan, China, and Afghanistan in the 1920s and 1930s. These developments showed the diversity and interconnectedness of anti-Western movements throughout Asia. A few examples will suffice to illustrate this phenomenon. In 1907, socialists and anarchists from China, Japan, and India joined
forces to found the Asiatic Humanitarian Brotherhood in Tokyo. In 1909 Japanese and Muslim pan-Asianists in Japan established the Ajia Gikai (Asian Congress) with the goal of promoting the cause of Asian solidarity and liberation. It was almost certainly this Ajia Gikai that a British intelligence report referred to when it mentioned “an Oriental Association in Tokyo attended by Japanese, Filipinos, Siamese, Indians, Koreans, and Chinese, where Count Okuma [Shigenobu, 1838–1922] once delivered an anti-American lecture”. In 1921, the Pan-Turanian Association was founded in Tokyo to rally Japanese support for the unification of the Turks of Central Asia and their liberation from Russian rule. The association cooperated closely with the Greater Asia Association (Dai Ajia Kyōkai) and other Japanese pan-Asian organizations.

The transnational character of Pan-Asianism was also apparent in its publishing activities. Indian pan-Asianists published material in Japan, China, the United States, and Germany; Japanese pan-Asianists published in China, India, and the United States. Koreans, too, such as the court noble An Kyongsu (1853–1900), published their works in Japan. Journals with a clear pan-Asian message—the source of many of the documents in this collection—were published in Japan, China, and Southeast Asia.

Although such writings might be dismissed as mere “propaganda”, there is no doubt that a significant number of Westerners were sympathetic to the ideals of Asian solidarity and Pan-Asianism. At the center of pan-Asian activities in Japan at the end of World War I stood the now obscure French mystic, Paul Richard (1874–1967), whose works were published in Japan, India, and the United States and certainly widely read, at least in Japan. In the 1920s and 1930s, the famous editor of the Zeitschrift für Geopolitik, Karl Haushofer (1869–1946), paid tribute to the pan-Asian movement, seeing it as proof of his theory that international relations would come to be dominated by regional blocs. Haushofer introduced to his readers the writings and activities of pan-Asianists such as Sun Yat-sen, Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941), and Benoy Kumar Sarkar (1887–1949). These Asian activists and revolutionaries, Haushofer was convinced, reflected a trend toward a future world order that would be dominated by large, regional blocs, replacing the existing order characterized by the sovereign nation-state. Another proponent of pan-ideas, Richard Nikolaus Count von Coudenhove-Kalergi (1894–1972), the founder of the pan-European movement and the publisher of the journal Pan-Europa, also praised the pan-Asian movement; a Japanese translation of an enthusiastic article by him appeared in the journal Dai Ajiashugi (Greater Asianism).

As a final striking example of the appeal of Pan-Asianism to Westerners, in 1934 an anonymous Greek wrote a letter addressed “to the Eastern Asiatic people of the Mongolian race and colour,” which he sent to the Japanese consulate at Surabaya in the Dutch East Indies (present-day Indonesia). The letter called on Asians to cultivate the Pan-Mongolian consciousness, in feeling, in thought and above all in action; harmonize, cultivate and facilitate in every possible way the Inter-Mongolian race intercourse and understanding by adopting an official and compulsory taught and used Inter-Mongolian language composed of Words of Chinese, Japanese and
Siamese languages; Eliminate from your mind and from your dictionaries the word FOREIGNER, and cultivate the Inter-Mongolian fellowship and community of interest; Harmonize your national, political, social, economic and religious life. . . . [F]orm and organize THE INTER-MONGOLIAN AND INTER-CONTINENTAL HARMONIZED AWAKENING, in every city, town, village and hamlet.

This bizarre letter was apparently inspired by the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s so-called Amau Statement, which declared “special responsibilities for Japan in East Asia” and which was often interpreted as a declaration by Japan of an “Asian Monroe Doctrine,” that is, a call for noninterference by Western powers in China. As far as one can tell, this appeal to an inter-Asian consciousness elicited no reaction either in Japan or elsewhere in Asia. Nevertheless, Pan-Asianism was stimulated, both positively and negatively, by Western influences. For example, the Japanese politician Kodera Kenkichi (1877–1949), who had studied international relations in Europe and the United States for almost a decade, justified his advocacy of Pan-Asianism by constantly referring to the positive role of pan-movements in the West. In contrast to Kodera, Prince Konoe Fumimaro (1891–1945) chose to stress the negative aspects of the West by rejecting the universalist pretensions of the League of Nations (founded 1919) when he proclaimed the need for Asian solidarity under Japanese leadership. Both Kanokogi Kazunobu (1884–1949) and Hirano Yoshitarō (1897–1980) were strongly influenced by German ideas, as were the 1930s proponents of a regional bloc in East Asia such as the political scientist Rōyama Masamichi (1895–1980) and Kada Tetsuji (1895–1964).

While the West was important as a reference point, Pan-Asianism as an ideology also posed a significant challenge to the earlier Sinocentric order—an order not limited to China proper but also appropriated by the nomadic conquerors of China and by states on the periphery such as Korea and Japan. In this context, the seemingly “more modern” ideology of Pan-Asianism served as an integrating force, helping to fulfill the requirement for the “de-centering of China.”

Arguably, in many cases the Sinocentric hierarchical view of the world influenced the thinking of some Japanese pan-Asianists who appropriated it faithfully with one significant change. For them it was Japan, not China, that was to be the new “Middle Kingdom” and the leader of Asia. Although, as we show, early forms of Pan-Asianism often envisioned cooperation on equal terms, insistence on Japanese leadership (meishu) in Asia increased in proportion to the growth and expansion of Japan’s power in East Asia.

For advocates of this “Meishuron” Asianism, Japan’s leadership was justified on moral grounds as well as by the realities of international relations. Japan qualified as the leader of Asia because it was morally superior to China, which was in political turmoil, and had always been as a result of its frequent dynastic changes. In contrast, Japan, many Japanese elites believed, was qualified to lead Asia because of its divine imperial dynasty that was “unbroken through ages immemorial.” Japan, in this view, was a “chosen” country, the “Land of the Gods”—qualities that uniquely fitted it for a special “mission” to liberate Asia from Western oppression, become the
leader of the region, and, as its more imaginative supporters asserted, unite the whole world under the benevolent rule of the Japanese emperor, following the ancient slogan *hakkō ichiu*, or “The Eight Corners of the World [United] under One Roof.” Rather than drawing on the foundational myths, other pan-Asian writers justified Japan’s leadership of Asia on the grounds of Japan’s successful modernization program, an effort they contrasted with the failure of the rest of Asia in this regard. From this perspective, Japan’s technological advances served as evidence of Japanese superiority. But whatever the grounds for such claims, the fact remains that many Japanese pan-Asianists, in various ways, consciously or unconsciously, provided justification for Japan’s colonial rule and territorial expansion in Asia.

**Pan-Asianism and Empire**

One of the reasons why, for a long time after 1945, Pan-Asianism was largely ignored by researchers—not to mention politicians and diplomats—was its fateful connection to Japanese imperialism and the role it played as an ideology that legitimized Japan’s empire-building project in the first half of the twentieth century. While some commentators insist that Japan never officially pursued a pan-Asian foreign policy before or even during the Asia-Pacific War (1931–1945), it is undeniable that the Japanese government frequently utilized pan-Asian rhetoric in the 1930s and 1940s in order to bolster claims to Japanese leadership in East Asia and legitimize its colonial rule over parts of Asia.

In *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, Hannah Arendt suggested a close link between nineteenth-century Pan-Germanism and Pan-Slavism and twentieth-century totalitarianism and expansionism. “Nazism and Bolshevism,” she contended, “owe more to Pan-Germanism and Pan-Slavism (respectively) than to any other ideology or political movement. This is most evident in foreign policies, where the strategies of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia have followed so closely the well-known programs of conquest outlined by the pan-movements before and during the First World War . . .”. Although it would be an exaggeration to claim that Pan-Asianism formed an important component of any totalitarian developments in modern Asia, one cannot overlook the connection between Pan-Asianism and Japaneseultranationalism (discussed below) and also the contribution of this ideology to the legitimation of Japanese colonial rule and empire building in Asia in the first half of the twentieth century.

As early as 1910, pan-Asian rhetoric was used by the Japanese government to legitimize the annexation of Korea. The Annexation Treaty referred specifically to commonalities between Japanese and Koreans, such as racial origins, a common history and culture, and a shared destiny. This remained the orthodox way of justifying and legitimizing Japanese rule in Korea throughout the colonial period and was reiterated time and again in both public and private statements. The same pan-Asian rhetoric was continuously reaffirmed and applied to other colonial territories. For example, in 1939, in the semi-official journal *Contemporary Japan*, a writer insisted that
contrary to the general assumption held abroad, and even entertained by some Japanese, Chosen [Korea], Taiwan, and even Manchukuo are not Japanese colonies according to the Western way of thinking. . . . “To make the world one household” is an expression used by the Japanese to indicate their moral principle of co-existence and co-prosperity. . . . Although their languages and customs are now different, Japan and Korea were especially close to each other until about thirteen centuries ago, there having been a large intermixture of both blood and culture before that time. . . . Japan’s annexation of the peninsula might be taken as a reversion of the two countries to their ancient status of being one homogeneous whole.

The assertion of racial and cultural commonalities presented here went hand in hand with the legitimization of Japanese superiority on the grounds that Japan was a country chosen by the gods. As early as the late 1910s, a number of writers, such as Kanokogi Kazunobu, Kita Ikki, and Ōkawa Shūmei, spoke of a divine Japanese “mission” to liberate Asia. This high-sounding objective was often difficult to distinguish from the substitution of one form of colonial oppression (by Europeans) for another (by fellow Asian Japanese). And a belief in Japan’s divine mission was by no means limited to radical reformists. Even mainstream writers who eschewed ideologically driven rhetoric and sought to explain international relations in terms of Realpolitik, such as Tokutomi Sohō (1863-1957), urged Japan to establish an “Asian Monroe Doctrine.” In doing so, Tokutomi may have been applying an idea of Western provenance to international relations in East Asia, but he still believed, like Kita and Kanokogi, that Japan had a special “mission” to accomplish in East Asia.

In the 1930s, claims that Japan’s empire was an embodiment of pan-Asian ideals were voiced more frequently and openly than before. This was due to the impact of “regional bloc thinking” that was highly influential at the time. For example, Rōyama Masamichi insisted in 1934 that “the Pan-Asiatic movement” was a “decisive influence responsible for the establishment of the Empire.” Though he lamented that this movement lacked “any coherent programme
under any prominent leader,” he nevertheless regarded it as full of promise for the future. As evidence, he noted with satisfaction that “many small groups of so-called Pan-Asianists loosely affiliated through study organizations ... have sprung up like mushrooms during the past two years in both Japan and Manchuria”. Rōyama’s notion of an “East Asian bloc” gained wide prominence in Japan in the late 1930s, amplified by a fusion with the geopolitical ideas of Karl Haushofer and Carl Schmidt (1888–1985) and with earlier concepts of an “Asian Monroe Doctrine.” The notion of an “East Asian bloc” was also popular with Marxists and socialists, as can be seen in the writings of Takahashi Kamekichi (1894–1977) and some members of the Shōwa Kenkyūkai, the brain trust founded by Prince Konoe Fumimaro, prime minister in 1937–1939 and 1940–1941.

The intimate connection of Pan-Asianism with Japan’s empire-building ambitions leads to another central problem of Pan-Asianism—the inherent ambiguity of the concepts involved. It is clear that, from the outset, pan-Asian thought was riddled with ambiguity and contradictions that made this ideology capable of being used to legitimize both the anticolonial struggle against the West and the domination of one Asian nation by another. This ambiguity is also inherent in the terminology used to describe the ideology.

Problems of Terminology

As stated at the start of this introduction, Pan-Asianism poses a problem as a topic of scholarly inquiry even at the level of terminology. The object of inquiry is hard to define and is almost as elusive as a continuously shifting target. There is no scholarly consensus on the definition of “Asia,” on pan-movements, or on ideologies with a transnational focus that have evolved over time. Likewise, the question of how Pan-Asianism is related to other pan-movements is far from settled.

As we have seen, the emergence of Pan-Asianism was inseparable from the rise of Japan as a major power and Japan’s struggle with China for leadership in Asia. But Pan-Asianism also reflected attempts by East Asian elites to forge Asian unity by bringing Japan and China together. Thus, early manifestations of the movement were characterized by the close cooperation of ideologues, activists, and politicians from Japan, China, and Korea. But the need for cooperation and, thus, compromise resulted in pan-Asian ideas being characterized by a marked lack of specific content. Although the concept of Pan-Asianism can be traced from the mid-nineteenth century on, the term “Pan-Asianism” (or Asianism, Greater Asianism) was not in use in China, Korea, and Japan before the 1890s and occurs only infrequently prior to the 1910s.

Around the turn of the century, Western writers who were clamoring about the threat of the Yellow Peril occasionally used the terms “Pan-Asianism” or “pan-Asiatic league” in warning of the dangers a united Asia would pose for Western supremacy. The Japanese government was quick to lay any Western suspicions on this score to rest, particularly after the start of the war with Russia, a Western power, in 1904. It took this popular Western agitation so seriously that on many occasions it officially disclaimed any interest in promoting closer relations with its
(weak) Asian neighbors. Japanese diplomats were dispatched to Europe and the United States expressly to dispel any Western suspicions as to Japan’s pan-Asian ambitions. For example, in the United States, Harvard-educated Baron Kaneko Kentarō (1853–1942) dismissed rumors voiced in the “yellow” press that Japan was aiming to form an Asian federation, as did diplomat Suematsu Kenchō (1855–1920) in Europe. As late as 1919, Takekoshi Yosaburō (1865–1950) ridiculed the idea of a Japanese-led Asian alliance against the West in a publication funded by the Japanese government:

Among our own people, there are some who do not rightly interpret the history of their own country, and who do not take their national strength into proper consideration and who, being prompted by certain fanatical ideas, advocate the alliance of the yellow races against the white, an alliance of which Japan should be the leader, and with that object in view, they favour the partition of China. Those who argue in this strain have evidently lost their mental balance.

Just as the government went to great lengths to deny any association with Pan-Asianism, the opposition placed a strong emphasis on Pan-Asianism, calling for the unification of the “yellow race,” that is, the Asian peoples. As early as 1874, Ueki Emori (1857–1892), a prominent member of the opposition freedom and peoples’ rights movement (jiyū minken undō), had attacked what he considered the pro-Western policy of the government and, insisting that the West was Japan’s enemy, called for the formation of an Asian League (Ajia rengō). Ueki held a version of Pan-Asianism that assumed equality among Asian nations. He even advocated independence for the Ryukyu archipelago (present-day Okinawa Prefecture), a previously independent kingdom that was annexed by Japan in the 1870s. An anonymous writer in the journal Ajia (Asia) and the antigovernment activist and politician Tarui Tōkichi (1850–1922) made similar proposals in the 1880s. It was not until 1903 that the first acknowledgment of the potent ial of Pan-Asianism as a significant factor in international relations was made, when the art critic Okakura Tenshin (1862–1913), famous for coining the phrase “Asia is one,” stated in his book The Awakening of the East that a “Pan-Asiatic Alliance” would “in itself constitute an immense force.” However, the impact of this statement may have been somewhat reduced in Japan by the fact that Okakura had written his book in English for an Indian and not a Japanese audience.

While the term “Pan-Asianism” entered the mainstream political vocabulary only in the 1910s, in the nineteenth century advocates of Asian unity could draw on a number of terms and slogans when propagating their ideals. In the 1880s, the term Kōa, or “Raising (or Developing) Asia,” was the most widely used slogan, implying the need for Asia to modernize in order to catch up with the technologically advanced West. The term was not without problems, however. For example, an organization called the Kōakai (Raising Asia Society) was founded in Tokyo in 1880. Its membership was predominantly Japanese—they had chosen the group’s name—but it included some Koreans and Chinese who objected to the name on the grounds that it implied—in contrast to successful, modern Japan—that Asia was backward, oppressed, and downtrodden, and could be saved only by “raising” it
through Japanese leadership and advice. Following such criticism, the Kōakai was renamed Ajia Kyōkai (Asia Association) in 1883. But it was not only Japanese pan-Asianists who believed in Japanese superiority; many Asians also acknowledged their political and economic backwardness in relation to Japan. Many Chinese recognized the failure of modernization, at least implicitly, in their nation, accounting for the formation of political associations with names such as the Raise China Society (Xingzhonghui), founded by Sun Yat-sen in 1894, and the China Revival Society (Huaxinghui), founded in Hunan 1904.

Another early term used to describe pan-Asian solidarity was the classical Chinese phrase *fuche chunchi* (Japanese: *hosha shinshi*; Korean: *poch'a sonch'i*), which means “mutual dependence” or, literally, “a relationship as close as that between the lips and the teeth or between the chassis and the wheels of a cart.” This image implied a high degree of interdependence, but, in contrast to the potentially hierarchical Kōa, it presumed equal relations among Asian nations. Its origin also indicates the influence of Chinese classical scholarship on early Pan-Asianism. This phrase was used by early pan-Asianists particularly in the 1870s and 1880s, but it can be found in many of the texts presented in this collection well into the twentieth century.

A third influential slogan used to express pan-Asian sentiment and activism that was very popular at the turn of the century was “Same Culture, Same Race” (Japanese: *dōbun dōshu*; Chinese: *tongwen tongzhong*; Korean: *tongmun tongjong*), which likewise did not imply hierarchical relations between Asian nations or make claim to the superiority of any one country. In Japan, the term was used particularly often by Prince Konoe Atsumaro (1863–1904), who, uncharacteristically for an early pan-Asianist, was a member of Japan’s ruling elite, and by the Tōa Dōbunkai (East Asian Common Culture Society). The term also appears frequently in Japanese journals of the day and seems to have received some acceptance in other Asian countries.

Closely related to the rise of racial thinking in Japan and East Asia, this slogan also has to be seen as an expression of the growing fear in Japan of a future “clash of races,” that is, a war fought along racial lines in which Japan would have no choice but to side with the Asian, or “colored,” peoples against the white powers of the West. Parallel with the development of this kind of racial thinking in Asia, the idea of the “White Peril” also gained ground. It was an inversion of the “Yellow Peril” hysteria that affected Europe at the time. The proponents of the “White Peril,” including some Europeans (e.g., Gulick 1905), believed that the threat to civilization came not from the “yellow” peoples of Asia but from the predatory European powers.

It was only in the 1910s that the term “Pan-Asianism” made its debut in intellectual discourse. Japanese political scientist Ōyama Ikuo (1880–1955) used the term for the first time to describe Chinese political associations which were promoting “Greater Asianism” (Da Yazhouzhiy) “in secretly published pamphlets” with the intention of spreading anti-Western sentiment in China. Ōyama himself rejected Asianism because he saw the emergence of this ideology as a sign of increasing nationalistic and xenophobic tendencies in Japan. While Ōyama criticized Asianism from his position as a liberal intellectual, the Japanese government remained wary
of pan-Asian proposals because it feared that such tendencies might undermine Japan's good relations with the Western powers. Between its signing in 1902 and 1921–1922, when it was superseded by the Washington treaty system, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was always at the heart of Japan's foreign policy. The alliance, however, would be in jeopardy if it transpired that Japan was supporting an independence movement in India as part of a pan-Asian foreign policy. On several occasions, Britain showed suspicion over Indian–Japanese relations, particularly during World War I when members of the Indian independence movement were cooperating with Germany. For example, the visit of the celebrated poet and first Asian Nobel laureate, Rabindranath Tagore, to Japan in 1916 caused "considerable uneasiness in London" over "a Japanese–Indian understanding that could eventually take a political and anti-British form". The British intelligence service kept close tabs on Indian independence activists in Japan (and China) and their Japanese sympathizers.

If only to avoid alienating its British ally and other Western powers, both the Japanese government and the press tended to be highly critical of pan-Asian schemes. The hostile tone adopted by Japanese newspapers during a public debate on Pan-Asianism in 1913 well illustrates this point. In a debate with the British journalist and diplomat Sir Valentine Chirol (1852–1929), the celebrated American naval strategist Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840–1914) defended the 1913 California "Alien Land Bill", which would prevent Asian immigrants from owning land or property in the state on the grounds that America would not be able to "digest and assimilate the strong national and racial characteristics which distinguish the Japanese." Mahan seemed moreover to believe that in excluding the Japanese, Californians were acting in the interests not only of the United States but also of "the whole community of European civilization". In the debate Chirol, who had retired from his position at The Times two years before and joined the Foreign Office, criticized the Land Bill. However, it appears that he was a voice in the wilderness. Even the editors of The Times seemed to support Mahan when they criticized Japan for what they regarded as contradictions in its foreign policy:

On the one hand, she [Japan] demands recognition because her people are not as other Asiatics. On the other hand, . . . her publicists are now asserting that "to Japan is assigned the leadership in the claim of the 'coloured' races against the 'non-coloured.'" These two sets are mutually destructive. Japan cannot have it both ways. . . . She must make up her mind whether she wishes to present herself as aloof from other Asiatic races, or as the avowed champion of Pan-Asian ideals.

Such criticisms clearly struck a sensitive chord in Japan. Throughout June and July 1913, these statements were discussed at great length by Japan's leading newspapers, including the Osaka Asahi Shinbun, the Osaka Mainichi Shinbun, and the Tokyo Nichinichi Shinbun. The Asahi unequivocally declared that it considered "Pan-Asianism an illusion (kūsō)," while the Nichinichi ridiculed the notion that Japan would "lead the Asian peoples to fight against the Euro-American white powers" as "useless and reckless." It was in these articles dismissing the accusations made by Mahan and the Times that the terms Han-Ajiashugi ("Pan-
Asianism,” Mainichi and Nichinichi) and Zen-Ajiashugi (“All-Asianism,” Asahi) made their first appearance in the Japanese language. They were coined specifically to express the English term “Pan-Asianism,” which previously had had no exact Japanese equivalent. At this stage, as indicated by the critical, derisory tone of the newspaper articles, these neologisms were used in a derogatory sense.

Yet, little by little, the negative connotations of the term “Asianism” were lost in the aftermath of World War I. The bloodbath in Europe made Japan the dominant power in East Asia and brought about an upsurge in Japan’s self-confidence. At the same time, it stimulated international attempts to establish a new world order after the war, an order that would guarantee peace—if not permanent peace, then at least peace for the foreseeable future. Within these developments, Japan’s newly found self-confidence resulted in an outpouring of pan-Asian writings during the last two years of the war. These writings should be seen as a Japanese contribution to the debate on how a new international order could guarantee peace. But Japanese writers were not alone in arguing for the necessity of regional integration. There were also notably some Chinese commentators who, while critical of Japanese Pan-Asianism, nonetheless advocated regional integration on the grounds that only a regional, pan-Asian order would result in the achievement of a permanent peace. When the idea of a League of Nations surfaced during World War I, pan-Asian writers in Japan reacted by proposing an East Asian League (Tōa renmei) that would guarantee peace on a regional basis.

By the war’s end, pan-Asianist visions of regional integration had thus come to be accepted, at least by public opinion and some politicians, as a realistic scenario for future international relations in East Asia. Certainly, in contrast to the vague professions of pan-Asian unity that had been the norm up until the beginning of the twentieth century, the ideology of Pan-Asianism had by 1918 become concrete and well defined. It had gained recognition in public discourse and was no longer confined to the political fringes. Terms such as Pan-Asianism (Han Ajiashugi), Greater Asianism (Dai Ajiashugi), All-Asianism (Zen Ajiashugi), and the “Asian Monroe Doctrine” (Ajia Monrōshugi), largely absent from public discourse until then, now began to appear frequently in newspapers and journals. This proliferation of neologisms reflected a growth of diverse and sophisticated approaches to the issue of Asian solidarity in all its ramifications. The wide range of responses can be gleaned from the flood of articles on Pan-Asianism that appeared during and after the war. While these works indicated the spread and acceptance of the term “Pan-Asianism” in Japanese discourse, perhaps more important they also defined Asianism in concrete terms and demanded that Japan act in accordance with pan-Asian principles in international relations.

The new popularity of Pan-Asianism in Japanese intellectual discourse and politics received a boost when news of a new immigration law that would bar Japanese from immigration to the United States (part of the 1924 Immigration or Johnson-Reed Act) reached Japan. Protests against the act were held through the length and breadth of Japan, events that in many cases turned into demonstrations of pan-Asian solidarity.
In this climate of anti-American agitation a number of new associations sprang up whose names—such as the Federation of East Asian Races (Ajia Minzoku Gikai, founded in 1923) or the Oriental Co-Existence Society (Tōyō Kyōzonkai)—proclaimed their pan-Asian orientation. The invigoration of popular interest in Pan-Asianism as a result of America's exclusionist policies was also attested to by a slew of articles on the subject in the Japanese press. For example, the influential journal *Nihon oyobi Nihonjin* (Japan and the Japanese) brought out a special issue on “Greater Asianism” (Dai Ajia shugi) in October 1924, and the Asian Newspaper Company published a call for the “Foundation of a Greater East Asian Federation”.

Not all pan-Asian slogans and catchphrases—like some of the new associations—survived. Many enjoyed a brief popularity and then quickly disappeared from public discourse. Some terms, however, resurfaced in later years, often in different contexts. The notion of an “East Asian League,” for example, exemplified the entrenchment of the term “East Asia” in Japanese public discourse around the turn of the century. However, after the wave of anti-American protests subsided in 1924, “East Asia” receded from public discourse, only to return to the mainstream discussion in the late 1930s, in somewhat modified form, as the “East Asian Cooperative Community” (tōa kyōdōtai or tōyō kyōdōtai). The formation of a “Greater Asian League” (Dai Ajia rengō) was also proposed in the founding manifesto of the Dai Ajia Kyōkai (Greater Asia Association) in 1933. This manifesto, drafted a year after Japan had left the League of Nations, insisted that such a league was necessary given the global trend toward the formation of regional blocs.

“All-Asianism” (Zen Ajia shugi), another term for Asianism or Pan-Asianism, was launched by Ōkawa Shūmei in the wake of the 1913 Chirol-Mahan debate in articles he contributed to *Tairiku* (The Continent). However, the term did not catch on and vanished from public discourse in the early 1920s. In any event, all these terms were used largely interchangeably. Even Ōkawa on occasion used Han Ajia shugi in the same context as Zen Ajia shugi, and he appears to have made no distinction between the two.

The term “Kōa” perhaps enjoyed the most remarkable career of any pan-Asian term. Kōa first appeared in the 1880s, when it was used as the main slogan to express pan-Asian solidarity. However, it was quickly discarded because it implied Japanese leadership of the pan-Asian movement. But the term was not forgotten completely, as it reappeared in the 1930s at a time when Japan was adopting a form of Pan-Asianism in its foreign policy. By then, Japan had begun to abandon its policy of cooperation with the Anglo-American powers and was openly pursuing a strategy of destroying the political status quo in East Asia. The unity of Asia and, at the same time, the establishment of Japanese hegemony in East Asia had become Japan’s ultimate objective. Although no government decrees contained the terms “Asianism” or “Pan-Asianism” even in the 1930s, the Japanese government demonstrated its commitment to the pan-Asian cause in 1938 by creating the Kōa-in, the Agency for the Development of Asia (sometimes also known in English as the East Asia Development Board). The Kōa-in was a cabinet-level agency with the primary task of coordinating political, economic, and cultural activities in regard to China. While
it engaged in research on Chinese affairs and published its findings in the *Kōa-in Chōsa Geppō* (Kōa-in Monthly Research Bulletin), some scholars argue that it was also involved in the recruitment and management of forced labor and even in the opium trade in China. Such were the powers of this agency that only formal diplomatic relations with China remained within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Kōa-in was integrated into the Ministry of Greater East Asia (Daitōa-shō) in 1942, which from that time on directed Japan’s political and diplomatic relations with the members of the newly declared Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere.

This official endorsement of what is probably the oldest pan-Asian term caused a veritable boom in the use of Kōa. Newspapers used the term frequently; journals incorporating it in their title—such as *Kōa Kyōiku* (Education to Raise Asia) or simply Kōa—were founded, while politicians, diplomats, and intellectuals discussed the new Kōa policy. These figures included a foreign minister, and a prime minister who proclaimed the “Raising of Asia” a “holy task”. Under the circumstances it is no surprise to learn that, in Japanese schools, children were taught from a “Colonial Kōa Textbook”. Newly founded political organizations and a number of political conferences held in the late 1930s and early 1940s also were characterized as contributing to the policy of “Raising Asia.” In 1941, the Dai Nihon Kōa Dōmei (Greater Japanese League for Raising Asia) was founded. Its members and advisers included venerable pan-Asianists such as Tōyama Mitsuru (1855–1944) and Kuzuu Yoshihisa (1874–1958), party politicians well known for their pan-Asian sympathies such as Nagai Ryūtarō (1881–1944), as well as a large number of senior military figures, such as Araki Sadao (1877–1966), Yanagawa Heisuke (1879–1945), Koiso Kuniaki (1880–1950), Ōi Shigemoto (1863–1951), Hayashi Senjūrō (1876–1943), Honjō Shigeru (1876–1945), Matsu Hane (1878–1948), and Abe Nobuyuki (1875–1943). This impressive lineup, which included two former (Hayashi and Abe) and one future prime minister (Koiso), reflected a growing interest in the potential of Pan-Asianism in military circles. In the atmosphere of social mobilization that thickened as the war escalated, the League became a central organization, incorporating fifty-three associations and institutions of pan-Asian character under its umbrella. These included the Tōa Dōbunkai, the Dōjinkai (Comrades’ Society), the Tōa Renmei Kyōkai (East Asian League Association), the Tōa Kensetsu Kyōkai (Association for Constructing East Asia), the Tōa Kyōkai (East Asia Association), and the Tōyō Kyōkai (Oriental Association), in addition to think tanks engaged in research on East Asia, such as the Dōmei Tōa Kenkyūkai (Alliance East Asia Research Association), the Tōa Chōsakai (East Asia Investigation Association), the Tōa Kenkyūjo (East Asian Order Research Association), and the Tōa Chitsujo Kenkyūkai (East Asian Order Research Association).

These wartime efforts to “raise Asia” had also an international dimension. A year before the founding of the League, a “Raising Asia Welfare Congress” (Kōa kōsei taikai) was held in Osaka in October 1940 that was attended by representatives of eleven countries, including Japan’s Asian and also its two European allies, Germany and Italy. Even today, the name of a Japanese insurance company, Nippon Kōa
Sonpo, which was founded in 1944, reminds us of the former popularity of this pan-Asian term.

Another term pan-Asianists began to use in the late 1920s was “Kingly Way” (Chinese: wangdao; Japanese: ōdō). In the 1930s it was used with increasing frequency as a way of emphasizing the region’s legacy of Confucian values and the significance of Confucianism as a potential basis for the unification of Asians. The “Kingly Way” implied benevolent rule and was used as a fundamental concept to help legitimize Japan’s construction of the new state of Manchukuo after 1932. Japanese “guidance” of this new, ostensibly independent state—in reality it was a puppet state—was seen in paternalistic, Confucian terms as the kindly direction and advice offered to a younger brother (Manchukuo) by his elder brother (Japan). In fact, as is well known, under Japan’s “benevolent” guidance Manchukuo became a cornerstone of the Japanese Empire. It was ruthlessly exploited to provide materiel for the Japanese war effort, and this economic exploitation, carried out under the cloak of paternalistic benevolence, contributed significantly to the discrediting of pan-Asian ideology—the subject to which we turn next.

**Pan-Asianism and the Asians**

As we have argued, Pan-Asianism was particularly important in the framework of intellectual debate and policy formulation in Japan, but other Asians also made an important contribution to the discussion—comment that was sometimes supportive, sometimes critical. While in China the term apparently made its debut in the 1910s, in Korea similar terms were used to express similar sets of ideas a decade or so earlier. At the turn of the century, the term “Easternism” (Tong'yangjuyi) was first found in Korean writings on the subject to describe the idea of close cooperation between Korea, China, and Japan. Although Koreans were on the whole suspicious of Pan-Asianism as a concept that served to cloak Japanese attempts to establish their leadership of East Asia, anxiety over a future “race war” with the West was just as widespread in Korea as in Japan. In fact, one of the first concrete pan-Asian policy proposals was penned by a Korean, An Chung-gŭn (Ahn Choong Kun, 1879–1910), a member of the anti-Japanese movement in Korea. In 1910, while imprisoned on death row for assassinating Prince Itō Hirobumi (1841–1909), Japan’s minister-resident in Korea, he wrote a visionary essay in which he talked of a united Asia facing the reality of a coming war between the yellow and white races. In order to prepare for this conflict, An advocated a transnational military force and even a single currency for an East Asian political union. However unrealistic in the climate of the time, An’s vision testified to the increasing importance of Pan-Asianism in international relations in East Asia.
As official and public support for Pan-Asianism as a tool for establishing Japanese hegemony in East Asia grew stronger in Japan, the likelihood of the acceptance of pan-Asian ideals waned in other Asian countries. This distrust of Pan-Asianism was particularly pronounced in East Asia, where the Japanese threat was most palpable. In Korea, for example, Pan-Asianism was marginalized. Korea was a special case because of its geographical proximity to Japan. Most Korean intellectuals and political activists had been fairly skeptical about the idea of Asian solidarity even in the nineteenth century, even if some pro-Japanese modernizers, such as Kim Ok-kyun (1851–1894), had promoted Pan-Asianism as a useful tool for cooperation with Japan against the threat posed by imperial Russia. In spite of Korean suspicions over Japanese ambitions for the Korean peninsula, many Korean intellectuals, strongly influenced by social Darwinism during the final years of the nineteenth century, were convinced that for historical reasons the Koreans—“a backward and thus inferior race”—had no choice but to form an alliance with China and Japan as a result of Korea’s proximity to its two neighbors. Others, who feared the much-trumpeted Western peril much more than any alleged racial inferiority, reached the same conclusions.

After Korea became a Japanese protectorate in 1905 and a Japanese colony in 1910, Korean writers naturally became highly suspicious of their powerful neighbor and advocated resistance and “self-strengthening” as a way of regaining their independence. Under Japanese rule, the appeal of Pan-Asianism to Koreans was greatly limited. But it was not extinguished completely. Some Korean pan-Asianists continued to advocate a more or less equal “union of the Korean and Japanese cultures within the context of a broader Asian alliance,” or within “a pan-Asian community,” until the end of Japanese colonial rule in 1945. Some Koreans who continued to adhere to the ideal of pan-Asian solidarity even interpreted the outbreak of war with the United States in 1941 (or the “Greater East Asian War,” as it was officially called in the Japanese Empire) as the beginning of “a real war of races—the Yellow against the White”. For these Koreans it was clear that Korea, as an Asian nation, had to side (temporarily at least) with Japan in this war of the races, even though Koreans were unhappy with Japanese colonial rule.
Some Chinese intellectuals and activists also continued to adhere to Pan-Asianism in the first decades of the twentieth century, as is evident from the quotation by Sun Yat-sen discussed above. However, open criticism of Japanese Pan-Asianism as a tool of Japanese expansionism was voiced as early as 1907, when the scholar and revolutionary Zhang Taiyan (1868–1936) described Japan as the “public enemy” (kōteki) of Asia. Zhang gave vent to his conviction that Japan was an imperialist predator rather than a victim of imperialist oppression to which calls for Asian solidarity could properly be directed. Zhang also questioned the validity of pan-Asian discourse in general. Rejecting the simplistic scheme of “oppressed yellow Asians” and “white oppressors,” he stressed the “double enslavement of the Chinese”—bondage by Western imperialism and by “foreign,” that is, Manchu, rule. His argument led him to emphasize the urgent need to establish Chinese nationalism as a counterforce to Manchu rule. However, these views did not prevent him from forming the Asiatic Humanitarian Brotherhood to promote cooperation with other Asian peoples.

Another revolutionary leader of modern China, Li Dazhao (1888–1927), also rejected Pan-Asianism as advocated by its Japanese exponents. In 1919, he harshly criticized Japanese pan-Asian writings as an expression of Japanese expansionism. However, while rejecting Japanese forms of Asianism, Li nevertheless conceded that some kind of regional cooperation was necessary to counter the threat of Western imperialism and called for the formulation of a “New Asianism” that presumably would be untainted by Japanese distortions. The tense atmosphere of pan-Asian conferences organized by Japanese and Chinese groups in Nagasaki in 1926 and Shanghai in 1927, however, clearly demonstrated that Chinese hostility to Japanese versions of Pan-Asianism had undermined any realistic expectation of close Sino-Japanese cooperation in an atmosphere of true solidarity.

Some Chinese, such as Sun Yat-sen (until his death in 1925) and his confidant Wang Ching-wei (1883–1944), remained hopeful that Pan-Asianism might yet play a constructive role in Asia’s fight against Anglo-Saxon imperialism, and a group of Chinese pan-Asianists published a journal, Asiatic Asia, in Shanghai from 1941. However, in the end Japanese efforts to legitimize its various forms of aggression, including the war against China (1937–1945), as a pan-Asian “holy war” completely discredited the idea of Asian solidarity in China for many years to come.

In India, by contrast, Pan-Asianism left few negative legacies, probably because, unlike Korea and China, that country had never come under Japanese rule. In India, attempts to secure Japanese support for the national independence movement had a long tradition and resulted in close connections with Japan. A number of Indian revolutionaries found asylum there, and some even used Japan as a base for their pan-Asian activities. Among them was Taraknath Das (1884–1958), who frequently published in Japan under the pseudonym “An Asian.” In works published in Japan and China, Das called on “Asian Youth” to resist the West: “Every Asian youth . . . who possesses even a tiny bit of the feeling of self-respect should strive to achieve the goal of assertion of Asia to the fullest sense of its meaning.” Clearly Japan’s invasion of China did nothing to dampen Das’s hopes for Japan as the liberator of
Asia, for as late as 1941 he insisted that Japan was “the only Eastern Power which can challenge the mighty forces of the West. . . . People of the East . . . have set their eyes on [Japan] as their possible saviour.” Rash Behari Bose (1886–1945), who was naturalized as a Japanese subject in 1923, also used his Japanese contacts to campaign on behalf of Pan-Asianism and Indian independence. He was an influential advocate of a Japan-centered Pan-Asianism and remained so until his death in 1944. His compatriot Subhas Chandra Bose (no relation, 1897–1945), who met Hitler in his attempt to marshal support for Indian independence, also entertained great hopes for Japan as Asia’s savior. He held meetings with Japanese leaders to encourage their support for his nationalist cause and participated in the Assembly of the Greater East Asiatic Nations in 1943.

The celebrated writer and cultural nationalist Rabindranath Tagore was a longtime friend of Okakura Tenshin and visited Japan several times in the 1910s and 1920s. During his first visit, Tagore condemned Japanese nationalism as an imitation of Western practices. However, in 1924, when demonstrations against the United States Asian Exclusion Act erupted in Japan, Tagore spoke out on a number of occasions in favor of pan-Asian unity to audiences of several thousand. Announced at these rallies as “The Pride of the Orient,” Tagore called on his fellow Asians to “awake, arise, agitate, agitate and agitate against this monstrous and inhuman insult which America has heaped upon us.” He hoped that the discriminatory U.S. immigration law would “unite the Asiatic races who will awake from their long sleep and . . . prove invulnerable against the attacks of the White Races” and motivate them to erect an “Empire of Asia . . . [that would] spring roaring into the arena of the world’s politics.”
South East Asians became suspicious of Japanese Pan-Asianism only in the late 1930s—much later than the Koreans and Chinese. The main reason for this was, unlike in Korea and China, the Japanese were not perceived as a threat to a region dominated by the Western powers. Consequently, Japanese-directed Pan-Asianism enjoyed great appeal throughout Southeast Asia. In the Philippines, Japanese pan-Asianists had already supported the independence movement under Emilio Aguinaldo (1869–1964) as early as 1898. In 1915, a Pan-Oriental Society was formed in Manila. The society was headed by General Jose Alejandrino (1870–1951), who had gained his rank in the struggle against the United States and, after surrendering in 1901, went on to enjoy a career as a senator. British intelligence reported that “he speaks and writes Japanese and speaks with the authority of the Japanese Foreign Office.” To the British, the anti-Western position of the Pan-Oriental Society was clear. At its meetings “speeches are made favoring an ‘Oriental Monroeism’ headed by Japan.” But it would be wrong to dismiss the society as nothing more than a front for Japanese propaganda. Alejandrino took a wider interest in Asian affairs and wrote newspaper articles in which he mentioned the Indian Independence Party and even discussed the possibility of a free India. And there was some evidence of contacts with other Asian pro-independence movements. According to the British intelligence report, “an intercepted letter, written by a Filipino student returned from Tokyo, shows that there might be a danger of a connection between these Filipino students and disaffected Indians in Japan.” In Malaya, too, some looked to Japan as a liberating force. For example, the nationalist journalist Ibrahim bin Haji Yaacob (1911–1979) founded, with Japanese support, the pro-Japanese and pan-Malay (if not pan-Asian) Kesatuan Melayu Muda (League of Malay Youth). Its members cooperated with the Japanese forces during the invasion of the Malay Peninsula against the British and continued to do so throughout the Japanese occupation.

The Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia in the wake of Pearl Harbor and the economic exploitation of the region that followed called into question the sincerity of pan-Asian rhetoric. However, even under the Japanese occupation, Pan-Asianism remained an important factor in Japan’s relations with Southeast Asia. The Japanese
certainly milked pan-Asian sentiment to help mobilize the region’s resources for the war effort. At the same time some Southeast Asians, such as the contributors to the Greater Asia newspaper in Indonesia embraced the anti-Western component of pan-Asian rhetoric.

However, relations between Japan and the leaders of independence movements in Southeast Asia remain a controversial subject in Asian historiography. The position of those Southeast Asians who supported the Japanese war effort was much more ambivalent than is generally believed. The Indonesian independence activist Mohammed Hatta (1902–1980) is a case in point. Hatta is known for his collaboration with the Japanese occupation authorities during the war, but even at that time he was no Japanese puppet. And even before the war, in the 1930s, he was capable of a sober critique of the problems inherent in the Japanese version of Pan-Asianism. This is made clear by an article that he published in 1934, shortly after returning from a visit to Japan, where he was wined and dined by members of the Dai Ajia Kyōkai. In the article, pointedly titled “Does Japan Desire to Return to Asia?,” Hatta predicted the failure of Japanese Pan-Asianism because, in his view, the two conditions necessary to ensure its success—a permanent peace between Japan and China and the achievement of perfect equality between the Asian nations—could not be realized in the foreseeable future. Indeed, notwithstanding his enthusiastic reception in Japan, Hatta regarded Asianism as tainted by fascist tendencies, among which he included Japan’s ambition to become the leader of Asia.

In western Asia, hopes for Japanese leadership in the struggle against Western imperialism were growing, but in the end no significant cooperation between Japan and any western Asian nation materialized. Japanese contacts with the Ottoman Empire, official and unofficial, went back to the late nineteenth century. In the first decades of the twentieth century, pan-Islamic activists came to Japan, where (among other things) they cooperated with Japanese pan-Asianists in founding the Ajia Gikai discussed here. During World War II, hopes for Japanese support were strongly expressed throughout the Arab world; they were fueled by the founding of the Greater Japan Islamic League (Dai Nippon Kaikyō Kyōkai) in Japan in 1938. However, although a number of influential individuals, including Ōkawa Shūmei and General Hayashi Senjūrō, were sympathetic to the Arab cause, the failure of the Japanese to advance west of India during the course of the war precluded any effective cooperation.

The “Greater East Asian War” and Pan-Asianism
The use of pan-Asian ideology to legitimize war and Japanese colonial rule discredited the movement. As a result, Pan-Asianism came to be widely identified as an ideology of colonial rule—specifically, Japan’s colonial rule over Asian countries and peoples, which, the Japanese rulers insisted, was more “benevolent” than Western colonial rule because Japanese were fellow Asians. Yet, as much recent research has shown, Japanese colonial rule was as oppressive as that of any European power. Like the European imperialists, the Japanese ruthlessly exploited the territories they ruled. They mobilized their subject populations for the Japanese war effort, and, unlike most Western powers, they made efforts to assimilate the populations of at least some of the colonial territories they controlled. For the populations of Japanese-controlled territories, Japanese colonial rule was not substantially different from Western colonial rule, even if the Japanese proclaimed pan-Asian “brotherhood” and professed to save them from the evils of colonial rule by non-Asians.

Many prominent Asians, however—politicians, diplomats, intellectuals, and writers alike—were forced to choose sides, particularly after the outbreak of the “Greater East Asian War.” China, where people were also forced to choose sides, was a special case. For the overwhelming number of Chinese “the war” meant not an “Asian” war of liberation against “the West” but a war against Japanese aggression in which Western countries including the United States and Britain were allies. The war in China had started much earlier than in the rest of Asia: it had broken out in 1931 in northeastern China (Manchuria), spreading to the rest of China by 1937. The different terms to name the conflict that were used by the opposing sides are instructive. While the Japanese term “Greater East Asian War,” used for the war against the United States and Britain from December 1941, implied some pan-Asian notion of liberation of the whole region, the Chinese term rejected the notion that this was a racial war and had anything to do with pan-Asian ideals. It was—and still is—simply the “War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression” (kangri zhanzheng).
The Japanese government made concerted efforts to stress the pan-Asian character of the war. Numerous government statements during the war emphasized the pan-Asian character of the conflict. However, it should be noted that it was only several months after the outbreak of hostilities that the Japanese government officially included the “liberation of Asia from Western imperialism” in its list of war objectives. Pan-Asian propaganda intensified as the war continued. In 1942, the Ministry of Greater East Asia was founded in order to coordinate and strengthen intra-Asian cooperation. This move was intended primarily to underline the rhetoric of pan-Asian liberation—but, at this point in the war, “strengthened cooperation” meant, above all, the mobilization of resources for Japan’s war effort. The worse the military situation became for Japan, the more the Japanese government tended to draw on pan-Asian rhetoric. In this context, the declaration of the “Assembly of the Greater East Asiatic Nations” issued in 1943 sounds like a last, desperate appeal for pan-Asian unity.

At that time even a liberal intellectual like Hasegawa Nyozekan (1875–1969), seemingly oblivious to the looming disaster ahead, was still insisting that the “Greater East Asian War” must be the starting point for the establishment of “a united cultural sphere [by] the races of East Asia.” In similar vein, Nishida Kitarō (1870–1945), one of Japan’s leading philosophers, in 1943 characterized the war as a holy, pan-Asian struggle to liberate and unify Asia:

The Great East Asian War is a sacred war, because it is the culmination of the historical progress of Asia. . . . The task of the liberated peoples is now to win the war and establish the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, in co-operation with the Germans, Italians, and other peoples in Europe, who are engaged in a heroic struggle to create a new order in Europe. . . . Japan’s victory will save Asia and will offer a new hope for mankind.

So, even though schemes for pan-Asian unity became more and more unrealistic as the fortunes of war turned against Japan, the official espousal of Pan-Asianism by the Japanese government and military resulted in a further wave of publications on Asian solidarity and brotherhood.

Pan-Asian Solidarity and the Legacies of Pan-Asianism in the Postwar Period
Japan’s surrender and the advent of the Cold War resulted in the disappearance of pan-Asian ideals from the international relations arena. Japanese proponents of Pan-Asianism were purged from office, and pan-Asian associations were disbanded by the occupation authorities. Pan-Asianism no longer figured in debates on foreign relations, in Japan or elsewhere. Clearly, there was no room for pan-Asian schemes in the new bipolar world order. This situation did not change even after the estrangement between China and the Soviet Union in the 1950s because Japan, once again an important Asian nation, was now closely allied to the United States and thus in effect part of “the West.” In the 1960s, however, the emergence of the nonaligned movement (NAM) led to the resurgence of pan-Asian ideals. The NAM was founded in 1961 under the leadership of India’s Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964), President Gamal Abdul Nasser (1918–1970) of Egypt, and Yugoslav President Josip Tito (1892–1980). However, Asian and African countries played the central role in the activities of the movement, which had its roots in the 1955 Bandung Conference. The Bandung Conference and the NAM assumed a firmly anti-imperialist stance and objected strongly to the domination of international relations by the United States, just as the pan-Asian movement before 1945 had opposed (and even fought) Anglo-American world hegemony.

Although Japan did not play a leading role in these developments, in Japan the sense of a pan-Asian “mission” was preserved in other forms. After the devastation wrought by the war had nullified the achievements of the prewar era and, as some suggested, turned Japan into an agricultural economy, intellectuals like Shimizu Ikutarō (1907–1988) felt impelled to proclaim that “now, once again, the Japanese are Asians”. Pan-Asian themes also survived in leftist critiques of Western modernity and in the related claims that Japan must side with the oppressed nations of Asia in their resistance to the continuing Western imperialist domination of the non-European world. Variations on the pan-Asian theme have continued to inform ideas of solidarity, both in left-wing circles and among those who became ultranationalists after giving up hope in the possibilities of socialism, such as the writer Hayashi Fusao (1903–75).

However, postwar Pan-Asianism was tainted by its association with Japanese imperialism and aggression. Indeed it became synonymous with it. For the most prominent political scientist of the postwar period, Maruyama Masao (1914–1996), Pan-Asianism, together with “familism” (kazokushugi) and “agrarianism” (nōhonshugi), was one of the three fundamental components of Japanese ultranationalism. Perhaps because of this association, there was no serious scholarly attempt to deal with Pan-Asianism as a subject of historical inquiry in the 1950s and the 1960s. One scarcely need mention that in Korea and China Pan-Asianism was completely discredited as an ideology of collaboration with the enemy and the colonizers. This was the direct consequence of the use of pan-Asian rhetoric to justify Japanese colonial rule in Korea, and (in wartime China) to justify Japanese aggression and legitimize the Nanjing puppet government. There are signs, however, that this situation is changing, as indicated by recent efforts by high-level Chinese diplomats to present Pan-Asianism in a more positive light.
In Japan, the first serious attempt to grapple with the thorny question of the legacy of Asianism was made by the Sinologist and literary critic Takeuchi Yoshimi. Takeuchi, who in his youth had enthusiastically embraced pan-Asian ideals, had his beliefs shaken by Japan’s defeat. Yet although some aspects of Takeuchi’s faith were undermined, he had no doubt that there were positive features that were worth preserving. Pan-Asianism, he never ceased to believe, was much more than mere window dressing for Japan’s Greater Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. In Takeuchi’s view, there was a core of pan-Asian ideals that retained validity and therefore needed to be remembered and even cherished. Interestingly, Takeuchi regarded Japan’s aggression in China not as a consequence of Pan-Asianism but rather as Japan’s “shedding” of Asia (datsu-A), a concept that emerged in the 1880s and became highly influential as the antithesis to Pan-Asianism throughout the course of modern Japanese history. From this perspective, Japan’s aggression was in effect an application of inauthentic (and therefore culpable) Western methods to Asia and thus had nothing to do with the “Eastern spirit” or Eastern cultural practices or political norms. It was a natural, if deplorable, consequence of the westernization of Japan. This misguided attempt by Japan to depart from pan-Asian principles was corrected, to some extent at least, by the war Japan waged from December 1941 on the colonial powers of the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands. It was little wonder that Takeuchi welcomed this war enthusiastically. Takeuchi is difficult to locate on the ideological spectrum. Although he would not classify himself as a rightist, his attempts to restore legitimacy to the discredited term Pan-Asianism were unusual. Those on the left preferred to talk of Asian solidarity, brotherhood, or cooperation, which often overlapped with socialist or communist forms of international solidarity, or the solidarity of the nonaligned movement. For the Japanese left, the term “Pan-Asianism” was (and perhaps still is) practically synonymous with Japanese colonialism and aggression.

Yet, whether or not they eschewed the term itself, in postwar Japan the left incorporated pan-Asian elements into its own views. And the continuity between prewar pan-Asian rightists and postwar left-wing circles should not be overlooked in this context. This (at first sight) surprising continuity has only rarely been discussed in previous research. The prewar flirtation with national socialism and Japanism by socialists like Asanuma Inejirō (1898–1960) is well known. It is less widely known, however, that Marquis Tokugawa Yoshichika (1886–1976), one of the major sponsors of the rightist movement in the prewar period and a close friend of pan-Asianists such as Ōkawa Shūmei, became a benefactor of the newly founded Socialist Party of Japan after the war. It appears that Tokugawa’s support for the Socialist Party was motivated to some extent, at least, by pan-Asian motives. These motives were also apparent in an extraordinary statement by Tokugawa’s erstwhile comrade in the rightist movement, Ōkawa, who in 1949 detected a “close resemblance between today’s communists and the early Muslims” and wished for “a second battle of Tours-Poitiers” to be fought between the communists and the West, which this time would result in victory for the communists (i.e., Asia).
Another right-wing Pan-Asianist, Tsukui Tatsuo (1901–1989), well known in the postwar period as an “ultranationalist historian,” is known to have lavished praise on communist China. In the mid-1950s, a U.S. counterintelligence report accused Tsukui of bringing a large sum of money from mainland China, funds that were eventually given to the National Diet member and former army colonel, Tsuji Masanobu (1902–1961?), “for safe keeping.”

It should be noted that, like Tsukui, the recipient of this unspecified largesse, Colonel Tsuji, who had achieved notoriety during the war, made no secret of his pan-Asian sympathies in the postwar period. According to Tsuji, on matters of regional solidarity ideological differences were less important than blood ties. At a gathering of former generals on 20 November 1954, Tsuji is reported as arguing that Japan should work with India to achieve neutrality and with communist China to maintain peace. Noting his friendship with Chinese Communist Party officials such as Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), he explained that, communist or not, “[a]fter all, they’re Asians.” An American intelligence analyst concluded, “Tsuji, head of the neutralist Self-Defense League (Jiei Dōmei), has long been a vigorous exponent of ‘the Asia for Asiatics,’ doctrine of the late Ishihara Kanji. Like right wing critic Tsukui Tatsuo, who also returned from Communist China, Tsuji considers the ties that bind Asians together stronger than those between Communist China and the USSR”. A Japanese biographer of Tsuji agreed that he was “harsh on the Soviet Union and soft on communist China.” For members of the Japanese left, Tsuji, as an army colonel blamed for a number of wartime atrocities, was beyond the pale. However, they would no doubt agree with his support for the downtrodden peoples of Asia.

Leftists might find the case of the politician and parliamentarian Utsunomiya Tokuma (1906–2000) even more ambiguous. The son of General Utsunomiya Tarō (1861–1922), commander of the Japanese army in colonial Korea, Utsunomiya was one of the founding members of the Liberal Democratic Party in 1955 but cannot be categorized simply as a conservative politician. In the 1980s Utsunomiya emerged as a stern critic of the party he had helped to found but no longer supported, and, on a number of occasions, he appeared to be closely allied with the Socialist Party. He was a fervent proponent of disarmament and ran successfully in elections against the retired Self-Defense Forces general, Kurisu Hiroomi (1920–2004), an advocate of rearmament. In the 1960s Utsunomiya had been a prominent supporter of Algeria’s struggle for independence. He went out of his way to support all expressions of “Asian and African nationalism” and never hid his pan-Asianist sympathies. It could be argued that Utsunomiya’s pro-Asian attitudes were inseparable from his anti-Western and, more specifically, anti-American, sentiments.

This same set of attitudes has characterized many on the left, one of whose major criticisms of the Japanese government is its pro-American, pro-Western stance. Most left-wing commentators would never admit to entertaining pan-Asian sentiments, for, as we have seen, in their view Pan-Asianism was irredeemably besmirched by Japan’s wartime aggression. But whether they recognize it or not, the political left in Japan is heir to the pan-Asian tradition. This is abundantly clear both
from the activities of the Japanese pacifist movement in general and the movement against the Vietnam War (organized by the Citizens’ League for Peace in Vietnam; Japanese: Betonamu ni Heiwa o! Shimin Rengō, Beheiren) in particular. Numerous statements by members of these movements condemning American imperialism and American aggression have been issued over the years and continue today.

The pan-Asian undertones of these criticisms are generally revealed in their appeals to Asian brotherhood and Asian solidarity. This tendency is also seen in gestures made by prominent left-wing politicians such as Doi Takako (1928–), the one-time leader of the Japan Socialist Party; in statements by activists such as Dr. Nakamura Tetsu (1946–), who has devoted his life to the cause of helping the needy and sick in Afghanistan; and in lawsuits challenging Japanese logistical assistance to U.S. military activities in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. Most recently, in a remarkable example of this tendency to pan-Asian solidarity, in late 2009 the Japanese cabinet, led by Hatoyama Yukio (1947–), the leader of the Democratic Party of Japan in coalition with the Social Democratic Party, halted Japanese military support for American-led operations in Afghanistan and recalled the Maritime Self-Defense Forces from the Indian Ocean.

Recent Developments

As stated at the outset, issues of regionalism and regional integration in East Asia have received considerable attention since the 1990s. In Korea, for example, pan-Asian unity is identified as a promising path to avoid domination not only by Japan but also by China. In 2002, for example, former South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun (1946–2009) declared that “the age of Northeast Asia is arriving.” At the same time, regional approaches in East Asia, especially since the beginning of the present century, have been an expression of increasing discontent with American-led globalization and a developing unilateral world system. In South Korea, pan-Asianist regionalism is thus “seen as an attractive alternative to Korea’s dependence on America.” South Korean and Japanese interests seem to have converged in these respects. In Japan, from as early as the 1980s, a “New Asianism” has begun to resurface, partly as an offshoot of the so-called Asian values debate of the 1980s, a discussion initiated by Malaysia’s Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad (1925–) and the prime minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew (1923–), supported by the xenophobic populist politician, writer and governor of Tokyo Ishihara Shintarō (1932–). Despite his frequent “Asian-bashing” outbursts, Ishihara is also known for his advocacy of pan-Asian views—which, essentially, are an expression of his strong anti-Americanism.

In the 1980s these politicians—and others like them—advocated a set of common “Asian values” (always vaguely defined), based on Confucian virtues, as a counter to the universalist claims of liberalism, democracy, and human rights, values that were dismissed as alien to the region and inauthentic for Asians on account of their allegedly Western provenance. However, many Asian politicians and writers, such as the future president of South Korea, Kim Dae-jung (1925–2009), strongly rejected the idea of a common set of “Asian” values, and the debate has made little
headway since. Recent work by Chinese scholars suggests an attempt to find some kernel of truth in the legacy of Pan-Asianism with the objective of criticizing “Western” (i.e., United States) policies or the West’s claim to the universality of democratic values. The recent trend in Chinese academia to deal more openly with the once completely discredited ideology of Pan-Asianism, in combination with statements by high-ranking diplomats acknowledging the potential of the region’s pan-Asian legacy, arguably reflects a change in attitudes in China.

In Japan, the rise of a “New Asianism” has reflected diplomatic and economic efforts to stimulate regionalist approaches. These efforts were, however, always placed under strain by the strong priority given by the Japanese government to the US-Japan Security Treaty. Nonetheless, Japan, as a recent study notes, “has been a driving force of Asian regionalism throughout the post-war period,” particularly in the economic sphere. Notable in this regard was Japan’s involvement in the founding of the Asian Development Fund in 1957 and the proposal for an Asian Monetary Fund in 1997. In addition, Japan has also been relatively active in the ASEAN+3 cooperative network, involving the ASEAN nations plus China, Japan, and South Korea. But as the acronym indicates, the driving force of this new body is ASEAN—the only effective organization working for regional integration in Asia, which has brought a considerable degree of stability and economic growth to Southeast Asia. Japan also has been rather passive and reactive with regard to the development of a Free Trade Agreement network in East Asia, and, given its continuing dependence on the security treaty with the United States, it remains questionable whether Japan can play a leading role in the integration of the region in the immediate future—notwithstanding the outspoken advocacy of Pan-Asianism by some leading politicians.

Nor should one forget the historical legacies of World War II and of Pan-Asianism as an ideology. As late as the 1990s, partly because of the difficulties Japan experienced in coming to terms with its past, writers in Asia as well as in the West warned that Japanese regionalist initiatives could be interpreted as a resurgence of claims for Japan’s leadership in East Asia, with the objective of creating “a new version of the Greater East-Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere of World War II.” In recent years, the issue of historical memory has become less contentious in Japan, but persistent elements of “retrospective Pan-Asianism”—the rehabilitation of wartime pan-Asian rhetoric to whitewash Japan’s wars of aggression and colonial rule in Asia—continue to hinder attempts to promote regional integration.

On the academic level, however, considerable progress has been made over the past two decades, as witnessed by drafts for an “Asian Constitution,” proposals for an East Asian Common House and a myriad of academic conferences dealing with (and not infrequently advocating) regional integration. This suggests that attention to the historical legacies of Pan-Asianism and the identification of positive examples of pan-Asian solidarity and regional integration in the past will play an increasingly significant role in the years to come.

Recurrent Pan-Asian Themes
Pan-Asian styles of thought have always come most to the fore in debates on foreign policy and on Asian identity. If the many varieties of Pan-Asianism had anything in common, it was their opposition to the West: opposition to the West’s presence in Asia (i.e., Western imperialism), opposition to Western culture and values, and, conversely, an emphasis on the importance (and in many cases, the superiority) of Asian culture and Asian values. In fact, it could be argued that anti-Westernism was central to Pan-Asianism. In opposition to the “West”—which was, to a large degree, an invented concept—pan-Asian writers constructed their own “Asia.” Images of this constructed Asia varied greatly. They changed over time and took particular forms in different places and in the works of different authors. But all pan-Asianists assumed the existence of “one Asia” and based this assumption on one or more of the following categories:

- Geography (Asia, East Asia, the Orient)
- Cultural unity (influence of Indian and Chinese civilization, religions)
- Historical interconnectedness (Sinocentric system, tribute relations, trade networks)
- Racial kinship (the yellow race, races of color)
- The unity of Asian civilization in terms of its values and spiritual character (Confucianism, justice and benevolence vs. Western materialism and rationalism)
- A common destiny (the fight against Western imperialism and colonial rule)

Nevertheless, there was never a consensus on the geographical definition of Asia and that pan-Asian writers constantly revised their definitions of “Asia,” blurring geographical exactitude with interpretations that allowed them to extend their definition of Asia even to some European and African nations.

The perception and creation of cultural unity, brought to an extreme of simplification in the slogan “Asia is one,” also remains an important theme of pan-Asian writers over the past one and a half centuries—and down to the present day. In 2010, an Internet search (google.com) of the term generates a large number of hits. Although it is clear that any particular assertion of what constitutes cultural commonalities (or differences) is highly arbitrary and subjective, it is important to acknowledge that such a particularized insistence on the existence of commonalities has played an important role in the construction of Pan-Asianism, as the texts reproduced in this collection show.

Recent research has stressed the importance of historical interconnectedness as an authentic foundation for forces encouraging the development of regional integration. The notion of a world system that connected the various states of East and Southeast Asia for centuries, before the imposition of Western-based international law, had sufficient cogency to bind indigenous forces against the threat of external domination. In recent years, these approaches have once again been attracting attention as a reaction to the emergence of a unipolar world order.
Enough has already been said about the incorporation of the Western ideas of race into pan-Asianist rhetoric. References to “racial kinship” were frequent, as the documents in this collection make clear. However, the Western provenance of the concept of race made it highly questionable that such an ideology could serve as the basis for a regional identity—not least since a Pan-Asianism based on racial motives limited “Asia” to East Asia and tended to exclude India, western Asia, and other areas. Further, the ideal of racial equality and the reality of racial discrimination within Asia eventually thoroughly discredited the racial component within Pan-Asianism, particularly in Korea (after 1910) and other territories under Japanese colonial rule.

The complex notion of Asian values—Asian “spirituality” versus the “materialism” of Western civilization—is also highly contested and riddled with contradictions. As we have already noted in the discussion of geographical definitions, the “Asia” of the pan-Asianists sometimes included territories that are generally classified as “Western” countries, such as Germany, Italy, or even Ireland. The 1920s saw a wave of sympathy for the cause of Irish independence in Asian publications, and in the 1930s, Japan allied itself with Germany and Italy—ostensibly since Germany and Italy had chosen to join the fight against “Western” materialism, now limited to Anglo-Saxon civilization.

Notwithstanding the various contradictions generated by any definition of Asia or the West, pan-Asianists have generally regarded “the West” as the alien Other. Time and again, as this collection shows, for pan-Asianists Asia represents the antithesis of the West. Indeed, these writers regularly define Asia in terms of the West. This is true of such diverse figures as Okakura Tenshin, Ōkawa Shūmei and, in the postwar period, Takeuchi Yoshimi, Ishihara Shintarō, and Nakamura Tetsu. The corollary to this vision of the West as the Other is the assumption that there exists a coherent set of Asian values and that these values, ex definitione shared by all Asians, are superior to Western values. This idea is often linked to an emphasis on the antiquity of Asian culture, which is often presented by pan-Asianists as the cradle of civilization, including European civilization. In this connection, much has been made of the fact that all major religions of the world, including Christianity, originated in what is geographically considered Asia. On these grounds, it is often argued that only “Asian” civilization has the potential to ultimately save mankind, including the West. In the words of Tagore, “If Asian civilization constituted a great reservoir of spiritual power, and if modern civilization was about to destroy humanity itself, then it must be from a regenerated Asia that man’s salvation would come.” Tagore was an outspoken critic of nationalism in at least some of his writings. There is no doubt that the kind of Pan-Asianism to which he subscribed was “a vision of community that sought to transcend the territorial nation-state and redeem and regenerate the world through Eastern spiritual morality.”

Yet, for all this cultural tension, the material advantages of the West and of modernity in general became obvious to most Asians, except for a very small number of reactionary obscurantists. Western-style modernity was an indispensable condition for success in the nineteenth-century world. For that reason, along with
the majority of Asians, most pan-Asianists never rejected modernity as such. Many ancient Asian customs and practices were patently useless or anachronistic in the modern world, and, under the circumstances, the chief problem that had to be overcome was the antiquated structure of state and society. But was everything distinctive about the East to be denied? Initially there was a tendency to discard the whole culture, lock, stock, and barrel. In an excess of modernizing enthusiasm, some Japanese even wanted to give up their native tongue in favor of English. Needless to say, such proposals were at best impractical. But were there aspects of Eastern tradition still of relevance in this Western-dominated world? Above all in the realms of ethics, morals, and philosophical and religious thought, convincing arguments could be made for the relevance, if not the superiority, of Eastern traditions—arguments that the reader will encounter time and again throughout this collection.

While the meaning—and even the existence—of “Asian values” remains debatable, the notion of commonly held Asian values and a common culture and racial identity, which together constitute the basis of Pan-Asianism, is closely related to the sentiment of a “common destiny” for Asian peoples. This latter notion represents another recurrent theme in Pan-Asianism—one that perhaps retains much of its appeal even today, if recent statements by Asian governments (e.g., the initiative of former Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio to prioritize East Asian community) or declarations by transnational organizations such as ASEAN, are anything to go by. It is impossible to gauge whether such sentiments will contribute to the realization of closer transnational cooperation or even regional integration in the future. To be sure, obstacles to regional cooperation in East Asia remain numerous. They include not only strong expressions of nationalism and the negative legacies of World War II but also the geography and demographics of Asia. Unlike in the case of European countries, the “Other,” or the “enemy,” for many smaller Asian nations is to be found within Asia, not somewhere outside. While Asia will certainly never be “one,” we may anticipate continued progress in the areas of regional cooperation and integration, developments that can contribute to the stability and the prosperity of the region.

About the book: The sources collected are arranged in chronological order. This allows the reader to trace the development of Pan-Asianism and Asian regionalism from the mid-nineteenth century down to the present day and provides an insider’s view of intra-Asian debates. The material discussed in each chapter falls roughly into three often overlapping and never mutually exclusive categories: 1) attempts to define Asia and assess the region’s contribution to world civilization; 2) calls for Asian solidarity, integration, and unity; and 3) debates about Asia’s role in world politics and, above all, about Asia’s relations with Europe.

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The above articles illustrate the malleability of racial discourse, the contradictions inherent in such thinking, and the ways that military and economic conflicts encourage their use. Race, like class and gender, could be used as a call to unity or exclusion. It could be the cause of conflict or its effect. Sometimes, it could be transcended altogether in the larger interests of geopolitics. Finally, these articles remind us that many of the ways in which nations and groups depict each other in the contemporary world have their roots in such earlier practices, demonstrating once again that history matters.
Japan’s Pan-Asianism and the Legitimacy of Imperial World Order, 1931–1945
Cemil Aydin

One of the most striking aspects of the international history of the 1930s is the revival and official endorsement of a pan-Asian vision of regional world order in Japan. The pan-Asian discourse of East-West civilizational difference and comparison was influential in various intellectual circles in Asia. But during the 1920s, as a political project of Asian solidarity, it was irrelevant for Japan's foreign policy, and it did not have any international momentum or movement. The period after the Manchurian Incident in 1931, however, witnessed a process by which pan-Asianist ideas and projects became part of Japan's official foreign policy rhetoric. After 1933 Japan's pan-Asian internationalism began to overshadow liberal internationalism, gradually becoming the mainstream vision of an alternative world order. This process culminated in the declaration of the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere in 1940, a project that relied heavily on the rhetoric of pan-Asian internationalism. In 1943, seventeen years after the ineffectual 1926 Nagasaki pan-Asiatic conference that was ridiculed by official and liberal circles in Japan, the Japanese government itself hosted a Greater East Asia Conference to which it invited the leaders of the Philippines, Burma, the provincial government of India, the Nanking government of China, Manchukuo, and Thailand.

Given that pan-Asianist activists had regularly expressed strong opposition to Japan's foreign policy up to the 1930s, and aware of the lack of political clout of Asianist circles during the 1920s, Japan's apparent endorsement of pan-Asianism in its official “return to Asia” after 1933 raises a major question. How can we understand the predominance of pan-Asianist discourses in Japanese intellectuals circles in the 1930s? Why would Japan's political elite, with its proven record of cooperation with Western powers based on a realistic assessment of the trends of the time, choose to endorse an anti-Western discourse of Asianism as its official policy during the late 1930s?

Explaining Japan's Official “Return to Asia”
In the literature, the process of transition from a policy of pro-Western capitalist internationalism in the 1920s to a very different policy aiming to create a regional order in East Asia has been attributed to a complex set of interrelated factors, both contingent and structural. For the sake of clarity, I categorize the explanations of the previous historiography into two groups, which are distinct but not necessarily in conflict: those that emphasize domestic political causes of the change and those that stress changes in the international environment.

According to domestic policy-driven explanations, Asianism was the foreign policy ideology espoused by the expansionist, militarist, and conservative segments of Japanese society. Frederick Dickinson has traced back to the period of World War I (WWI) the origins of two distinct agendas for Japan's diplomacy and national mission, one liberal and pro-British and the other characterized by pro-German, anti-liberal, and Asianist tendencies. The Asianist and conservative group, mostly clustered around Yamagata Aritomo, could not implement its policy visions during
the 1910s because the liberal group prevailed in domestic politics. By identifying two distinct visions of Japan’s national identity and two corresponding international policies in response to the opportunities presented by WWI, Dickinson’s study successfully demonstrates that foreign policy decisions should not be regarded as automatic responses to international trends and immediate external challenges but rather be seen as results of the balance of power in domestic politics among groups that have competing visions of their national identity and mission. According to Dickinson, pan-Asianism was one such grand vision, which aimed to establish Japan’s leadership in Asia by excluding Western powers from the region in the name of racial solidarity and civilizational harmony.2

Other studies on the 1920s have argued that members of the conservative antiliberal political camp, often identified with pan-Asianist inclinations, continued to agitate for an expansionist policy at a time when their voices were overshadowed by the liberalism of the Taishô democracy and the capitalist internationalism of Shidehara diplomacy. According to Richard Storry’s early work, which offers a history of Japanese ultranationalism based on the materials of the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal, the persistence and violence displayed by right-wing groups was able to weaken and eventually to overturn the prevailing atmosphere of Taishô democracy and liberal diplomacy. For Storry, for example, pan-Asianist thinker Ôkawa Shûmei was one of the Asianist “double patriots” who influenced young military officers and played a great role in the transition to the expansionist 1930s.3 Christopher Szpilman strengthened this argument in his study of Kokuhonsha, the main conservative organization of interwar Japan, noting that anti-Western and antiliberal trends in Japan had high-ranking supporters and strong organizational solidarity during the 1920s and thus were able to exert disproportionate influence as a result of their popularity among the bureaucratic and military elite.4 In his research on the House of Peers, Genzo Yamamoto further demonstrated the appeal and predominance of what he described as an “illiberal” agenda among Japan’s top political elite from the 1920s to the late 1930s, leading to their final triumph in domestic politics paralleling the adoption of an aggressive China policy.5 This focus on the domestic political components of the transition to the pan-Asianist policies of the 1930s has obvious merit. Asianism, however, could not always be uniquely identified as the expansionist ideology of conservative antiliberals, as Japan’s liberals also envisioned a special role for Japan in Asia, whether as the disseminator of a higher civilization to backward areas or as the leading force in economic development and political cooperation in the region. Moreover, an aggressive policy in Manchuria was not the monopoly of Japanese Asianists. As demonstrated by Louise Young, there existed within Japanese society an overwhelming consensus concerning policy in Manchuria, which cut across the lines dividing liberals and conservatives.6 The majority of Japan’s political and intellectual elite, including the pro-Western internationalists, supported the new orientation in foreign policy symbolized by the withdrawal from the League of Nations. For example, Nitobe Inazô, reputed for his liberal internationalism, was willing to defend Japan’s policy in China that led to the Manchurian Incident, even to the point of accepting Japan’s withdrawal in 1932 from the League of Nations, in which he had
served for so many years. Another liberal internationalist, Zumoto Motosada, went on lecture tours in 1931 to Europe and the United States in an attempt to explain Japan's position on the Manchurian Incident. During his speeches, Motosada often referred to the idea of a Japan-led regional order in East Asia separate from the European-based league system. Just five years before the Manchurian Incident, Zumoto had affirmed Japan's pro-League internationalism in his critique of the Nagasaki pan-Asiatic conference of 1926. Japan's liberal internationalists apparently turned to pan-Asianism when they saw a tension between Japanese national interests and the decisions of the League of Nations.

Nitobe Inazô at the League of Nations

The Asianist discourse of Japan's transnational identity had many different versions, ranging from a doctrine of regional solidarity to anti-Western visions of civilizational revival, and it was not limited to conservative circles. For example, during the 1930s, many Japanese intellectuals who had no previous connection with conservative radical nationalist groups, such as the members of the Kyoto School of Philosophy or the semiofficial think tank Shôwa Kenkyûkai, also utilized anti-Western rhetoric and advocated the revival of Japan's Asian identity. This indicates an area of overlap in the worldviews of liberals and antiliberals with respect to Japan's Asian identity and its international mission in Asia, as well as their shared diagnosis of the international system during the 1920s. It also shows that the theories of the clash of civilizations and Japan's mission in Asia were part of a common vocabulary, which would then have different political connotations depending on the intellectual climate. For example, those promoting U.S.-Japan
friendship would frame their efforts as a dialogue of harmony among the different civilizations of East and West, thus confirming a vision of the world as divided into different race and civilization groups beyond the nations. In that sense, many leading Japanese intellectuals who had no ties to the conservative radical nationalist groups ended up contributing to the legitimacy of the pan-Asianist program in some way, either through their theories on overcoming modernity and Eurocentrism or through their search for an alternative modernity in the Japanese and Asian cultural traditions.\textsuperscript{10}

The second major approach to the question of Japan’s adoption of Asianist rhetoric in foreign policy emphasizes that the structural transformations in the international system in East Asia complemented changes in the domestic power configurations to create a situation that led to the triumph of antiliberal and Asianist projects. Akira Iriye and James Crowley have argued that Japanese policies during the 1930s were largely a response to changes in the trends of the times as perceived by the Japanese elite. A perceived sense of an international legitimacy crisis and Japan’s isolation after the Manchurian Incident was accelerated by the impact of changed world conditions. Regionalism became the trend of the time, making the creation of a regional order in East Asia a more feasible policy, in harmony with the flow of world opinion. As Iriye noted, “by 1931 all indications seem to suggest that the neo-mercantilist world-view of Matsuoka was more realistic than Shidehara’s rational, laissez-faire image, which had apparently failed to produce tangible results.”\textsuperscript{11} The capitalist internationalism of the 1920s was not only denied altogether by Fascist Germany and Socialist Russia but also half-abandoned in the concept of the pan-American trade bloc and economic nationalism of the United States and the idea of the sterling trade bloc in England.\textsuperscript{12} In short, Japan’s policy shift from liberal internationalism to Asian regionalism could be considered a function just as much of other powers’ policies in the changing international system of the late 1930s as of Japan’s own domestic politics.

The end of the party cabinet system in 1932 and the increasing power of the military in political decisions created a discontinuity in the history of Japan’s domestic political order in terms of democratic participation and popular expression. Japan continued to be a constitutional state, however, with normally functioning domestic politics in accordance with the intricacies of the Meiji Constitution.\textsuperscript{13} In his study on the 1930s, Crowley refutes the idea of a conservative or right-wing takeover of the Japanese leadership by focusing on continuity in the “official mind” and the “decision-making process.” Crowley shows that all the policy decisions of the Japanese government during the 1930s were made by responsible political and military leaders in the interest of national defense and national policy.\textsuperscript{14}

The historiography that focuses on Japan’s response to changes in the international environment attributes an important role to ideology and culture in shaping Japanese perceptions of world events, without limiting focus to right-wing or militarist groups. It is in this context that an Asianist worldview about world cultures and international order becomes relevant for determining the perceptions
and decisions of Japanese leaders. Iriye has discussed the role of key notions such as isolation and self-sufficiency in the psychology of Japanese decision makers, showing how the perception that Japan stood uneasily between East and West influenced the policy-making mood.

In this view, the notions that the elite held concerning the threats and opportunities presented to Japan by the new global developments should thus be regarded as more significant than the impact of antiliberal right-wing movements associated with pan-Asianism. A similar approach attributes Japan’s turn to anti-Westernism not to the influence of pan-Asianist groups in particular but rather to the general characteristics of Japanese nationalism. Hayashi Fusao’s controversial assertion that the “Pacific War was one phase of an Asian Hundred Years’ War to drive out the Occidental invader” presents a generalized formulation that portrays Asianist ideas as a permanent part of mainstream Japanese nationalism. This emphasis on the anti-Western historical memory of Japanese nationalism depicts Asianism as a widely held conception about Japan’s transnational identity rather than an exclusively radical ideology monopolized by ultranationalists or conservatives. Mark Peattie and James Crowley concur with Hayashi’s assessment of the importance of anti-Western historical memory embedded in Japanese nationalism as an ideological factor, although they do not share his revisionist agenda.

Since we know, however, that mainstream nationalism in Japan had changing perceptions of the West, it would be inaccurate to characterize anti-Westernism as a single constant position in the history of Japanese nationalism from the Opium War to the Greater East Asia War. Moreover, the Japanese intellectual elite remained closely linked to trends and ideas in Europe and the United States. During the 1930s, there was no new expansion of the West in Asia to which the surge in Japanese nationalism might be attributed; on the contrary, the West was perceived to be in a phase of global decline and retreat. Thus the very assumption that there was a constant association between Japanese nationalism and resistance to Western expansion reflects the influence of the official pan-Asianist discourse of wartime Japan rather than accurately characterizing how images of the West and civilizational identity interacted with Japanese foreign policy.

Withdrawal from the League of Nations as a Turning Point

There had been pan-Asianists in Japan since the turn of the twentieth century, and some continued to work for the cause they believed in especially from 1905 to the 1930s, especially under the umbrella of patriotic Asianist organizations such as Kokuryūkai and Genyōsha. These patriotic Asianists represented a minority, if not a marginal opinion, in shaping Japanese foreign policy. They often complained about the neglect to which they had been subjected by the Japanese elite. In the aftermath of the Manchurian Incident of 1931 and Japan’s withdrawal from the League of Nations the following year, however, traditional Asianists found a very receptive audience for their ideas among Japanese bureaucrats and army officers. The story told by Wakabayashi Han, a Kokuryūkai Asianist who specialized in the Islamic world, is very telling in this regard. Wakabayashi became interested in the
Muslim world after a visit to India with the Burmese Buddhist monk and anticolonial nationalist U. Ottama in 1912. His discovery of Indian Muslims led him to undertake further research about Islam in Asia. For twenty years, he worked closely with a small circle of Islam experts within Kokuryûkai led by Tanaka Ippei, arguing that if Japan could develop closer ties with the colonized Muslims of Asia, its efforts to become the leader of an awakening and independent Asia could benefit from Muslim support. According to Wakabayashi, however, his small group neither achieved any result nor received any support from the government, and he became pessimistic about its future success. Then in 1932 Tôyama Mitsuru and Uchida Ryôhei sent Wakabayashi to observe the meeting of the League of Nations in Geneva that addressed the question of recognizing the state of Manchukuo. There, Wakabayashi witnessed the decision of Japanese diplomats to withdraw from the league upon its refusal to recognize Manchukuo. It was only during his trip back to Japan, Wakabayashi notes, that he recognized a change of attitude toward his group’s Asianist ideas on the part of Japanese military officers. In the long trip from Europe to Japan, he explained to Isogai Rensuke, a lieutenant colonel in the Japanese army the benefits that attention to the Muslim world could bring to Japan’s East Asian policy. Isogai later contacted Wakabayashi and introduced him to Army Minister Araki Sadao. Wakabayashi’s story of what followed is a narrative of triumph, as the Japanese army began to implement a pan-Asianist Islam policy in China and supported the activities of the Kokuryûkai. It is clear from his story that Japan’s withdrawal from the League of Nations was a turning point in the Japanese government’s attitude to the pan-Asianist ideas of Japan’s cooperation with Muslim nationalities against the Western colonial presence. Autobiographical anecdotes of other pan-Asianist activists exhibit a similar pattern. The most influential pan-Asianist, Ôkawa Shûmei, had the similar experience of finding a surprising shift in Japanese official policy and intellectual life toward positions more to his liking in the mid-1930s, more than two decades after his initial commitment of the cause of Asianism.

Ôkawa Shûmei’s biography during the 1930s took an ironic turn, as he was put on trial and imprisoned for his involvement in a failed military coup to change Japan’s domestic politics at the very time his Asianist projects were receiving the support of the Japanese government. As head of the East Asia Economic Research Bureau of the Manchurian Railway Company after 1929, Ôkawa naturally was familiar with Japanese interests in Manchuria. Frequently visiting Manchuria and China, he came to know the leading military figures of the Kwantung Army personally. From 1929 onward, Ôkawa argued that a solution to the Manchurian problem was essential for both Asian revival and the reconstruction of Japan. In 1928 Ôkawa met with the Manchurian warlord Chang Hsüeh-liang in an effort to convince him to form a stronger political union with Japan based on “Confucian political values.” Both a respected scholar of colonial studies and a radical nationalist, Ôkawa once gave a lecture on the necessity of creating an independent Manchuria-Mongolia to an audience that included top military officers of the 1930s, most notably, Itagaki Seishirô, Nagata Tetsuzan, and Tôjô Hideki. He went on a lecture tour in Japan before and after the Manchurian Incident, expressing his conviction that Manchuria
was not only a legitimate economic and security sphere for Japan but actually represented the lifeline of Japan’s national policy.

Like so many other Japanese intellectuals and leaders, Ôkawa was outspoken about the importance of protecting Japanese interests in Manchuria, and he favored radical action to secure those interests against the claims of Chinese nationalism. For Ôkawa, Japan’s “sacrifice” in the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars created the historical legitimacy for its treaty privileges in Manchuria. Criticizing the anti-Japanese movement in China, Ôkawa argued that if Japan did not act to protect its rights in Manchuria, it would endanger its position in Korea and Taiwan as well. He condemned the Japanese leaders of the late 1920s for not being able to show the courage and determination necessary to find a long-term solution to the Manchurian problem because of their submissive commitment to international cooperation with the Western powers. His arguments can clearly be construed as offering encouragement for the radical actions orchestrated by the Kwantung Army. Citing these facts, the prosecution at the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal argued that there was a link between Ôkawa’s pan-Asianist ideas and the Manchurian Incident, a key step in constructing the ideological background of the tribunal’s thesis about the long-term Japanese conspiracy to invade Asia.
It is impossible to attribute the Manchurian Incident or post-Manchurian Incident Japanese policies specifically to the ideology of the pan-Asianists. The fact that pan-Asianist Ōkawa Shûmei had lectured on the issue of Manchuria and had known some of the military leaders did not necessarily make him an ideologue of the Manchurian Incident, since there were many others, including those identified as liberals at the time, who advocated a similarly radical policy in Manchuria.²⁷ It is helpful to compare Ōkawa's arguments on Manchuria with the writings of Rôyama Masamichi (1895–1980), a liberal intellectual of the time who was well respected internationally and influential in Japanese policy circles. Rôyama, who presented his analysis of Japan's relations with Manchuria to an international audience affiliated with the Institute of Pacific Relations two years before the Manchurian Incident, held that Japan's established interests in Manchuria deserved international approval.²⁸ In a later policy report on Manchuria, Rôyama placed blame for the Manchurian Incident on the existing international peace structures and the refusal to acknowledge the special relations between China and Japan, not on the actions of the Kwantung Army. Ōkawa's writings about the need to defend Japanese rights in Manchuria against Chinese nationalist demands did not differ substantially from Rôyama's insistence on the protection of Japan's vital interests.²⁹
The nature of the pan-Asianist approach to the Manchurian Incident became apparent only after the incident, when intellectuals like Ôkawa formulated laudatory characterizations of the establishment of Manchukuo both as a victory against the corruption of business conglomerates (zaibatsu) and political parties at home, and as a brave defense of Japan's continental policy against American, British, and Soviet opposition. Ôkawa retroactively offered a moral justification for the Manchurian Incident within the framework of a pan-Asianist critique of Japan's foreign policy between 1905 and 1931. His interpretation of the incident as a correction of the misguided course of pro-Western diplomacy, especially since the Russo-Japanese War, differed significantly from Rōyama Masamichi's justification of the Manchurian Incident as a practical response to the changing conditions of the region. Ôkawa wrote:

Our victory over Russia inspired hope and courage in the countries exploited under the pressure of the Caucasian colonialists. But, before long, Japan gave in to the Franco-Japanese Agreement and the revised Anglo-Japanese Alliance, actions that shattered the hopes of noble Vietnamese and Indian patriots who sought independence for their countries. . . . However, the mistakes in Japanese policy were later rectified decisively by the foundation of Manchukuo. Japan abandoned cooperation with the Anglo-Americans, the chief instigators suppressing the Asian people. The foundation of Manchukuo was the first step in achieving a great "renascent Asia."

Ôkawa similarly applauded Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations. As shown in the previous chapter, Ôkawa had always regarded the league as an instrument of Western colonial powers and often urged the Japanese government to create a League of Asian Nations as an alternative. After Japan's withdrawal from the league in 1933, Ôkawa's ideas seemed in harmony with the policies of the Japanese government for the first time in the history of his Asianist activism, dating back to 1913.
As the foreign policy Ōkawa had envisioned began to be implemented, he was put on trial for his involvement in the May 15, 1932, assassination of Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi. After his arrest on June 15, 1932, the court found Ōkawa guilty of providing guns and money to conspirators during the planning stage of the assassination. In February 1934, he received a fifteen-year prison sentence, however, between appeals and paroles he spent less than two years in prison, between June 1936 and October 1937. Between 1931 to 1935, the dominant visions of Japanese foreign policy and domestic politics changed so dramatically that, by early 1935, Ōkawa no longer needed to work through secretive radical organizations to achieve his ideological goals. In February 1935, he marked the end of his career as an activist promoting the Shōwa Restoration in domestic politics and pan-Asianism in foreign policy by disbanding the last organization he established, Jinmukai. Japan itself was approaching the state of military mobilization while endorsing an Asianist foreign policy agenda, making radical activism for the same purpose pointless.
Although his image had been tarnished by his involvement in the May 15 assassination, shortly after his release from prison, Ôkawa was appointed to head the continental campus of Hôsei University. In May 1938, he was reinstated to his position as director of the East Asia Economic Research Bureau in Tokyo. Back in his position of managing one of the largest research institutes in Japan, he actively promoted a pan-Asianist agenda with the journal he edited, entitled Shin Ajia (New Asia). His position as editor allowed him to observe, comment on, and influence Japan’s Asia policy in the period following the official declaration of the “New Order.
in East Asia” in November 1938. In his first editorial, published just a month before the German invasion of Poland, Ôkawa predicted that the outbreak of war in Europe would usher in a new era in which nationalist movements in Asia would find their chance to achieve independence. He also urged the Japanese government to support these anticolonial movements with the goal of accelerating their process of national liberation and simultaneously creating future allies for Japan. Pointing out that Japan’s mission in Asia was gaining greater urgency, Ôkawa expressed his hope that the Japanese public, which was not knowledgeable even about the recent developments in China, would become better informed about the conditions and peoples of Asia in general.

As the Japanese government began to use the slogan “New Order in East Asia” to describe its foreign policy, Ôkawa became concerned about the Japanese public’s lack of preparedness, in terms of their knowledge about Asian societies and cultures, for a serious pan-Asian policy. In order to educate young Japanese about the culture and politics of Asia and prepare them for positions in the service of Japan, Ôkawa received government funds to establish a special school offering instruction in Asian studies. The two-year professional school, the most concrete product of Ôkawa’s Asianist vision, was established in May 1938 as a teaching institute affiliated with the East Asian Economic Research Bureau in Tokyo, with funds from the Manchurian Railway Company, the army, and the Foreign Ministry. All expenses of the admitted students were paid by the school, which was widely known as the Ôkawa Juku (Ôkawa School), although it was named the Shôwa Gogaku Kenkyûjo (Shôwa Language Research Institute). In return for receiving tuition and a stipend for two years, the students were obligated to work for the Japanese government in overseas regions such as Southeast Asia for approximately ten years. Each year, the school recruited twenty students around the age of seventeen. In their first year, students had to learn either English or French as their primary foreign language, along with an additional language to be selected from among Hindu, Urdu, Thai, and Malay. After the second year of the school, Arabic, Persian, and Turkish were added to the elective language course offerings. The Ôkawa Juku represented a practical implementation of Ôkawa Shûmei’s long-held pan-Asianist vision of merging a colonial cultural policy with anticolonial ideology. He aimed to educate a body of Japanese bureaucrats who could understand the culture and language of Asian peoples and take a position of leadership among them. According to his students, Ôkawa often noted the apparent unreadiness of the Japanese Empire for a great pan-Asian cause, underlining the urgency he perceived in his teaching mission. He encouraged students to form personal friendship with Asian peoples and establish bonds of solidarity that would last even if Japan lost the war.

A retrospective assessment of Japan’s wartime cultural policies in newly occupied Southeast Asia shows that, with a few exceptions, cultural policies were in fact developed ad hoc by administrators faced with the reality of ruling a large population they knew little about. Ôkawa Juku complemented the other Asianist program that brought students from Southeast Asia to Japan for training. Most of the
graduating students of Ôkawa Juku did find employment in the military administration of the Southeast Asian region during the era of the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere.\textsuperscript{41}

The content of pan-Asianist education at Ôkawa Juku reflected a synthesis between the scholarly-idealistic vision of Asian liberation and pragmatic goals of Japan’s wartime military expansion. Ôkawa himself taught classes on colonial history, the “Japanese spirit,” Islam, and Oriental history. His lecture notes for the classes entitled “History of Modern European Colonialism” and “Introduction to Islam” later became the basis for books with these titles. Students praised Ôkawa as a dedicated educator, citing his informative and clear lectures, his hard work, and his close relationship with students.\textsuperscript{42} From time to time, high-ranking army generals such as Doihara Kenji, Itagaki Seishirô, Matsui Iwane, Tôjô Hideki, and Okamura Seiji would visit the Ôkawa Juku and lecture students on Japan’s Asia policy.\textsuperscript{43} Indian nationalist Rash Behari Bose and Muslim immigrant from Russia Qurban Ali were among the part-time language and history instructors of the school, giving students a firsthand encounter with the anticolonial nationalist thinking of Asian exiles in Japan. It was during this time that Ôkawa pioneered Japan’s rapidly growing field of Islamic studies not only through his own writings but also by supporting young scholars and purchasing library collections on Islamic studies from Europe in his capacity as director of the East Asia Economic Research Institute.\textsuperscript{44}

It would be mistaken to assume that, before Pearl Harbor, Japan’s Asianists advocated war with the United States based on their vision of East-West conflict.
From the time of the Manchurian Incident in July 1937 to the Pearl Harbor attack in December 1941, for example, Ôkawa Shûmei cautioned against entering into conflict with the United States while advocating a southern advance by Japan that would target the colonies of Britain, France, and the Netherlands in Southeast Asia. With this goal in mind, he urged a quick resolution to the Sino-Japanese conflict. Particularly as pan-Asianists became aware of an approaching war in Europe, with all the implications that such a war carried for the colonized areas in Asia, they found renewed faith in Asia’s ultimate rise to independence; destiny seemed to have presented Japan with an ideal opportunity to lead the liberation of Asia from Western colonialism. For pan-Asianists, a southern advance was as much a practical opportunity as it was a moral imperative, since neither the British nor the Dutch were in a position to resist Japanese military pressure, particularly if Japan could act in cooperation with native nationalist movements in Southeast Asia. It is in this spirit that Ôkawa Shûmei proposed the creation of a Southeast [Asian] Common Cooperative Region (Tônan Kyôdôken) to secure the political and economic unity of liberated Southeast Asia with Japan. With this historical opportunity, there could emerge a new world order based on three regional blocs, Euro-Africa, America, and East-Southeast Asia. Meanwhile, realizing the danger that cooperation between Europe and America could present to Japan, Ôkawa Shûmei advocated a policy of keeping the United States neutral. He refrained from making anti-American statements in his editorials and urged the improvement of economic ties, especially with joint projects in Manchuria and China, in a bid to secure U.S. neutrality in the event of a future British-Japanese conflict.

Thus, from 1938 up until the Pearl Harbor attack, Ôkawa Shûmei was involved in a project of developing trade ties between Japan and the United States. There had been an economic diplomacy toward the United States that aimed at cooperation in the industrialization of Manchuria between 1937 and 1940. Endorsing Ishiwara Kanji’s vision of the creation of a self-sufficient military industry in Manchukuo, but recognizing the insufficiency of the machine tool industry in the region, military and industrial leaders in Manchuria aimed to attract a higher level of U.S. investment and technology. In fact, Manchuria became more heavily dependent on American capital and technology than it was on European investments. Beyond the goal of industrializing Manchuria, Ayukawa Yoshisuke, the president of the Manchurian Industrial Development Corporation and the founder of the Nissan conglomerate, also hoped to avoid war between the United States and Japan by fostering mutual economic ties.

Ôkawa Shûmei’s personal commitment to the improvement of economic relations with the United States stemmed more from his interest in U.S. neutrality than from considerations of economic rationality. He believed it was possible for Japan to avoid U.S. intervention in its confrontation with the Chinese Nationalist government and the European colonial powers. It was Ôkawa’s expectation that the strong trade relationships and joint investments they shared with Japan in Manchuria would lead the Americans to withdraw their support from the Nationalist government of China. In making these policy suggestions, Ôkawa relied on his assumptions about the
American national character as being concerned primarily with business interests rather than principled foreign policies. He also considered that the United States had less to lose by giving up its support for the government of Chiang Kai-shek than Britain did. With these assessments and goals, Ōkawa became personally involved in an effort by the Pan-Pacific Trading and Navigation Company to barter mineral ores from China for gasoline from the United States. His project failed as a result of difficulties with the intricacies of U.S. trade regulations. Nevertheless, Ōkawa's desire to insulate the U.S from Japan's war in China, in addition to his willingness to make use of U.S. trade in the development of Manchuria, should be noted as an indication that he was not, at least where practical policy matters were concerned, a consistent advocate of an inevitable war between the United States and Japan.

Once the fighting between the United States and Japan began, however, Ōkawa Shūmei immediately took on the task of offering a historical justification for the war as Japan's response to a century of Anglo-American aggression in East Asia. He preferred the term “Anglo-American aggression” to “Western aggression,” a contemporary expression that allowed pan-Asianist thinkers to exclude Germany from their anti-Western rhetoric. Even so, when Ōkawa discussed the historical and philosophical basis of the Greater East Asia War, he again spoke about the confrontation of East and West as if China did not belong to the East or Germany to the West. It was during his radio lectures on this topic delivered between December 14 and December 25 of 1941, that Ōkawa credited himself for the prophecy he had made back in 1924 in his book “Asia, Europe and Japan” of an inevitable war between Eastern and Western civilizations, represented by Japan and the United States. He described the book's purposes as follows:

- First, to let the pacifists reconsider their wrong attitude by clarifying the historical significance of war;
- Second, to show that world history, in its true sense of the word, is nothing but a chronicle of antagonism, struggle and unification between the Orient and the Occident;
- Third, to reveal the cultural characteristics of the East and the West which had been blended into the history of the world;
- Fourth, to give a logical foundation to Pan-Asianism;
- Last, but not least, to point out that a war is inevitable between the East and the Anglo-American powers for the establishment of a new world. Moreover, I tried to clarify the sublime mission of Japan in the coming world war. I concluded the book as follows: “Now, East and West have respectively attained their ultimate goals. As history fully proves, in creating a new world, a life-and-death struggle between the champion of the East and that of the West is inevitable. This logic proved true when America challenged Japan.” My prediction proved correct after the passage of 16 years.

Such self-promoting references to his prediction of Japan's war with the United States led to Ōkawa's indictment at the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal. During the trial, he pointed out that his writings in 1924 did not necessarily constitute a plan for a Japanese attack, as he was merely commenting on the inevitability of war between civilizations based on the ideas of the Russian philosopher Soloviev. In fact, he offered a more historical reinterpretation of his 1924 clash of civilization
thesis while under U.S. interrogation. Albeit for opportunistic reasons, pan-Asianists opposed war with the United States before 1941. Moreover, in the aftermath of the Immigration Act of 1924, theories of a clash between the USA and Japan was a popular topic beyond Asianist circles. Yet the easy transition by the pan-Asianists to clash of civilization theories to justify the war with the United States in the immediate aftermath of the Pearl Harbor attack also signifies the flexible utilization of the ideas of Eastern and Western civilization, and the historical memory of Western colonialism, for the ends of Japan’s own imperial expansion.

**Asianist Journals and Organizations**

From the Manchurian Incident in 1931 to the end of WWII, Ôkawa Shûmei was only one of the many intellectual voices trying to clarify the content and goals of the ambivalent notion of Asian solidarity and Japan’s Asian mission. Especially after Japan’s withdrawal from the League of Nations, activities related to the ideals and discourse of pan-Asianism gained momentum as support from the government, the military, and business circles increased. There was a significant gap, however, between the discourse of civilization reducing all global conflicts to a question of clashes between distinct races or major civilizations and the reality of the state of international affairs. Around the time of the Russo-Japanese War, a vision of racial solidarity and civilizational alliance seemed to be an appealing international strategy for the political projects of the rising nationalist movements, which perceived a united policy in the West of imperialism toward their Asian colonies. During the late 1930s, however, the Western world no longer seemed such a unified front as a result of sharp political and ideological divisions in Europe. And Japan’s challenge to the international order was not based on racial divisions, either. Within East Asia, the major conflict was not between East and West but between Japanese imperialism, on the one hand, and Chinese and Korean nationalism, on the other. From 1933 onward, there was a dramatic increase in the number of Asianist organizations, publications, and events. They aimed not only at demonstrating the sincerity of Japan’s “return to Asia” but also at guarding against a perceived state of international isolation for Japan after its withdrawal from the League of Nations. Asianist publications and events also aimed at convincing both the Japanese public and Asian nationalists that civilizational and racial distinctions were in fact to be regarded as the primary consideration in international relations. But the empty repetition of slogans about the conflict between civilizations and races did not succeed in creating any substantial ideology able to account for the complex global politics of the 1930s. Instead, Asianism became less and less credible in the face of Japan’s full-scale war against Chinese nationalism. Realizing this, Asianists pursued ideological credibility by attempting to revive and reinvent the legacy of the early Asian internationalism dating back to the period from 1905 to 1914. At the same time, liberal and socialist converts to Asianism during the late 1930s infused new content and vigor into the nearly exhausted concept of Asian community and solidarity.

The reinvention of pan-Asianist ideology following the Manchurian Incident can best be seen in the sudden increase in the number of Asianist journals and
organizations supported by military, political, and business authorities. In 1933, the
same year Japan left the League of Nations, Rash Behari Bose and Qurban Ali, two
Asianist exiles who had lived in Japan during the 1920s, began to receive funding for
the purpose of publishing journals addressed to India and the Muslim World. Rash
Behari Bose published The New Asia—Shin Ajia, a monthly periodical in a dual
English- and Japanese-language format. The government of India banned the entry
and sale of The New Asia within the territories it controlled. The journal seemed to
have supporters in Southeast Asia, as evidenced by the contact between Indonesian
nationalist leader Muhammed Hatta and Rash Behari Bose.

Almost half the journal was devoted to coverage of news about the Indian
independence movement, taking a tone sympathetic to the radical wing led by
Subhas Chandra Bose. Neither Japanese pan-Asianism nor The New Asia, however,
receiving support from such prominent leaders of the Indian national movement as
Gandhi, Nehru, Tagore, and Subhas Chandra Bose, all of whom were very critical of
Japanese aggression in China. Despite the absence of interest in a Japan-centered
pan-Asianist vision among Indian nationalists, the journal referred to the pro-
Japanese statement by Tagore back in 1916, even though Tagore had radically
changed his views of Japan by the 1930s. Even Taraknath Das, the one Indian
nationalist who bestowed great hopes on Japan’s leadership of Asian nationalism
during WWI, wrote to The New Asia that Japan had done nothing to improve Indo-
Japanese relations for about two decades, expressing skepticism over the
motivations behind Japan’s attempt to “return to Asia” after such a long period of
indifference to nationalist movements.

The New Asia included international news from the perspective of the East-West
conflict and domestic news on the activities of various Asianist associations in Japan,
such as the visits to Tokyo of Asian or African American figures of repute, or the
awarding of scholarships to students from Asia. The journal refrained from
publishing any news or articles critical of the creation of Manchukuo and
maintained silence on the subject of Chinese nationalism. After discussing the Sino-
Japanese conflict in a tone of regret, Rash Behari Bose suggested that India should
mediate between the two nations to reach a peaceful settlement. With regard to
the clash of civilizations and races, articles in The New Asia emphasized that what
Asians wanted was national liberation, with the possibility of a racial conflict thus
depending entirely on the attitude that the Western powers chose to assume toward
the independence movements.

The non-white peoples are now conscious of the distressing fact that they have
hitherto been mercilessly exploited and inhumanly humiliated. The intensity of this
consciousness is the measure of their challenge to the white man. One thing is
certain, and that is that the East and the West cannot coalesce, unless the West fully
realizes its immeasurable folly of race-superiority consciousness, completely
abandons its mischievous policy of exploitation, and immediately makes ample
amends for the untold wrongs it has inflicted on the non-white peoples of the
earth.
In The New Asia’s editorials on Japanese foreign policy, Rash Behari Bose urged the Japanese government to cooperate with the United States, China, and the Soviet Union in a move to eliminate British colonial control in Asia. For him, Britain was the root of all problems in the region, including Japan’s isolation in the international community. As early as 1934, Behari Bose warned that Japan needed to maintain good relations with the United States, as only Britain would benefit from a conflict between that country and Japan: “Britain is not able to fight Japan singly and therefore waiting for her opportunity, when Japan may be involved in a war with America. . . . An American-Japanese War will weaken these two great powers who are serious rivals of Great Britain. Those Americans and Japanese who are real patriots should do their best to promote American-Japanese friendship.”

While Rash Behari Bose edited a journal addressing primarily India, Qurban Ali was publishing Yani Yapon Muhbiri (New Japan journal), which aimed its message at the Muslim world. Although the journal was in Turkish, the cover page of the magazine included a Japanese subtitle, describing it as “the only journal that introduces Japan to the Muslim world.” Several Japanese companies provided support to the small Muslim community in Tokyo for their efforts in the publication of Yani Yapon Muhbiri, which was seen as an effective means for the creation of an information network linking Japan and the Muslim world. In spite of the journal’s limited circulation, the very fact that Tokyo was hosting a magazine published by Muslims was expected to have propaganda value in cultivating pro-Japanese sentiments within a Muslim audience.

Around the same time that Yani Yapon Muhbiri began publication in 1933, several other attempts at networking with the Muslim world were promoted with the support of the Japanese army in Manchuria. These new attempts benefited from the contacts Kokuryûkai had established in the Muslim world and the Turkish Tatar diaspora network in East Asia. In a daring experiment in 1933, a prince from the abolished Ottoman dynasty, Abdül Kerim Efendi (1904–1935) was invited to Japan, presumably to consider his potential contribution to Japan’s policy toward the Muslims of Central Asia in case of a conflict with the Soviet Union. Although the plan was soon abandoned, it exemplified the reckless and unrealistic projects that Asianists were willing to consider at the expense of jeopardizing Japan’s diplomatic relations with the Turkish Republic. In the same year, Abdurreşid İbrahim, the famous pan-Islamist whose travel memoirs more than two decades earlier had popularized a pro-Japanese image in the Muslim world, currently leading an isolated and uneventful life in Turkey, received an invitation to visit Tokyo. İbrahim collaborated with the Asianist projects reaching out to the Muslim world until his death in 1944 in Tokyo.

It was also in 1933 that several high-level military and civilian leaders established the Greater Asia Association (Dai Ajia Kyôkai). The Greater Asia Association not only promoted regional unity in East Asia but also advocated solidarity among West and Southeast Asian societies. Konoe Fumimaro, General Matsui Iwane, and General Ishiwara Kanji were among its prominent members. The Greater Asia Association published a monthly journal titled Dai Ajia Shugi (Greater Asianism), which became
the most important pan-Asianist journal during that period, offering a wide range of news and opinion articles covering all of Asia, including Muslim West Asia, Southeast Asia, and Central Asia. Ōkawa Shûmei, Nakatani Takeyo, Rash Behari Bose and many Asianist figures in the military frequently wrote for this journal. The content and discourse of Dai Ajia Shugi became an influential source in shaping the official language of pan-Asianism during the late 1930s, influencing the “New Order in East Asia” proclamation of the Konoe Fumimaro cabinet in 1938.\(^\text{70}\)

Toyama Mitsuru honors Rash Behari Bose

The discourse of Asian identity represented in Dai Ajia Shugi was perfectly in harmony with the broader Asia view of Ōkawa Shûmei’s ideology, as it seemed to regard India and the Muslim world as just as important as East and Southeast Asia. Taking this continental Asia perspective, Dai Ajia Kyôkai made an important contribution to Asianist thought with its introduction of news and information about the political, economic, and social trends of the entire Asian world, from China and India to Iran and Turkey.\(^\text{71}\) In foreign policy, Dai Ajia Shugi was highly anti-British and, strikingly, not anti-American. Discussions of the conflict and clash of interests between England and Japan started as early as 1933,\(^\text{72}\) and gradually the journal’s call for a new world order turned to a more radical rejection of European hegemony in Asia. The journal, however, did not carry any vision of conflict with the United States that could have indicated the path to war. Beginning in 1938, it
actively promoted the concept of “New Asia,” offering enthusiastic intellectual support for the government’s declaration of the “New Order in East Asia.”

Despite the journal’s endorsement of cooperation among Asian nations, there was no genuine dialogue with Asian intellectuals and nationalist movements in the pages of Dai Ajia Shugi. When it claimed to present an Asian perspective, the journal always consulted the same small group of exiled nationalists in Japan. This artificial perspective tended to give the journal a self-congratulatory tone, which became typical of Japanese pan-Asianism during the late 1930s; Japanese readers received the impression that Asian nationalists eagerly looked to Japan for leadership. In reality, expectation of Japanese leadership against Western colonialism was much weaker among the nationalist movements of the 1930s compared to the period in the aftermath of 1905. Still, the journal tried to convince the Japanese public that pan-Asianism could be a plausible and positive alternative to the declining Eurocentric world order in Asia.

In addition to the boom of journals and organizations, an increasing degree of networking with different Asian countries took place, primarily involving students and intellectuals. When one of Indonesia’s most prominent nationalist leaders, Muhammad Hatta, visited Japan in 1933, he was showered with media attention and received an enthusiastic welcome from the Greater Asia Association as the “Gandhi of the Netherlands East Indies.” Hatta had previously expressed criticism of Japanese imperialism in China following the Manchurian Incident; however, after his trip, he moderated his position on the Japanese “return to Asia” and advocated Indonesian cooperation with the liberal, progressive, and idealistic segments of Japanese society, suggesting that Indonesian nationalists should challenge the Japanese to be sincere in their pan-Asianist rhetoric. During his visit to Japan in the fall of 1935, Ahmad Subardjo, another Indonesian nationalist leader, expressed his belief that Japan’s withdrawal from the League of Nations and the revival of the pan-Asianist discourse represented a very positive turning point in Asian history. It is important to note that, despite their cautious approach to Japan’s official Asianism, neither Hatta nor Subardjo had anything positive to say about the League of Nations. Meanwhile, various Asianist organizations tried to increase the number of Indonesian students attending Japanese universities, with most of these students becoming members of pan-Asianist organizations during their stays in Japan. In 1934 the Japanese government established a semiofficial agency, Kokusai Bunka Shinkōkai (Society for International Cultural Relations), with the purpose of introducing Japanese culture to other parts of the world and improving cultural ties with European, American, and Asian societies. Although the initial focus of the organization emphasized Europe and the United States, Kokusai Bunka Shinkōkai gradually expanded the funding it devoted to cultural interactions with Asian societies.

As the number of cultural and political associations, journals, and books focusing on Asia grew dramatically after 1933, the Japanese public’s interpretation of international events began to be shaped more by their consciousness of racial difference and Asian identity. The best example of the power that an internationalist
race identity held over the Japanese imagination was the popular reaction to the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, when strong pro-Ethiopian sentiments caused problems for Japan's diplomatic relations with Italy. The mainstream Japanese media was full of anti-Italian and pro-Ethiopian commentaries, with references to the conflict as another instance of the struggle between the white race and colored races. Such overwhelming sympathy for the Ethiopian resistance caused diplomatic tension between Japan and Italy, despite the Japanese Foreign Ministry's policy of keeping good relations with Italy. Meanwhile, the highly pro-Ethiopian public response to the Ethiopian crisis attracted the attention of African American intellectuals, prompting a visit to Japan by W. E. B. Du Bois. The warm reception Du Bois met during his 1936 visit to Manchuria and Japan, combined with his perception of a genuine Japanese public interest in the struggle of Africans and African Americans, convinced him of the sincerity behind Japan's claim for leadership of the colored races. Du Bois continued to write about the legitimacy of Japan's actions in Asia in the framework of the importance of race in international affairs, even in the face of Japanese atrocities in China. Predictably, pro-Japanese comments by Du Bois received great coverage in Japanese papers in a self-righteous affirmation of Japanese policies.
Overall, the small group of Japan’s Asian collaborators, together with the Asian and African American intellectuals who expressed support for Japan’s Asianist projects, were very important in allowing Japanese intellectuals to convince themselves that their ideas of the New Order in East Asia and the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere were different from Western imperialism. As Naoki Sakai has pointed out, the ideologues of Japan’s official pan-Asianism manifested a kind of “narcissism” that impelled them repeatedly to quote those individuals who praised the Japanese or who hoped to receive support from Japan against Western colonial rule. Through magnification of these manifestations of pro-Japanese expressions, many of which dated back to the decade after the Russo-Japanese War, Japanese leaders depicted the Japanese Empire as a Coprosperity Sphere that purported to represent the will of all its colonial subjects.

When Japan first began the process of colonizing Taiwan and Korea and received rights in Manchuria, its policies could be justified in international law through references to the ideals of progress and development favored by other colonial powers. In the starkly different international climate of the 1930s, the vocabulary of benevolent colonialism had to be replaced by the discourse of pan-Asian solidarity to justify Japanese imperialism. By 1940 there were many Japanese, especially in the young generation, who believed in their Asian identity and the discourses of Asian liberation propagated by multiple sources within Japan.

**Asianist Ideology of the 1930s**

Pan-Asianism did not have a defined ideology or a systematic doctrine. Formulating an ideology that was both realistic and intellectually appealing proved to be the greatest challenge faced by official Asianism in the 1930s. Early pan-Asianism derived its appeal from its opposition to the intellectual foundations of the Eurocentric international order while claiming to be in harmony with Japan’s national interest through the idea of regional leadership in the project of an Asian Monroe Doctrine. In the 1930s, when pan-Asianist ideology took on a more assertive challenge to the Eurocentric world order, a new generation of intellectuals struggled to inject a degree of international legitimacy and realism into the idea of Asianism by modifying the content of the racial conflict thesis with reference to regionalism and geopolitics. Moreover, a strong tide of intellectual critiques of Western modernity during the 1930s ended up strengthening the anti-Western discourse of pan-Asianism.

The charter of Dai Ajia Kyôkai, promulgated in 1933 after Japan’s withdrawal from the League of Nations, was a far cry from the cautious language of the early Asian Monroe Doctrine developed during the 1910s:

> In culture, politics, economics, geography, and race, Asia is a body of common destiny. The true peace, prosperity, and development of Asian peoples are feasible only on the basis of their consciousness of Asia as one entity and an organic union thereof. . . . The heavy responsibility for reconstruction and ordering of Asia rests upon the shoulders of Imperial Japan. . . . now is the time for Japan to concentrate all its cultural, political, economic, and
organizational power to take one step toward the reconstruction and union in Asia. . . . The formulation of the Greater Asia Federation is the historical mission facing the Japanese people today.\(^\text{84}\)

In the early stages after Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations, scholars of international relations such as Kamikawa Hikomatsu and Rōyama Masamichi criticized the idea of Great Asianism advocated by Dai Ajia Kyôkai, calling it both unrealistic and anachronistic. They suggested that instead of pursuing an anti-Western vision of Asian solidarity, Japan should create a Far Eastern League using the League of Nations as its model. This plan was based on a liberal internationalist agenda without any emphasis on the primacy of race and civilization.\(^\text{85}\) At that stage, scholars like Rōyama Masamichi were maintaining their resistance to an increasingly pervasive Asianist tendency to analyze and reorder Japan's relations with the rest of the world in terms of racial and civilizational blocs and conflicts among them. Rōyama noted that he deliberately decided "not to give a leading position to the question of race and culture" in his writings and policy suggestions.\(^\text{86}\)

In the end, however, Rōyama capitulated to this convention, offering realpolitik substance to the slogans of official pan-Asianism. He incorporated the idea of a distinct East Asian culture in his elaborate support of the New Order in East Asia, although it is true that the core of his arguments relied more on the concepts of regionalism.\(^\text{87}\) Japan's liberal intellectuals could redefine the idea of East Asian community (kyôdôtai) as a form of regionalism that would bring about a rationalization of economic and social interaction in the region.\(^\text{88}\)

Because of harsh critiques from leading Asian nationalists, such as Gandhi and Nehru, of Japanese policies in China during the 1930s, official Asianism was based on highly repetitive references to the events and ideas of the Asian internationalism of the 1905–1914 period, when there was an interest in Japanese leadership in different parts of Asia. One of the best examples of this attempt to overcome the emptiness of an imposed notion of Asian unity through references to early Asianism can be seen in the response Ôkawa Shûmei offered to the condemnation of Japanese Asianism by leaders of the Indian National Congress. Even at the time when Japan was sponsoring the Indian National Army's fight against British rule, both Gandhi and Nehru denounced Japanese colonialism. In an open letter to them, Ôkawa recounted his experiences during WWI in joining Indian nationalists to campaign for the liberation of India, regardless of Japan's pro-Western policy at the time of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. For Ôkawa, this historical background of Indian-Japanese collaboration showed that the ideals of official pan-Asianism during the Greater East Asia War had altruistic historical roots, reflecting a genuine interest in aiding the decolonization of Asia.\(^\text{89}\) It was during such a search for the historical roots of Asianism that Okakura Tenshin was made an icon of pan-Asian thought. All of Okakura's works, including a previously unpublished manuscript from his 1901 trip to India called Awakening of the East, were published in both English and Japanese editions between 1938 and 1945.\(^\text{90}\) In the same quest to reinvent early Asian internationalism, books by Ôkawa Shûmei, Paul Richard, and Taraknath Das from the period of WWI were reprinted after more than twenty years.\(^\text{91}\)
It was the presence of new converts from the socialist and liberal intellectual traditions, however, that injected new energy and vitality to Asianism. In the writings of Miki Kiyoshi, a leading member of the Shôwa Kenkyûkai, we can see the Asianist discourse of civilization in its most sophisticated formulation, polished with the German tradition of the philosophy of history. According to Miki, the over-Westernization of world cultures and the Eurocentric character of the social sciences posed a global political problem. Borrowing the self-critique of European thought during the interwar period, Miki expressed the conviction that Western civilization was in the process of self-destruction and could no longer dominate the fate of Asia. From this observation, he proceeded to the conclusion that Japan should uphold its civilizational mission to facilitate Asian unity and cooperation and eliminate Western colonialism. For Miki, Asian cooperation under Japanese leadership would serve the interests of peace and harmony, as well as liberation and racial equality.
Miki’s arguments drew on reflections on modernity and Eurocentrism in the writings of the interwar era in both Europe and Japan. Ultimately, however, they resembled the ideas of Okakura Tenshin and Ōkawa Shûmei in their basic tenet, namely, belief in the collapse of the Eurocentric world order and the corresponding necessity to offer an alternative order based on Asian values and political solidarity. Other converts to Asianism, such as the famous socialists Sano Manabu, Nabeyama Sadachika, and Akamatsu Katsumaro, offered their own interpretations of the content of pan-Asianist thought. These former socialists described their perception of the world in terms of a division into a proletarian East and a bourgeois West. It was their belief that the fusion between the West, “reorganized by the proletariat,” and the East, “awakened through the influence of Pan-Asianism,” would create a new world order that would finally establish world peace and unity. Their retreat from Comintern socialism was accompanied by a shift in allegiance to Asian internationalism.

What united the ideology of such diverse groups and figures as the Greater Asia Association, Ōkawa Shûmei, and the new converts to Asianism such as Miki Kiyoshi, was the discourse of civilization central to all their arguments. Victor Koschmann have accounted for the differences among these pan-Asianist visions by making a distinction between esoteric and exoteric versions of Asianism. According to Koschmann, popular organizations such as the Greater Asia Association presented the exoteric Asianism that had the power to appeal to Japanese public opinion, while Shôwa Research Institute intellectuals such as Miki Kiyoshi produced an esoteric version of Asianism that was more relevant to rational policy making and legitimization in the eyes of the presumed world public opinion. East-West civilization discourse, however, united both the more sophisticated scholarly
elaborations of Asianism and those that appealed to the broader domestic public opinion. This explains the striking similarities between the pan-Asianist ideas of Ōkawa Shūmei and Miki Kiyoshi, despite their dramatically different intellectual and political backgrounds. Very much like Ōkawa Shūmei, Miki Kiyoshi based his argument on the conviction that Eurocentrism or Western civilization had to be overcome, while the civilizational legacy of Asia could become the basis for an alternative. Gradually, these ideas turned into well-known slogans, frequently repeated if not always clearly defined. The following ambiguous formulation by the Greater Asia Association summed up the slogans that were common to all versions of Asianism: “It goes without saying that the cultures of Europe are incapable of rescuing themselves any more, much less the world at large. The new potential power lies with the third civilization. It makes both Eastern and Western civilizations come alive through ‘musubi’ or harmonious combination. This is what can produce a new order in China, and Japan may rightfully serve as a catalyst for this combination.”

The central tension in world politics, according to this Asianist discourse of civilization, was between East and West, and thus Asianism helped serve to reduce all world conflicts to this reductionist framework. Once the war between Japan and the United States started, such rhetoric served a very useful political purpose by placing the focus on the conflict with the Western powers and covering up the sense of guilt some Japanese may otherwise have felt about their country’s aggression in China. Thus a great number of Japanese intellectuals may have felt relieved after the outbreak of war with the USA. They could mobilize their ideas for the glorification and justification of the Pacific War in the name of overcoming modernity and East-West confrontation. For example, the participants in the famous wartime conference “Overcoming Modernity” utilized a wide array of philosophies and theories to link Japan’s military conflict with the intellectual attempts to overcome the problems of Eurocentric modernity. It was thus the intellectual legacy of early Asianism in the form of a discourse of Asian civilization that created similarities between the ideology of old-time Asianists such as Ōkawa Shūmei and that of the new converts to Asianism during the 1930s, whose disparate beliefs converged in their obsessive and constant blaming of the imagined West for the problems of the international order.

Wartime Asian Internationalism and Its Postwar Legacy

Throughout the Pacific War, pan-Asianists like Ōkawa Shūmei devoted all their energies to the service of the Japanese state and the project of the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere. In addition to publishing books and journals advocating the ideals of Asianism, Ōkawa continued to head the administration of the East Asian Economic Research Institute and to run his professional school. Among these efforts, he saw it as particularly important to clarify Japan’s war aims and explain the origins and goals of the Greater East Asia War. The main Asianist project Ōkawa closely followed during the war was the establishment of the Indian National Army, an event that gave a sense of final achievement to Ōkawa after three decades of advocating Japanese support for Indian independence.
The creation of the Indian National Army (INA) in 1942, with its ranks composed of Indian soldiers from the surrendered British troops in Singapore, became the most memorable project to embody pan-Asianist slogans. The INA was intended to fight alongside the Japanese army against the British forces at the Burmese-Indian border. It is now clear that the initial success of the Japanese plans for the creation of an Indian army can be attributed more to the contributions of idealistic Japanese figures on the ground than to any planning in Tokyo.\textsuperscript{99} Major Fujiwara Iwaichi (1908–1986) gained the trust of Indian officers mainly through his own sincere commitment to the project of Indian independence. In fact, upon Fujiwara’s departure, INA commander Mohan Singh soon clashed with the new liaison officer and attempted to disband the 40,000-man army he had created.\textsuperscript{100} The objection of Mohan Singh and other Indian officers to the appointment of Rash Behari Bose to the top position in the newly created army marked another point of crisis, one that shows the agency of Indian collaborators in the whole project.\textsuperscript{101}

Subhas Chandra Bose’s willingness to cooperate with Japan, followed by his secret submarine trip from Germany to Japan in 1942, saved the Indian National Army project, when it faced a crisis provoked by disagreement between the Japanese and Indian sides. Chandra Bose was a well-respected leader of the Indian nationalist movement who could both gain the loyalty of the Indian officers and assert authority over the Japanese liaison officers. For a long time, he had advocated cooperation with anti-British powers in order to win independence for India, in contrast to the policy of passive resistance advocated by Gandhi. He saw a great opportunity in German and Japanese support for the liberation of India and willingly collaborated with both powers. Soon after his arrival in Singapore, Chandra Bose took over the leadership of the INA and formed the Provisional Government of Free India. Although the actual engagement between the Indian National Army and their British enemies at Imphal resulted in defeat for the Indian side, the mere existence of a provisional government and an army had a positive psychological impact on the Indian nationalist movement as a whole.\textsuperscript{102}

From his arrival at Singapore until his death in a plane crash at the end of the Pacific War, Subhas Chandra Bose visited Tokyo several times during the war. The speech he made as the leader of the Provisional Government of Free India at the Greater East Asia Conference in 1943 to the heads of state of six nations of the Coprosperity Sphere (Japan, China, Manchuria, the Philippines, Burma, and Thailand, all recognized as independent by Japan) demonstrated the links between the failure of the League of Nations system and the New Order in East Asia that Japan had declared its intention to establish in the context of its war aims. Bose began his speech by recalling his frustration with the League of Nations: ”My thoughts also went back to the Assembly of the League of Nations, that League of Nations along whose corridors and lobbies I spent many a day, knocking at one door after another, in the vain attempt to obtain a hearing for the cause of Indian freedom.”\textsuperscript{103}

According to Bose, the Greater East Asia Conference organized by the Japanese government as an alternative to the League of Nations was receptive to nationalist voices in Asia in a way none of the European-centered international organizations
had ever been. Meanwhile, he gave several radio speeches and lectured to the Japanese public, helping to enhance the popular Japanese confidence in the liberation mission of the Pacific War.

What pan-Asianists like Ôkawa Shûmei never realized was that, for nationalist leaders like Subhas Chandra Bose, pan-Asianism was merely one of the means to reach national independence, not a goal in itself.¹⁰⁴ In one of his conversations with Ôkawa Shûmei about the future of the Indian national movement, Subhas Chandra Bose talked about the possibility of receiving Soviet support against the British Empire if Germany was defeated on the European front. Ôkawa was surprised that Bose could think of cooperating with the Soviets and asked him why he would collaborate with the Soviet Union if he was against Communism. In response, Bose pointed out that he was prepared “to shake hands even with Satan himself to drive out the British from India.”¹⁰⁵ It did not occur to Ôkawa that Japan might well be one Satan with whom Chandra Bose had to cooperate. In fact, Chandra Bose saw Japan as a different ally from Russia or Germany because of the Asian identity common to both India and Japan. In the end, however, Bose’s nationalist agenda was the main motive for collaboration, rather than a vision of Asian regionalism under Japanese leadership. In a sense, the legitimacy of wartime pan-Asianism intimately depended on the idea of national self-determination.
For Ôkawa Shûmei, on the other hand, Asian decolonization was unthinkable in the absence of Japan’s unique mission to lead the free Asia. He refrained, however, from stating specifically what kind Asian federation would replace the old order. Unsurprisingly, Ôkawa’s vision of the future Asia was ambiguous, and his wartime writings focused more on the history and ideology of Asianism. The Japanese government, on the other hand, had to clarify its war aims and postwar visions much more clearly than Ôkawa did, especially in response to the appeal of the Atlantic Charter. Initially, Japanese leaders defined the first stage of the new world order they envisioned for Asia—namely, the expulsion of Western hegemony and the elimination of Western interests—without specifying clearly what would happen after the Western powers were gone. They assumed that, once Western exploitation was over and trade between Asian nations was established, Asia would develop very fast. They also hoped that the new Asia would cooperate with a German-dominated Europe to create a world order based on regional economic blocs.[106] As Japanese leaders sought the further cooperation of local nationalist movements during the later stages of the war, they eventually clarified their own war aims as an alternative to the Atlantic Charter.¹⁰⁷

As the declarations of the 1926 Nagasaki pan-Asiatic conference had looked similar to the principles of the League of Nations, so the Greater East Asia Conference declaration also looked like a modification of the Atlantic Charter, with slight alterations affording sensitivity to the cultural traditions of non-Western societies. For example, the principles declared on November 7, 1943, in Tokyo affirmed the national self-determination of Asian societies, with the only major difference from the Atlantic Charter being a call for the “abolition of racial discrimination” and the cultivation of Asian cultural heritages.¹⁰⁸ During the Greater East Asia War, the fierce competition between the Allied Powers and Japan in propaganda battles and psychological warfare had accelerated the pace of decolonization. Not only did Japan feel the need to respond to the Atlantic Charter, but the Allied Powers also had to respond to the pan-Asianist challenge to the interwar colonial order. For instance, U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS) reports on psychological warfare in Southeast Asia held that Japan’s Asianist propaganda was generally very successful. In response, the OSS suggested that the vision of a United Nations organization and a new world order should be emphasized, taking care not to make any reference to the continuation of the British, French, and Dutch empires.¹⁰⁹ More important, there was a growing awareness among U.S. wartime leaders, including President Roosevelt, that they had to counter the widespread pan-Asian notions of solidarity spread by Japan by offering a new vision of a postwar order that at least recognized the national demands of India and China. There was also a second concern beyond the competition with Japan: how to assure the support of China and later India in the postwar international order. These concerns led to recognition that the pre-WWII colonial discourses of racial inferiority and the reality of the colonial subjugation of India and China should not continue, even if Japan were punished by a national-racial isolation.¹¹⁰ It is against the background of this concern with pan-Asianism that Roosevelt recommended that Churchill give India more self-government in order to improve the war efforts against Japan.¹¹¹
As a matter of fact, after the end of the Greater East Asia War, the prewar imperial order would not be reestablished. When Ôkawa Shûmei listened to the emperor’s radio announcement of Japan’s surrender, on August 15, 1945, he thought that four decades of his work “toward the revival of Asia [had] disappeared like a soap bubble.” Yet, although it was true that Japanese pan-Asianism as a political movement would disappear, the decolonization of Asia would be completed by the 1950s. More important, the Asianist discourse of an East-West civilizational conflict would likewise survive the post-WWII period.

The period immediately after WWII witnessed nationalist revolutions from Indonesia to Vietnam fighting against the returning Dutch and French colonialism. Even in India, despite Chandra Bose’s death in a plane crash and the dissolution of his army at the end of WWII, the Indian national movement rushed to the moral and legal defense of the officers of the Japanese-sponsored Indian National Army, who were indicted for treason against the British Empire. As Tilak Raj Sareen wrote, the trial of the INA officers revitalized the nationalist movement in India, actually creating a new turning point in the Indian national movement, demoralized after WWII. Meanwhile, at the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal, the legacy of the prewar Asian discourse of civilization would be played out in full in the conflict of opinion between the Indian Radhabinod Pal and the other judges.

Ôkawa Shûmei was indicted as a Class A war criminal by the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal based on his role as an ideologue of right-wing pan-Asianism. Both the prosecution and the final verdict used Ôkawa’s writings extensively in the construction of their case charging the accused Japanese leaders with conspiracy to commit aggression, even though charges against Ôkawa himself were dropped when he was diagnosed with brain syphilis in the early stages of the tribunal. While the majority of judges found the accused Japanese leaders guilty of the charges, Judge Radhabinod Pal wrote a long dissenting opinion asserting that Japanese decision making leading up to the Pacific War did not constitute a crime in international law. It is a testimony to Radhabinod Pal’s expertise in international law and his sharp political and legal acumen that his long dissenting opinion is now as well remembered as the Tokyo Tribunal itself. The substance of Pal’s dissenting judgment derived from his ideas of international law and his commitment to a just trial untainted by the politics of “victor’s justice.” It is also evident that Pal’s background in colonial Bengal and his sympathies for the Indian National Army under the leadership of Subhas Chandra Bose had an impact on the content of his dissenting judgment. This background may have also influenced his failure to speak out against the use of his dissenting judgment by Japanese right-wing revisionists.
Monument to Radhabinod Pal in Japan
Richard Minear and John Dower have agreed with many of Pal’s legal arguments in their discussion of the neocolonial context of the Tokyo Tribunal and their critique of the negative impact of the Tokyo trial on both international justice and Japan’s acceptance of responsibility for the Pacific War. As Timothy Brook has demonstrated, however, Justice Pal’s anticolonial sensibilities led him to refrain from making any meaningful judgment on Japan’s responsibility for the Nanking Massacre. Pal’s anticolonial stance led him to withhold comment on Japan’s war crimes against Chinese civilians in Nanking and elsewhere. The majority of the judges, on the other hand, condemned Japanese imperialism in the name of international justice at the same time that Western powers were trying to reestablish their colonial hegemony. Thus, in a sense, the color lines that pan-Asianism emphasized were acted out on the benches of the Tokyo Tribunal, indicating one of the many ways the legacies of the pan-Asianist discourse of civilization and race survived in the postwar period, shaping the perception of both the cold war and decolonization in contemporary history.

Conclusion

Japanese pan-Asianism gained unprecedented official support among the elites of the Japanese Empire in the aftermath of the Manchurian Incident and Japan’s decision to withdraw from the League of Nations. The Japanese government declared its “return to Asia” by appropriating an already existing pan-Asianist alternative to the Eurocentric world order only when its empire was challenged internally by nationalist movements and externally by the other great powers. The very fact that Japan’s elites saw something practical and useful in the pan-Asian slogans and networks to help justify the multiethnic Asian empire of Japan indicates both the continuing intellectual vitality of Asianist critiques of the interwar-era world order and the potential appeal of the Asianist slogans of East-West relations and racial identity to broader Japanese public opinion. Pan-Asianism allowed the Japanese Empire to implement more rigorous and inclusive assimilation policies and exhibit a high level of international confidence and self-righteousness in an era when imperialism was globally delegitimized. Yet it was partly a nostalgic and narcissistic ideology, making frequent references to the post-1905 Asian nationalist admiration of Japan without recognizing the fact that both the nature of nationalism and the image of Japan had changed dramatically from 1905 to the late 1930s. Japanese pan-Asianists saw a great opportunity in the unexpected patronage of their ideas by the Japanese government and military authorities after 1933. Throughout the 1930s, the radical anti-Western tradition within Asianism was focused on the end of European empires in Asia, especially on the weakness of British Empire, without advocating or recommending any Japanese challenge to the United States. Pearl Harbor was thus an undesirable development for pan-Asianists in Japan, even though they rushed to glorify and justify it via a discourse of East-West civilizational or yellow-white racial conflicts. Meanwhile, new converts to Asianism from different segments of Japanese intellectual life added practical and policy-oriented content to the ambivalent slogans of Asian solidarity via social science theories of regional cooperation and multiethnic communities. Despite its internal paradoxes and its
tensions with the logic of Japanese imperialism, pan-Asianism nevertheless allowed Japan to conduct a relatively successful propaganda campaign against Western imperialism in Southeast Asia while motivating numerous idealist Japanese activists and their collaborators. Pan-Asianist propaganda, accompanied by Japan's own imperial expansion during WWII, did contribute to the end of Western empires, partly by forcing the Allied powers to formulate and promise a more inclusive and nonimperialistic world order at the end of WWII, and partly by stimulating anti-colonial thought and confidence in the possibility of defeating European colonizers among colonized Asian nations.


Notes

1 The Manchurian Incident of 1931 initiated a process that led to the establishment of a Japanese-controlled puppet government in Manchuria and Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations. Japan's Kwantung army guarding the South Manchurian Railways bombed parts of the railway in Mukden to create a pretext to occupy Manchuria with the ostensible purpose of providing security against Chinese nationalists in September 1931. Instead of withdrawing from the occupied territories, the Japanese government created the puppet state Manchukuo in February 1932. Nonrecognition of this state by the League of Nations became the reason for Japanese withdrawal from the league in 1933.


6 Louise Young, Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Empire (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).


13 This continuity in change was theorized by Andrew Gordon as the transition from


16 For example, Mark Peattie has argued that Ishiwara Kanji’s views “were part of this surging anti-Western nationalism during the interwar period, and his concept of a Final War must be seen as a reinvigoration of a persistent, if long-muted, theme of challenge to the West throughout Japan’s modern history to 1945” (Mark R. Peattie, Ishiwara Kanji and Japan’s Confrontation with the West [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975], 368).

17 For a good example of the perception of Western retreat from Asia, see No-Yong Park, Retreat of the West: The White Man’s Adventure in Eastern Asia (Boston: Hale, Cushman, and Flint, 1937).


20 Tanaka Ippei was a scholar of China and Buddhism. He converted to Islam and performed pilgrimages to Mecca in 1925 and 1933. Wakabayashi describes Tanaka Ippei as a fighter for “Sonno Yûkoku,” meaning “Revere the Emperor, and be a Patriot,” despite the fact that Tanaka became a Muslim and adopted the name Haji Nur Muhammad in 1918.

21 His brother, Wakabayashi Kyûman, worked for the same cause, operating undercover as a merchant among Chinese Muslims until he died in Changsha in 1924. For Wakabayashi’s reflections on the history of the Kokuryûkai circle of Islam policy advocates, see Wakabayashi Han, Kaikyô Sekai to Nihon (Tokyo: Wakabayashi Han, 1937), 1–3.

22 Wakabayashi, Kaikyô Sekai to Nihon, 3–7. Araki Sadao (1877–1966) was a leader
in the Imperial Way faction of the army.


26 See Awaysa Kentaro and Yoshida Yutada, eds., International Prosecution Section (IPS) (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1980), 23:396–398. During the interrogation, Ōkawa conceded that he knew something would happen but noted that many others at that time had the same knowledge and it was not a secret.

27 For instance, as the biography of Ishiwara Kanji, the military brain of the Manchurian Incident, confirms, ideas about a final war and East-West confrontation, which were very important in Ōkawa Shūmei’s pan-Asianism, were commonly shared by other European, American, and Japanese thinkers, and Ōkawa was not the main inspiration for Ishiwara’s plans. See Peattie, Ishiwara Kanji, 27–86.


29 Even in June 1931, shortly before the Manchurian Incident, when Ōkawa warned that a war could break out between China and Japan at a slight provocation and suggested the necessity of a radical change in policy in Manchuria, his ideas still were not exceptional enough to single him out as an instigator of Kwantung Army officers. See Ōkawa, “Mannō Mondai no Kōsatsu,” 679–682.


32 For Ōkawa Shūmei’s main article on the withdrawal from the League of Nations, see “Kokusai Renmei to Nihon,” Tōyō, May 1932, reprinted in Ōkawa Shūmei Kankei Monjo, 232.

33 For Ōkawa’s advocacy of the withdrawal from the league before the Manchurian Incident, see Ōkawa Shūmei, “Nihon no Kokusai Chii O Kokoromiru,” Daitō Bunka, May 1929, reprinted in Ōkawa Shūmei Kankei Monjo, 234–243.

34 Inukai was assassinated by a group of radical nationalist army cadets and naval officers. Ōkawa Shūmei was indicted, and found guilty, of providing material assistance to this group. It is ironic that he ended up contributing to Inukai Tsuyoshi’s assassination, as pan-Asianists usually viewed Inukai positively, and the 1926 Nagasaki pan-Asiatic conference honored him as one of the Asian politicians who aided the cause of Asian people’s awakening.

35 The fifteen-year prison sentence Ōkawa received on February 3, 1934, was
reduced to five years on October 24, 1935. Because of health problems, he was allowed to postpone his prison term until June 16, 1936. He was finally paroled on October 13, 1937. See Ōtsuka Takehiro, Ôkawa Shûmei to Kindai Nihon (Tokyo: Mokutakusha, 1990), 220.

36 In the aftermath of the Manchurian Incident, Ôkawa established Jinmukai (Society of Jinmu) as a new nationalist organization in the aftermath of the Manchurian Incident, with hopes of reaching a larger audience and creating a broader popular base for his radical nationalist and Asianist movement. Ôkawa Shûmei's trial and imprisonment must have played a role in his decision to disband the group. Moreover, after the coup of February 26, 1936, an event that led to the execution of Kita Ikki as the civilian ideologue of the military conspirators, the authorities began to show less tolerance for radical nationalist organizations.

37 The journal was published by Mantetsu Tôa Keizai Chôsakyoku in Tokyo from August 1939 to February 1944.

38 Ôkawa Shûmei, editorial, Shin Ajia 1, no. 1 (August 1939); 2–3.


42 Students of Ôkawa were the leading figures in Ôkawa Shûmei Kenkôkai and organized the publication of his collected works and other related materials. See Harada Kôkichi, Ôkawa Shûmei Hakushi no Shôgai (Yamagata-ken Sakata-shi: Ôkawa Shûmei Kenkôkai, 1982).

43 For a personal account of the Ôkawa Juku from the memoirs of students, see Tazawa, Musurimu Nippon, 129–142.

44 For the evaluation of Ôkawa's Islamic studies, see Takeuchi Yoshimi, “Ôkawa Shûmei no Ajia Kenkyû,” in Hashikawa Bunsô, ed., Ôkawa Shûmei Shû; (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobô, 1975), 391–394.


3.

51 For the way the prosecution used this reference, see Awaya and Yoshida, International Prosecution Section (IPS), 23:319.


53 The New Asia, edited by Rash Behari Bose in Tokyo from 1933 to 1937.

54 The content of The New Asia included many of the arguments expounded by Ōkawa Shūmei, unsurprisingly, given the close ties that had existed between Ōkawa and Bose since 1915. For example, the content in The New Asia, nos. 5–6 (September–October 1933): 1, is very similar to the writings of Ōkawa in Fukkô Ajia no Shomondai and Ajia, Yoroppa, Nihon.


56 The New Asia, nos. 17–18 (September–October 1934), contains extensive coverage of Chandra Bose’s ideas.

57 The New Asia, nos. 5–6 (September–October 1933): 3. For Tagore’s critique of Japan during the late 1930s, see Zeljko Cipris, “Seduced by Nationalism: Yone Noguchi’s ‘Terrible Mistake’. Debating the China-Japan War With Tagore” Japan Focus.


59 News about the visit to Japan of the African American poet Langston Hughes was accompanied by information about the issue of white discrimination against blacks in the United States; see Shin Ajia, no. 4 (August 1933): 2. In another instance, the Pan-Asiatic Cultural Association declared its goal to invite students from Turkey, Afghanistan, Persia, India, and East Asian and Southeast Asian regions to Japan. See Shin Ajia, nos. 7–8 (November–December 1933): 4.

60 Shin Ajia, nos. 5–6 (September–October 1933): 2.

61 For a lengthy commentary on the rise of the colored and decline of the white races, see Shin Ajia, no. 17–18 (September–October 1934): 1.

62 The New Asia, nos. 7–8 (November–December 1933): 2. Indicating his color-blind loyalty to universal principles, Bose wrote about his admiration for Abraham Lincoln, describing him as the leader who taught the world the meaning of liberation. See The New Asia, nos. 23–24 (March–April 1935): 2.


64 Yani Yapon Muhbiri was edited by Qurban Ali in Tokyo from 1933 to 1938. The journal often contained didactic articles about the history, economy, and culture of Japan, as well as carrying news about the Tatar Turkish diaspora living within the boundaries of the Japanese Empire. Since there was a large Tatar Muslim community in Manchuria, the journal included news about Manchukuo, the Manchu dynasty, and developments in China as well.


66 Abdurreṣîd İbrahim looked to Japanese expansion in the north against the Soviet Union with the hope that this would allow the Muslim regions of Central Asia
to achieve independence. Initially, this idea had many supporters within the Japanese army as well. However, clashes between Japanese and Soviet forces in Nomonhan, Mongolia, during the summer of 1939 convinced the military authorities of Japan that Soviet military power could not be easily challenged, strengthening the southern advance theory. For the relationship between Kokuryûkai and AbdurreÅŸid İbrahim, see Selçuk Esenbel, “Japanese Interest in the Ottoman Empire,” in Edstrom, The Japanese and Europe, 95–124; see also Selçuk Esenbel, Nadir Ozbek, Â“smail TûrkoÅ¥lu, François Georgeon, and Ahmet Ucar, “Ozel Dosya: Abdurrejîd Ibrahim (2),” Toplumsal Tarih 4, no. 20 (August 1995): 6–23.

67 See Storry, The Double Patriots, 149.

68 In fact, General Ishiwara Kanji’s Tôa Renmei Kyôkai (East Asia League Association), founded in 1939, was based on ideas also advocated by Dai Ajia Kyôkai. See Peattie, Ishiwara Kanji and Japan’s Confrontation with the West, 281–282.

69 Nakatani Takeyô became a prolific writer in Asianist publications of the 1930s. Nakatani was influenced by Ôkawa Shûmei during his student years at Tokyo University and later became a member of several organizations led by Ôkawa. He took a leading position in both Dai Ajia Kyôkai and its journals. For his memoirs, see Nakatani Takeyô, Shôwa Dôranki no Kaisô—Nakatani Takeyô Kaikoroku, 2 vols. (Tokyo: Tairyûsha, 1989).

70 Koschmann, “Asianism’s Ambivalent Legacy,” 89–90.

71 For example see, Okubô Kôji, “Shinkô Toruko No Kokumin Shugi Hyôshiki,” Dai Ajia Shugi 5, no. 5 (May 1937): 5–10. By late 1934, the news section was divided into five parts, devoted to Manchuria, China, India, Southeast Asia, and West Asia.


74 In a roundtable discussion on nationalist movements in Asia, four Indians (including Behari Bose), two Annamese, two Indonesians, and one Manchurian nationalist offered contributions. Naitô Chishû, Mitsukawa Kametarô, and Nakatani Takeyô, all three close to Ôkawa Shûmei, were among the ten participants representing the Japanese side of the organization. See “Ajia Minzoku Undo: Zadankai,” Dai Ajia Shugi 3, no. 3 (March 1935): 51–62.

75 It was only during the Pacific War that the same circle of Japanese Asianists began to publish an English-language magazine in Shanghai, Asiatic Asia, in order to reach a larger non-Japanese readership with more participation from non-Japanese Asian intellectuals. Publication began in January 1941 and continued for at least five monthly issues.


Shibasaki Atsushi, Kindai Nihon no Kokusai Bunka Kôryû: Kokusai Bunka Shinôkôkai no Sôsetsu to Tenkai, 1934–1945 (Tokyo: Yûshindô Kôbunsha, 1999). For example, it was through the support of Kokusai Bunka Shinôkôkai that two Muslim intellectuals, Amir Lahiri and Mian Abdul Aziz, were able to visit Japan to prepare books advocating Asian solidarity: Mian Abdul Aziz (former president of the All-India Moslem League), The Crescent in the Land of the Rising Sun (London: Blades, 1941); and Amar Lahiri, Japanese Modernism (Tokyo: Hokuseido, 1939); idem, Mikado's Mission (Tokyo: Japan Times, 1940).

For example, the journal Dai Ajia Shugi printed articles on the Italian-Ethiopian conflict with a pro-Ethiopian character, including those sent by Japanese correspondents from Addis Ababa, in each of the twelve months of 1935. There was also regular news on Ethiopia in the section devoted to West Asia. For example, see the five articles on Ethiopia in Dai Ajia Shugi 3, no. 8 (August 1935): 32–53.


For a good example of a Japanese who combined the liberation vision of pan-Asian identity, sometimes with highly critical views on the policies of the Japanese state, see Mariko Asano Tamanoi, “Pan-Asianism in the Diary of Morisaku Minato (1924–1945) and the Suicide of Mishima Yukio (1925–1970),” in Mariko Asano Tamanoi, ed., Crossed Histories: Manchuria in the Age of Empire (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2005), 184–206.


For an argument that shows the proto-Asianist views of Japanese liberals during the 1920s, see Han Jung-Sun, “Rationalizing the Orient: The ‘East Asia Cooperative Community’ in Prewar Japan,” Monumenta Nipponica 60, no. 4 (Winter 2005), 481–514.

Ôkawa Shûmei, “Gandhi wo Tô Shite Indojin ni Atau” and “Nehru o Tô Shite Indojin ni Atau” (1942), in Shin Ajia Shôron (Tokyo: Nihon Hyôronsha, 1944),
reprinted in Ôkawa Shûmei Zenshû, 2:925–938.

90 For some examples of the flood of publications on Okakura, see Kiyomi Rokurô, Okakura Tenshin den, (Tokyo: Keizôsha, 1938); Okakura Kakuzô, Okakura Tenshin Zenshû (Tokyo: Rikugeisha, 1939); and Kiyomi Rokurô, Senkakusha Okakura Tenshin (Tokyo: Atoriesha, 1942). See also Okakura Kakuzô, Japan’s Innate Virility: Selections from Okakura and Nitobe (Tokyo: Hokuseido, 1943).

91 For examples of the publication and republication of the books of Das, Paul Richard, and Ôkawa after the post-1937 Japan-China war, see Taraknath Das, Indo Dokuritsu Ron (Tokyo: Hakubunkan, 1944); and [Paul] Risharu, Tsugu Nihon Koku, trans. Ôkawa Shûmei (Tokyo: Seinen Shobô, 1941).

92 For a recent assessment of Miki Kiyoshi’s Asianist ideas, see Harootunian, Overcome by Modernity, 394–399. See also Koschmann, “Asianism’s Ambivalent Legacy,” 90–94.

93 Crowley, “"A New Asian Order,” 278–279.

94 Germaine Hoston’s study of the writings of post-tenko Sano Manabu shows the importance of her interest in Eastern spirituality and intellectual tradition, as well as her belief in Japanese exceptionalism, in leading her to search for a Japanese context for adopting certain core ideals of Marxism. See Germaine A. Hoston, “Ikkoku Shakai-Shugi: Sano Manabu and the Limits of Marxism as Cultural Criticism,” in Rimer, Culture and Identity, 168–190.


98 All the books Ôkawa published during the wartime years attempted to define the ideology of the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere and Japan’s war aims. See Ôkawa Shûmei, Dai Tôa Chitsujyo Kensetsu (Tokyo: Dai Ichibôhô, 1943); idem, Shin Ajia Shôron; and idem, Shin Tôyô Seishin (Tokyo: Shinkyô Shuppan Kabushiki Kaisha, 1945).


100 A similar idealist Asianism can be seen in the Japanese cooperation with the nationalist leadership of Burma. As Louis Allen has shown, a conflict emerged among Japanese officers involved in the Burmese government when Officer Suzuki Keiji from Minami Kikan took the side of Burmese nationalism and asked for immediate independence, while General Ishii objected to this on the grounds of military interest. See Allen, “Fujiwara and Suzuki.”

101 Objection to the leadership of Rash Behari Bose is another indication of the ineffectiveness of Japanese pan-Asianists’ political networks. Although Japan’s Asianist circles had always presented Behari Bose as the representative voice of Indian nationalism, it became apparent that he did not have a reputation sufficient to play a role in the project of the Indian National Army. See Tilak Raj Sareen, Japan and the Indian National Army (New Delhi: Mounto, 1996), 35–82. See also Fujiwara
Iwaichi, Japanese Army Intelligence Operations in South East Asia During World War II (Singapore: Select, 1983).

102 Sareen, Japan and the Indian National Army, 228–236.


108 The Greater East Asia conference did not allow for any representation from not-yet-independent regions under Japanese occupation, such as Indonesia and Vietnam. Similar contradictions existed in the Atlantic Charter Alliance, which likewise had not been prepared to envision a fully decolonized Asia. In fact, immediately after the end of the war, the French, British, and Dutch governments rushed to reclaim their colonial possessions in Asia.

109 One report made the following suggestion as a means to win support for the Allied cause: “Play up American and United Nations war aims; play down our association with Great Britain in the East. . . . Do not refer to British Malaya since many inhabitants of Malaya will not wish to see Malaya revert to its old status under British control” (Office of Strategic Services, Research and Analysis Branch, “Japanese Attempts at Indoctrination of Youth in Occupied Areas,” March 23, 1943, microfilm, 10).


111 Ibid., 242–243.


113 Sareen, Japan and the Indian National Army, 234–236.


116 Radhabinod Pal became the hero of the revisionist right in Japan in the postwar period. He himself revealed his long-lasting sympathies to Japan during his celebrated visit to Japan in 1966 upon the invitation of Japanese right-wing revisionist groups. Justice Pal declared how he had admired Japan since his youth because Japan had “consistently stood up against the West” with “the spirit of independence that can say ‘no.’ ” Then, he urged the Japanese people once again to resist the “flood of Westernization” with inspiration from Eastern civilization. For Pal’s speeches during his 1966 visit to Japan, see Radhabinod Pal, Ai Rabu Japan:
The Yellow Peril in War, Economics, and Popular Culture

Militarizing Japan: Patriotism, Profit, and Children's Print Media, 1894-1925
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http://www.japanfocus.org/-owen-griffiths/2528

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January 25, 2010

'Japan, Britain and the Yellow Peril in Africa in the 1930s
Richard Bradshaw and Jim Ransdell
http://www.japanfocus.org/-Daniel_A -M_traux/3293
October 31, 2011.

These three articles provide insight into the different conditions under which yellow peril and white peril fears were invoked. My article argues that Japanese stories of real and imagined war written for children revealed adult fears of a Social Darwinist world in which only the strong survive through an intensely gendered combination of martial glory and manly sacrifice. The commercial success of these stories, beginning at the time of the first Sino-Japanese War (1894-5), also demonstrates how war and patriotism could be turned to profitable advantage for mass media. An important component of this formula was to contrast Japanese heroism with the treachery, cowardice, or incompetence of the enemy. The Americans, British, and Russians were cast as a “white peril,” duplicitous predators who, if not stopped, would devour the Japanese homeland. The Chinese, on the other hand, were depicted in a Japanese style “yellow peril,” as bumbling fools, devoid of national pride whose inability to govern themselves was a threat to Japan’s own national security. These stories contained all of the tropes and rhetorical devices of yellow and white peril that would be deployed in Japan’s later all-out wars with China and the West. In this, the Japanese were not unique. They drew from the same deep well of racial imagery as did their enemies, real and imagined.

Métraux’s article asks us to reconsider the work of Jack London, one of America’s greatest modern writers. Rather than see him as a mouthpiece for yellow peril fears as many have done, Métraux suggests that London may have been the opposite, a realist who saw a predatory world driven by war and a rare internal critic of an arrogant West, blind to its own role in creating the dangers it sought to eradicate. Through London’s fiction and non-fiction we can see the ease with which yellow and white peril fears could move people to action in the early 20th century. His work also reminds us of the power of ideas themselves and the important role media of all types play as purveyors of those ideas.

In yet another take on the yellow peril, Bradshaw and Ransdell analyze how economic conflict could be articulated in terms of race. Specifically, they examine
the rise of yellow peril fears in South Africa, Britain, and Italy due to Japan's growing economic presence in Africa. South Africans feared that cheap Japanese textile imports would undercut and ultimately destabilize the South African economy. Along with these fears were parallel concerns that Japanese immigrants might be admitted together with their products. These fears grew increasingly strident after the Great Depression in 1929, which further reveals the all too human tendency of seizing on a scapegoat in times of perceived crisis. Japanese industry was also increasing its economic presence in Ethiopia in the 1930s, bringing it into conflict with Italy at the very moment Italy sought to expand its colonial empire in East Africa. After war broke out between Italy and Ethiopia in 1935, however, the Japanese government decided that global political concerns trumped economic interests. Despite immense popular Japanese support for Ethiopia, Japan's leaders ultimately chose to recognize Italy's annexation of Ethiopia in return for Italy's recognition of Manchukuo.
Militarizing Japan: Patriotism, Profit, and Children’s Print Media, 1894-1925

Owen Griffiths

Introduction: War, Media, and Militarization ¹

The January 1922 issue of Shonen kurabu (Boy’s Club) carried the first episode of an exciting new “hot-blooded novel” (nekketsu shosetsu) drawn from the fertile imagination of noted children’s writer Miyazaki Ichiu.² For fourteen consecutive issues Miyazaki enthralled Japanese children with depictions of Japanese valour and the Yamato spirit (Yamato damashii) locked in a titanic struggle against a duplicitous and rapacious foreign enemy. The fate of the navy and of the nation itself hung in the balance. The Imperial navy fought valiantly against a technologically superior foe but was ultimately destroyed. Then, in Japan’s darkest hour, the nation was saved by a group of true patriots, led by a child warrior commanding a powerful new technology. All Japan wept. This was the Future War Between Japan and America, “the greatest naval battle in history.”³

Shonen Kurabu

Miyazaki’s story fascinates the imagination on a number of levels. It reveals the manner in which adults transmitted their fears, aspirations, and values to children and the role of Japan’s print media in that process. It also provides insight into adult
Japanese understandings of international politics and their intense concern about Japan’s place in the early 20th century world order. More specifically for the purposes of this paper, it provides an entrée into the process by which war, real and vicarious, and the martial, manly values it fostered were embedded and normalized within the very fabric of Japanese society. This process, what I call the militarization of Japanese society, is the subject of my paper. With Nichibei miraisen in mind, I trace the lineage of the “war as entertainment” genre back to the origins of children’s print media during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 and the wave of pro-war sentiment that swept Japan and that time. From there, I move forward, outlining the major influences, domestic and foreign, on the war and future war genre of children’s stories, of which Miyazaki was a master.4

Finally, I locate Japan’s experience in the broader historical context of modernity itself when war and the martial, manly values that accompanied its contemplation and prosecution became central to peoples’ understanding of how nations survived and prospered. One of the most important expressions of this ethos was future war fiction, which enthralled and alarmed Euro-American audiences with incessant tales of “The Next Great War.”5 Between 1871 and 1914 some 300 stories of future war
were published, first in England and then France, Germany and the United States, with the most popular quickly translated into virtually every European language. Set amid a world of endemic struggle among nations and races, featuring equal doses of stout hearts, foreign predation, heroic sacrifice, and amazing new technologies, these stories disclose a particularly martial understanding of modernity defined by science, progress, competition and, above all, struggle. Some historians like Jackson Lears have argued that the turn to martiality in the 19th century was part of a larger revolt against modernity itself, an attempt to recover “authentic” manly experience from the apparent clutches of commercialism and feminism that appeared to be besieging the middle classes of America and England. The immense popularity of future war stories, especially those focusing on the folly of military unpreparedness, reveal clearly a deep concern about the soft underbelly of industrial modernity but even more powerfully do they exhibit an understanding of human nature as inherently predatory for which militarization and eternal vigilance were essential for survival.

In all this, Japanese sentiments were remarkably similar to those of their Euro-American counterparts. The stories of Miyazaki and other Japanese writers exhibited distinct features drawn from Japanese history and culture but these, too, need to be understood as products of the same modernity, driven by the emergent technologies of mass production and consumption and fueled by seemingly unbounded science and geopolitical insecurity. Thus, Japanese future war fiction must be grounded in this historical context and read as a case study or example of a modern nation embracing a common body of ideas driven in large measure by the growth and development of mass media. Before turning to Miyazaki’s story, therefore, a word on the centrality of Japanese media and children’s print media in particular.

My choice of children’s media as the agents of this narrative is informed by a belief that the best way to understand the values of adults, as well as the often yawing gap between what they say and do, is to look at the process by which they transmit knowledge of all types to children. As the Chinese scholar Hu Shih observed nearly a century ago, we learn much about a people by observing how they treat their children. Hu Shih was referring primarily to the worlds of childrearing and education but his comments remain relevant if we expand the meaning of childrearing and education to include all adult activities where the child is the principle intended audience. Moving beyond the confines of the family, immediate community, and schoolhouse to the public spaces of print media, we can see the power the adult world has, in its broadest sense, in shaping and defining that of the child. This is where children’s print media is most salient.

Together with the formal education of the classroom and the non-formal education of the home, the informal education offered through children’s print media was the principle means by which young Japanese were socialized and prepared for adult subjection under the Imperial realm. Prior to the advent of electronic mass media in the second half of the twentieth century, print media was the main vehicle through which children were educated and socialized in the process of being
entertained. Even when not overtly didactic, print media created compelling role models for girls and boys, much of which focused heavily on a manly, martial ethos. The many stories of war and future war that graced the pages of children’s magazines during this period had a significant impact on the development of prewar Japanese martial identity, one perhaps unnoticed at the time and certainly unnoticed by subsequent generations of scholars.12

Although children’s print media only began as a modern institution in the 1890s, publishing houses like Hakubunkan, Jitsugyo no Nihon, and Kodansha quickly recognized the commercial potential of the vast untapped children’s market. By Miyazaki’s time, children’s magazine publishers were collectively “entertaining and uplifting” children with hundreds of thousands of copies per month, ranging over history, education, science, politics, sports, romance, and of course war.13 Due to their low cost and portability, children’s magazines transcended geography and class and therefore performed an important mediatory function linking home, school, and playground. Moreover, because children consumed this media by choice rather than by fiat, magazines reflected children’s subjective preferences to a degree that purely educational materials did not. Thus, the power of children’s print media stemmed from its uniquely commercial impulse, its function as entertainment, and its interplay with other forms of socialization and education.

From the 1890s onward, tales of martial glory, sacrifice, patriotism, and foreign perfidy drove a significant segment of children’s print media, functioning as didactic vehicles for inculcating the essential tropes of what would become the “patriotic cannon” to generations of boys and girls. Long before the ubiquitous “human bullets” (nikudan), suicide bombers (kamikaze), and the “one hundred million” (ichioku) of the Pacific War, adult writers and publishers working from a variety of motives nourished the latent national spirit of Japanese children with a steady diet of martial imagery. One consequence of this was a chillingly social Darwinistic vision of the early 20th century world order, one grounded in the zero-sum logic of grow or die, with a distinctive sense of Japanese particularism as its saviour.

Nichibei Miraisen

Nichibei miraisen is an excellent place to begin an inquiry into the nexus of media and militarization in early 20th century Japan. It contained all the essential tropes of martial, manly virtue first constructed in the earliest beginnings of children’s print media and then replayed with great frequency thereafter.14 In this sense, Miyazaki stood at the midpoint of a fifty-year continuum that ran from the 1890s through to the end of the Pacific War. As Japanese media moved into the first decades of the twentieth century, surging populations in the cities and higher literacy rates, especially among the relatively poor and the rural, created vast new potential markets for all types of visual materials. By the 1920s, print media, although centring on the metropolises of Tokyo and Osaka, had penetrated virtually every corner of the archipelago.15
Precise circulation figures are difficult to determine for most children’s media, but *Nichibei* reached hundreds of thousands of children through sales of the book and the magazines alone. By 1925, Kodansha claimed to be printing 400,000 copies of *Shonen kurabu* monthly, selling about 275,000. Its audience was boys aged 8-16, but editors always encouraged girls to read the stories, even after Kodansha started *Shojo kurabu* (*Girl’s Club*) in January 1923. Through the more informal methods of lending, borrowing, or trading, circulation for *Nichibei* was likely much higher. It became so popular that Kodansha reissued it as a single novel in August 1923 with full-page ads in both magazines announcing its impending publication. The full-page advertisement in the June 1923 issue of *Shojo kurabu* carried large white characters reverse printed on an exploding black ball: “GREAT HOT-BLOODED NOVEL.” To the left another headline read: “Those who love the homeland must buy this!! The great struggle of hot-blooded youth!” The book solidified Miyazaki’s reputation as the premier writer of “hot-blooded novels” and helped make Kodansha the leading publisher of children’s fiction in the prewar years with *Shonen kurabu* and *Shojo kurabu* leading the way. Indeed, Miyazaki held a virtual monopoly over the “hot-blooded” label with both Kodansha and Hakubunkan until his mysterious death in 1934.

Miyazaki’s tale of future war began its serialized run in February 1922, the same month Japan’s representatives signed the Washington Naval Treaty with the other “great powers,” which established the “5:5:3” ratio of capital ships for the United States, the British Empire, and Japan respectively. The juxtaposition of fact and
fiction was not accidental or new. Riding the wave of public dissatisfaction about the Washington Treaty to great advantage, Miyazaki drew on the common practice of using contemporary political events as the subtext for fiction. As a staunch opponent of Japan’s political and military subordination, he used the pages of Shonen kurabu to construct both a morality play and an object lesson about the folly of military unpreparedness. In this, he echoed the sentiments of many in the press, the public, and the military who saw Imperial Japan’s twin enemies as “weak-kneed” politicians and American perfidy. Now, children could see this too. In hindsight we can see Miyazaki as kind of a middleman, transmitting adult values and geo-political insecurities to children through the fictional medium of “hot-blooded adventure.”

Set about ten years in the future, Nichibei opens in Sasebo Harbour with the navy’s launching of eight new battleships to complement its eight existing battle cruisers: The “Hachi hachi kantai” (The 8/8 Squadron). The story begins:

The Navy’s hachi/hachi kantai was at last ready. It had taken more than ten years and one third of each year’s total national expenditures… Despite the underhanded and detestable meddling of the United States, which had overtaken England as the world’s number one naval power, and the interference of Japanese politicians and their arguments for arms reduction, the construction of the new squadron had succeeded. … Throng of people lined the docks of Sasebo Harbour to see the new ships, joined by over a hundred other vessels. What a brave sight!...

Miyazaki waxes patriotic as he describes the crush of onlookers – old and young, rich and poor – all “sons of the divine land in whose hearts beats the yamato damashii unbroken for all ages.” As quickly as he stirs the hearts of his young readers, however, Miyazaki leads them to the sobering realities of contemporary international relations. Not only have the self-aggrandizing wealthy and the self-promoting politicians tried to hinder the project at every turn but the eight new ships are not even sufficient in number and strength to counter the immense power of the US. With its “heart like a tiger and a wolf” the American navy maintains more than twice that number, all of which burn oil rather than coal. Even more threatening, Miyazaki tells his audience, the Panama Canal, opened in 1914, gives the US access to the Pacific at speeds unheard of in the days of the Russo-Japanese War. The potential for Japan’s eventual encirclement is real.

The adventure now unfolds rapidly as the entire fleet slips its moorings under the cover of darkness and vanishes. Witnessing the departure from a hill above the harbour are retired Admiral Nango and his teenaged grandson Takuji, the story’s protagonist. The old man turns to his grandson and orders him into action as planned. The next day’s newspaper headlines scream, “Break in Diplomatic Relations! Outbreak of US-Japan War! Combined Fleet Departs Sasebo!... How will the Imperial Navy fair against the military might of the United States? And what is the mysterious plan Admiral Nango and Takuji have set in motion?”

Episode two treats readers with a brief lecture on modern international relations before turning to the battle. Still remaining in the fictional framework of future war, Miyazaki explains that Japan owes a great debt to Commodore Perry for
opening the country in the 19th century, even though he acknowledges there were also American forces at work to turn Japan into a vassal state. Since then, however, America has treated Japanese immigrants terribly, attempted to wrest control of Yap from Japan, and generally interfered throughout the Nanyo. The Japanese endured all this, secure in its martial traditions, its *yamato damashii*, its deep sense of loyalty, and its strong sense of shame. With the rise of American naval power and its attempt to control Japan’s military growth, however, Japan lost its temper and is now forced into action.

The first attack comes from the air, as American planes bombard Japan’s ships on the high seas. Quickly the two forces close and the battle erupts with earsplitting thunder. After chasing off the enemy while suffering only minor damage, the Japanese navy steams toward Olongapo in the Philippines where the main force of the American navy awaits. There, the battle resumes with a vengeance, this time on the land and the sea, as 100,000 Japanese troops storm Manila. At the same time the Japanese navy uses a new type of incendiary to destroy Olongapo’s fortifications and force the US navy to run. After a full day’s chase, the battle begins anew and Japan’s Imperial navy pounds its enemy into oblivion. At the very moment of victory, however, ten new American ships and dozens of planes, fresh from their berth in Hawaii, appear on the horizon and the weary Japanese fleet girds itself for yet another battle. Drawing on its last reserves of strength and courage, the *hachi hachi kantai* obliterates the Hawaii fleet, but is itself destroyed in the process. As morning dawns it becomes clear that the “greatest naval battle in history, the Japan/US battle of the Pacific” is finally over. Or is it? Just as it seems the war will turn into one of attrition, the surviving sailors get word that the US Atlantic fleet has already passed through the Panama Canal. Its arrival spells doom for the entire nation now that it has no navy with which to defend itself.

Here, the story shifts to a *Shishigashima* (Lion Island), a mysterious island in the Indian Ocean where hundreds of “hot-blooded” young Japanese men have barricaded themselves under the command of Azuma Namio. Most of the men are missing soldiers from the Russo-Japanese War or from the warship Unebi that mysteriously vanished without a trace in the South China Sea en route to Japan from France in 1887. Azuma found the island when only eighteen and then spent the next twenty years building a powerful fighting force with ships, aircraft, and a new secret weapon. Also on the island is the young Takuji from the first episode. It turns out that Takuji’s grandfather, old Admiral Nango, is a friend of Namio’s father, Viscount Azuma. So Takuji’s presence on Lion Island is finally revealed as part of the plan set in motion at the beginning of the story. Takuji is eager to execute the plan but Azuma has restrained him at every turn to this point, arguing that the time was not right. Now, however, with Japan’s navy destroyed and the US Atlantic fleet now in the Pacific, all of Japan is in peril. Azuma moves into action. Appointing the astonished Takuji commander, Azuma and Takuji lead a dozen newly designed submarines, their secret weapon, to hunt down the US Fleet in the stormy Pacific.

The scene again shifts to the deck of an enemy ship as two American officers boast about how they can easily sail right up to “the little monkey country of Japan” now
the Japanese fleet has been destroyed. As they talk of conquering Japan’s Asian possessions and possibly even the archipelago itself, massive explosions rock the ship and it begins to sink. Suddenly, ships throughout the fleet are sinking. The Americans panic and begin firing wildly in all directions. “Monsters like giant white snakes appear and disappear through the driving rain and massive waves.” They are none other than the new submarines, designed and built by the “iron arms” of Azuma and led by the young boy warrior Takuji. Unexpectedly, however, disaster strikes as an errant shell cleaves the command sub in half, throwing Takuji into the “cruel black sea.” Compassion for a fallen comrade drives Rear Admiral Soda to split the submarine squadron. Half will search for Takuji while the others engage the US Atlantic Fleet in a “decisive battle.” “Can the squad defeat the mighty Americans? Will Takuji be saved?”

The final episode finds Takuji clinging to a piece of flotsam, fortuitously given him by another adrift Japanese sailor just before a giant wave separates them. The selflessness of the sailor is rewarded as the search succeeds and Takuji is saved. Readers never learn the fate of that valiant sailor. After being taken aboard ship, Takuji learns that the other half of the squadron has completely destroyed the enemy and saved the nation. Takuji utters quiet thanks and the crew rejoices. Across the Pacific, the Americans react with shock and anger on hearing the news. Some allege that Japan must have violated the laws of naval warfare but no evidence is found to support this. Of course, none will be. In Japan, the entire nation – male and female, young and old – dance for joy. As Miyazaki brings the story to a close, he tells his young readers, “In the clamour of common madness there is a vast gulf between fortune and misfortune.”

Miyazaki reflected this worldview clearly, both in Nichibei and in his postscript where he addressed his young readers directly:

**Meiji Antecedents of Future War**

This abridged version of Nichibei highlights a number of themes common to the war-as-entertainment genre, all of which trace their roots back to earlier practices. The first concerns an adult understanding of the international world as one of endemic conflict where the strong devour the weak, where, as Thucydides said two millennia ago, “the powerful exact what they can, and the weak grant what they must.” In the world of Taisho Japan, this concept was cloaked in the modern Spenserian garb of seizon kyoso (the survival of the fittest). Japanese observers of world affairs in Miyazaki’s time saw this clearly in the increasing global acquisitiveness of nations like Russia, England, and America. In fact, they did not need Thucydides and Spencer to tell them what was happening before their very eyes. The belief that the strong devoured the weak also served to justify and legitimize Japan’s own predatory impulses, which many Japanese agreed, or at least assumed, were simply defensive responses to the predations of the more powerful nations. Therein lay the need for a “rich country and strong army” and for the development of science, both of which figured prominently in all forms of children’s future war and always for the sake of the nation.
Do not expect that mysterious sea snakes will always appear to save the nation. Had they not done so at that time, Japan, the shining light of the East, the *Oyashima* of 3000 years of tradition, would have been destroyed... Study hard literary [*bun*] and military [*bu*] affairs. You shoulder the burden of responsibility for Japan’s future... Young Readers! Exert yourselves to the utmost for the sake of the nation (*kokka no tame ni*).

Miyazaki’s message was clear. The sea snakes were pure fiction. They did not exist in the great power politics of the early 20th century where martial, manly values were essential for national survival. Miyazaki’s call to pursue tirelessly the union of *bu* and *bun* was in fact a call to arms, not just in a physical sense but in a spiritual sense as well. Drawing on Meiji era tropes of Japanese particularism, Miyazaki’s use of the *bu* and *bun* reinforced an image of Japanese uniqueness derived from an earlier indigenous ideal of the cultured warrior and then reworked as a virtue of necessity in the modern world of rationalized endemic conflict among nations.[44]

In addition to entertaining young Japanese, Miyazaki was also preparing them for this new world in which they would be central actors, for Japan’s real future lay in the hands of those who held the magazine. Sounding like a latter-day Yoshida Shoin with his injunction to put aside childish things and go forth as men of high purpose, Miyazaki charged his young readers with the weighty responsibility of defending the realm from the deadly combination of vacillating leaders and dangerous foreign enemies. Only through eternal vigilance and military preparedness could Japan’s destiny as a great power could be fulfilled.

The pedigree of these ideas dated back to the heady days of nation building in the Meiji era. Here, too, fiction played a central role. One of the main prototypes of future war was the “political novel” and Yano Ryukei’s 1890 *Ukishiro monogatari* (*The Floating Battleship*) in particular. Although Yano wrote *Ukishiro* for an adult audience, later generations of children it seems read the story with great enthusiasm.45 Considered by some to be the first work of science fiction in modern Japan, *Ukishiro* became a standard for later war and future war fiction: Young, male uber-patriots embark on a South Sea adventure to “open up a giant territory tens of times the size of Japan and offer it to the Emperor...”46 Like Miyazaki’s heroes, Yano’s adventurers are motivated by a deep dissatisfaction with Japanese passivity in the face of overwhelming foreign power. When Captain Sakura addresses his men early in the story, he says:

“The Western race carries out its exploits throughout the entire earth while the Japanese people carry out their exploits within their own country. We shouldn’t put up with such a lamentable predicament... Indeed, we should take this entire earth as our stage and carry out a great enterprise of singular proportions. Why does Japan alone need to cower in fear and move stealthily about”47

In this fictional address we can see strong parallels to Miyazaki’s own words thirty years later. A passive nation was at the mercy of external enemies, all of whom would exploit Japan’s weakness given the chance. Thus, a stout heart was not enough. The men in *Ukishiro* had that in spades but they also had fantastic weapons
like *raiyaku*, a new explosive developed by a Japanese scientist that could destroy entire islands. *Raiyaku* helped the men defeat the Dutch and emboldened one of the main characters to say, “With this, we have what it takes to make the British and French fleets scatter.” Nationalism, imperialism, political passivity, foreign enemies, and military science, all rolled into a South Sea adventure: This became the stuff of children’s print media for decades.

While the roots of children’s future war fiction can be found in the political idealism of 1880s adult fiction, early producers of this media also drew heavily on two older, indigenous traditions, one martial and one other moral. The moral imperative was *kanzen/choaku* (rewarding good and punishing evil), which has proved to be a durable concept in children’s writing throughout the 20th century. A good example of this was Iwaya Sazanami’s *Shin hakken den* (*The New Biography of Eight Dogs*) serialized in *Shonen sekai* in 1898.[49] Based on Takizawa Bakin’s Edo-era novel *Nanso satomi hakken den* (*Biographies of Eight Dogs*), it was a tale of eight young boys who traveled to a South Sea island and, through a series of daring adventures, came to rule over it. The original story, set in Edo at the end of the Muromachi era in mid-16th century, was a didactic tale about the power of morality and the triumph of virtue. Replete with sacrifice, heroism, and miracles, *Nanso* centred on the attempts of Satomi Yoshizane, an actual historical figure, to restore his family name to its former glory. The eight dogs in the title represented the eight cardinal virtues of Confucianism and through their intervention virtue triumphed over vice, allowing Satomi to overcome enormous obstacles and rehabilitate his family name. Iwaya’s updated version replaced the historical figure of Satomi with the geography of the South Seas and turned the dogs into boys. The didacticism and morality of the original story remained. Looking back more than one hundred years, it is possible to see a prophetic strain in *Shin hakken den*. It certainly seemed to have anticipated the wildly popular manga series *Boken dankichi* of the 1920s and 1930s, a cartoon serial depicting the heroic South Sea adventures of its protagonist by the same name. It is also interesting to speculate how many of Japan’s “southern advance” (*Nanshinron*) proponents of the 1930s and 1940s may have cut their teeth on stories that took as their premise adventure and expansion in the *Nanyo* (South Seas).
In its modern incarnation, the martial imperative first intersected with the moral imperative of *kanzen choaku* with the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1894. From its inaugural issue on January 1, 1895 until war’s end, Iwaya’s *Shonen sekai* carried a variety of stories of the war in each monthly issue, including reports from the front, accounts of bravery in battle, and tales drawn from Japan’s martial past. On the cover of the first issue were two illustrations: one of Crown Prince Munehito (later the Taisho Emperor); the other of the mythical Empress Jingu subjugating Sankan (the three kingdoms of ancient Korea). Inside were stories of Jingu’s glorious conquest and of Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s invasion of Korea in the 1590s.[50] No mention was made of Jingu’s questionable historical status or of the ultimate failure of Hideyoshi’s invasion, the final act of which he did not live to see. Jingu was given equivalent historical status with Hideyoshi and their noble acts established a direct link between past and present, legitimizing and justifying the equally noble efforts of Japan’s Imperial forces. It is here that Hobsbawm’s concept of “invented traditions” becomes an important tool in understanding the process of Japanese militarization. The actual existence of these past heroes and whether they
had done what the stories claimed they did matters less in a practical and analytical sense than does the process by which these heroes were used to construct and continually reinforce a seamless web of continuity with the past. This was what was actually invented. The process took place at all levels of Japanese society but it took on a new dynamic in children’s print media because of the intersection of commercialism and competition at the very moment war became a central concern of the young nation. Whatever else they thought about the war, media publishers and contributors discovered that war and patriotism paid.  

**Modern Children’s Media in the Crucible of War**

Iwaya Sazanami (1870-1933) stands as a giant in the world of modern Japanese children’s literature and is considered by many scholars to be the true pioneer of the field and the first to devote his entire professional life to the development of children’s media. At the tender age of nineteen, Iwaya wrote what many consider to be the first full-length modern novel for children, *Kogane maru (The Courageous Dog Kogane)* in 1891. It launched Iwaya on a career that would earn him the affectionate titles of “Uncle Fairy Tale” (*Otoji Ojisan*) and “Uncle Iwaya” from generations of adoring children by the time of his death in 1933. In addition to his many koen dowa and his popular collections of Japanese fairy tales (*Otogibanashi*), Iwaya also became Japan’s leading authority on Hans Christian Anderson and the Brothers Grimm, on whose works he laboured and lectured for many years. His interest in Northern European folk and fairy tales placed him firmly at the centre of a growing Japanese interest in German letters among well-educated elite. Iwaya’s intellectual and cultural affinity with Germany was reflected in the attitudes of another giant of children’s print media, Kodansha founder Noma Seiji. The careers of both men career also suggests a powerful sense of commitment to the values of education, progress, and a profound attachment to the idea of Japan as a modern, masculine, and martial nation. This sentiment was evident in Iwaya’s fairy tales and storytelling performances but even more expressly in the pages of *Shonen sekai (Boy’s World)* he founded in 1895. Published by Hakubunkan, *Shonen sekai* was one of the first children’s magazines in modern Japan and certainly the most popular of its day. Unlike earlier children’s magazines, which had small circulations and short life spans, *Shonen sekai* was the first long run, mass circulation children’s publication in modern Japan. Published continuously from 1895 to 1914, and then in different variations and with some interruptions until 1933, *Shonen sekai* educated and entertained at least two generations of Japanese children.
Even before *Shonen sekai*’s debut, Hakubunkan published two special issues on the Sino-Japanese War for children in October and November of 1895, both of which provide a clear idea of what was to come. Titled *Yonen zasshi* (*Children’s Magazine*), and edited by Iwaya himself, these two publications gave up to date accounts of Japanese bravery and valour. The November issue carried a story entitled “*A Verbatim Account of Hell in the Sino-Japanese War.*” This was the heroic tale of Captain Matsuzaki Naomii, said to have been the first Japanese commissioned officer to die in the Sino-Japanese War on July 29, 1894. The story opens with a group of dead Chinese soldiers on their way to hell. As they approach the River Styx (*Sanzu no kawa*), Captain Matsuzaki overhears and surprises them, at which point they flee across the river in fear. Laughing heartily, Captain Matsuzaki muses that nothing can be done for them and decides to head for heaven. Drawing heavily on Buddhist metaphors, all of which would have been familiar to Japanese boys, the story contrasts the brave and cheerful Matsuzaki, even in death, on his way to his Edenic reward for faithful service to the Emperor/nation, with the scared, bumbling Chinese soldiers whose only fate is Hell. Even *Shonen sekai* writers on non-military topics seemed compelled to offer their thoughts on the army’s victories in battle. Owada Takeki, for example, began his regular column on literature by telling readers how the recent, decisive victory of the Imperial forces “moved him deeply.”

The deification of Captain Matsuzaki was quickly followed by other heroes from both the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars like the resolute Mitsushima Kan and the indomitable bugler Kikuchi Kohei, whose stories would be told and retold until the end of the Pacific War. These stories,
intermingling with the pantheon of past martial heroes, became enormously popular with both boys and girls, leading publishers to create an entire genre of serialized historical novels published along side of the adventure novels, patriotic novels, and war adventures. While these stories ranged across the entire corpus of Japanese literature, including romance, tales of selfless devotion and sacrificial death tended to predominate. Collectively, these stories mutually reinforced the relevance of Japan’s manly, martial past and the unbroken continuum of the *yamato damashii*, especially the willingness to die happily at a moment’s notice.

An episode in Miyazaki’s *Nichibei* illustrates the power and endurance of the *yamato damashii* over the intervening thirty years. Just before Japanese troops invade Manila, Lt. Commander Onuki is ordered to destroy an American gun emplacement. He valiantly leads a hundred “suicide troops” (*kesshitai*) to take out the battery. Fierce fighting ensues and the Americans soon learn the truth of the Japanese proverb that “even though the *sansho* is small, it is very spicy.” Ultimately the battery is destroyed along with all soldiers on both sides except Onuki. Realizing his mission is complete, Onuki takes down the Rising Sun Flag and, hearing the approach of more enemy troops, taunts them:

“‘Hey, Yankees (Yôki)! I expect you’ve heard of Japanese hara-kiri but you’ve never seen it performed have you. Well, Onuki’s gonna show you!’ With that, he pulled open his tunic and grasping firmly his precious Japanese sword he thrust it deep into his right side. The sword sliced through his flesh as he pulled it across his body. Grasping his beloved flag, he then stuffed it into the gaping wound he had just made. That fine fellow died a brave and unparalleled death. When the American troops arrived they froze in terror at the sight.”

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Onuki Committing seppuku [64] (Reproduction credit: Peter Manchester)
To kanzen choaku and the pantheon of past martial heroes, all excavated from Japan’s past, modern media producers added the novelty of the child hero, especially the boy warrior like Miyazaki’s Takuji. While this practice was not entirely new, as the timeless appeal of Momotaro and Urashima Taro attests, the child warrior with Yamato spirit and science on his side became a staple of children’s adventure fiction from the 1890s onward. This, too, was pioneered by Shonen sekai during the Sino-Japanese War. In November 1894, Hakubunkan published a children’s series called The Child’s Treasure Box (Yonen gyokute hako). Volume One of the series included a story from Kenyusha member Izumi Kyoka titled “The Aftermath of a Naval Battle” (Kaisen no yoha). The hero of the story is nine-year old Matsue Chiyodai whose father served as a First Lieutenant on the battleship Chiyoda, the same ship on from which Kunikida Doppo reported the war. After his father’s departure, Chiyodai and his mother return to her native home near the sea so as to be closer to his father. On a particularly stormy day, Chiyodai spies a ship floundering in rough seas. He immediately commandeers a small boat and recruits a group of seamen to affect a rescue. Their efforts succeed but on the way back to shore Chiyodai falls into the sea and is lost. The story does not end there, however, as Chiyodai is somehow then taken captive on a Chinese ship and brought to the Palace of the Sea God where he meets a young princess. At the same time, during the Battle of the Yellow Sea on September 7, 1894 (an actual naval battle of the Sino-Japanese War), Chiyodai’s father is killed in action. Moved by the heroism of both father and son, the sea princess makes Chiyodai’s father king of the sea who in turn pledges to protect Japan at all costs.

Two points are noteworthy here. The first is the fascinating blend of fact (the battleship Chiyoda and the Battle of the Yellow Sea), fiction (the story of the young Chiyodai), and fantasy (the Palace of the Sea God, the princess, and elder Matsue’s reincarnation as the king of the Sea), all of this from the man who later gained fame as a Japanese playwright in the manner of Oscar Wilde. This blending of fact, fiction, and fantasy became a staple in Japanese children’s literature throughout the prewar years. The second point relates to the centrality of children as the main protagonists of the stories. Sometimes they were depicted sacrificing and dying for their country, as with young Chiyodai. In others the heroism and death of adults, usually family members, was portrayed through the eyes of the child heroes as in Miyazaki’s Nichibei. Hirotsu Ryuro’s “Heart of a Child” exemplified this practice. His story centred on nine-year old Ichiro whose father is killed in battle during the Sino-Japanese War. Like Chiyodai, Ichiro accompanies his mother back to her ancestral home where he also learns of his uncle’s death in battle. Rather than being filled with remorse and sadness, Ichiro swells with pride knowing that his father and uncle have died glorious deaths. We then read about Ichiro playing war games with the Japanese Imperial forces pitted against the Chinese “hog-bristle army.” In the meantime, Ichiro’s older sister and aunt dutifully join the Red Cross to help ease the pain and suffering of wounded Japanese soldiers.
In depicting the deaths of children or adults as acts to be glorified and praised, the media was not alone. Textbooks also immortalized and beautified death in war. Most commonly this was portrayed through the protagonist dying happily with a smile on his lips. One volume of the 1900 textbook series *Shinhen shumiten* (New Teacher’s Guide to Moral Training) carried a story entitled “A Sailor Named Mitsushima Kan” (*Mitsushima kan no suihei*) set during the Battle of Yellow Sea in the Sino-Japanese War. On hearing of the destruction of an enemy ship the mortally wounded Mitsushima exclaimed, “I’m so happy...then with a bright smile on his lips, Mitsushima died.”71 Taken together, magazines and textbooks appropriated older samurai traditions of “dying well” and placed them in the contemporary context of wartime to create compelling role models to which Japanese boys could aspire. These kinds of stories were not aberrations of the last, desperate days of the Pacific
War but were rather borne in the victories of modern Japan's earliest wars, none of which touched directly the young readers who consumed them.

The manner in which the Sino-Japanese War was fictionalized and presented as entertainment for children became the prototype for constructing a manly, martial ethos throughout the first half of the 20th century. Indeed, the Sino-Japanese War was the first to be "textualized" specifically for children. Much has been written about Vietnam as America's first media war. Those who are old enough can hardly forget the television images on the nightly news that contributed significantly to the anti-war movement emerging at the same time. The Sino-Japanese War was Japan's first media war, the support for which, unlike Vietnam, was almost total. It was the new nation's first international conflict and the first to be covered in detail by journalists from the front. More than one hundred correspondents and photographers followed the actions of Japan's Imperial forces in China throughout the war. Among this group were some of Japan's most famous, or soon to be famous, literary figures, including Masaoka Shiki who was a staff writer for the newspaper Nihon Shimbun and Kunikida Doppo, one of the most vocal critics of the Kenyusha men, who sailed on the battleship Chiyoda as a special correspondent for Kokumin Shimbun (The Peoples’ Newspaper). The Japanese public, hungry for news of heroism, sacrifice, or victory, consumed their reports eagerly. The Sino-Japanese War should thus be seen as the first major international media event in modern Japanese history with consumer and producer alike, including Shonen sekai, all contributing to the wave of pro-war sentiment that swept Japan at this time.

Tales of war and patriotism proved highly profitable throughout the world of print media. Just as the war encouraged competition and innovation among producers of adult magazines and newspapers, so, too, did it drive a similar process in children’s media. Competition between Hakubunkan’s Yonen sekai (Children’s World) and Shonen sekai and Jitsugyo no Nihon’s Nihon Shonen (Japan Youth) and Shojo no tomo (Girl’s Friend) led the way in the 1890s, driving innovation and market expansion and creating a highly commercialized and profitable children’s print media that had scarcely existed a decade earlier. Into this growing and profitable field stepped a young Oshikawa Shunro with a new adventure story, modeled on Yano’s Ukishiro and written while still a student at Tokyo Semmon Kakko (Waseda) where he studied politics. A relative introduced Oshikawa to Iwaya who loved the young man's new story and quickly took him under his wing at Hakubunkan. With a preface written by Admiral Ito Yuko, a veteran of the Sino-Japanese War, Oshikawa’s new adventure novel Kaitei gunkan (The Submarine Battleship) made its debut in 1900. The novel was a huge hit among boys 8 to 15. Almost overnight Oshikawa had created a new genre of children’s stories known as the adventure novel. Despite a career cut short by personal tragedy and illness, Oshikawa occupies a preeminent position in the history Japanese children’s media. He exerted a profound influence on Miyazaki and contemporaries like Abu Tempu, Hirata Gensaku, and Yamanaka Minetaro, creating the basic format for many kinds of future war and adventure stories.
"Kaitei gunkan" was actually part of a six-novel series published between 1900 and 1907, all of which took as their point of departure Japanese passivity in the face of predatory foreign imperialism. "Kaitei gunkan" traces the exploits of a disgruntled former naval officer Captain Sakuragi and his hardy band of patriots who build a new submarine battleship on a secret island. The ship, the "denkopan" is submersible, capable of flight and is armed with futuristic torpedoes and a new ramming technology. Throughout the series, Sakuragi and his men battle the Russians, the French and the English, destroying them all. They even fight on the side of Filipino "freedom fighters" against American imperialists. Written before, during and after the Russo-Japanese War, Oshikawa's novels rode the rollercoaster of war fever and then disgruntlement over the treaty that followed. In the process, he introduced thousands of Japanese boys to adult concerns about Japan's weakness vis-a-vis the great powers and apprehension over an increasingly enervated youth. In the process, Oshikawa ignored Japan's own predatory impulses and re-channeled them into patriotic sacrifice for a people fighting to secure their destiny.

According to Ito Hideo, Oshikawa's purpose was to "oppose those who oppressed freedom" and to inculcate in young readers "the spirit of resistance at all costs." Yet neither Ito nor Oshikawa himself acknowledged Japan's own imperialist endeavours or its brutal treatment of its own subject peoples. The tendency to lionize one's own and demonize the other has many antecedents in Japan and elsewhere. In late Meiji this kind of binary thinking created a compellingly stark portrait of the international world that lent apparent truth to the national imperative of grow or die. Oshikawa revealed this in a non-fiction essay in *Boken sekai* (*Adventure World*) a Hakubunkan publication he helped to found and edit. Proclaiming a new age of struggle that would last for years to come, "an age of Enlightened warring states," Oshikawa told his young readers that Japan's future depended on "robust thinking and a war-like spirit." Oshikawa specifically focused on the United States as the primary external foe. He granted that Americans were not devoid of bravery, mentioning Oshikawa then went on to lament the decline of *bushido damashii* since the Russo-Japanese War, singling out excessive pride, conceit, socialism and naturalism as the principle domestic evils. The youth of Japan, he said, were being corrupted with the licentiousness of naturalistic literature and the destructive effects of socialism on the national polity. Oshikawa reserved some of his most scathing criticism for the mediocre, the small-minded, and the vulgar that he called the enemies of bravery and martial valour. "They sneer at heroism," he decried. "They ridicule Japan's bushido, they trample on the blood of patriots, and they don't hesitate to call fools those who sacrifice for their nation." Sounding much like Miyazaki would ten years later, Oshikawa called on all young boys to nurture Japan's millennia-old martial spirit and prepare themselves to give everything for the country. The message was clear: The world was a dangerous place where only the strong and the resolute survive. Japan must become strong and grow, or die.

The idea of war helping to drive the popularization of mass media in early 20th century Japan should be familiar to those of us who have grown up in North America since 1945. The nexus of victorious and vicarious war (World War II and
the cold war) and electronic media have created an irresistible and inexhaustible wellspring of material from which to construct war adventures as entertainment. In Meiji Japan a similar dynamic emerged only with print media leading the way. In both cases, war was the catalyst rather than the cause. It created the opportunity for profit and patriotism to unite in a self-sustaining process fed by perceived international crisis and by war itself – real and imagined. Of course men such as Oshikawa and Miyazaki would likely have been outraged at the suggestion that they were motivated by gain. But it was the prospect of gain, together with an unshakable confidence in nation building, that motivated early publishers of children’s media to develop a children’s market which then provided employment for these same men. In this war was central.

Cultures Collide: Martiality in America and Japan

Like all things Meiji, children’s print media developed from a fascinating blend of indigenous styles and practices, critiqued and reconstructed with foreign ideas and importations. As Oshikawa drew on Yano and Iwaya and then in turn influenced Miyazaki, Abu, and others, so too did the wave of foreign narratives flooding Japan at this time influence the thinking of many aspiring Japanese writers. Iwaya’s acknowledged debt to Hans Christian Anderson and the Grim Brothers, particularly the idea of excavating a useable past, is one such example. Two more powerful examples for children’s media were the science fiction of Jules Verne and H.G. Wells. The works of both men had a profound impact on a wide range of writers including Yano, Oshikawa and Miyazaki. The list of foreign influences on Meiji and Taisho reads like a who’s who of Euro-American fiction and non-fiction but for Japanese writers of future war a more significant influence was Homer Lea’s 1909 *The Valor of Ignorance*, translated in 1911 by Ike Ukichi under the title *Nichibei senso*.

Lea wrote *The Valor of Ignorance* to shake Americans out of their complacency and to convince them that the romantic ideal of republican martial virtue expressed in the militia was hopelessly out of date. Modern wars, he said, required the “conversion of the nation’s potential military resources into actual power ... by men more scientifically trained than lawyers, doctors, or engineers.” Disparaging volunteers as a mediaeval institution,” Lea maintained that the “soul of the soldier” could not be molded “in twenty-four days by uniforming a volunteer” but took “not less than a dozen men six-and-thirty long months to hammer and temper him into the image of his maker.” This necessitated “a relentless absorption of individuality” and “an annihilation of all personality.” Sounding much like Oshikawa, and later future war writers like Miyazaki and Abu, Lea argued that only through this process could a man “reach that pinnacle of human greatness, to seek glory in death.” Animating Lea’s argument was his fundamental belief that nations obeyed the same laws of birth growth, decline, and death as did all forms of life: “the Law of Struggle, the Law of Survival.” Thus war was “but a composite exemplification of the struggle of man upward” expressed in the grasping, expansionist nature of the nation itself. The chief impediments to success in this struggle were commercialism and opulence, which bred ‘enervation through luxury’ and opened
the door for all manner of ills including feminism, socialism, and the utter
destruction of the martial spirit. For Lea, America was in grave peril and he
devoted the bulk of his book to explaining how Japan could easily defeat America in
the Philippines, Hawaii, and then occupy much of the west coast.

That Lea’s ideas animated the thinking of military men, including those in Japan,
should surprise no one familiar with history of imperialism. But his book also had a
profound impact on men like Oshikawa and Miyazaki because it articulated a
theoretical position that aligned precisely with how the world actually operated in
their eyes. The fascinating aspect about this relationship is that men
like Miyazaki turned Lea’s “fact” into fiction and in doing so strengthened Lea’s
argument about Japanese expansion and gave substance to his prophecies
about Japan-as-predator. Even though Miyazaki turned the tables in Nichibei
miraisen, making America the predator and Japan the prey, he nonetheless
acknowledged Lea’s influence in the preface to the Nichibei book where he said,
“This story of military operations in the Philippines draws heavily on the work of
Mr. Homer Lea.”

Equally fascinating is the manner in which the purveyors of war
advantages turned adult concerns about international politics into fiction that
posited a future world of war in which Japan was the underdog and frequently lost
because the enemy was militarily stronger. The implication was that Japan could
only survive in hyper-militarized form in which the present day child consumers
would become its future adult saviors. These narratives, according to Kuwahara
Saburo, participated in the creation and romanticization of a unique “child’s spirit”
(kodomo damashii), especially from the Taisho era onward. Mirroring its
predecessor, yamato damashii, kodomo damashii represented an adult ideal of
what yamato damashii could truly be in its most perfect form, particularly its
specific emphasis on children’s purity and unquestioning obedience. In this we can
glimpse a kind of adult crisis consciousness about the instability of the present and
an implicit fear about an indeterminate future, especially if the children of the
present fail to safeguard the nation of the future.

**Militarization, Media, and Mirrors**

While this is essentially a Japanese story, the process by which it unfolded and the
ideology that animated it were by no means unique to Japan. Virtually all modern
industrial nations trace their origins back to the crucible of war or revolution, while
their inhabitants derive a significant portion of their identities as citizens or subjects
from these events and their remembrances. Japan is no exception. The experiences
of the Japanese people must be understood comparatively as part of a more
widespread modern process whereby national identities were constructed through
the mass production and consumption of real and imagined war. Herein lay the
power of the print media. War seems to be as old as humanity itself, as are the
stories of martial glory and sacrifice that naturally accompany its prosecution. But
only with the creation of mass forms of culture like print media have human
societies been able to create and disseminate information, including stories of war,
on such a massive scale. And it is the sheer scale of production and consumption
that separates the modern from all other historical eras. Future war was a
particularly powerful vehicle in this process, creating a seamless continuity over time that grounded children of the present in a shared martial past while preparing them for an adult future in which they would become the saviors. Japanese future war reinforced the ideological triad of military preparedness, eternal vigilance, and sacrificial death as the key components of modern Japanese nationalism, one that was heavily gendered in favour of the martial and the manly.

Until World War II a wide range of individuals and groups throughout the industrializing world preached the gospel of militarism and militarization, often in the stated interests of preserving peace. Since 1945 militarism and militarization have understandably taken on a more pejorative tone, despite the fact that the gospel of military preparedness was never more systematically spread than during the cold war: and now again in the current war on terror. C. Wright Mills may have been one of the first to recognize this postwar shift in the 1950s when he spoke of a new “military definition of reality” throughout America, one enabled by war and the “current ‘emergency’ without foreseeable end.” The result, for Mills, would be, “the triumph in all areas of life of the military metaphysic, and hence the subordination to it of all other ways of life.” Mills appeared to be sanguine about this development, treating it as a natural outgrowth of shifting postwar American power relations. But a few years later President Eisenhower gave Mills’ idea a decidedly more ominous tone in his 1960 farewell speech when he warned of the threat posed to American liberty by the “military industrial complex.” “We should take nothing for granted,” he told the American public. “Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together.” It is ironic in the extreme that these statements capture almost exactly the sentiments of men like Oshikawa and Miyazaki (and Homer Lea) a few decades earlier, only in the affirmative. Believing in a “military definition of reality,” these men actively promoted the ascendancy of a “military metaphysic” that would “subordinate” all other forms of national existence. Indeed, only “alert and knowledgeable” subjects – children dedicating themselves to the union of *bu* and *bun* – could ensure Japan’s future “security and liberty.” Print media continually reinforced the ideology of militarism through future war fiction – Mill’s “military metaphysic” – thereby driving the process of militarization into virtually every playground, schoolyard and neighbourhood in Japan.

In the last couple of decades, scholars and activists have begun to reexamine and refine the relationship between militarism and militarization, usually from a feminist perspective. Cynthia Enloe, a pioneer in this area, argues that “[m]ilitarism is an ideology. Militarization, by contrast is a sociopolitical process... by which the roots of militarism are driven deep down into the soil of a society.” Moreover, she maintains that militarization is “a tricky process” because virtually anything can be militarized at any time, in war or in peace. Thus, for Enloe, militarization occurs “when any part of a society becomes clearly controlled by or dependent on the military or on military values.” In a similar vein, Michael Geyer, argues that
militarization is a "contradictory and tense social process in which civil society organizes itself for the production of violence." More recently, Catherine Lutz echoes Geyer's definition in her study of Fayetteville North Carolina, home of Fort Bragg, focusing particularly on the development of modern war and its relationship to industrial capitalism and the nation state. These scholars demonstrate the importance of analyzing militarism and militarization in terms of the relationships between power, gender, and violence and between industrial capitalism and the nation-state. They also demonstrate the utility of seeing both ideology and process through feminist lenses.

The work of these scholars alerts us to dangers in our own world, but their comments also apply equally to the world of prewar Japan and, indeed, much of the modern world from the 19th century onward when urban, industrial life appeared to be undermining national and racial vitality. This fear was so menacing because it began with an a priori assumption of human nature as inherently war-like and of the natural world as a site of struggle where only the strong survived. Thus, nations grew or died. There were no other options. Future war fiction articulated this belief most clearly because it was the very raison d'être of the genre itself. In Japan where such stories more specifically targeted children, they left a heavy legacy for their young readers in whose hands the final decision would later be worked out. The “grow or die” mentality also revealed the manner in which militarism expressed itself ideologically through the employment of such binary structures as strong/weak, us/them, and masculine/feminine. Men like Miyazaki and Oshikawa revealed this attitude clearly when talking of the dangers posed by the great powers. Japan was noble and honourable whereas America had a “heart like a tiger and a wolf.” Thus, Japan needed to be strong militarily for defensive purposes only. Those defensive purposes could be conveniently extended, however, to Japan’s own expansionist aims by appealing to its responsibility to protect the peoples of Asia from the evil intentions of the O-bei. The a priori explained why war occurred and why all Japanese had to prepare for that eventuality. It was then through preparation that Japanese society became militarized. This meant not only creating larger armies and more powerful weapons through the application of science, but also curbing luxury and over-consumption, bending industrial activity to the will of military necessity, and guarding against slippage in gender roles.

This last category is particularly important because in Japan as elsewhere the core values of militarism have historically been exclusively masculine and martial, cohering around the concepts of loyalty, sacrifice, and the shared “authentic” male experience of war. Anchoring this is the idea of sacrificial death as the ultimate expression of these values, what Lea called, “the pinnacle of human greatness.” The focus on dying as the ultimate sacrifice in Japanese future war also served to exclude females, at least until the end of the Pacific War. In prewar Japanese war adventures there were many girl heroes but few died and never in battle. Men and boys, by contrast, died by the shipload. This form of gendered nationalism carried right through to the last desperate days of the Pacific War, by which time everyone was expected to die. Still, echoes of the prewar division of gender based on
who died in battle remained as late as 1945. Kodansha’s New Year’s 1945 issue of *Shonen kurabu*, for example, carried Bakumatsu era poems about women dreaming of being reborn as men so they could die for the emperor. The February 1945 issue even contained a young girl’s letter to the editor in which she said, “If I were a boy, I too could join the shimpu.” It is difficult to know whether letters like these were actually written by girls or merely fabricated by the magazine’s editors. Either way, they do reveal a deeply gendered conception of war and death, one that was largely monopolized by males.

As Geyer and Enloe have noted militarization occurs wherever a class, caste, or other social group reserves for itself the right and responsibility to use violence. Monopolizing the right to use violence is a core component of the classic definition of the state, dating back at least to Max Weber. Charles Tilly has argued that states or other agents who produce “both the danger and, at a price, the shield against it” are effectively racketeers. This is a reasonable description of what many adult producers of children’s media did in Japan and, sadly, what some leaders continue to do in our contemporary world. The producers of children’s war adventures created the danger (national destruction) and the solution (martiality and *yamato damashii*). The price was, to quote Lea again, the “annihilation of all personality” in selfless devotion to the nation. Seeing Japan’s print media in this light also emphasizes the fact that the adult producers were not simply products of their time but were active participants in its making. Children’s print media created a public and thereafter the two were inseparable, reciprocally reinforcing each other and driving militarization deeper into Japanese society.

Men like Iwaya, Oshikawa, and Miyazaki constructed a present and future world for children through vicarious war, skillfully blurring the lines between fact, fiction, and fantasy. They did so, as do all peoples, with the materials at hand, drawing on Japan’s martial past and its rich corpus of heroic fiction and myth, and then augmenting it with similar traditions from Europe. Marx himself recognized this tendency fifty years earlier, although in an entirely different context. His commentary on this phenomenon is worth quoting at length:

Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given, and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living. And just when men seem engaged in revolutionizing themselves and things, in creating something entirely new... they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past and borrow from them names, battle slogans and costumes in order to present the new scene of world history in this time-honored disguise and this borrowed language.

For Marx, this tendency was the bane of human existence, drawing us into the past at the very moment when we should be breaking with that past in an effort to construct a new future. The adult producers of Japan’s print media gave truth to Marx’s claim. They showed no desire to break with the past but incorporated it into their present to construct a common identity that would provide a bulwark against
rampant capitalism, socialism, and feminism, indeed, against modernity itself. At the same time, these men seemed to be unaware of a supreme irony: That the growing power of print media to militarize society was driven by the same economic and technological processes they believed were threatening the nation’s vitality. It is difficult to say whether any of these men would have likely wished for the “nightmare” that was to come in the 1930s and 1940s but in their relentless drive to create an educational and uplifting world for children they certainly made acceptance of that “nightmare” more likely. Through future war children could live vicariously for a time because the reality of Japan’s dark valley would not encumber “the brain of the living” for many years to come. In our contemporary climate of a global war on terror, Japan’s story shows us tendencies that we share in common, through time and space, rather than highlight what makes us different. In attempting to make this comparison, I am reminded of the words of Helen Mears who suggested many years ago that Japan, in addition to our studying it for its own sake, can be a mirror in which we can see our own reflection.

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Endnotes:

1 I would like to thank the Social Science and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) for its generous support in providing funding for this project.

2 Miyazaki also wrote many stories for children under the penname Shirane Ryobu.


4 Although I focus principally on Miyazaki in this piece, he was actually one of many writers of children’s future war. To date, I have uncovered more than 30 future war stories written between 1915 and 1937, almost all of which were written for children. Other writers of this genre include Abu Tenpu, Yoshikawa Eiji, Hirata Shinsaku, Yamanaka Minetaro, Nanyo Ichiro, and Unno Juzo.

5 This phrase comes from the title of I. F. Clarke’s collection of Euro-American future war stories. The Tale of the Next Great War, 1871-1914, Syracuse University Press, 1995.


8 Any use of the term media must always refer to a plurality of agents, whose reciprocal interactions with the public and with each other is complex, contested, and competitive. The media can never be usefully understood as a monolithic entity.
This is especially true during the formative period of its development, as with the print media in Japan’s Meiji era.

9 Hu Shih, “T’z’u-yu te wen t’i,” Hu Shih wen-ts’un, p. 739, cited in Ping-chen Hsiung, A Tender Voyage: Children and Childhood in Late Imperial China, Stanford University Press, 2005, xiv. Hu Shih said that any society could be understood by the way its people treat their children and their women, and how they spend their leisure time.

10 Despite much public discussion of citizenship during this period, the Japanese people under the Meiji Constitution were subjects not citizens. Citizenship only emerged as a result of popular sovereignty finally being enshrined in the people under the postwar constitution.

11 This three-fold division comes from Edward Beauchamp, Education and Ideology in Modern Japan, 1868 – Present,” Asian Thought and Society, 16:48 (1991), 189-98. It is useful to distinguish between these three forms of socialization as long as we recognize that all three stem from a similar set of impulses.

12 Exceptions in Japan are Torigoe Shin, Hasegawa Ushio, and Ueda Nobumichi. Here, I want to offer my deep appreciation to Hasegawa-sensei and Ueda-sensei for their generosity in providing me with materials and in taking time to discuss their research when I was in Japan in summer 2006. One general trend I have noticed in Japanese scholarship, Torigoe and Ueda included, is the tendency to evaluate children’s literature as literature rather than as political and social commentaries. This is partly due to the fact that most scholars in this field were trained as literary critics rather than as historians or social scientists.

13 The relationship between formal education and print media during these years is a fascinating and complex subject in its own right, but one to which I cannot do justice here. However, there are three areas of convergence between the two that are central to my story. The first is that education and media were both products of the same processes of mass production and consumption. The second is the important role played by education in creating a readership for all print media through rising literacy rates. The third is the remarkable continuity between both institutions in terms of their focus on war, patriotism, and the need for building a martial, manly society. Future war fiction, however, seems to have been exclusive to print media. The intersection of formal education and print media was best exemplified in the person of Kodansha founder Noma Seiji (1878-1938). In a 1938 eulogy to Noma, Tokutomi Soho referred to him as Japan’s “private Minister of Education.” Tokutomi Soho, “Noma shacho tsuitoroku” (A Memorial to President Noma), Kingu, December 12, 1938, 17, cited in Sato Takumi, ‘Kingu’ no jidai: Kokumin taishu zasshi no kokyosei (The Age of ‘King’: The Public Nature of National Popular Magazines), Iwanami Shoten, 2002, viii.

14 Thus far in my research, I have focused primarily on boy’s magazine where the martial, manly ethos was understandably most prominent. However, historical and contemporary stories focusing on war and foreign perfidy were also prominent in girl’s magazines. In fact, many writers, Miyazaki included, regularly wrote for both

15 I am currently working on a quantitative assessment of national coverage of *Shonen kurabu* and *Shojo kurabu* based on the letters to the editor published monthly in both magazines. These letters, which came from every prefecture, may not necessarily reflect actual circulation patterns but they do provide insight into Kodansha's strategy of representing its magazines as truly national in scope.

16 These are the official figures from Kodansha Hachijunenshi Henshu linkai, *Kuronikku Kodansha no hachijunen* (*Eighty Years of Kodansha*), Kodansha, 1995, 116.

17 Kodansha, *Shojo kurabu* was printing 380,000 copies by 1925 and selling 188,710. Both magazines sold for 60 sen per copy. Ibid., 116.

18 The editors of *Shonen kurabu* actively encouraged this practice, regularly using its Tayori column to instruct young readers to pass on their magazines or to form reading clubs so they could enjoy the stories together.


20 *Shojo kurabu*, June 1923, å¸‰ã®A. *Shonen kurabu* also carried ads in at least two of its issues for the upcoming book. Given that both magazines were published by Kodansha, it is not surprising that the tone and language of the advertisements was the same. Nonetheless, from a gender perspective, it is interesting to note that the same basic message was directed toward both boys and girls.


22 Miyazaki’s death indeed remains a mystery, although I do hope to determine the conditions under which he died in future research. To date, I have found no record of his death or burial and, according to Ueda and Hasegawa, he appeared to have left no family. “Hot-blooded” was one of many genre names publishers like Kodansha used to distinguish different kinds of stories. Other labels included “adventure novel” (*boken shosetsu*), “patriotic novel” (*aikoku shosetsu*), “military novel” (*guntai shosetsu*), historical novel (*rekishi shosetsu*), and chivalric novel (*kyoyu shosetsu*). Until the publication of Sato Koroku’s *Kogan bidan* (*The Stirring Tale of a Fair Youth*) in *Shonen kurabu* in March 1928, no other writer was ever published under the “hot-blooded” label. In the 1930s this mantle was passed to the likes of Hirata Gensaku, Yamanaka Minetaro, Unno Juzo, and Nanyo Ichiro. For a fascinating look at these war adventures in the 1930s, see Yamanaka Hisashi and Yamamoto Akira (eds.), *Kachinuku bokura shokokumin: Shonen gunji aikoku shosetsu no sekai* (*We
Curiously, the authors make no reference to Miyazaki and treat the “hot-blooded novel” as a product of the 1930s, which it clearly was not.

23 The actual ratio of capital ships permitted under the treaty was as follows: United States 525,000 tons (533,400 metric tons); the British Empire 525,000 tons (533,400 metric tons); Japan 315,000 tons (320,040 metric tons); France 175,000 tons (177,800 metric tons); Italy 175,000 tons (177,800 metric tons). See Article IV of the General Provisions Relating To The Limitation Of Naval Armament, signed February 6, 1922. Taken from Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: 1922, Vol. 1, pp. 247-266, available online here, accessed July 12, 2006.

24 Of the eight, four were of the Nagato class (Nagato, Mutsu, Saga, and Tosa), two were of the Ise Class (Ise and Hyuga), and two were of the Fuso Class (Fuso and Yamashiro). Taken from Nichibei, January 1922, 49-50.

25 Ibid., 48-49. Here, I want to thank Takahashi Kazuko for her valuable assistance in reading this story. Unless otherwise noted, however, all translations are mine.

26 Ibid., 50.

27 Miyazaki took great pains to highlight Japan’s numerical and technological inferiority at the beginning of the story. Japan’s coal-burning ships, for example, were not only slower than the US diesel-powered fleet but they could also be seen from a further distance because of the thick smoke coming from their stacks.

28 Although Miyazaki did not use the phrase “encirclement,” he went into great detail to explain how the three American fleets could, at a moment’s notice, literally cut off Japan’s lifeline to the continent. Therein lay the injustice of the Washington Treaty. Here, we can of course find the roots of “ABCD encirclement” and the “defensive war” used by Japanese officials before and after the Pacific War.

29 Admiral Nango was, of course, none other than Admiral Togo, Japan’s great hero from the Russo-Japanese War. Miyazaki simply replaced “To” (East) with “Nan” (South).

30 Nichibei, January 1922, 55.

31 Nanyo was the phrase given to the South Seas, which was the site of imagining empire for many Japanese. For more on the Nanyo see Mark Peattie, “The Nan’yo: Japan in the South Pacific, 1885-1945,” in Peattie and Ramon H. Myers (eds), The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945, Princeton University Press, 1984, 172-176 and Kenneth Pyle, The New Generation of Meiji Japan: Problems of Cultural Identity, 1885-1895, Stanford University Press, 1969, 158. Yap was a small south sea island Japan had gained control over in the post-Versailles treaties. Its importance lay in the fact that it was a crucial node in the Pacific undersea cable linking Asia with North America. For an American account of the time, see Charles Noble Gregory, “The Mandate Over Yap,” American Journal of International Law, 15:3 (July 1921), 419-427. For a Japanese perspective on the eve of the Manchurian Incident,


33 Ibid., August 1922, 48-49.

34 Ibid., November 1922, 67.

35 The Unebi was a French-built cruiser commissioned by the Japanese navy in December 1886. Three months later it disappeared at sea with all hands lost en route from France to Japan. Miyazaki didn't tell his readers about the Unebi, mentioning only its name. In this, he followed a common practice of inserting actual historical events and actors into fictional stories. He stretched the fantastic here since any Unebi survivors would have been in their sixties by the time of his future war.

36 Ibid., December 1922, 68.

37 Ibid., 72.

38 Ibid., 73.

39 Ibid., 77.

40 At this time, international treaties did not forbid submarine warfare except with regard to merchant vessels, the sinking of which was governed by the same rules as those covering surface naval warfare. The main treaty covering submarine warfare was “The Treaty Relating to the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases in Warfare,” signed on February 6, 1922 as part of the Washington Conference negotiations. This treaty was never put in force, however, because France did not ratify it. The text of this treaty is available in full text here. Accessed July 21, 2007.

41 Ibid., February 1923, 87.

42 This phrase comes from Thucydides in his reconstruction of the dialogue between the Athenians and the Melians after the former had defeated the Melian’s ally Lucaedamon, reprinted from here, accessed September 15, 2006.

43 *Nichibei*, February 1923, 88. *Oyashima* comes from the *Nihonshoki* and refers to the original eight islands said to have been created by Izanagi and Izanami. Italics mine.

44 The idea of Japan as embodying both *bu* and *bun* emerged from the Meiji era in the writings of Shiratori Kurakichi, particularly his concept of “North/South Dualism,” which sought to create a progressive picture of Japan’s historical development as the best of both *bu* and *bun*. For more on this, see Stefan Tanaka, *Japan’s Orient: Rendering Pasts into History*, University of California Press, 1995, 94-104.


47 Quoted in Bensky, “Dynamite Don!,” 8.

48 Ibid., 10.

49 This account comes from Hasegawa Ushio, Jido senso yomimono no kindai (Modern Children’s Wartime Media), Nihon Jido Bungakushi Sosho, No. 21, Hissayamasha, 1999, 15-16.

50 Hasegawa, Jido senso, 18-19.


52 There is some debate among Japanese scholars as to Iwaya’s place as modern pioneer of children’s fiction. Some reject this title, arguing that Iwaya was not so much modern pioneer as he was popularizer of older Edo literary traditions like kanzen choaku. From a historical perspective, however, Iwaya was both. He helped create a modern print media where none existed before, using Japan’s rich literary and historical traditions as raw materials to construct stories for the children of a emerging modern nation. For a discussion of the Japanese debate about Iwaya, see Torigoe Shin, “Nihon kindai Jidobungaku kitten,” in Torigoe (ed.), Nihon Jidobungakushi, 1-12. Some have also identified Iwaya as part of vanguard of a new, rising middle class of social reformers, which included Tokutomi Soho, Inobe Inazo, Abe Isso, and Hani Motoko. See for example, Mark Alan Jones, Children as Treasures: Childhood and the Middle Class in Early Twentieth Century Japan, unpublished Ph.D. manuscript, Columbia University, 2000. Social reformer he may have been but middle class he decidedly was not. Born in 1870 in Shiga Prefecture, Iwaya was the son of Iwaya Ichirou (1834-1905), a Cabinet Secretary in the Meiji government and later a member of the House of Peers. As such, we must see Iwaya as a product of early Meiji upper class for whom hereditary privilege was de rigueur, and for whom the concept of progressive development of the Meiji state was unshakable.

53 A tale of a dog who avenges the death of his father by a tiger with the help of another canine, Kogane maru reflected Iwaya’s own literary heritage, particularly the centrality kanzen choaku and his membership in the Kenyusha (Friends of the Inkstone), an elite literary group centring around Ozaki Koyo (1867-1904) and
counting as its members Izumi Kyoka, Takase Bunen, and Hirotsu Ryuro. The Kenyusha was the dominant literary group in Japan until Ozaki’s untimely death in 1904, after which it was superseded by the rise of naturalist literature. Detailed discussions of the Kenyusha can be found in Fukuda Kiyoto, *Kenyusha no Bungaku undo (The Kenyusha Literary Movement)*, Hakubunkan reprint series, 1985 and Ikari Akira, *Kenyusha no bungaku (The Literature of Kenyusha)*, Kosensho, 1951.

54 *Koen dowa* were stories told aloud. Iwaya drew on both indigenous and foreign traditions to construct his modern versions of these.

55 The powerful Japanese attraction for German philosophy and political theory is a fascinating subject in its own right. While there is no space to discuss this here, readers should note that the attraction was not merely a matter of cultural borrowing for its own sake but reflected a deep Japanese predisposition for German ideas that was rooted in Japan’s own cultural and philosophical traditions. In Iwaya’s case, see Ueda Toshiro, *Iwaya Sazanami to doitsu bungaku: Otogibanashi no minamoto (Iwaya Sazanami and German Literature: The Origins of the Fairy Tale)* Dainihon Tosho, 1991.


57 I have not been able to obtain accurate circulation figures but *Shonen sekai’s* longevity alone, compared with that of most other children’s media until the WWI years, suggests its dominance through the mid-1910s. This was certainly the official position of Hakubunkan as can be seen in Tsubotani Yoshiyoro, *Hakubunkan gojunenshi (A Fifty-year History of Hakubunkan)*, Hakubunkan, 1937.


59 Captain Matsuzaki’s exploits were later immortalized just before the second Sino-Japanese War in 1937 with the publication of Tsuji Zennosuke (ed), *Ruishu denki dainihonshi (Collected Biographies from Imperial Japanese History)*, Yusankaku, 1935-1936.

60 The basic storyline comes from Hasegawa, *Jido senso*, 16-17.
Ibid., 19.

“Sansho wa kotsubu demo piriri to karai,” Nichibei, July 1922, 34. Sansho is a Japanese pepper.

Ibid., 36-37. Visual images of men committing seppuku were not uncommon in war and historical novels at this time. I have found examples in both girl’s and boy’s magazines throughout the 1920s and 1930s.

Ibid., 36-37. The original artist for the illustrations in Nichibei was named until the September 1922 issue when Yamada Rikken’s name appeared in each subsequent issue.


This account is taken from Hasegawa, Jido senso, 19-20.

Kyoka’s penchant for the fantastic and the bizarre is revealed in M. Cody Poulton, Spirits of Another Sort: The Plays of Izumi Kyoka, Ann Arbor Center for Japanese Studies, University of Michigan, 2001. Like many scholars of adult literature, however, Poulton pays little attention to Kyoka’s work as a children’s writer.

Hirotsu was also a Kenyusha member. The Kenyusha presence suggests a number of interesting points of analysis I am unable to explore here. It seems clear that Iwaya actively sought contributions from members of his own group, who were in turn happy to earn some income in the early stages of their careers. In terms of legacy, children’s fiction draws a fairly straight line from the Kenyusha men who embraced the concept of playful composition (gesaku) and kanzen choaku. This is in contrast to the naturalist movement that overtook the Kenyusha group, the adherents of whom rarely entered into the field of children’s fiction.

Hasegawa, Jido senso, 20-21. This story reflects a gendering trend in children’s media common to all martial traditions that permitted only Japanese boys to anticipate their fate in battle. Girls and women were relegated to support roles of nurturer or nurse whose ability to face the enemy in battle had to await their rebirth as males. This support role was not modern but the creation of new institutions like the Red Cross gave it a particularly modern focus.

Nichibei, November 1922, 66.

Quoted in Hasegawa, Jido senso, 98.
72 See Ibid., 19 and James Huffman, Creating a Public, 199-224.

73 This point is made by many including Huffman, Creating a Public and Rubin, Injurious to Public Morals.

74 Torigoe says that Kaitei gunkan’s enormous popularity since its publication in 1900 may have created renewed interest in Ukishiro among young readers. Torigoe Shin and Nemoto Masagi, “Oshikawa Shunro to Tachikawa Bunko,” 108-09.

75 Ibid., p. 111.

76 Oshikawa Shunro, Kaitei gunkan, Hakubunkan, 1900. Ito participated in the Battle of the Yalu River on September 17, 1894. The battle seems to have been a draw but is noteworthy because it was the first major naval encounter involving ironclad ships with breech-loading guns.

77 Between 1911 and 1912 Oshikawa lost his two sons to illness, turned to drink and died in 1914 from acute pneumonia. Although his mentor Iwaya is better known in Japan, Oshikawa is one of the few writers of children’s fiction known outside Japan.


80 Ibid., 174.

81 Ibid., 174.

82 Ibid., 176.

83 Ibid., 177.

84 Ibid., 178. Oshikawa never identified these enemies clearly but he seemed to be taking aim at the middle classes and all those who supported democratic ideals or any form of egalitarianism.


Lea is a fascinating but relatively unknown character in modern history. Not quite five feet tall, hunchbacked, and dismissed from West Point due to ill health, Lea nonetheless managed find the martial life he so desperately sought, leading a ragtag group of Chinese soldiers against the Boxers in 1900 before fleeing to Hong Kong and Japan with a price on his head courtesy of the Empress Cixi. In Japan Lea sought out Sun Yat-sen who was so impressed by the little man, he promised to make Lea his chief military adviser. Sun finally made good on his promise ten years later. With the proclamation of the Chinese Republic in Nanjing on January 1, 1912, Sun made Lea a full general and his chief of staff. Lea never lived to direct the fortunes of the new republic however. He suffered a massive stroke en route to America that same year and died at age 35 in November 1912. Information on Homer Lea in English or Japanese is thin. There is Eugene Anschel’s Homer Lea, Sun Yat-sen, and the Chinese Revolution, Praeger Publishers, 1984, although I have not had a chance to consult this work. In Japanese, see Hasegawa Ushio, Jido senso, 76-77, and Ueda Nobumichi, “Taisho ni okeru nichibei miraisenki no keifu,” (“The Genealogy of the Japan-America Future War Stories in the Taisho Era”), Jido Bungaku Kenkyu 29 (November 1, 1996), accessed here, July 12, 2006. The above storyline is taken from Simon Rees, “Homer Lea: Author of The Valor of Ignorance,” Military History, October 2004, accessed online here, August 2, 2006. Rees says The Valor sold 84,000 in its Japanese translation but provides no documentation. Lea also wrote Day of the Saxon, which documented much the same story only relating to Germany and England. At the time of his death, Lea was working on The Swarming of the Slav, about the Russian war-like impulse. Overall, Lea’s works have a decidedly racist and misogynistic edge. In Valor he repeats disparages Jews as money mongers, feminists as enervating influences and displays open hostility to Oriental immigration and the intermixing of the races. This he said would spell doom for America.

Ike Ukichi, Nichibei senso, Hakubunkan, 1911. This information comes from Ueda Nobumichi, “Taisho ni okeru nichibei miraisenki no keifu” and Rees, “Homer Lea.” The Valor of Ignorance received mixed reviews in the United States but was read with great enthusiasm by the likes of Sun Yat-sen, Douglas MacArthur, General Adna Chaffee, and Field Admiral Lord Frederick Roberts.

Homer Lea, The Valor of Ignorance, (Harper and Brothers, 1909), Simon Publications 2001, 47.

Ibid, 48, 52, 56.

Ibid., 52-53.

Ibid., 76.

Ibid., 82.

Ibid., 66.

Lea never explained why Japan would want to occupy parts of America. He simply assumed that the “law” of nations and Japan’s own uber-martiality dictated this.
Curiously, this was the exact argument of Miyazaki and Oshikawa in reverse. Japan was at the mercy of the United States, according to them, because it was far behind the US militarily and technologically.

96 Quoted in Hasegawa, *Jido senso*, 80.

97 Another example of this plotline is Abu Tempu’s future war classic “Taiyo wa ketteri” (The Sun Victorious) serialized in *Shonen kurabu* from January 1926 until Abu’s untimely death in November 1927.


99 By “trace” I mean create in the sense that among all the stories we tell ourselves about our origins a significant number relate to war. This is particularly true of national histories of the last 100 years and also of the manner in which we teach our children in the classroom.


101 Ibid., 223.

102 The entire speech is reproduced here. Cited September 12, 2006.

103 Ibid.


108 This statement corresponds to Enloe’s first three of seven core beliefs of militarism as an ideology: “a) that armed force is the ultimate resolver of tensions; b) that human nature is prone to conflict; c) that having enemies is a natural condition.” Ibid., 219. Clearly the interpreters of Lamarck and Darwin have much to answer for.

The focus on death also serves to deflect attention away from the fact that in war one also kills. To say that one has died for a cause (for “us,” for example) is psychologically more satisfying and acceptable than to say that one has killed for that same cause. He who dies is a martyr or hero and retains a degree of humanity that he who kills does not. And until recently this has meant man against man. In the vast, linked systems of war and its remembrances constructed by most countries in the last century – Japan, Canada and America included – sacrificial death occupies centre stage. It is death we mourn and glorify, even when hating war and its costs. Thus, dying displaces killing and thus enables the intensification of militarization as a process because the public is compelled to remember and always support sacrificial death. These systems of war and remembrance also include the media and the images they collectively create as our vicarious experiences of war. Children’s print media in Japan, for example, served as a valuable means of remembering war, particularly as new, victorious wars were grafted onto those of the past. This process was particularly important after the Russo-Japanese War because few adults or children from this time onward had any direct experience with war until the 1930s. I explore this relationship between dying and killing elsewhere in Owen Griffiths “What We Forget When We Remember the Pacific War,” Education About Asia, (Spring 2006), 5-9.

Girls’ magazines like Shojo kurabu and shojjo no tomo published no future war stories that I have found, although they did advertise them to girls. There were, however, numerous adventures with girl protagonists who were usually motivated to solve a mystery because of the death of a male relative. One example is Miyazaki’s Yurejima (Ghost Island), Shojo kurabu, January – December 1925. Ueda has argued that these stories were too fantastic to be taken as serious science fiction because girls clearly did not have the physical power to subdue men. This seems to reflect a continued Japanese gender bias since such scenarios are no more fantastic than boys overpowering men. See Ueda, “Miyazaki Ichiu no Jidobungaku.”

Kimata Osamu, "Bakumatsu aikoku josei no uta: Minatogawa kiyoku nagareshi" (Songs of Female Patriots of the Bakumatsu Era: The Minato River flows purely) Shojo kurabu, January 1945, 5-7.

This letter was published by Goto Shosa of the War Ministry’s Information Bureau under the title "Kamiwashi o miokuru" (Bidding Farewell to the Divine Eagles), Shojo kurabu, February 1945. 19.


The reciprocal relationship between print media and the Japanese public is a central theme in Huffman’s, Creating a Public. Japanese scholars like Torigoe, Ueda, and Hasegawa, tend to shy away from the idea of print media as a collection of agents. When asking whether men like Iwaya, Oshikawa, or Miyazaki were militarists, for example, they evade the hard answer, opting for the simpler, less pointed one that these men were products of their times.

Jack London: The Adventurer-Writer who Chronciled Asian Wars, Confronted Racism—and Saw the Future (Revised)

Daniel A. Métraux

He stood among the Japanese soldiers wearing a weather-beaten visored cap over his short, dark hair and a rough hewn jacket covering his broad soldiers, a cigarette angling away from his square jaw and a camera dangling from his gloved hand. As they studied documents, the Japanese troops contrasted with Jack London in their box hats and high collared uniforms. A photographer present immortalized London looking like the adventurer and writer that he was, one drawn to the battle like a missionary to his calling, who skillfully recorded the machinations of great powers while sympathizing with the underdogs who struggled to survive.

Jack London (1876-1916), easily the most popular American writer a century ago, is still praised for his Yukon novels and short stories such as The Call of the Wild, White Fang and To Build a Fire. However, his visits to Japan, Korea and Manchuria; his factual, hard hitting coverage of the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05); his astute short stories about Sino-Japanese competition; his prophetic essays predicting the rise of the Pacific Rim, and his call for respect and constructive interaction between Americans and Asians over "yellow peril" hysteria are undeservedly forgotten. These salient aspects of London’s life deserve to be remembered and respected. They evidence his keen intelligence, painfully accurate vision of the future and the progressive and humane values that are still needed to bridge the East and West.

The Yellow Peril Threatens the West?

Today the term “The Yellow Peril” — but not necessarily the fears and fantasies that it engenders — has gone out of fashion. But in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Westerners’ dreams about the "superiority" of their civilization competed with their nightmares of Oriental hordes swarming from the East to engulf the advanced West. This was a popular theme in the day’s literature and
journalism, which London knew well. The term "Yellow Peril" supposedly derives from German Kaiser Wilhelm II's warning following Japan's defeat of China in 1895 in the first Sino-Japanese War. The expression initially referred to Tokyo's sudden rise as a military and industrial power in the late nineteenth century. Soon, however, its more sinister meaning was broadly applied to all of Asia. "The Yellow Peril" highlighted diverse Western fears including the supposed threat of a military invasion from Asia, competition to the white labor force from Asian workers, the alleged moral degeneracy of Asian people and the spectre of the genetic mixing of Anglo-Saxons with Asians.¹

Many writers and journalists in the early 1900s wielded an unflattering pen when writing about Asians, boasting of Anglo-Saxon superiority over the "yellow and brown" Asians. The Hearst newspapers stridently warned of the "yellow peril". So did noted British novelist M. P. Shiel in his short story serial, The Yellow Danger. One finds similar views in Kipling's poem "The White Man's Burden" and in some of his stories and novels.

**London in the Dock: His Defense is on the Page**

John R. Eperjesi, a London scholar, writes that "More than any other writer, London fixed the idea of a yellow peril in the minds of the turn-of-the-century Americans..."² Many biographers quote London, just after his return from covering the first months of the Russo-Japanese War for the Hearst newspapers in 1904, as telling a coterie of fellow socialists of his profound dislike for the "yellow man." Biographer Richard O'Connor quotes Robert Dunn, a fellow journalist with London during the Russo-Japanese war, as saying that Jack's dislike of the Japanese "outdid mine. Though a professed socialist, he really believed in the Kaiser's 'yellow peril.'"³

Are these charges correct? If so, they would cast London as a bigot and alarmist.

In fact, a close examination of London's writing shows the opposite: he was ahead of his time intellectually and morally. His Russo-Japanese war dispatches from Korea and Manchuria around 1904-5 are balanced and objective reporting, evincing concern for the welfare of both the average Japanese soldier and Russian soldier and
the Korean peasant, and respect for the ordinary Chinese whom he met. As perhaps the most widely read of the journalists covering that war, London emerges as one of the era’s writers who sensed that the tide of white “superiority” and Western expansionism and imperialism was receding.

His positive views of Asians can be traced back a decade earlier to his first published stories and later writing such as his essays “The Yellow Peril” and “If Japan Awakens China” and his short story, “The Unparalleled Invasion” — see below. Even as many Americans held racist beliefs about Asians, London expressed more liberal views.

**Japanese Aggression, Chinese Pride**

In addition, as an analyst, London’s deep understanding of how the industrial, politico-strategic and social worlds were profoundly changing surpassed that of his peers. His fiction and essays explored the appearance of new industrial powers in the East, as well as Western counter moves and inter-Asian tensions, too. London shrewdly predicted elements of the coming age of revolution, total war, genocide and even terrorism. This renders his writing painfully relevant. As Jonah Raskin observed, “In a short, volatile life of four decades, Jack London (1876-1916) explored and mapped the territory of war and revolution in fiction and non-fiction alike. More accurately than any other writer of his day, he also predicted the shape of political power – from dictatorship to terrorism – that would emerge in the twentieth century, and his work is as timely today as when it was first written.”

For instance, during and after his time in Korea and Manchuria, London developed a complicated thesis in his 1904 essay, "The Yellow Peril," envisaging the rise first of Japan and then China in opposition as major twentieth century economic and industrial powers.

London’s starting point was his suspicion that Japan's imperial appetite exceeded its swallowing of Korea in the Russo-Japanese War. He anticipated that Tokyo would eventually take over Manchuria and then attempt to seize control of China in the attempt to use China’s vast land, resources and labor for its own benefit.

London knew that Japan’s strength at the turn of the twentieth century lay in its ability to use Western technology and its national unity. London and some other contemporary writers, as well as many politically attuned Asians recognized that Japan’s defeat of Russia was a turning point in a history of Asian subjugation to white imperial powers. Japan’s victory called into question as no previous event the innate superiority of the white race.

However, London believed that there were severe limits on Japan’s ability to become a leading world power. However impressive its initial gains, Tokyo would falter from lack of "staying power." One reason was that it was too small. Although it had humbled Russian forces, London believed that it was not sufficiently powerful to create a massive Asian empire, still less to militarily or economically threaten the West. Seizing “poor, empty Korea for a breeding colony and Manchuria for a granary” would greatly enhance Japan’s population and strength -- but that was not enough to challenge the great powers.
Simultaneously, London saw that Asians themselves would be antagonists. He clearly distinguished between the Chinese and Japanese, at times -- ironically -- referring to the Chinese as the “Yellow Peril” and the Japanese as the “Brown Peril.” Japan would launch its crusade promising “Asia for the Asiatics” as its clarion call, but its aggression would catalyze Chinese resistance.6

**China’s Rise Provokes the White Peril’s Germs**

In "The Yellow Peril," London’s conclusion left the reader hanging. Although aroused, China’s vast potential is hindered. Its leaders hew tenaciously to the past. Clinging to power and tradition, they refuse to modernize and so China’s fate is uncertain. London does not tell the reader who will prevail. However, in his 1906 short story, “The Unparalleled Invasion,” London develops the theme of China’s rise. The Japanese are expelled from China and are crushed when they try to reassert themselves there. China then becomes a major power.

Writing a century ago, London warned that the imperial West, blissfully ignorant of what awaited it, was living in a bubble. The shift of power to Asia was the prick that would burst it. The transition would be peaceful because Asia’s rise was primarily economic, but eventually war between East and West was inevitable because China challenged the economic might of the West. Although critics have read different messages into the story, the clear irony is that the West is the paranoid aggressor. It is a White Peril and China is the innocent victim.

But “contrary to expectation, China did not prove warlike [so] after a time of disquietude, the idea was accepted that China was not to be feared in war, but in commerce.” The West would come to understand that the “real danger” from China “lay in the fecundity of her loins.” As the 20th century advances, the story depicts Chinese immigrants swarming into French Indochina and later into Southwest Asia and Russia, seizing territory. Western attempts to slow or stem the Chinese tide all fail. By 1975 it appears that this onslaught will overwhelm the world.

With despair mounting, an American scientist, Jacobus Laningdale, visits the White House to propose eradicating the entire Chinese population. He aims to drop deadly plagues from Allied airships over China. In May, 1976, the bombers appear over China and release a torrent of glass tubes.7 At first nothing happens, then an inferno of plagues gradually wipes out the entire population. Allied armies surround China and all Chinese die. Even the seas are closed because 75,000 Allied naval vessels blockade China’s coast. “Modern war machinery held back the disorganized mass of China, while the plagues did the work.”8

Here, let’s praise London’s piece as a stern warning about bio-warfare. He wrote when strategists were investigating the new concept of germ weapons. London sounds an alarm over such hazards that world powers ignored as they rushed into the gas clouds and carnage of World War I. Decades later, Japan would unleash bio-warfare against China’s cities in the China-Japan War of 1937-45, and China and North Korea would charge the US with waging germ warfare during the Korean War.
More broadly it is worth reflecting on London’s vision in light of the changes of the last few decades in East Asia. Above all, this has been a story of the rise of East Asia. First Japan’s, and later Taiwan’s South Korea’s and China’s, wealth and power have grown spectacularly. East Asia’s resurgence has challenged the status quo of American and European dominance. Now the exponents of the “China Threat” school insist that this could auger a military challenge that transforms the balance of power in Asia and the Pacific.

In short, long before Samuel Huntington, London anticipated a clash of civilizations. His readers see how the vast cultural differences that divide the West from China spark hatred and malice in the former. The focus here is not the Chinese danger to the West, but its reverse. As Jean Campbell Reesman points out, “London’s story is a strident warning against race hatred and its paranoia, and an alarm sounded against an international policy that would permit and encourage germ warfare. It is also an indictment of imperialist governments per se.”

He anticipates that the wars of the twentieth century will exact an unprecedented death toll among armies and civilians. Indeed, the world can regret London’s prescience. To avoid this fate, London urges the West to understand the new Asia and to live with non-white peoples in a spirit of brotherhood.

**Conclusion: London the Internationalist Still Speaks to Us**

London’s views of Asians and the Pacific’s other non-white people became more refined in the last seven years of his life during and after his 1907-1909 trip to the South Pacific aboard his decrepit schooner, the Snark. London’s increasingly pan-national world view led to his 1915 recommendation of a “Pan-Pacific Club” where Easterners and Westerners could meet congenially in a “forum” to exchange views and share ideas as equals. Far from being the thoughts of a racist, they are the vision of an internationalist. In particular, London wanted Americans and Japanese to associate to promote mutual respect and understanding.

Jack London traveled extensively during his short but active life. He encountered diverse cultures that he tried to understand. He empathized with the downtrodden in the United States, Europe, East Asia and the South Pacific. His “Pan-Pacific Club” essay is his final appeal for the West to overcome stereotypical view of Asians as inferior peoples who needed Western domination for their betterment. Although London died in 1916, the words of this realistic and humane writer still speak to us.

**Jack London Reporting From Manchuria**

[Editor’s Note: The Hearst newspaper empire hired Jack London to be its chief correspondent covering the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905). When London arrived in Tokyo in late January 1904, he found that the Japanese government would not allow foreign correspondents near its army as it marched north through Korea to meet Russian forces in Manchuria. Refusing to spend the war attending banquets, London raced across Japan searching for a vessel to take him to Korea.]
After considerable difficulty, he caught up with the Japanese army in late winter 1904 in Korea and accompanied the troops as they marched north through Korea and into Manchuria to confront the Russians. London continued his coverage of the war through June of 1904. The following dispatch followed Japan’s victory over Russian forces in a tense battle for control of the Yalu River between Korea and Manchuria.

“Beware the Monkey Cage”

ANTUNG, Manchuria. May 10th, 1904. The Japanese, following the German model, make every possible preparation, take every possible precaution, and then proceed to act, confident in the belief that nothing short of a miracle can prevent success. Opposed to their three divisions on the Yalu was a greatly inferior Russian force, but the Japanese had to cross the river under fire and attack an enemy lying in wait for them.

By the manipulation of their three divisions, and what of their ruses, they must have sadly befuddled the Russians. At the mouth of the Yalu the Japanese had two small gunboats, two torpedo boats and four small steamers armed with Hotchkiss-guns. Also they had fifty sampans loaded with bridge materials. These were intended for a permanent bridge at Wiju; but they served another purpose—first, farther down the stream. The presence of the small navy and the loaded sampans led the Russians to believe that right there was where the bridge was to be built. So right there they stationed some three thousand men to prevent the building of the bridge. Thus a handful of Japanese sailors kept 3,000 Russian soldiers occupied in doing nothing and reduced the effectiveness of the Russian strength that much.
Another ruse was the building of a bridge in front of Wiju. This was in plain view of the Russians on the conical hill opposite just east of Kieu-Liang-Cheng, and they consumed much time and powder in shelling it. This was precisely what the Japanese intended for the bridge. While it held the Russian attention, a little farther down the stream the Japanese were at work on another bridge screened by small willow trees on the intervening island, and which, when completed, had never had a shot fired at it.

Have you ever stood in front of a cage wherein there was a monkey gazing innocently and peaceably into your eyes—so innocent and peaceable the hands grasping the bars and wholly unbelligerent, the eyes that bent with friendly interest on yours, and all the while and unbeknown a foot sliding out to surprise your fancied security and set you shrieking with sudden fright? Beware the monkey cage! You have need of more than your eyes; and beware the Japanese. When he sits down stupidly to build a bridge with his two hands before your eyes, have a thought to the quiet place behind the willow-screen where another bridge is built by his two feet. He works with his hands and his feet, he works night and day, and he never does one thing expected of him, and that is the unexpected thing.

The night of April 29th and the day of the 30th was an anxious time for the Japanese. Their army was cut in half, and it was no less than the Yalu that divided it. One-third of its force, the Z division, had crossed the river to the right and was in Manchuria. They had no very accurate knowledge of the Russian strength, and it was not beyond liability that the Russians might make a counter attack on the Z division and destroy it. So the X and Y divisions on the south bank were in momentary readiness to prevent this by delivering an attack upon the Russians straight across the river. But there was no need for this. The Russians were not in sufficient force to attack a single division, advancing as it was across mountainous country. This, in turn, the Japanese did not know, but they prepared for the possibility as they prepare for everything.

The Ai-ho river flows out of Manchuria and enters the Yalu valley a mile or more above Kieu-Liang-Chen. It also flows past that village, close to the Manchurian shore, thus interposing an obstacle to the advance of the whole Japanese army (even the Z
division), after it had crossed the Yalu proper. The crossing of the Ai-ho was seriously menaced by the sixteen guns of the Russian right on the conical hill. The day's work for April 30th was to put these sixteen guns out of business. The Japanese bent themselves to the task. It was an exposed position and a concentration of fire lasting twenty-five minutes and in which time sixty common shells were thrown, did the work. The Russian fire was silenced and the guns were withdrawn that night! Incidentally the Japanese bombed the Russian camp, carelessly situated where it was exposed from the Korean hills, and wrought great havoc.

On the night of April 30th the X and Y divisions crossed the main Yalu and rested on the sands, with the Ai-ho between them and the Russians. The X division forming the Japanese left, faced the Russian right on the conical hill, and the Y division was extended near the mouth of the Ai-ho; and up the Ai-ho, extended for several miles, lay the Z division. Opposing these three divisions was a Russian actual fighting force of about 4,000 men. The Russian line, extending some six or seven miles, was not intact. In fact, because of the lay of the land, the Russians really occupied two positions—one on and about the conical hill at Kieu-Leng-Cheng, the other at the Ai-ho, from its mouth several miles up.

Against these two positions, occupied by about 2,000 men, was hurled an army of three divisions (probably 25,000 men actually on the spot), backed by a powerful artillery of field guns and howitzers. Prevented by shell fire and shrapnel from doing their best to repel the general attack, and being flanked by an immensely superior force, the Russian left on the Ai-ho broke first and fled in the direction of the Hamatan. The Russian right on the conical hill, fought more, tenaciously, the survivors in turn fleeing toward Hamatan.

The Japanese understand the utility of things. Reserves they consider should be used, not only to strengthen the line or protect the repulsed line, but in the moment of victory to clinch victory hard and fast. The reserves, fresh and chafing from inaction wild to take part in a glorious day, received the order for general pursuit. Right, left and center, they took after the Russians. The field guns, delayed by the Ai-ho followed at a gallop.
The retreat became a rout. The Russian reserves, two regiments, had fled without firing a shot—at least the Japanese have no record of these two regiments. Hamatan is at the conjunction of three roads, six miles to the rear of the conical hill. Down these three roads the Russians ran, coming together and passing on to the main road—the Pekin or Mandarin road. And down these three roads, from left, right, and center, came the fresh reserves, and after them the artillery.

In the meantime, however, far from the Japanese right and outstripping the rest of the pursuit, arrived one company of men in time to cut off fifteen Russian guns and eight maxims. The remnants of the three battalions rallied around the guns. A hasty position was taken. The rest of the pursuing Japanese did not arrive. But one company of men stood between the Russians and the Pekin Road. And it stood. Its captain and three lieutenants were killed. One officer only remained alive. The last cartridge was fired. Those that survived fixed their bayonets ready to receive a charge. And in the moment, left, right, and center, their pursuing comrades arrived.

The Russians were assailed from three sides. The tables were turned but they fought with equal courage. The day was lost; they knew it; yet they fought on doggedly. Night was falling. As the Japanese grew closer the Russians turned loose their horses, destroyed or threw away the breechblocks of their guns, smashed the breeches of the maxims and then, as bayonet countered bayonet, drew white handkerchiefs from their pockets in token of surrender.

One other noteworthy thing occurred in the Japanese pursuit. Midway to Hamatan, flying on the heels of a rout, in the very heat and sweep of triumph, they dropped a line of reserves to receive and protect them should they be hurled back broken and crushed by Russian re-enforcements. Hand in hand with terrifying bravery goes this cold-blooded precaution. Verily, nothing short of the miracle can wreck a plan they have once started to put into execution. The men furnish the unfaltering bravery, confident in their knowledge that their officers have furnished the precaution.

Of course, the officers are as brave as the men. On the night of the 30th, when the army took up its position on the Ai-ho, it was not known whether that stream was fordable. Officers from each of the three divisions stripped and swam or waded the river at many different points, practically under the rifles of the Russians.

“Men determined to die” is the way one Japanese officer characterized the volunteers who answer in large number to every call for dangerous work. Not knowing whether the Ai-ho was fordable, three plans were seriously considered. First, each soldier was to go into action May 1st dressed in cartilage belt and equipped with a rifle and a board, the latter to be used as a means for paddling across the Ai-ho. Second, same garb and equipment with a tub substituted for the board, and third, the strongest swimmers to cross over with ropes, along which, when once fast on the other side bank, the weaker swimmers and non-swimmers could make their way. In any case, had the river not proved fordable, Kipling’s “Taking the Long-Tong-Pen” would have been repeated on a most formidable scale. Surely the Russians would have broken and fled perceptibly before so terrible a charge.
Every division, every battery was connected with headquarters by field telephone. When the divisions moved forward they dragged their wires after them like spiders drag the silk of their webs. Even the tiny navy at the mouth of the Yalu was in constant communication with headquarters. Thus, on a wide-stretching and largely invisible field, the commander-in-chief was in immediate control of everything. Inventions, weapons, systems (the navy modeled after the English, the army after the German) everything utilized by the Japanese has been supplied by the Western world; but the Japanese have shown themselves the only Eastern people capable of utilizing them.

**If Japan Awakens China**

[London wrote this piece in 1909, five years after his return from Manchuria. He predicts the rise of Japan and its endeavor to transform itself into a major world power by harnessing the labor of four hundred million Chinese. The Chinese, he suggested, would in turn eventually overthrow their conservative leaders, drive out the Japanese and develop a prosperous modern economy. Excerpts.]

The point that I have striven to make is that much of the reasoning of the white race about the Japanese is erroneous, because is it based on fancied knowledge of the stuff and fiber of the Japanese mind. An American lady of my acquaintance, after residing for months in Japan, in response to a query as to how she liked the Japanese, said: “They have no souls.”

In this she was wrong. The Japanese are just as much possessed of a soul as she and the rest of her race. And far be it from me to infer that the Japanese soul is in the smallest way inferior to the Western soul. It may even be superior. You see, we do not know the Japanese soul, and what its value may be in the scheme of things. And yet that American lady’s remark but emphasizes the point. So different was the Japanese soul from hers, so unutterably alien, so absolutely without any kinship or means of communication, that to her there was no slightest sign of its existence.

Japan, in her remarkable evolution, has repeatedly surprised the world. Now the element of surprise can be present only when one is unfamiliar with the data that go to constitute the surprise. Had we really known the Japanese, we should not have been surprised. And as she has surprised us in the past, and only the other day, may she not surprise us in the days that are yet to be? And since she may surprise us in the future, and since ignorance is the meat and wine of surprise, who are we, and with what second sight are we invested, that we may calmly say: “Surprise is all very well, but there is not going to be any Yellow peril or Japanese peril?”

There are forty-five million Japanese in the world. There are over four hundred million Chinese. That is to say, that if we add together the various branches of the white race, the English, the French, and the German, the Austrian, the Scandinavian, and the white Russian, the Latins as well, the Americans, the Canadians, Australians and New Zealanders, the South Africans, the Anglo Indians, and all the scattered remnants of us, we shall find that we are still outnumbered by the combined Japanese and Chinese.
We understand the Chinese mind no more than we do the Japanese. What if these two races, as homogenous as we, should embark on some vast race-adventure? There have been no race adventures in the past. We English-speaking peoples are just now in the midst of our own great adventure. We are dreaming as all race-adventurers have dreamed. And who will dare to say that in the Japanese mind is not burning some colossal Napoleonic dream? And what if the dreams clash?

Japan is the one unique Asiatic race, in that alone among the races of Asia, she has been able to borrow from us and equip herself with all our material achievement. Our machinery of warfare, of commerce, and of industry she has made hers. And so well has she done it that we have been surprised. We did not think she had it in her. Next consider China. We of the West have tried, and tried vainly, to awaken her. We have failed to express our material achievements in terms comprehensible to the Chinese mind. We do not know the Chinese mind. But Japan does. She and China spring from the same primitive stock—their languages are rooted in the same primitive tongue; and their mental processes are the same. The Chinese mind may baffle us, but it cannot baffle the Japanese. And what if Japan wakens China—not to our dream, if you please, but to her dream, to Japan's dream? Japan, having taken from us all our material achievement, is alone able to transmute that material achievement in terms intelligible to the Chinese mind.

The Chinese and Japanese are thrifty and industrious. China possesses great natural resources of coal and iron—and coal and iron constitute the backbone of machine civilization. When four hundred and fifty million of the best workers in the world go into manufacturing, a new competitor, and a most ominous and formidable one, will enter the arena where the races struggle for the world-market. Here is the race-adventure—the first clashing of the Asiatic dream with ours. It is true, it is only an economic clash, but economic clashes always precede clashes at arms. And what then? Oh, only that will-o’-wisp, the Yellow peril. But to the Russian, Japan was only a will-o’-wisp until one day, with fire and steel, she smashed the great adventure of the Russian and punctured the bubble-dream he was dreaming. Of this be sure: if ever the day comes that our dreams clash with that of the Yellow and the Brown, and our particular bubble-dream is punctured, there will be one country at least unsurprised, and that country will be Russia. She was awakened from her dream. We are still dreaming.

this article for The Asia-Pacific Journal. The author thanks Victor Fic for editing this text.

Notes


6 "The menace to the Western world lies not in the little brown man, but in the four hundred millions of yellow men should the little brown man undertake their management." Jack London Reports, 346


Japan, Britain and the Yellow Peril in Africa in the 1930s
Richard Bradshaw and Jim Ransdell

During the 1930s, a dramatic increase in Japanese exports to Africa and Japan’s growing influence in Ethiopia led many Europeans and South African whites to evoke the specter of the ‘Yellow Peril’ and to call for measures to halt Japan’s ‘penetration’ of Africa. Japan’s close ties with Ethiopia and her growing exports to South Africa were of particular concern. Japan and Italy were able to reach an agreement with regard to their conflict of interest in Ethiopia, but Japan’s relations with the British Empire suffered as a result of anti-Japanese sentiment in South Africa.

Growing Chinese economic and political influence in Africa has recently received considerable attention, but this is not the first time that the projection of Asian power into Africa has provoked great concern. In the 1930s, a rapid rise in Japanese exports to Africa and Japan’s close ties with Ethiopia invoked cries of the ‘Yellow Peril’ and led to efforts to stop Japan’s penetration of Africa. Barriers to Japanese exports were erected all over Africa to secure markets for the colonial powers of Europe, Britain in particular. With decline in European exports during World War I, the Japanese had been able to gain an economic foothold in countries such as the Union of South Africa. This growth of Japanese exports to southern Africa during the first decades of the 20th century coincided with the growth of South African economic nationalism, which, in turn, led to public hysteria among European competitors and domestic business interests over what was perceived as Japanese economic “dumping.” The conclusion of a “Gentleman’s Agreement” with Japan by Prime Minister Hertzog’s government in the 1930s further antagonized white South Africans who displayed widespread bi-partisan hostility to the arrangement. Later, following the Great Depression and South Africa’s gold standard crisis, the economic concerns of South African whites were compounded with worries over Japan’s political ambitions in Ethiopia.

This became a matter of concern from Rome to Cape Town at the time of the Italo-Ethiopian crisis of 1934-35, during which Italy feared that Japan would provide military assistance to Ethiopia, were it attacked. Though this incident initially saw public outcry on both sides, it ultimately brought Italy and Japan closer together. The Italian and Japanese governments were able to overcome their clash of interests in Africa by reaching a compromise regarding their respective spheres of influence in Ethiopia and Manchuria. But for the British, the Japanese activities in Manchukuo (満州国) combined with the ongoing competition between the two over exports throughout Africa was a point of tension dividing the two former allies.

Rising Japanese exports to Africa

Although Britain’s trade with foreign countries was far greater than its trade with its colonies, its diminishing overseas sales were most apparent in its colonies. African consumers were particularly attracted to low-priced Japanese goods. While Japan maintained an adverse balance of trade with British dominions
prior to the 1930s, it subsequently came to have a favorable exchange with them in the 1930s.\textsuperscript{8}

The most important new markets for Japanese goods in Africa were the British colonies of East Africa where, in most cases, free entry of Japanese goods was protected by treaty. As the following tables indicate, Japanese exports of cotton and rayon textiles subsequently came to constitute a serious threat to British textiles in East Africa.

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<th>Table 10.1 British &amp; Japanese Textile Imports into Kenya &amp; Uganda, 1930-33</th>
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Source: "Written Answers, House of Commons," 30 May 1934, FO 371/18179F3310/347/23, PRO.

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<th>Table 10.2 British &amp; Japanese Textile Imports into Tanganyika, 1930-33</th>
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Source: "Written Answers, House of Commons," 30 May 1934, FO 371/18179F3310/347/23, PRO.

British measures to curtail even the rather modest growth of Japanese trade with British West Africa particularly offended the Japanese.\textsuperscript{9} This was further exacerbated by the efforts of British allies, such as the French, to restrict the flow of Japanese goods into their colonies and dependencies such as Morocco.\textsuperscript{10} To the Japanese, it appeared clear that the British and other European colonial powers were selectively discriminating against Japanese goods. The erection of barriers to Japan's exports throughout colonial Africa in places such as Portuguese Africa\textsuperscript{11} and Egypt\textsuperscript{12} thus led to further Anglo-Japanese alienation during a time when the world's political climate was becoming ever tenser. Still, the greatest point of economic contention was South Africa.
Asian-South African relations before the Great Depression

Commercial contacts between Asia and South Africa were first stimulated by the founding of Dutch East India Company (DEIC) posts in both locations during the seventeenth century. The possibility of exporting animal skins from South Africa to Japan was one of the reasons DEIC employee Jan van Riebeeck offered for establishing a post in South Africa in 1652. Between the late seventeenth and early twentieth centuries, a small quantity of goods passed between Japan and South Africa in Dutch, British (after c. 1800), and Indian (after c. 1870) ships. However, the real turning point for South African-Japanese trade relations was World War I, during which Japanese trade with South Africa flourished as Japan replaced the European countries that had become entangled in the conflict on the continent.

Though imports decreased from their wartime boom to less than 4 million yen by 1920, this was still nearly ten times the value of the trade prior to World War I. By 1921 trade relations had deepened and the value of Japanese exports to the Union of South Africa was again experiencing substantial growth. By 1926, a combination of falling costs of cotton thread and favorable exchange rates gave Japanese goods a new opportunity in South Africa. Thus, late 1920s South African protectionists began to express concern over the extent to which Japanese exports of certain products (notably silk goods, cotton textiles, and clothing) had grown. Intent on stimulating the growth of South African industry, the Nationalist-Labor Pact government led by General Barry Hertzog, who served as prime minister of South Africa from 1924-1939, enacted a tariff reform in 1925. Further protective measures included anti-Asian legislation, such as the 1913 Immigration Act, which had provisions aimed against all Asians, but effectively prohibited Japanese from residing and doing business in South Africa. Troubled by this restriction, the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce sent Magoichi Nunokawa (孫一布川) in late 1916 to negotiate an agreement that the 1913 Act would not apply to the Japanese, but the British government, which still deeply influenced South African policymaking, intervened to put an end to the negotiation. Although South Africa had gained considerable autonomy after the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910, British influence, particularly in the realm of foreign policy, was still quite strong.

Growing fear of a ‘Yellow Peril’

The next decade, under PM Hertzog, saw the growth of discrimination in various forms while the Japanese still struggled to extricate themselves from the anti-Asian legislation. Hertzog’s election campaign of June 1929 focused on the Swart Gevaar or "Black Peril" and advocated increasing discriminatory policies on various fronts. However, in October 1930, South Africa began to feel the Great Depression. Between 1928/9 and 1932/3 the value of wool exports from the Union fell by over 70 percent. As discriminatory legislation restricted potential buyers, the Union’s need to attract businessmen who would purchase more wool dictated changes in policy.

Accordingly, on 2 September 1930, the Union Ministry of Agriculture decided to permit Japanese wool purchasers to enter South Africa. Then, on 16 October 1930,
the acting Japanese consul in Cape Town, Yamasaki Sakashige (山崎坂重) and acting external affairs secretary, W.G.H. Farrell, exchanged notes stating that Pretoria would, upon the recommendation of the Japanese consul, grant a temporary permit valid for one year to Japanese tourists, students, wholesale merchants and purchasers of South African goods to enter and reside in the Union. The document stated that, “no Japanese subject whose admission is recommended by the Consul for Japan in terms of this understanding will be served on arrival at a Union port with a notice declaring him to be a prohibited immigrant.”

Criticism of what came to be known as the “Gentleman’s Agreement” began in March 1931 and continued throughout the summer, the overarching fear being that Japanese stores would soon proliferate throughout the country. When such concerns surfaced during debates in the Assembly on 5 July 1931, interior minister Dr. Daniel F. Malan, the leader of the Nationalist Party in the Cape, ridiculed the idea that the Union would be overrun by Japanese retail traders, factory employees and farm hands, but then disagreed with the critics of the treaty who argued that only Japanese wholesale buyers should be allowed admittance into the country.

A few days later a letter in the Rand Daily Mail, a leading Johannesburg newspaper, charged that by the terms of the treaty

A Japanese wholesale firm may establish itself anywhere in South Africa (except the Orange Free State, where by statute, no Asiatics are permitted to live) and carry on business selling any class of goods, and utilising a hundred percent Japanese staff. As there is no law to prohibit a merchant who has a wholesale license from selling direct to the public, the Agreement means that these wholesale traders can do a retail business.

The same critic mentioned that by the time of the last census, in 1921, there were already 98 Japanese residents in the Union. At present, he warned, "one of the biggest merchant princes of Japan is visiting us with an eye to establishing wholesale houses in this country." The Japanese, he added, were busy "spying out the land."

Opposition leader General Jan Smuts voiced yet another objection to the treaty, asserting that "it would be quite impossible to keep out Asiatic immigrants once [the Union] had very large trade relations with the East." His wife, Isie Smuts, also spoke out against the treaty. At a South African Party gathering she condemned it, saying

We are already having a good deal of trouble with the Indians in this country, and now the Government proposes to introduce a yellow race into South Africa, the strongest and most powerful yellow race in the world. Once they are in we shall never succeed in getting rid of them.

The press also attempted to demonstrate exactly how the "dumping" of goods from Japan would damage local trade. After praising South Africa’s "flourishing and excellent boot and shoe industry," a critic noted that Japanese shoes, or "plimsolls,"
were "selling like hotcakes" after being landed at a cost of between 1s. 6d. and 2s. (c. $0.50) a pair. The "poorer of the coloured folk" in Cape Town, he noted, were buying them for as little as 3s. (c. 75 cents) a pair. These "plimsolls" were threatening the sale of the locally made \textit{velskoen} (untanned hide shoes) which sold for 5s. 6d. (c. $1.35) a pair.\textsuperscript{23}

As this table indicates, Japanese imports also included growing quantities of clothing, another category of good which South African industry was attempting to provide. Japanese exports to South Africa were clearly increasing, but except for silk, they constituted only a small part of the goods entering the Union. Although the quantities as of 1929 did not represent a particularly large percentage of the Union's overall imports, quantities in many categories had nearly doubled since 1926. Thus, South African industrialists feared imports of Japanese goods would continue to increase and that domestic industries would not be able to compete in the long run.

Japan's acting consul in Cape Town, Mr. Hongō (本郷), made efforts to offset this rising tide of anti-Japanese agitation. In response to the rumors that the Japanese were setting up warehouses all over the Union, he asserted that not a single Japanese warehouse had been established during the nine months since the signing of the agreement. As for the question of commercial competition, Mr. Hongō placed the blame on the South African businessmen who, he claimed, competed unnecessarily among themselves.\textsuperscript{24}

Still, complaints linking the treaty with increased Japanese imports frustrated members of Hertzog's cabinet. The labor minister, Colonel Cresswell, commented that those people who had previously been so intent on the government's not raising tariffs were now, for self-serving reasons, raising "a howl" about the treaty with Japan. Further complaints were then raised regarding "yellow standards of living" which, it was claimed, were at the root of the problem. In July 1931, at a public meeting in Johannesburg, a prominent lawyer and Parliament member, Colonel C. F. Stallard, a strong opponent of Asian immigration, claimed that there "had seldom been a matter which had struck deeper at the roots of the prosperity of South Africa." The Union of South Africa "did not want [an influx of Japanese] people who could not be assimilated...and live in accordance with civilized standards."\textsuperscript{25} In response to these criticisms, interior minister Malan explained, once again, that the Japanese treaty was unrelated to the rise in Japanese imports.\textsuperscript{26}

Nevertheless, this link endured in the minds of the public and the government found itself having to explain the disadvantages of increasing tariffs. When the "serious effects to South African industries created by the importations of Japanese rubber-soled shoes," arose during Parliamentary debates, the minister of mines and industries remarked that the government had no desire to increase the 30 percent protective duty already in place.\textsuperscript{27}

General Kemp, the agricultural minister, defended the treaty by noting that prices for many South African consumers would drop. He also emphasized that the treaty could lead to the capture by the Union of new markets in the East and prompt the Japanese to buy more wool.\textsuperscript{28} Whatever else was said, it was really this hope that the
Japanese would purchase more wool which lay behind the conclusion of the controversial treaty. And yet, before the year was out, Hertzog's government would elect not to follow Britain in abandoning the gold standard, a decision which reduced Japanese demand for South African wool. Thus what the cabinet had hoped to achieve was undone by its reluctance to allow the South African pound to fall in value.

**The gold standard crisis in South Africa**

The initial uproar over the Japanese Treaty died down during the latter half of 1931, but the underlying anger remained. Thus, following Great Britain's September 1931 decision to discontinue use of the gold standard, when changes in the relative value of both Japan's and South Africa's currencies made Japanese goods even cheaper and South African goods more expensive, the stage was set for a new outbreak of anti-Japanese demonstrations. These feelings intensified over the next fifteen months as Hertzog and his ministers ignored growing domestic opposition and refused to allow the Union to follow Britain in abandoning the gold standard. This had a devastating impact on foreign demand for export-dependent agricultural products, wool in particular. On the other hand, Australia, which produced three times as much wool as the Union, and which was Japan's primary supplier, left the gold standard as early as February 1931. By the end of that year and in early 1932 the Union's wool became almost twice as expensive as that of Australia's, in terms of British pounds.²⁹

By mid-1932, after Japan abandoned the gold standard on 13 December 1931, the value of the Japanese yen had dropped to half its former level and exports began to rise sharply.³⁰ Thus, facing acute financial and political crises, finance minister Havenga announced the abandonment of the gold standard by the Union on 28 December 1932. Nevertheless, imports of Japanese goods continued to climb.³¹

**Renewed outbursts of Anti-Asian agitation**

In 1933 the value of imports from Japan rose higher than ever before, to over 26.7 million yen (c. $6.85 million). This dramatic increase sparked a new wave of anti-Japanese demonstrations: politicians called for action, newspapers were filled with articles advocating different measures to be taken, and eventually a boycott was initiated.

In September 1933, speakers at the Union's Chamber of Commerce voiced their hostility to the rise in Japanese imports. One speaker reminded his audience that the government had not addressed sufficiently the importation of Japanese footwear until some "seven million pairs of rubber and canvas shoes were actually in the country and the lower end of the industry was threatened with extinction."³²

Unlike the threat to domestic industry posed by Japanese shoes, due to measures taken by Hertzog's government in response to this agitation, and its abandonment of the gold standard, the price of gold began to rise in September 1933,³³ and wool prices were up 33 percent from the year before.³⁴ Concern remained, however, about competition with Japanese products in foreign markets. Coal from Japan,
which was mined in Manchuria, sold in Singapore and elsewhere for a lower price than South African coal. A Johannesburg newspaper estimated that South African coal would have to be produced for 4s. (c. .83 cents) per ton "at the pit's mouth" in order to compete with Japanese coal. After leaving the pit, the argument continued, the coal had to be sent to the coast and shipped to Singapore and yet still sold for 16s. (c. $3.32) per ton or less; and "even then the Japanese are in a position to undersell" South African coal.35

The fears of South African whites were not only economic. Since the early 20th century, multitudes of Japanese emigrants had refueled in South African ports on their way to settle in Brazil. Having borne witness to this, South African whites were particularly aware of the Japanese government's desire to find outlets for what it termed Japan's "excess population." Thus any suggestion that Japanese interests might obtain land or concessions anywhere in Africa or Asia, whether in neighboring Swaziland, in Ethiopia, or in East Asia, came to elicit strong reactions from South African whites. Japanese encroachments in Africa were viewed by South African whites, in the end, as threats to white supremacy on the continent.

In September 1931 concern in South Africa grew upon hearing news of Japan's invasion of Manchuria. "It is practically certain that the Japanese military and naval authorities possess a ready-made plan to people the empty spaces here and in Australia," it was reported.36 The Rand Daily Mail's headlines on 24 September were "3 WHITES KILLED – By Japanese in Mukden – 'TO ABSORB CHINA' – Step to World Domination."

Fears were exacerbated by the pronouncements of certain military enthusiasts and pan-Asianists in Japan. In a book entitled Japan Must Fight Britain, for example, lieutenant-commander Ishimaru Tōta (石丸藤太) of the Japanese navy had discussed the strategic importance of the Cape, arguing that "it would be far wiser for Britain to concentrate on protecting the Cape route" instead of the Mediterranean route and that "Great Barriers have grown up between England and her children, [including] South Africa..."37

The sympathy for Japan expressed among non-white South Africans and their sympathizers further troubled white South Africans. John Henry Baynes of Johannesburg, describing himself as a European with a "Cape Colored wife" and "leader of the African Proletariat Party," wrote a letter to the Japanese foreign ministry in April 1931 in which he condemned white South African hostility towards the "Japanese Commercial Treaty" and praised the efforts of the Japanese to defend the rights of their colored brothers.38

The 'Yellow Man' Looks On

The apprehension of many South African whites was expressed when a South African, Hedley Arthur Chilvers, published The Yellow Man Looks On in 1933.39 In this book, Chilvers argued that Anglo-Dutch reconciliation was necessary, and even advocated black-white cooperation in the Union, because of the Japanese threat. The book voiced support for the coalition or United Party government formed by
Hertzog and Smuts in 1933. Just as the "Black Peril" provided a slogan for Hertzog’s electoral campaign in 1929, the specter of a "Yellow Peril" provided some justification for Hertzog’s controversial decision to join forces with Smuts in 1933. In his introduction to the book Abe Bailey wrote: "If the white races in Southern Africa can only agree to work together...they will continue to enjoy the protection of the British navy."

Publication of Chilvers’ book in late 1933 coincided with the first reports that the Japanese government was negotiating the purchase of a large cotton-growing plot and other commercial concessions with the Ethiopian government. These rumors were taken seriously enough to provoke debate in South Africa’s parliament and prompted diplomatic and military intelligence correspondence. Japan’s perceived closeness with Ethiopia soon became a matter of worldwide concern as the Italo-Ethiopian conflict loomed. Thus, in the midst of Japan’s formidable escalation of trade its political influence on the continent of Africa became a matter of grave concern to all the European colonial powers and intensified white South African fears of the Yellow Peril.

**Japan’s attempt to increase imports of South African wool**

The cry of “Yellow Peril” would have incited less fear among white South Africans had the rapid increase in Japanese exports been complemented by an increase in Japanese purchases of raw wool from the Union; but this was not the case. However, during 1933 the prospect that the Japanese might become important wool buyers seemed to improve. Though South African wool remained more expensive than Australian wool, the Japanese were gradually increasing their purchases of South African wool in hopes of capturing a greater market for their exports.

A Japanese foreign ministry official, Mr. Shudō, visited South Africa early in 1934 to seek a solution to the intensifying trade dispute. Shudō encountered strong
anti-Japanese sentiment in South Africa. He and his colleagues were treated very
discourteously at times during their stay in the Union, once being excluded as
"Asiatics" from a cinema, and suffered other humiliating discrimination.45

Nevertheless, shortly after returning to Tokyo, Shudō outlined to the commercial
counselor at the British Embassy, George B. Sansom, the steps the Japanese
government had taken to improve the situation. Shudō explained that although
Japan had promised at the time of the "Gentleman's Agreement" (1930) to attempt
to increase its purchase of South African goods, raw wool in particular, it had failed
to purchase more than 10,000 bales per annum during any year since then.46 In
order to alleviate some of the tension, Shudō advised the Japanese government to
increase purchases of South African wool.

The Japanese government then arranged with the Association of Woolen Industries
and others to immediately increase imports of wool from South Africa, agreements
which were partially successful. Japan advanced in the rank of exporters to South
Africa. By 1935 she was in fourth place, behind Great Britain, the United States, and
Germany. Japan rose to second place, after Germany, in 1936-7.47 But as a Japanese
study reported in 1937:

South Africa’s policy to promote the buying of wool was far less successful than
expected. At the same time the South African market was flooded by Japanese
products. In contrast, imports of European goods, especially British ones, were
declining sharply and the pro-British element in South Africa thus strongly attacked
the failure of the "Gentleman’s Agreement" with Japan and the fact that Japan
purchased such a small quantity of South African wool. In addition, every
newspaper has been running articles on Japanese insincerity and on the unfair
competition of Japanese traders. Anti-Japanese sentiment is increasing dramatically
as the mood of the people grows more hostile to Japan and its products.48

Thus Japanese expansion in Africa evoked a strong reaction among many white
South Africans in the 1930s. Japanese commercial development threatened the
interests of British and South African manufacturers alike. Furthermore, Japanese
ambitions were not, it appeared, limited to an increase in exports. By the early
1930s some South African whites feared that the Japanese harbored political
ambitions in the African continent, and perhaps even colonial intentions. Although
Japan’s economic presence posed the greatest threat to white South Africans
domestically, the growing closeness of Japanese-Ethiopian relations was another
source of uneasiness.

**Japanese-Italian relations before the Italian invasion**

Although the economic dimension of Japanese-Ethiopian relations during the
interwar period was far less important than the political aspect, their trade relations
actually predated those of South Africa. It was during the 17th century, under the
Tokugawa Shogunate, that the first diplomatic exchange of gifts between the
Japanese government and an African government took place. In 1675 Khodja Murad,
an "ambassador of several Ethiopian kings and a merchant in his own right," sent
two zebras to the Japanese government from Batavia. The Japanese government not only recognized this gesture but sent "10,000 taels [ounces] of silver and thirty Japanese garments" to Khodja in return.49

As has been noted, by the 20th century the Japanese had begun trading all over Africa, much to the alarm of the British and other colonial powers. However, it was Italy whose relations with Japan suffered the most severe strain in the months before the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in October 1935. Part of the reason for this was the worldwide commercial competition between the two nations.50 In the early 1930s their trade rivalry encompassed Latin America and the Balkans as well as Africa and Asia. Italians resented Japan's capture of ever-increasing market shares around the world at the expense of Italian exports. Moreover, since both countries specialized in the export of low-cost textiles they were often in direct competition with one another.

As will be seen, the restoration of cordial relations between Japan and Italy, and their conclusion of an eventual alliance, only became possible after the two countries reached an agreement regarding their respective positions in Manchuria and Ethiopia.

**Japanese official response at the outset of the conflict**

Though the Ethiopian Crisis would eventually lead to the formation of bonds between Japan and Italy, at initially brought the two countries into conflict and placed great strain on their relations. The spark which lit the fire was a November 1934 border dispute between Ethiopia and Italian Somaliland.51 In reaction to this incident, on 24 December, the Ethiopian Chargé d'Affaires in Rome, Negadras Ghevre Yesus, asked Sugimura Yotarô (杉村陽太郎), the Japanese ambassador to Italy, if the Japanese government would be willing to supply arms to the Ethiopian government.52

Formerly Japan's ambassador to the League of Nations,53 Sugimura was a member of Japan's controlling faction, an official who, like his superiors, undoubtedly valued the Italo-Japanese relationship more highly than the Japanese-Ethiopian relationship. Sugimura explained to Ghevre that he had no authority to commit Japan to providing weapons to Ethiopia. He emphasized however, that Japan was interested in expanding their economic ties.54

When Sugimura met with Premier Mussolini in mid-July 1935, he reportedly assured Mussolini that Japan had no intention of supplying military aid to either party, even if war were declared.55 But almost simultaneously, on 18 July, London papers reported foreign minister Hirota Koki (広田弘毅), as having suggested that Japan would act in defense of its interests and nationals in Ethiopia. This, it was expected, would stiffen Ethiopian resolve to resist Italian demands.56 Sugimura's unqualified assurances to Mussolini were clearly at odds with the more calculated and ambiguous diplomatic stance taken by Hirota and Prime Minister Okada Keisuke (岡田啓介).
Following this, Sugimura was questioned on the content of his discussion with Mussolini by a representative of Rengo news services in Rome. Sugimura explained that he had told Mussolini that Japan was watching the crisis carefully in light of its economic interests in Ethiopia. He then attempted to refute rumors aired in the press regarding the possibility of Japan’s intervention in the conflict.57

**Italian reaction to the Sugimura affair**

The Italian ambassador to Japan, Giacinto Auriti, went to the Foreign Office on the afternoon of 19 July to inquire into the reason for the contradictory statements issued by Japanese officials. Hirota assured him that the Japanese wished for a peaceful solution, but that Sugimura’s statement of absolute assurance did not reflect the Foreign Office position. 58

Ambassador Auriti then drew attention to anti-Italian articles which had appeared in the Japanese press. In response, the same evening, a spokesman for the Japanese Foreign Minister, Amau Eijiro (尼羽英治郎), called on Luigi Mariani, counselor at the Italian Embassy in Tokyo, and reminded Mariani that a 6 July article in the Italian press had claimed that Ethiopia was violating the Italo-Ethiopian treaty of 1928 by purposefully favoring Japanese goods in order to stifle Italian influence in East Africa.59 Amau further pointed out an Italian article, dated 13 July, which stated that although Japan had occupied much of China, the anti-war Kellogg-Briand Pact was not yet dead.60 The Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, which renounced war as an instrument of national policy, was signed by Japan. Since Italy was on the verge of invading Ethiopia it was obviously hypocritical to remind Japan that it was a party to this ineffective pact which, in any case, was backed by little more than the threat of public disapproval were any of its 65 signatory nations to resort to war.

Still, Mariani continued to assert that the import of Japanese goods into Ethiopia breached the Italo-Ethiopian Treaty of 1928 because the treaty had stipulated that Ethiopia would "welcome Italian products." Amau replied that he found it hard to understand why Ethiopians or Japanese should be blamed for importing Japanese products on account of a treaty which stipulated only that Ethiopia would welcome Italian products.61

Shortly thereafter, when report of the Japanese Foreign Office’s denial of Sugimura’s statements reached Rome, it caused an uproar. Faced with contradictory statements, Italy chose to ignore the more threatening stance of the Foreign Office in favor of Sugimura’s initial pledge of neutrality.62 Thus, Rome announced that they expected Japan had no political interest in Ethiopia and would remain neutral if war broke out.63 Encouraged by the Italian government, the Italian public began to demonstrate dissatisfaction with Japan. On 22 July the Japanese Embassy in Rome was surrounded by six policemen and "numerous Fascist Blackshirts." All the leading Italian newspapers then ran front-page stories examining Japanese policy towards Ethiopia. Some asserted that Japan was attempting to become a champion of both the yellow and black races.64 Others accused Japan of trying "to launch a big economic offensive against Europe" via the Red Sea and the African continent. They labeled the perceived expansion of Japanese imperialism worldwide by means of
commercial "dumping" as a "peril to the white race." An article by Virginio Gayda entitled "The Cry of Solidarity of the Yellow with the Blacks" in the widely-read Giornale d'Italia declared that:

Japan must not think that her methods of imperial conquest and violation of the territorial and national rights of peoples claiming standards of civilization much older and more refined than their own are ignored or misunderstood by the civilized nations of the world ... However, there are some fixed points on the globe where such a policy is futile.65

Gayda maintained that Japan deliberately left the League of Nations in order to pursue her territorial ambitions in China, "whose civilization cannot be compared with that of Ethiopia."66 Gayda seemed to imply that Japan's aggression towards a 'civilized' country was more upsetting than Italy's 'civilizing mission' in Africa.

Italian animosity continued, and, on 25 July, anti-Japanese demonstrations were reported in Milan, Genoa, Turin and Bologna. A newspaper founded by Mussolini, the Popolo d'Italia, argued that Japan's new attitude towards the Italo-Ethiopian conflict completely contradicted the claim that Japan had no political interest in Ethiopia. It linked Japan's sympathy for "poor Ethiopia" to Japan's "unlimited political and economic expansion in Africa as a new hope for campaigning against Europe." The Messaggero asked why Japan could not stay out of the conflict and charged the Japanese with "hypocrisy, double-dealing and bad faith."67 No anti-Japanese demonstrations took place in Rome, but police and Black-shirt guards were maintained around the Japanese Embassy.

The following day, 26 July, the anti-Japanese campaign by Italian newspapers suddenly ceased. There were still articles critical of Japanese activities in China, but the "virulent attacks of the previous two days" were noticeably absent.68 The press campaign against Japan did not in fact die out but rather, for a few days, overlapped with a new campaign against Britain. Britain had superseded Japan as Italy's number-one-enemy. The reason for this can be discerned from an editorial in the Tevere which suggested that Britain would be faster than Japan to rush contraband arms to the Red Sea, to which Italy might respond with a "salvo of cannon."69

Although the anti-Japanese campaign in Italian newspapers died down, the same day an estimated 15,000 demonstrators in Rome converged on the center of the city at midnight, many carrying banners and cartoons attacking Japan, Britain, and Ethiopia. The number of special carabinieri (riflemen) assigned to protect the Japanese and British embassies was strengthened to 200, compared to the previous allotment of two per site.70 The demonstrations were clearly not spontaneous. They appeared instead to have been carefully staged to send strong messages to Japan and Britain. When a huge crowd gathered near the Foreign Office on 25 July, for example, they were "harangued" by the secretary of the Fascist Party, who called for Italian expansion.71
By August it became increasingly clear that the British would not stop the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, and the Japanese government apparently saw no point in antagonizing Italy any further. When Auriti again questioned the Japanese government in mid-September about its position, vice foreign minister Shigemitsu Mamoru (重光葵) replied that since Japan’s withdrawal from the League of Nations it had adopted the principle of non-intervention in European political affairs not connected with East Asia. As long as the rights of Japanese were not endangered, Japan would remain neutral and watch developments closely.72

Japanese public opinion and the Italo-Ethiopian War

In contrast to the cautious, realpolitik stance of Japan’s leaders toward the conflict, important segments of the Japanese public felt that Italy’s aggression should be unequivocally condemned, if not forcibly prevented, by Japan. Support for the Ethiopian cause came primarily from right-wing patriotic organizations and allied factions within the military and the government bureaucracy, but also from a large number of newspaper reporters and the public at large.

This is illustrated by the coverage of the conflict by *The Osaka Mainichi* and its English version, as well as the *Tokyo Nichi Nichi*.73 Even before the Italian invasion, the *Osaka Mainichi* hired three Japanese residents in Ethiopia as special correspondents. In addition, journalists in London, Berlin, and Moscow were instructed to cover the "European repercussions" of the war and the paper’s New York reporter was even sent to Africa on a special mission. Finally, the services of "all the correspondents of world renown" were engaged to cover the war.74

The August 1935 mission to Ethiopia of the *Osaka Mainichi*’s New York reporter, Wada Dengoro, is particularly noteworthy. News of his intention to negotiate a contract with the Ethiopian government for the *Osaka Mainichi* to broadcast to Ethiopians became a source of concern as far away as the Union of South Africa. The Union’s Defense Department feared that "if the Japs get a footing in Ethiopia of any kind, there will be no saying how far their influence will extend."75
During this period, Japanese-Ethiopian relations were strong enough that a marriage between an Ethiopian prince and a Japanese woman was arranged. [Left] Kuroda Masako (proposed marriage between Araya Abeba of Ethiopia and Kuroda
Masako of Japan) [Right] At the home of Mr. Sumioka. Front row, right to left: Araya Abeba, Foreign Minister Herui, Lij Tafari, and the interpreter, Daba Birru. In the back row are Mr. and Mrs. Sumioka. Picture taken from Herui's Dai Nihon. "Marriage Alliance: The Union of Two Imperiums, Japan and Ethiopia?" Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Florida Conference of Historians, (Gainesville, FL: April 1999).

Back in Japan, a meeting of the Ethiopian Society of Osaka had been held at Hotel New Osaka on 22 July. Many of the attendees had either visited Ethiopia or had contact with Ethiopian Foreign Minister Herui during his visit to Japan in 1931, the year following the signing of a treaty of Friendship and Commerce between the two nations. Some speakers, such as the consul in Osaka, Yukawa Chusaburō (湯川忠三郎), stressed the similarities between Ethiopia (Abyssinia) and Japan. Others, such as the executive director of the Osaka-based Africa Traders' Association, Yamazoe Shinkichi (山添新吉), spoke for commercial interests, reminding the gathering that over 50 percent of Ethiopia's imports of cotton cloth and piece goods came from Japan.76

Popular support reached a fever pitch as money, letters, and applications from Japanese wanting to fight for Ethiopia flooded the honorary consulate in Osaka. Herui described a similar situation in Addis Ababa, as applications from Japanese, some written in blood, arrived en masse. Weeks later, Yukawa, the honorary consul, attempted to secure passports for four Japanese citizens wishing to enlist in Ethiopia's flying corps. Another Japanese commander had offered the volunteers the use of two planes. One of the volunteers was Yasujiro Kita, a 28-year-old Japanese living in Berlin. Concerning the influx of applications, Yasujiro declared, "I am proud of the Japanese spirit of chivalry. I cannot remain idle in face of the news of the Italo-Abyssinian conflict as long as Japanese blood runs in my veins."77 Despite this patriotic fervor, Tokyo did not allow any Japanese to participate, and Ethiopia's consul rejected all applications.78

Japanese leaders, struggling to maintain control of policy, became alarmed as public support for Ethiopia exploded. They decided to clamp down on the activities of radical groups like the Amur River Society (黒龍会). Police raids in the wake of these pro-Ethiopian activities reduced this society to a shadow of its former self.79 The Home Ministry's crackdown on the pro-Ethiopian activities of patriotic societies was one manifestation of the controlling faction's assertion of power at this critical juncture. Finally, in February 1936, the failure of a coup by the Imperial Way Faction (皇道派) further strengthened the hand of government leaders who proceeded to ally Japan with Germany and Italy.

**Manchukuo (Manchuria) and Ethiopia**

Following this, on 12 May 1936, with the Japanese government firmly in control of foreign policy, Auriti, called on vice foreign minister Horinouchi Kensuke (堀之内健介) to notify the Japanese government of Italy's annexation of Ethiopia and to promise that Japanese interests would be respected.80 Then, on 27 June foreign
minister Arita cabled Sugimura in Rome that "while a unilateral recognition of the Italian occupation of Ethiopia would be in bad taste...the actual situation in Ethiopia should be recognized as presenting a fait-accompli to all governments." Reluctant to take the lead in affirming this controversial acquisition, Japan delayed recognition and negotiated with Italy over the new few months.

Finally, in mid-October, 1936, Count Ciano, then Italian Foreign Minister, indicated to Sugimura that Italy would be willing to establish a legation in Manchukuo if Japan retained its Legation in Ethiopia. The Japanese government then asked for assurances that there would be no discrimination against Japanese imports in the new Italian protectorate. In response, Ciano indicated that he preferred not to exchange formal notes regarding such an arrangement at that time.

Shortly thereafter, however, on 25 November, the Japanese Privy Council ratified the Anti-Comintern Pact, which served to remove any further reluctance on Italy's part to solidify their hitherto informal agreement. On 2 December 1936 Japan and Italy thus exchanged notes whereby the former recognized Italy's annexation of Ethiopia and the latter granted formal recognition to Manchukuo.

Despite the strong undercurrent of support in Japan for Ethiopia, the Japanese government retained power throughout this period of crisis in Italo-Japanese relations and avoided alienating Italy. As Japan moved further away from its former ally, Great Britain, Japanese leaders were acutely aware of the need to protect their nation from international isolation by cultivating closer ties with alternative European powers. Italy, likewise, found itself in need of friends after worldwide condemnation of its invasion of Ethiopia. Japan and Germany provided natural allies in such circumstances.

Conclusion

Japanese intrusion into the “white man’s paradise” of Africa fueled concern over the “Yellow Peril” in Great Britain, South Africa and Italy. In South Africa, this anxiety was sparked by intensifying opposition to the “Gentleman’s Agreement” during the early 1930s as imports from Japan rose, and as Japanese purchases of South African wool failed to grow. Anti-Japanese sentiment within the Union in fact became so widespread that the Japanese government eventually decided to take measures, in cooperation with Japanese business, to assure greater purchases of South African wool. These measures were successful to some extent, Japan becoming the second largest buyer of South African wool by 1937. Only during that year, however, was the trade balance in the Union's favor. It was a persistent trade imbalance in favor of Japan, together with direct competition between Japanese and South African goods, and the fact that the Japanese political as well as economic influence appeared to be growing rapidly on the African continent, which strained relations between Japan and South Africa as well as between Japan and the British Empire.

Japan's leaders again faced with a difficult choice with the outbreak of the Italo-Ethiopian conflict. Since Japan's occupation of Manchuria in 1931 it was increasingly cast in the role of an aggressive power and felt a growing sense of isolation from...
other powers with imperial ambitions. Japanese official response throughout the conflict was thus guarded and non-provocative, though their ambiguity angered the Italians. Finally, after the Italian government notified the world of its annexation of Ethiopia, the Japanese managed to reach an agreement with Italy by which it would grant recognition to Manchukuo and "most favored nation status" to Japan in Ethiopia in exchange for Japan’s recognition of Italy's annexation of Ethiopia. This quid pro quo helped to bring the two power into diplomatic, and eventually military, alliance.

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Notes


5 Rand Daily Mail (RDM), 13 July 1931. The Rand Daily Mail is published by the Anglo American Corp. in Johannesburg.


11 For information on Anglo-Japanese trade competition in Portuguese Africa see, (Consul-General) Francis O’Meara to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 31 July 1934, FO 371/18173 F 5304, PRO; Francis O’Meara to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 31 July 1934, FO 371/18173 F 5304, PRO; Memorandum on the General Trade and Economic Position of the Colony of Angola in 1935, Enclosure in Consul-General (Francis) O’Meara (Loanda) to Eden, 16 March 1936, PRO 433/3 W 3644/36/36; O’Meara (Loanda) to Department of Overseas Trade, 31 July 1934, PRO FO 371/18173 F 5304; Essentially the same information, with more information on the Japanese trade mission described below, is contained in O’Meara to Department of Overseas Trade, 19 June 1934, PRO FO 371/18173; figures in "Trade Relations Between Japan and Africa," *The Japan Times* (Supplement), 31 Oct. 1935.


16 DRO E.4.3.2.2-2; Richard Bradshaw, “Japan and European...,” 1992; Katsuhiko, “Japan’s Trade...,” in Alden and Hirano, Japan and South Africa... 2003: 25-40.

17 Osada, Sanctions and Honorary... 2002: 39.

18 Assembly Debates, 5 July 1931.

19 RDM, 11 July 1931.

20 Arthur G. Barlow in the RDM, 1933.


23 RDM, 13 July 1931.

24 RDM, 15 July 1931.

25 RDM, 14 July 1931.

26 RDM, 17 July 1931.

27 Hansard, XVII, 2 June 1931, 4707.

28 RDM, 8 July 1931.


32 RDM, 19 Sept 1933.
33 RDM, 19 Sept 1933.
34 RDM, 15 Sept 1933.
35 RDM, 6 Sept 1933.
36 RDM, 19 Sept 1931.
37 Rosenthal, Japan’s Bid... 1944: 12.
39 Chilvers, The Yellow Man... 1933.
40 Rosenthal, Japan’s Bid... 1944: 9-10.
41 Hansard, XXII, 7 March 1934.
42 “Sir H.F. Batterbee to Sir George Mounsey,” 1 August 1934, FO 371/18188 B.
43 RDM, 10 Oct 1933.
45 George B. Sansom, (Tokyo) "Japanese Trade with South Africa" Enclosure in British Minister F.O. Lindley (Tokyo) to John Simon, 5 March 1934, "Trade Agreement Between Japan and Union of South Africa" PRO FO 2181/159/23.
51 The Wa-Wal Incident mentioned above.
Sugimura had formerly been deputy secretary-general of the League of Nations (Osaka Mainichi & Tokyo Nichi Nichi (OM&TNN), 12 Sept 1933).

Agbi, “Italo-Ethiopian Crisis...” 1984: 3.

OM&TNN, 20 July 1935. The Osaka Mainichi & Tokyo Nichi Nichi is published by The Mainichi Newspapers Co., Ltd. in Osaka and Tokyo.

OM & TNN, 21 July 1935.

The Japan Times (JT), 21 July 1935. General Ugaki had arrived in Tokyo on July 8, shortly before the onset of the Sugimura affair, in order to discuss the question of Chosen [Korea]'s budget with government officials in Tokyo. He left Tokyo on July 22 and returned to Chosen on 25 July, "General Ugaki To Visit Genro Today Before Leaving For Chosen," JT, 24 July 1935; "Ugaki Visits Shimoda On Return To Chosen," JT, 26 July 1935. While in Tokyo Ugaki was reported as stating that the "impending Italo-Ethiopian war would not be regarded as something on the other bank of the river," Sugimura to Hirota, 18 July 1935, DRO, File A ET/1-2, cited in Agbi, "Italo-Ethiopian Crisis...," 1984: 5.

OM & TNN, 20 July 1935; JT, 21 July 1935.

"Amau Points Out Cases of Italy's Attack On Japan," JT, 22 July 1935.

"Amau Points Out Cases of Italy's Attack On Japan," JT, 22 July 1935.

"Amau Points Out Cases of Italy's Attack On Japan," JT, 22 July 1935.

"Rome Disturbed by Hirota's Talk To Italian Envoy," JT, 23 July 1935.

"Rome Disturbed by Hirota's Talk To Italian Envoy," JT, 23 July 1935.


"France Favors Treaty to Grant Italy Protectorate Over Ethiopia; Anti-Japan Demonstrations Seen," JT, 25 July 1935.


"15,000 Demonstrate Against Japan, Britain," JT, 27 July 1935.


"This Paper's Network is Completed for News-Gathering in African War," OM & TNN, 5 Oct 1935: "For a full account of the momentous world drama that is about to be played," the newspaper advertised, "read the Osaka Mainichi and the Tokyo Nichi Nichi."


Wallingston (Pretoria) to Wiseman, 6 Aug 1935, PRO, FO 371/19367. It is not known whether Wada actually entered into negotiations for broadcasting rights. Wada returned to the U.S. at the end of August, see "Staff Correspondent Back," 3 Sept 1935, PRO, FO 371/19367.

OM & TNN, 24 July 1935.


See Hugh Byas, *Government by Assassination* (New York: Knopf Publishers 1942): 200. The Amur River Society is often referred to as the "Black Dragon Society" because the literal meaning of the Chinese characters for the Amur River are "Black Dragon". The society took the name of the Amur because of its initial goal to prevent the Russians from extending their influence beyond that river in Manchuria. To call it the "Black Dragon Society" downplays the importance of the river after which it was named and tends to exaggerate the reputedly sinister, secret nature of the society.

Auriti called on Horinouchi in the absence of Foreign Minister Arita Hachiro, see, "Italian High Commissioner At Addis Ababa To Be Told To Respect Japanese Rights," OM & TNN, 14 May 1936.


The contradictions of racial discourse, and their relevance to our contemporary world, are well illustrated in this last set of readings. Morris-Suzuki explains the tensions in Japan’s empire building, especially the distinctions between formal nationality and civic rights. One could be a member of the Japanese empire, and therefore a subject of the Emperor, without necessarily having the privileges (voting, office holding) or responsibilities (conscription) of citizenship. Legally resembling an amalgamation of British and French systems, the expanding Japanese colonial system of the early 20th century differed from its British and French counterparts in practice because it had both large inflows and outflows of migrants. While Japanese migrated to other parts of Asia and elsewhere, hundreds of thousands of Asians flowed into Japanese territories and the home islands themselves. In all cases, however, the Japanese, like other colonial empires, imposed a system of unequal rights legitimized by the belief in some kind of natural hierarchy, often based on race. These practices have left a lasting and often painful legacy in the contemporary world.

The articles by Murphy and Kramer take us in a different direction by examining some of the controversies surrounding the American decision to incorporate the Philippines into its own expanding empire at the beginning of the 20th century. These articles are important for a number of reasons. First, they remind us that Japan and America began to build colonial empires at the same time. Second, they reveal the importance of concepts like race, civilization, and progress in all justifications for empire. Third, they illustrate how powerfully national and racial identities were gendered, and the key role war played in that process. Kramer shows how initial American restraint devolved into a war filled with race hatred.
while, at the same time, Filipino leaders anguished over adopting guerrilla tactics because they would make their people appear uncivilized.

Murphy examines the Philippine-American War from the perspective of its American opponents, the anti-Imperialists, a diverse collection of men and women of different classes and races led for the most part by elite white men. She focuses primarily on the efforts of women to stop the American annexation of the Philippines and, when that failed, to expose the atrocities of the war itself. In the process, we see how their opponents used gender to discredit these women and their supporters, employing language and imagery that closely resembled common forms of racial discrimination. In addition, both articles show how many people in those days, especially men, understood war as a force of progress, as a way of weeding out the weak, and, of course, as an expression of manly virtue and honour.
Migrants, Subjects, Citizens: Comparative Perspectives on Nationality in the Prewar Japanese Empire
Tessa Morris-Suzuki

Former Prime Minister Mori Yoshiro seems an unlikely champion of a multicultural Japan. His brief term of office is, after all, perhaps best remembered for the furore he evoked by a speech in which he described Japan as a “Divine Nation headed by the Emperor”. This echo of prewar nationalism stirred fears at home and abroad that senior Japanese politicians still subscribed to Shinto myths of a unique and racially superior Japan. Yet Mori today is an active participant in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s “Diet Members’ League for Promoting Exchanges of Foreign Human Resources” (Gaikoku Jinzai Koryu Suishin Giin Renmei), an awkwardly-named body whose mission is to promote mass immigration by making Japan a magnet for skilled workers from around the world. (Akashi and Ogawa 2008, 69)

Mori’s capacity to combine nostalgia for wartime nationalism with enthusiasm for boosting the number of foreigners in Japan is, however, perhaps not so odd after all. The inspiration for the activities of the Diet Members’ League is a fear that a low birth rate and declining population will irrevocably damage Japan’s power and prestige. For this reason, its members have given a friendly reception to the views of Sakanaka Hidenori, former head of Japan’s Immigration Bureau, who advocates an expansion in the size of Japan’s foreigner population to 10 million, or even maybe 20 million (ten times the current size) by the middle of this century, thus creating a “Big Japan” with enhanced global power and prestige. (Sakanaka 2005; Akashi and Ogawa 2008)

Public statements by the Diet Members’ League are part of an intensifying debate in Japan about immigration and the place of foreigners in Japanese society. Against a background of impending population decline and global competition for skilled labour, the conventional battlelines of the migration debate are being redrawn. Now some conservative politicians are looking seriously at the need to revise social policies, and even to reform Japan’s nationality law, in order to adapt to an age of higher migration. Meanwhile, leading members of the opposition Democratic Party have been debating a proposal to give local voting rights to foreign permanent residents: a proposal which Sakanaka firmly excludes from his vision of Big Japan, and which LDP politician Hirasawa Katsue describes as “the first step towards the loss of Japanese identity and the dissolution of the heart of the nation state”. (Nishi Nihon Shimbun, 18 April 2008). Such political crosscurrents highlight a complex relationship between nationalism and internationalism, between belief in a “unique Japan” and in “coexistence [kyosei] with foreigners”, and between nostalgia for the past and visions for the future.

Colonial Origins

These controversies surrounding migration and nationality are deeply embedded in Japan’s colonial history, just as current debates on multiculturalism and citizenship in Britain and France are deeply embedded in the history of the British and French
Empires. The prewar past has a bearing on the present for several reasons. First, the policies pursued by Japanese governments in the first half of the twentieth century helped to determine the nature of the foreign presence in Japan today. Many Koreans in Japan are descendents of migrants from the colonial era. Many members of Japan’s Brazilian and Peruvian communities, which together numbered over 370,000 in 2006, are descendents of those who emigrated in the first half of the twentieth century, often under schemes supported by the Japanese state as a means of strengthening their nation’s social cohesion and international influence. (Immigration Bureau 2007, 18-19)

Second, the ideas that resurface in present-day debates have a lineage that goes back to the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The legal framework of Japanese nationality was first set in place at a time when the creation of the Japanese colonial empire was just beginning, and this framework was further refined and developed as the empire grew. The boundaries of nationality, subjecthood and citizenship were therefore dynamic and contested. They were also riven with paradoxes, many of which arose from a central contradiction: the need for the Empire to unite its diverse subjects into a single loyal body while simultaneously seeking to divide rulers and ruled into a hierarchy of groups with separate sets of rights. As the Japanese empire expanded during the Asia Pacific War, colonial subjects in Korea and Taiwan were encouraged to see themselves as part of the inner circles of a multiethnic Greater Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere [Dai ToA Kyoeiken], in which increasingly complex layers of rights and duties distinguished peoples of the metropolitan core, the formal colonies, quasi-colonies like Manchukuo and occupied areas. Identity, subjecthood, legal nationality and voting rights did not necessarily go together, and seldom coalesced into a single national heart.
The age of colonial empires, like the present day, was a time of mass migrations, and the prewar Japanese empire was a space crossed by a complex web of movement. By 1932, there were estimated to be some 825,000 Japanese nationals living in foreign countries, Japan’s mandated territories and the quasi-colony of Manchukuo, as well as about a million Japanese settlers in the colonial territories of Korea, Taiwan and Karafuto. (Allison 1934a) The number of foreigners in prewar and wartime Japan was relatively small - around 54,000 in 1930 and 39,000 in 1940. (Homusho Nyukoku Kanrikyoku 1964, 10) This figure, however, did not include the large number of Korean and Taiwanese colonial subjects who migrated to Japan particularly from the late 1920s onwards. By 1938 there were probably some 800,000 Korean residents in Japan - over 1% of the total population of metropolitan Japan [naichi], and by 1945 the number had exceeded two million. (Pak 1975, 9)
Around 42,000 Chinese labourers were also transported to Japan during the War, of whom some 31,000 were still in Japan at war’s end. In addition, there were about 28,000 migrants from the Japanese colony of Taiwan in Japan, making a total Chinese population of almost 60,000 in 1945. (Vasishth 1997, 132) Japan’s imperial expansion was also associated with other movements of people between colonial territories or across the frontiers of empire: mass emigration from Korea to Manchuria, for example, as well as a smaller flow of immigrants from China to the Japanese colony of Taiwan.

Migration was the lifeblood of empire, and those who governed the empire sought to maximise the economic and strategic benefits for cross-border movement while also controlling, channelling and filtering it so as to contain its subversive potential. The tools they devised for this purpose were often ingenious. Here I shall begin by using a comparison between the British and Japanese empires to clarify both commonalities and distinct features of the Japanese system. I shall then go on to look at the way in which prewar migrations challenged and sometimes shifted the boundaries of Japanese subjecthood and nationality, before concluding with some reflections on the implications of this history for the current migration and nationality debates.

**Imperial Subjects**

“There are only two nations, East and West”. This quotation, from no less an authority than Napoleon Bonaparte, forms the opening sentence of a discussion paper on imperial citizenship written in 1914 by the forum of British foreign affairs experts known as the Round Table. The document’s authors go on to observe: “in
this Napoleon’s aphorism is essentially correct, that history has been for the most part a settling of accounts between East and West. The chief pieces have been those of Europe and Asia, and uncivilized races have occupied the position of pawns in the game”. (Round Table 1914, 1) The Round Table’s reflections on the evolution of the British Commonwealth, which they portrayed as “the highest development of political ideas typical of Europe”, exposed the profound ambiguities and dilemmas of subjecthood and nationality in the colonial world. On the one hand, the might of an empire is demonstrated by the size of its population. From this point of view it is desirable to have an inclusive system of membership which defines all inhabitants as sharing a single nationality. On the other hand, it is necessary to justify the right of one section of the population to exercise control over others. Hence the tendency for most colonial empires to develop an increasingly sharp distinction between the formal status of nationality (shared by all or most inhabitants of the empire) and substantive citizenship (rights to participate in the political process, which were unequally distributed between colonisers and colonised.)

The Japanese model of colonialism is often likened to the assimilationist French model, which involved an extension of the metropolitan order to the colonies, and contrasted with the British model, which is seen as involving a higher degree of autonomy for local people. (See for example Tanaka 1984, 159) This distinction, however, seems too sharp. France, Britain and Japan all had highly complex imperial systems in which the strength of metropolitan control and the degree of assimilationism varied both between regions and over time, and Japan in fact borrowed and adapted eclectically from both French and British precedents.

The Japanese empire, interestingly enough, acquired its formal legal framework for nationality before the British Empire did. The first Japanese Nationality Act [kokuseki ho] was passed in 1899, and a local version of the Act was extended to the recently-acquired Japanese colony of Taiwan in the same year. When Japan acquired Taiwan in 1895, Taiwanese residents who did not wish to live under Japanese rule had been allowed two years to remove themselves and their property from the colony; those who remained were then deemed to be Japanese subjects. (Tanaka 1984, 156) In the case of subsequent colonial acquisitions, issues of citizenship were somewhat less clear-cut.

The colony of Karafuto was obtained from Russia in 1905 as part of the spoils of victory in the Russo-Japanese War, but it was only in 1924 that Karafuto obtained its local version of the Nationality Law (modelled closely on the 1899 Act). When Japan assumed control of Karafuto it allowed existing residents to leave the colony, taking their property with them, if they wished to do so. But in the case of Karafuto those who remained did not become Japanese subjects, but retained Russian nationality. In fact, the great majority of the pre-1905 population elected to return to Russia, the main exception being some 2000-3000 indigenous people (Ainu, Nivkh and Uilta). The status of these indigenous groups remained obscure for many years. It was only in 1932 that the colonial authorities officially recognised all Ainu inhabitants of Karafuto as Japanese subjects, and even after that other indigenous people continued to be treated separately, being enrolled in “native registers” [dojin meibo]
rather than included in the standard family registration system. In Korea, which became a fully-fledged Japanese colony in 1910, local residents were deemed automatically and without choice to have become Japanese subjects, but a local version of the Nationality Law was never introduced, for reasons which we shall explore a little later.

Britain, on the other hand, did not acquire its first comprehensive nationality law until the passing of the 1914 Nationality and Status of Aliens Act. It is true that, in the British case, some important aspects of nationality had been dealt with by the Naturalisation Acts of 1844 and 1870, but the first of these explicitly did not apply to the colonies (which were allowed to have their own separate naturalisation laws), and the application of the 1870 law to the colonies was uncertain. (Parry 1957, 76-82) The Japanese law of 1899 and the British law of 1914 resembled each other in the sense that they both defined the people of the empire as “Imperial Subjects”, rather than as “citizens”, and that the status of an Imperial Subject was defined primarily in terms of allegiance to the Crown or Emperor. The greatest difference between the two systems, however, was that nationality in the British empire was based on the principle of ius soli, which grants citizenship to anyone born in the nation or colony - in part a legacy of the fact that for long periods of British history a substantial proportion of the ruling class had been of foreign ancestry - while Japanese nationality was based on ius sanguinis, which grants citizenship based on ancestry.

In imperial systems, contrary to the theoretical ideals set out in many texts on citizenship, formal status as members of the Imperial community did not confer equal civic rights. In devising its systems for the rule of colonies, Japan was in fact strongly influenced by the British model of the Crown Colony, where political power rested mainly in the hands of a Governor General, advised by a small appointed council. (See for example Takekoshi 1907, 37-38) Imperial ideologues generally justified the inequalities of imperial subjects by means of ideas of social evolution, which they saw as imposing on “civilized” nations a duty of “trusteeship for the welfare of backward peoples”. (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1937, 141) The members of the Round Table, reflecting on Britain’s colony of India in 1914, wrote: “as a whole the East does not understand the conceptions nor have its people acquired the habit which make self-government possible. The gradual introduction of these customs and habits is a work which will take centuries of orderly government to complete”. (Round Table 1914, 117) This view of the unequal evolution of different races was reflected in the complex subdivision of the empire into colonies where legislative power was vested in an appointed Governor alone, those where the Governor was advised by a partly appointed and partly elected legislative council, those with wholly elected legislative councils and those with their own systems of government which control most matters apart from external affairs.

The idea of social evolution also served as the justification for the inequality of civic rights within the Japanese empire. In 1918, for example, a government committee discussed the possibility of granting colonial subjects the right to elect members to
the Japanese Diet, as well as the possibility of enforcing conscription in the colonies, but concluded that “the time had not yet come” for such measures. To justify its conclusions, it compared the colonies with the prefecture of Okinawa, which until 1879 had been the Ryukyu Kingdom – an independent state, though one which paid tribute both to China and to the Japanese Domain of Satsuma – and had only gradually been incorporated into the Japanese nation. In Okinawa, conscription and voting rights had been introduced later than in other parts of Japan. (Tashiro 1974, 794)

These comments point to a second issue which, in addition to the question of representation, created particular complexities for nationality law in imperial systems: the question of military service. In traditional citizenship theory, the duty of military service is seen as being the obverse side of the rights of citizenship, and this relationship was very strongly emphasised in prewar Japanese writings on the subject. It seems clear that one of the main reasons for the maintenance of a firm distinction between subjects from overseas colonies [gaichi] and “mainland” Japanese [naichi] subjects in the Japanese system was a desire to exclude colonial peoples from conscription, on the grounds that they lacked the necessary loyalty to the state. (Tashiro 1974, 791) When all out war arrived, however, this ultimately proved untenable, and, after energetic recruitment of “volunteers”, by the final stages of the Asia-Pacific War Japan found it necessary to introduce conscription in the colonies of Korea and Taiwan, and to link this with promises of increased civic rights (discussed below).

In the British Empire conscription was enforced only during the First World War and from 1939 to 1962. During the world wars, Britain relied massively on the recruitment of Commonwealth troops from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, India and elsewhere. In peacetime however, the issue in the British Empire was not one of excluding potentially “disloyal” colonial subjects from conscription, but rather one of identifying particular colonial groups (such as the Ghurkhas) who provided potential sources for the recruitment of volunteer professional soldiers.

The British and Japanese colonial states, however, shared a concern with a third problem of imperial subjecthood: the problem of the movement of peoples. Since all inhabitants of the empire possessed the same nationality, they would theoretically appear to have had the right to migrate and settle anywhere within the empire, but in fact colonial powers had a very strong vested interest in controlling the movement of people: on the one hand, preventing migration to areas where they wished to maintain high wages and restrict ethnic diversity; on the other, encouraging the movement of people to areas with labour shortage. Although the underlying concerns were the same, the approach to this issue was different in the cases of Britain and Japan.

In the case of Japan, a single coherent framework was used to separate formal nationality from substantive citizenship; that is, to divide the rights and duties of subjects of the colonies [gaichi] from those of “Japanese proper” [naichi], and so to deal simultaneously with the questions of unequal civic rights and conscription, and
with the problem of the potential intermingling of people from different parts of the empire. This framework was the *koseki* or family register system, which has been described as creating “states within a state”. (Tashiro 1974, 795) In other words, while all colonial peoples possessed “Japanese nationality” - Nihon kokuseki - in terms of international law, they also had what might be termed a “regional citizenship” in terms of their family registration [koseki]. Each colony had its own family registration law, and people were not free to move their registration between one colony and another, or between the colonized “external territories” [gaichi] and “Japan proper” [naichi].

This system did not in itself prevent the movement of people between different parts of the empire, but it did ensure that (for example) colonial migrants to Japan were always distinguishable from the metropolitan population in terms of legal status. It also made it easier to draw up laws which discriminated between the rights of coloniser and colonised in the various overseas territories. In Korea and Taiwan, for example, separate school systems were established for local people (who had Korean or Taiwanese family registration) and for Japanese settlers (who, wherever they went in the empire, retained their naichi registration), though a small number of places in schools for settlers were reserved for socially elite or academically outstanding “colonials”. (Tanaka 1984, 160) The description of the system as creating “states within a state” seems particularly appropriate because the rules for changing family registration precisely mirrored the rules for changing nationality. For example, in marriages between people with family registration in different regions of the empire, the wife acquired the family registration of her husband, just as, in marriages between people of Japanese and foreign nationality, the wife was assumed to take her husband’s nationality.

In the British empire, there was no such comprehensive set of sub-systems to separate different categories of imperial subject. As Robert Huttenback has observed, “owing to its somewhat haphazard growth, the British Empire lacked the administrative and structural continuity apparent in more planned enterprises such as the French and German Empires”. (Huttenback 1976, 22) During the 19th century, many settler colonies were given a substantial measure of self-rule (evolving from the status of “Crown Colony” to “Dominion”), and many went on to enact their own migration regulations. Before the Second World War, moreover, some colonies or former colonies (notably Canada, South Africa and Ireland) introduced nationality laws of their own, defining the rights and duties of the nationals of their particular territories, who nonetheless remained British subjects. Other colonies and Commonwealth countries like Australia, however, did not create their own separate nationalities until after 1945.

Within this complex structure, the interests of colonial governments and the metropolitan power did not always coincide. (Huttenback 1976) In the settler colonies, a key issue from the mid-19th century onward was the desire to control and limit the inflow of non-European immigrants, many of whom came from other parts of the Empire. The obvious way to do this was through the use of crudely racial classifications. In 1896, for example, New South Wales banned the entry of “all
persons belonging to any coloured race inhabiting the Continent of Asia or the Continent of Africa, or any island adjacent thereto, or any island in the Pacific Ocean or Indian Ocean” (see Lake and Reynolds 2005, 144). However, this approach met with considerable resistance in Britain itself, in part because it evoked waves of protest in Britain’s largest colony, India, and in part because it complicated relations with other countries, notably Japan.

The New South Wales legislation and race-based labour migration laws in Queensland drew heated protests from the Japanese government, which felt (as Secretary of State for the Colonies Joseph Chamberlain put it) particular distress that “Japan should be spoken of in formal documents, such as the colonial Acts, as if the Japanese were on the same level of morality and civilization as Chinese, or other less advanced populations of Asia”. It was in response to these sensitivities that in 1901 the newly federated Australia passed an Immigration Restriction Act which made no explicit mention of race, but instead required entrants to Australia to be able to demonstrate knowledge of a European language: a knowledge that would be confirmed through a dictation test administered by an immigration officer. This form of language and education test had been introduced in Natal four years earlier, and was therefore commonly known as the “Natal Formula” (Huttenback 1976, 141).

The real meaning of the test was very firmly spelled out in the lengthy confidential notes for Australian immigration officers, produced by the Federal Government to help them administer the law effectively. These carefully explain:

It is intended that the dictation tests shall be an absolute bar to admission. Officers will therefore take means to ascertain whether, in their opinion, the immigrant can write English. If it is thought that he can, the test must be dictated in some other European language, one with which the immigrant is not acquainted...

The dictation test is not to be applied to Japanese, Indians and Hong Kong Chinese, who are the holders of passports from their governments...

Officers will use their discretion when applying this law. Persons who are suffering from any serious physical incapacity, and who are without means, may be regarded as coming within its terms; but Europeans of sound bodily health, notwithstanding that they have no money, should not be so regarded, and are to be admitted without restriction.

With the aid of such devices, by the beginning of the First World War, Australia, British Columbia and South Africa had all passed laws which, in one way or another, prevented the immigration of most non-Europeans.

In practice, then, the subjects of the Empire belonged to a multi-layered system, which served to ensure the inequality of rights and duties between different parts of the empire even as it sought to cement a shared identity as members of the imperial community. As one prewar study described the situation in the British Empire, “in
conferring political rights the state may discriminate between various classes of subjects, and in many parts of the Empire it does in fact discriminate, particularly on racial and economic grounds." (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1937: 309)

**Japanese Emigrants and the “Dual Nationality Problem”**

Nowadays nationality is often seen as being symbolised by the passport: the standardised ubiquitous prerequisite for international mobility. It is important to remember, though, that the contemporary form of multiple-use passport only gradually came into widespread use during the first half of the twentieth century. Emigrants leaving Japan in the late nineteenth century were expected to obtain official letters of permission, but frequent references to “illegal” or “unofficial” migrants suggest that many travelled without official documents. In the interwar period, Japanese travellers planning to go abroad generally had to obtain a new passport for each trip: only privileged categories (such as employees of major companies) could acquire passports for multiple journeys. On the other hand, a long-standing agreement with China ensured that throughout the 1920s and 1930s passport-free travel was possible in both directions between China and Japan. (Grew 1936) Restrictions on Chinese immigration were therefore enforced, less by the border controls with which we are familiar today, than by internal controls which made it difficult for Chinese migrants to obtain work or housing in Japan.

Even the very word *imin* - the Japanese term which covers both immigration and emigration - did not come into widespread use until the late nineteenth century. Before that, Japanese emigrés were often referred to by the term *dekaseginin* - “people who go out to earn money” - the same word which was used to describe seasonal labourers who left their home villages to seek work in other parts of Japan. (Hata 1970, 14-15) In other words, many of the ideas, rules and institutions which we now take for granted as marking the boundaries of national populations were only gradually developed through contact and friction with the modern world order. In this process, the Japanese state found itself confronting new and unforeseen problems relating to the definition of nationality.

The outflow of Japanese emigrants began on a small scale in the mid-1860s, and gathered pace after the Meiji Restoration of 1868. In that year, 148 Japanese went to Hawaii on labour contracts, while a further group of samurai from the defeated side in the Restoration struggle migrated to California. (Daniels 2006, 31; Dresner 2006, 53) Early Meiji emigrants were a diverse assortment of people including students officially sent overseas by the Japanese government, “pseudo-students” from less illustrious backgrounds who earned their keep while studying or enjoying the novelties of US or European society, sailors, itinerant entertainers and prostitutes. Few intended to settle permanently abroad: rather, they saw themselves as earning money or acquiring skills which would enable them to create a better life for themselves on their return to Japan. (Hata 1970; Ichioka 1988, 7-19) Official attitudes to this exodus varied. Some, like the famous westerniser Fukuzawa Yukichi, favoured the migration of Japanese geisha and prostitutes, whom he saw as
potential pioneers of Japanese overseas expansion. From the mid-1880s to the mid-1890s, the Japanese government also encouraged the emigration of some 30,000 contract labourers to the plantations of Hawaii, since it saw this as a means of releasing social tensions caused by economic recession in Japan. (Daniels 2006, 31)

At the same time, however, other Japanese observers lamented the bad image of Japan projected by “undesirable elements”. In the early twentieth century, attempts to regulate the behaviour of “undesirable” emigrants became linked to fears of rising anti-Japanese racism in the United States, Canada and elsewhere. But Japanese concern at the impact of emigration on national prestige predated by many years the emergence of anti-Japanese exclusion movements, and this suggests that the processes of emigration challenged the unspoken, and perhaps unconscious, images of Japanese nationality developed by bureaucrats and politicians in the course of Meiji period debates on the modern nation state.

The official image of “the Japanese national”, in other words, was shaped not simply by ethno-racial preconceptions but also by preconceptions of gender, class and lifestyle. To the extent that they represented Japan to the world, emigrants were expected to represent a Japan which conformed to urban, middle-class ideologies of officialdom: they should embody the sober, frugal, hard-working values of a modernising Japan. Late nineteenth-century consular officials complained, not simply of emigrants who drank, gambled or engaged in prostitution, but also of those who made spectacles of themselves by going around the streets of foreign cities dressed in traditional Japanese garb. In the 1880s, for example, the Japanese consul in New York expressed particular horror at one Matsuda Kojiro, a sumo wrestler who insisted on dressing in quilted gown, obi sash and wooden clogs with supreme indifference to the fact that he “looked outlandish and indecent to the eyes of Americans”. (Quoted in Hata 1970, 30)

By the beginning of the twentieth century, the nature of Japanese emigration had begun to change. The numbers of migrants were now much higher, running at around 10,000 a year in the early years of the century, and the majority of migrants were agricultural and other labourers from relatively poor rural regions of Japan, many of whom were recruited by labour contracting companies. The main destinations for migration at this stage were Hawaii, Canada and the United States, but in 1907 an agreement to encourage Japanese migration was reached with the state of Sao Paulo in Brazil, which was to become a major magnet for emigrants in the 1920s and early 1930s, and from the period of the First World War onwards emigration to Southeast Asia also began to expand rapidly.
By the end of the 1920s there were some 140,000 Japanese residents on the US mainland, around 134,000 in Hawaii, 130,000 in Brazil and about 30,000 in the Philippines, Malaya and the Dutch East Indies combined. (Garrels 1930, 4) As the geographical spread of Japanese emigration extended, so its social character also evolved. More and more migrants were now beginning to recognise that their departure from Japan was permanent, and Japanese community associations were beginning to establish schemes to help emigrants purchase land in their new home countries. (Ichioka 146-153)

In responding to these changes, Japanese bureaucrats continued to see the migrant in patriarchal terms, as a national liability whose behaviour was to be guided and controlled so as to present a favourable image of Japan to the outside world. The state, for example, took a very active role in regulating the “picture bride” system which proliferated in the United States as male Japanese emigrés to America sought wives from home. Under this system, emigrant men sent photographs and details of their lives to friends or relatives in Japan, who selected a bride for them. The marriage ceremony took place in Japan, with the bridegroom in absentia, and the bride then obtained permission to join her husband overseas.
The Japanese government sanctioned the system until 1920, when public criticism in the US caused them to suspend the issuing of passports to “picture brides” bound for America. It also took it upon itself to intervene in many aspects of the marriage arrangements. Ordinary labourers were ineligible to sponsor “picture brides” until 1915, and thereafter were given permission only if they could prove that they had savings of over $800. Women had to enter their names into their prospective husband’s family register six months before applying for a passport. They could not be more than thirteen years younger than their husband, and had to submit to rigorous health examinations before leaving Japan. (Ichikawa 1988, 166-167)

Regulations like these were inspired by two distinct motives. On the one hand, they demonstrated a genuine if paternalistic concern to protect women from abusive husbands, but at the same time they were also clearly designed to protect the public image of the Japanese citizen by imposing an official model of proper marital relationships. A similar mixture of motives also prompted the passing of the 1896 “Migrants’ Protection Act” [Imin Hogo Ho] whose main aim was to control the activities of the Japanese labour contracting firms which were responsible for recruiting a large proportion of Japanese emigrants. Labour contracting companies were required to post a bond and obtain a licence from the government, to draw up written contracts with the workers they recruited and to take responsibility for
helping sick or indigent workers return to Japan. At the same time, emigrants who were not recruited by contracting companies were obliged to name two guarantors who would assist them if they ran into difficulties overseas. (Ichioka 1988, 47-48)

The Act marked a new stage in the history of an extremely close relationship between the Japanese state and migrant recruiting companies. In 1917 the government again intervened to force the forty or so existing labour contractors to
merge into a single firm: the Overseas Development Company [Kaigai Kogyo Kaisha], and from 1921 onwards the company was supported by annual government subsidies. (Allison 1934a, 5-6) The symbiotic relationship between state and labour recruiters is well illustrated by the case of Japanese migration to Brazil. During the first quarter of the twentieth century, increasing hostility to Asian immigration in the United States and Canada led to growing restrictions on the inflow of Japanese workers, and in 1924 America’s racially discriminatory Immigration Act put an end to labour migration from Japan to the USA.

American exclusionism, coming at a time of considerable economic distress in rural Japan, encouraged migrants and government officials to look for other destinations. In 1927-1928 the Japanese government drew up a colonisation plan with the Brazilian government, the local administration of the Sao Paulo region and three large Japanese companies: the Overseas Development Co., the Osaka Steamship Co. and the partly state-owned Oriental Development Co. [Toyo Takushoku Kaisha]. Under this plan, migrants were recruited particularly from the poorer rural districts of southwestern Japan - including Kumamoto and Fukuoka Prefectures, as well as Hokkaido and Okinawa - to work on Brazilian coffee and cotton plantations and silk farms, some of which were directly owned by the Overseas Development Company. (Suzuki 1969, 172; McClintock 1933)

Both sending and receiving ends of the migration process were carefully regulated. Migrants who signed up with the Overseas Development Company were usually transported to Kobe, where they spent a week or ten days in the Kobe Emigrants’ Hostel, opened in 1928. Here they were given health checks and vaccinations and their personal possessions were disinfected. The hostel also provided classes in Portuguese, sewing, hygiene and physical education, and lectures on religious, social and agricultural conditions in Brazil. Once their processing was complete, the migrants embarked on a long and circuitous voyage to South America via China, Singapore, Ceylon, Mombassa and Cape Town - a route determined by the commercial considerations of the Osaka Steamship Company, which picked up and unloaded cargo along the way. The ¥200 fare per emigrant was wholly paid by the Japanese government, and in 1933 the Osaka Steamship Company was said to have earned a revenue of ¥2.7 million from the transport of migrants to Brazil. (McClintock 1933, 14-16)

When they arrived at the port of Santos in Brazil, migrants were met by a representative of the Overseas Development Company, who arranged their transport to the plantations where they were to be employed. Labour contracts bound them to work for the plantation, often for six years but sometimes for as long as ten, but in the meanwhile most hoped to save enough money to acquire their own smallholding or market garden. (Konno and Fujisaki 1994, 62-63) As the US Vice-Consul in Kobe observed, after a visit to the Kobe Emigrants’ Hostel, “the Japanese emigrant to Brazil takes with him a very slender store of the world’s goods: bedding, a few extra kimonos and a thin suit, some pots and pans and a great deal of optimism.” (McClintock 1933, 14)
As migrants settled into their new lives, and as the second generation of overseas Japanese was born, the government faced new problems of defining the boundaries of Japanese nationality. The 1899 Nationality Law had envisaged that Japanese nationals who became naturalised citizens of foreign countries would lose their Japanese nationality. This, in fact, was not relevant to migrants to the United States because racially discriminatory pre-war US citizenship regulations limited naturalisation to “free white persons” and descendants of slaves. (Ichikawa 1988, 1) First-generation Asian immigrants were therefore denied the right to naturalisation. Under the ius soli system of citizenship, the children of Japanese migrants, if born on US soil, did automatically have a right to US nationality. However, Japan's Nationality Law stipulated only that people who became naturalised citizens of foreign countries would lose their Japanese nationality, but contained no provision for people born overseas to renounce that nationality.

As the number of second generation migrants grew, this issue became a growing problem. For one thing, it meant that the overseas-born children of Japanese migrants were liable to conscription if they returned to Japan; for another, it fuelled fears amongst host populations that Japanese migrants would never become wholly reliable citizens of their new homeland, but would always retain a prior loyalty to Japan. From around 1910 onwards, with a rising tide of anti-Japanese sentiment in North America, the question of dual nationality became a topic of increasing debate both within Japan and amongst Japanese communities overseas, and Japanese emigre groups began to lobby the government for a change in the law. (See for example Yoshida 1913).

The response was at first a cautious one: in 1916, the Nationality Law was amended to allow second generation emigrants to renounce Japanese citizenship, although adult males could only do so after they had completed compulsory military service. This was followed, however, by a more fundamental reform, introduced in 1924, which made it necessary for children born in ius soli nations (specified as the USA, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile and Peru) to be registered with the Japanese consulate within two weeks of their birth if they were to retain Japanese citizenship. These changes helped to clarify the boundaries of Japanese belonging, but, perhaps predictably, they failed to silence anti-Japanese sentiments amongst some sections of the US population, since these sentiments were based much more on racial stereotypes and fears of economic competition than they were on legal realities. In the mid-1930s V. S. McClatchy, the Executive Secretary of the exclusionist California Joint Immigration Committee, was still complaining that “only” one-third of the Japanese born in Hawaii since the revision of the law had chosen to renounce their Japanese citizenship. (McClatchy 1936)

Colonial Migrants in Japan

The response of the Japanese government to the emigrant issue reveals deep ambiguities in the official attitude to nationality. At one level, there was a profound mistrust of the notion of dual nationality, which was seen as creating administrative
untidiness and potential conflicts of loyalty. But at another, the government wished as far as possible to retain some hold over the conduct of emigrants, and was therefore reluctant to do anything to encourage overseas Japanese to renounce their original citizenship. But if the status of emigrants created complexities, the status of Japan’s colonial citizens was even more fraught with paradoxes, inconsistencies and expediencies.

In relation to the world order - the realms beyond the boundaries of the Japanese empire itself - colonial subjects were Japanese. If they lived abroad (like the substantial number of Koreans who migrated to Latin America), they were expected to register with the Japanese Consulate as did all other Japanese citizens; if they competed in the Olympics (like the Korean marathon gold medalist Son Kitei), they competed for the Japanese team. But within the bounds of the empire itself, a quite different set of distinctions came into play. Here, colonial subjects were holders of “external territory family registration” [gaichi koseki] as opposed to “internal territory family registration” [naichi koseki] - a status which could only be changed in the most exceptional of circumstances. As such, their rights and duties, as well as the regulations covering the recording of their births, marriages and deaths, were governed by the local rules of the colony (Korea, Taiwan etc.) rather than by the rule of metropolitan Japan. The bureaucratic tangles created by this dual system of belonging are vividly illustrated by the handbooks of case law issued in the pre-war period to guide courts and officials through the maze of the family registration system.

What should be done (asks one bewildered official) when a Japanese woman has married a Korean man in Japan, and registered her marriage correctly under metropolitan Japanese law, but the head of the husband’s family has not consented to the marriage, which makes the marriage invalid under colonial Korean regulations? Could an official in Japan take responsibility for entering an illegitimate child, born in Japan to a Taiwanese man and a Japanese woman, into the father’s Taiwanese family registry? When a Korean man (who was born before Korea became a colony) was adopted as an heir by a Japanese family, should his date of birth be entered into the Japanese family register according to the traditional Korean dating system or according to the Japanese system? (Sakamoto 1938, 62-63)

These, and dozens of similar cases, remind us that despite the discrimination which permeated the colonial order, the movement of people through the empire constantly created human complexities, hybridities and blurred boundaries. In theory, colonial subjects enjoyed the legal right to enter Japan but (because of the immobility of family registration) not to equal legal status within metropolitan Japanese society. In practice, however, the state used a variety of mechanisms to control the flow of migration: at some times, restricting the flow of migrants into Japan; at others, conscripting labour for work in Japan or other parts of the empire. In Korea, the agricultural policies introduced by the colonial government created a widening divide between large and small farmers, and produced a growing problem of rural poverty which drove many Koreans to seek work in the industrial cities of Japan. During the 1920s, the Korean population in Japan expanded rapidly, from
around 30,000 to some 300,000, and the government was beginning to introduce measures to stem the migratory tide. Koreans travelling to Japan began to be required to obtain “embarkation certificates” from the police in their home regions, and these were only issued when the migrants could prove that they had sufficient means to support themselves, or relatives in Japan who could help them find accommodation and work.

By the late 1930s, though, the situation had shifted again. The escalating war in China led to growing demand for labour in mines, armament factories and heavy industry, particularly as increasing numbers of Japanese workers were drafted into the armed forces. To fill the gap, Japanese companies and government turned increasingly to colonial Korea. The forced labour [kyosei renko] system introduced during the war years consisted in fact of a complex and changing maze of ordinances allowing colonial authorities to recruit workers with varying degrees of coercion.

Under the Labour Mobilization Laws of 1939, companies were able to recruit labour in the colonies; under a revised scheme initiated in 1942, they submitted requests to the appropriate government authorities, who then vetted them and passed on “quotas” for labour recruitment to colonial officials in various regions of Korea. How these officials fulfilled their quotas was very much a matter for local discretion, but might include anything from financial inducements, to threats and promises, to outright force. A direct system of labour conscription was introduced in 1944. (Pak 1975, 14) Similar methods were used (though on a somewhat smaller scale) to recruit labourers from Manchuria and North China, and prisoners-of-war from China were also sent to work in Japan (Vasisht 1997, 130-131; Sugihara 2002)

Most notoriously, a combination of deception and threats was in many cases used to recruit women for employment in military brothels during the Pacific War: about 80% of women conscripted into military prostitution are believed to have come from Korea.
Chinese plaintiffs enter Nagasaki court to demand payment for wartime forced labor, 2004

The lives of colonial migrants to Japan varied greatly according to their social circumstances. Migrant or conscript labourers generally faced extremely harsh working conditions and received far lower wages than their Japanese counterparts. Forced labourers in the mines and military-related industries were often held as virtual prisoners, and risked death if they tried to escape. (Underwood 2006) On the other hand, the substantial numbers of colonial subjects who came to Japan to complete their university education were often able to associate relatively easily with members of the Japanese intellectual elite, despite the underlying inequities of the colonial order. It should be remembered, too, that migrants were not wholly devoid of civil rights. In 1918, during a debate on the legal systems of the colonies, a number of Japanese parliamentarians raised the question of the voting rights of Taiwanese and Korean residents in Japan. The Japanese electoral law was not based on the family registration system but rather bestowed the franchise on all “male imperial subjects” who lived in Japan proper and (until 1925) who paid more than a specified amount of tax. In 1920 the Ministry of the Interior issued an administrative ordinance making it clear that this included “male imperial subjects” from the colonies living in metropolitan Japan. At that stage, the ruling was almost entirely academic, since hardly any colonial migrants were wealthy enough to qualify for the vote under Japan’s property-based franchise. (Matsuda 1995, 21-25)

The story changed, however, after 1925, when universal male suffrage was introduced. A growing number of Korean and Taiwanese migrants to Japan registered to vote, and in the 1932 general election twelve Korean candidates stood for the Japanese parliament, of whom one - Pak Chunkim, from the Tokyo constituency of Honjo-Fukagawa - was elected. (Matsuda 1995, 102) The inclusion
of colonial migrants in the Japanese franchise, however, was not a simple victory for civic rights. For one thing, the proportion of immigrants who enrolled to vote remained very low, in part because the franchise was restricted to males over 25 those who had lived in the same constituency for at least one year. As a result, the total number of Korean residents enrolled to vote in 1936 was a mere 41,829. (Matsuda 1995, 37) Besides, the Korean migrants who became active participants in domestic Japanese politics were drawn from the relatively small pro-Japanese group who believed that cooperation with colonialism was the best means of winning concessions from the colonisers. They failed to gain support from those sections of the politically-aware migrant community who saw their only hope for the future as lying in the struggle for independence.

Throughout the 1920s, 1930s and early 1940s there were intermittent debates on the desirability of extending some form of voting rights to colonial subjects, not just in metropolitan Japan but also in the colonies. These, however, came to nothing until the very last months of the Pacific War. At this stage, the desperate military situation persuaded the Japanese government that it was necessary to introduce military conscription for colonial subjects. As compensation for this new civic duty, it was also proposed that the franchise should be extended to the colonised areas of Korea, Taiwan and Karafuto, who would be allowed to elect (respectively) twenty-three, five and three members to the Japanese Lower House. Even this concession, however, was heavily hedged around with qualifications. The colonial franchise, unlike that for Japanese, would be restricted to men who paid more than 15 yen in direct taxes, thus excluding a large proportion of tenant farmers and workers. In any event, the electoral reform, which was passed in May 1945, was too late to have any practical effect. Before an election could be held under the revised system, Japan had surrendered to the Allied forces. (Tanaka 1984, 162)

Across Imperial Boundaries

The creation of the Japanese empire did not simply result in an outflow of Japanese administrators and settlers to the colonies and an inflow of colonial migrant workers into Japan. Instead, it produced much more complex cross-currents whose consequences (in some cases) are still being felt today. Like all modern empires, Japanese colonialism created a multi-layered structure in which the colonised might also participate in the processes of colonisation. In the British empire, many Irish colonial subjects sought escape from poverty at home by serving in the imperial army in India. In the Japanese case, Okinawans formed a disproportionately large part of the Japanese settler population in Taiwan and the Micronesian Mandated Territories (though as a group they faced the prejudices of colonists from other parts of Japan). Some Taiwanese and Koreans, in turn, volunteered for service with the Japanese army or served as auxiliaries with the Japanese occupation forces in wartime Southeast Asia.

In the interwar period, the tight restrictions which prevented the migration of foreign labourers (other than colonial subjects) into metropolitan Japan were not necessarily applied in the colonies. In Taiwan, for example, a more flexible set of
regulations allowed a fair amount of coming and going between the island and the Chinese mainland during the 1920s. Labour contractors based in Taiwan were authorised by the Government General to recruit Chinese labour for work in plantations and other colonial projects, and Chinese labourers were allowed to enter the colony provided that they had a certificate issued by one of these agencies. In 1924, for example, some 6,800 Chinese labourers and 3,000 other Chinese were admitted to Taiwan. (De Vault 1925) A similar situation existed in the northern colony of Karafuto, where the colonial authorities repeatedly complained of a shortage of labour for development purposes. Apart from the small indigenous population and a few hundred remaining ethnic Russians, the great majority of the colony’s population was made up of settlers from Japan (particularly from Hokkaido and northern Honshu. Yet, because of the harsh climate and tough frontier reputation of the colony, the government had difficulty in attracting migrants to Karafuto. Initially, the population expanded rapidly, from around 12,000 in 1908 to almost 100,000 in 1920, but thereafter the pace of expansion slowed. (Karafuto Cho 1973, 86-90) By the 1930s, the population was around 300,000, but officials and entrepreneurs were finding it almost impossible to recruit enough Japanese workers for some of the most arduous labouring tasks in the colony.

The most intractable problem was railway construction: particularly the building of a railway line through the rugged mountainous interior of the island, linking the colonial capital of Toyohara in the east with the west-coast port of Maoka. This project, which was completed in 1928, involved particularly atrocious working conditions, and many labourers died as a result of the extreme cold, landslides, rockfalls and tunnel collapses. Here again, as in Taiwan, the colonial authorities chose to supplement an inadequate Japanese workforce with Chinese labourers, who were recruited by contracting companies for very low wages. An uncertain number of Chinese, but probably several thousand, were brought to Karafuto to work on the railway in the mid-1920s, although tensions with the Japanese workforce eventually led to the abandonment of the labour recruitment scheme. (Karafuto Cho 1973, 1245; Karafuto Cho Keisatsu Bu 1990, 391-393)

In the 1930s, though, and particularly from the late 1930s onwards, growing numbers of Korean workers were recruited to supplement the Karafuto labour force. By 1929 there were over 4,000 Koreans in Karafuto, many of them employed in the colony’s coal mines, and after the outbreak of full-scale war in China in 1937 the number soared. The precise number of Korean workers brought to Karafuto during the war is unknown, but it is thought to have reached a peak of around 50,000 - well over 10% of the colony’s population, before declining slightly in the final months of the war as workers were transferred to metropolitan Japan. The first postwar census conducted after the Soviet Union gained control of Japanese Karafuto [now re-incorporated into the Russian region of Sakhalin] found that there were 23,498 Korean residents (15,356 men and 8,142 women). However, this figure is almost certainly an underestimate, since just six years later the census of 1951 counted 42,900 Koreans in Sakhalin. (Kuzin 1993, 200-201)
The postwar Japanese government and the allied occupation authorities in Japan moved fairly quickly to repatriate ethnic Japanese from the colony, but no efforts were made to evacuate the Koreans, despite the fact that, until the Treaty of San Francisco came into effect in 1952, they were still "Japanese nationals" under international law. (Hirowatari 1993, 101) Apart from a few who managed to flee in the immediate post-surrender confusion, most remained stranded in Sakhalin. Today there are some 40,000 Korean residents in Sakhalin, some still seeking to return to the Korean homes and families which they left more than fifty years ago in the belief that they were going abroad to fulfil a one-year or two-year contract. It was only in 1992 that the Japanese and South Korean governments finally agreed to contribute to a scheme under which some of the first generation of Sakhalin Koreans were able to return home. (Underwood 2007)

In the 1920s and early 1930s, however, the largest and most controversial migratory movement was the exodus of Koreans into Manchuria and North China. Korea and the adjacent Chinese region of Chientao (Jiandao) had ancient historical connections, and there were already over 200,000 Koreans living in the region when Korea became a Japanese colony in 1910. (Park 2005, 44) During the following two decades, rural poverty in Korea not only encouraged large-scale labour migration to Japan, but also prompted a massive flow of landless farmers from Korea into Manchuria. According to one estimate, by the early 1920s there were half a million Koreans in Manchuria, the Tumen Region and Eastern Inner Mongolia, as compared with just 2,000 metropolitan Japanese. (Hsu 1932, 142) By 1935, the number of Koreans in Manchuria had exceeded 800,000, and by 1942 it had reached about 1.5 million. (Park 2005, 44) For these migrants, the difficulties of adjusting to a new life in a harsh environment were aggravated by their uncertain nationality status. In many cases, they faced discrimination from Chinese authorities because they were "aliens". Tensions between immigrants and local people were reflected in conflicts like the Wanpaoshan (Manbosan) Incident of 1931, where Korean tenant farmers in Manchuria clashed with Chinese landowners: an event which sparked subsequent anti-Chinese riots in Korea.

If Korean migrants to Manchuria attempted to solve their problems by becoming naturalised Chinese, or later Manchukuo, citizens, however, they encountered a new problem. The Japanese government, which had substantial economic and strategic interests in Manchuria, wanted to enhance its claims to a presence in the region. It therefore continued to regard all Koreans in Manchuria as Japanese subjects, required them to maintain their Korean family residence, and insisted on the right for its consular representatives to attend court cases involving the migrants. (Hsu 1932, 143; Shinobu 1932, 286-287) Statements by Japanese legal experts, in fact, suggest that the desire to maintain a claim over this emigrant group was a major reason for the failure of the Japanese government to officially extend the provisions of the Nationality Law to Korea: since the 1899 law made it clear that Japanese subjects who took up foreign nationality would lose their Japanese nationality, its application to Korea would have made it all too easy for the emigrants to transfer their allegiance to China. (see Shinobu 1932, 286-287) Many Koreans in Manchuria
thus acquired dual nationality, but as Park Hyun Ok observes, this dual nationality “represented the incompatibility of national membership in the Korean and Manchukuo states rather than enjoyment of membership in both.” (Park 2005, 137)

Legacies

In a new age of global movement, some of the underlying paradoxes of the imperial age appear to be resurfacing. Once again, the economic imperatives promoting large-scale migration interact in complex ways with the political impulse to control, channel and screen, separating “desirable” from “undesirable” and creating multiple categories of residents with hierarchies of political rights. The dictation test is long dead, but the British government increasingly uses language tests in selecting migrants, and has even threatened to exclude immigrant spouses who cannot pass an English test. Both Britain and Australia, meanwhile, have recently introduced citizenship tests, based on multiple-choice questions about national culture, for those seeking naturalisation. Though more sensitive and subtle in their operation than colonial era antecedents, such “cultural literacy tests” perform a similar function – screening out those considered undesirable in terms of class and culture, and reassuring existing citizens that the walls surrounding their nation state are robustly guarded. And, like the dictation tests of old, the content of such tests can be carefully adjusted to open doors to certain categories of migrant while closing doors to others.

In Japan too, the history of migration and nationality in the prewar Japanese Empire has an important bearing on contemporary politics. The multiple and intersecting movements of people across the space of empire had lasting implications for Japan and for East Asian society more generally. Today, for example, the return migration of ethnic Koreans from Manchuria and China is transforming the social make up of some urban communities in South Korea. Official figures of “Chinese immigrants” in Japan also include an unknown number of ethnic Koreans from the region that was once Manchukuo. (Kwon, Miyajima, Tanigawa and Lee 2006) Efforts by Koreans from Sakhalin to return to Korea continue to generate political controversy. Though a scheme has been established by the South Korean and Japanese governments to assist the return of some first-generation Sakhalin Koreans, this is limited in scope and fails to fully satisfy demands for resettlement and recompense. (Underwood 2007)

The institutional legacies are equally profound. Debates on local voting rights for foreigners in Japan today often overlook the fact that Korean and Taiwanese men in Japan had voting rights from the Taisho period until 1945, and that these were unilaterally rescinded by the Japanese government in December 1945, at the very moment when Japanese women were given the vote. This disenfranchisement occurred at a time when the long-term nationality status of Korean and Taiwanese residents in Japan still remained to be settled. Despite insistence from some legal advisers to the Allied Occupation that former colonial subjects in Japan should be given a choice of nationalities, when the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into force in 1952 the Japanese government unilaterally revoked these residents’ claim to
Japanese nationality. (Kim 1997) These events still cast a shadow over current debates about the legal rights of the 440,000 descendents of colonial period migrants 4 who still live as foreigners in Japan today, and over the identity and cultural rights of the hundreds of thousands more who have obtained Japanese nationality by naturalization. Meanwhile, the issues of dual nationality which surfaced in the 1920s and 1930s also have echoes for twenty-first century Japan. For Japan, the challenge will be to devise responses to the new age of mobility which will overcome the remaining troubled legacies of colonialism, and create a secure basis of civil and social rights for foreigners, old an new.

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Notes

1 Holders of Special Permanent Residence (tokubetsu eijosha) are colonial-period immigrants and their descendents, who are treated differently from others because colonial period immigrants were Japanese subjects when they moved to Japan, and were only turned into “aliens” by an administrative fiat of the Japanese government at the time when the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into force in 1952.

2 Dispatch from Chamberlain, 20 October 1897, in Australian National Archives, series no A8/1, control symbol 1902/51 Part 6.

3 “Immigration Restriction Acts 1901 and 1905, Notes for the Guidance of Officers”, in Australian National Archives, series no A1/1, control symbol 1922/7119.

4 In 2006 there were 443,044 holders of “Special Permanent Residence”, the status given to colonial period migrants, mostly from Korea, and their descendents. See Immigration Bureau, Immigration Control 2007.

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Women's Anti-Imperialism, 'The White Man's Burden,' and the Philippine-American War  
Erin L. Murphy

At the Chicago Liberty Meeting in April 1899, organized to protest U.S. imperialist advances in the Philippines, Jane Addams was the only woman of eight plenary speakers. There she stated, “To ‘protect the weak’ has always been the excuse of the ruler and tax-gatherer, the chief, the king, the baron; and now, at last, of ‘the white man’” (Addams 1899). A few months earlier, in late 1898, the United States purchased the Philippines from Spain in the Treaty of Paris despite a preexisting revolutionary movement for independence. Subsequently, the Philippine-American War broke out, with Filipinos continuing to seek an end to colonial rule, be it the rule of Spain or the United States. President Roosevelt officially announced the war to be over on July 4, 1902, although fighting continued in some provinces through 1913.

With the U.S. military mobilized in the Philippines, U.S. citizens mobilized an opposition movement in the metropole. The Anti-Imperialist League (AIL), the vanguard of the movement, organized around the Constitutional contradictions of imperialism and democracy. Those eventually identifying as "anti-imperialists" included men and women, people of various “races,”	1 conservatives and progressives, elites and laborers, Boston Brahmins and rural populists. The initial goal of the movement was to stop the U.S. from taking the Philippines as a colony. After the ratification of the Treaty of Paris in the Senate, the AIL endorsed William Jennings Bryan as an anti-imperialist candidate for President in the 1900 election, which yielded another defeat. It then appeared to many anti-imperialists that the U.S. was on an imperialist course that could no longer be stopped, so they dropped out of the movement. Those left focused on the news of the U.S. military committing egregious violence in the Philippines and became determined to expose such "atrocities" to the public. Women made material and symbolic contributions to this movement at home and abroad. However, their contributions have been previously disregarded.

Anti-Imperialism and the White Man’s Burden

White men from privileged or well-known backgrounds represented the public face of the anti-imperialist movement, men such as: steel-magnate Andrew Carnegie, labor leader Samuel Gompers, satirist Mark Twain, lawyer-activist Moorfield Storey, Charles Francis Adams, Jr. (grandson of John Quincy Adams), Harvard philosopher William James, Yale sociologist William Graham Sumner, and reformers known for their connections to abolitionism, like William Lloyd Garrison, Jr. However, rank and file anti-imperialists included many working-class whites, Black and white women, as well as Black men, all of whom disagreed with the path the United States was taking in the Philippines.

For example, in February 1899, McClure’s magazine published Rudyard Kipling’s poem “The White Man’s Burden: The United States and the Philippine Islands.” In
the midst of debates over the United States' involvement in the Philippines, the poem spread quickly. In it, Kipling advised the United States to take its place alongside Great Britain and make the sacrifices necessary for the civilization of those "half devil and half child." However, it was also the inspiration for many anti-imperialist counter-poems, serving as a phrase for anti-imperialist ridicule because of contradictions between violence and civilization.


While anti-imperialists were carving out the organization and its agenda, pro-imperialists were there to oppose them at every turn. In her work, Fighting for American Manhood (1998), Kristin Hoganson notes "imperialists derided the antis' manliness" (p. 175). Supporters of imperialism did this through depicting anti-imperialist men in cartoons as the "aunties," feminizing their opposition to the Philippine-American War. Feminizing anti-imperialists was meant to delegitimate their public influence on imperialist policies (Hoganson 1998). Hoganson (1998) states, "depicting men as women was the most effective way of showing they lacked the manly character necessary for political authority" (p. 176-177). But even for pro-imperialists, Anglo-Saxon men's supposed "adaptability," previously seen as so advantageous for progress, now needed to be reconsidered in light of colonial contact with "savage" Filipinos (Newman 1999). Therefore, during the Spanish-American War and the Philippine-American War, martial masculinity hegemonically redefined the relationship between gender, race, and nation (Hoganson 1998), emphasizing white men's independence. This put the masculinities of other white men, like anti-imperialists promoting cautiousness, in question with regard to their claims to patriotism and citizenship. Targeting governmental policies for change meant that the AIL's main audience would be enfranchised citizens (i.e. in 1899, mainly white men), and pro-imperialists appealed to the same audience. Though formulations of it were contested, "the white man's burden" was inescapable.
"It Won't Come Down" Puck. Oct. 4, 1899. (Source: The Forbidden Book (2004) ed. Ignacio et al.). This image literally shows the tension between the nationalist masculinities of the imperialists, embodied in the physically large, strong, young, white soldiers, and the miniscule, older white anti-imperialists, many dressed as women, apropos the "aunties." Anti-imperialist men were called "old women with trousers on," "squaw men," the "'old lady element' of public affairs," and were said to resemble a "nagging wife" (Hoganson 1998,177).

The intersectionality of anti-imperialists' race, class, and gender informed their views (Collins 2000). Therefore, there was no single coherent anti-imperialism. Rather, there were multiple anti-imperialisms. For example, in the context of "the white man's burden" debates, anti-imperialist leaders had an ambivalent take on gender and on women's roles as anti-imperialists. They spent
little time discussing women, gender, or themselves as "emasculated" men in their correspondence to each other-- a function of their gendered privilege (Kimmel 2006). Their anti-imperialism came from a particular conception of their role as responsible citizens, carrying out their obligations to keep the nation true to its democratic legacy. While they espoused freedom, liberty, and self-determination, they practiced patriarchal control of the resistance. While they tried to prevent the nation from committing violence against racialized imperialist subjects, they kept Black men and women at the margins.

However, rejoinders to "the white man's burden" filled the pages of Black publications in various forms of "the Black man's burden" (Gatewood 1975). Some Black men like Clifford H. Plummer, who was secretary of the National Colored Protective League and an attorney in Boston, were involved with plans to form a Black auxiliary to the AIL (Gatewood 1975), and more formed their own organizations such as the "Colored National Anti-Imperialistic League" and the "Negro National Anti-Imperial and Anti-Trust League" (Foner and Winchester 1984: 167). Booker T. Washington wrote to the New York AIL declaring his support of anti-imperialist efforts and publicly declared his opposition given already existing "race problems" (Gatewood 1975). Kelly Miller, a professor at Howard University and a colleague of W.E.B. Du Bois in editing The Crisis, authored a broadside (an extended pamphlet) published by the AIL which stated "The whole trend of imperial aggression is antagonistic to the feeble races. It is a revival of racial arrogance." The anti-imperialist analyses of Black men ranged from radical to moderate, but they were all rooted in critiques of spreading race prejudice beyond the U.S. "race problems" (Gatewood 1975) with Indians, Blacks, and Chinese (Murphy 2005). Led by Ida B. Wells and the African American woman's club movement, the anti-lynching campaigns at the turn of the 20th century were seen as anti-imperialism by these women, including Anna Julia Cooper and Ida B. Wells (Carby 1985).

Although anti-imperialist leaders periodically made arguments comparing lynching Black men at home with torturing Filipinos in the colony, their practices of exclusion reproduced inequalities across race, class, and gender within the movement. Anti-imperialist leaders appreciated and accepted the support of women and women's organizations, but they were not open to taking on gender inequality along with anti-imperialism, though Susan B. Anthony did seek the support of men in the AIL. Keeping gender politics off the table enabled a situation where gendered contradictions could coexist, explicitly invoking gendered discourses only if immediate benefits were clear.

Although many women supported anti-imperialism, most of the women directly involved with the AIL were white and middle-class, a fact that enabled them to make monetary contributions to the movement. White women from the Midwest and the East Coast formed auxiliary organizations of the AIL. The women's auxiliary of the Boston AIL petitioned other women for support in 1899. They implored, "We, women of the United States, earnestly protest against the war of conquest into which our country has been plunged in the Philippine islands. We appeal to the
Declaration of Independence, which is the moral foundation of the constitution you have swore to defend, we reaffirm its weighty words.” Other women’s organizations such as the WCTU, the Congress of Mothers, and the Daughters of the American Revolution (DAR) also took official anti-imperialist stances, offering the AIL support. WCTU leadership educated affiliated women on international affairs and violence in the Philippines, which they attributed to prostitution and liquor (Papachristou 1990).

Two extraordinary women, Jane Addams and Josephine Shaw Lowell, transcended the expected roles for women of the AIL. Both of these white women acquired informal leadership positions as extraordinary "individuals" with valuable resources. Both had prior experience as reformers, informing their anti-imperialism and their style of activism, which was familiar to progressives. Addams is frequently listed as one of the AIL’s most well-known vice presidents. She lent her name to the anti-imperialist cause as well as spoke at the 1899 Chicago Liberty Meetings against imperialism. In her speech, “Democracy or Militarism,” Addams opened, “None of us who has been reared and nurtured in America can be wholly without the democratic instinct. It is not a question with any of us of having it or not having it; it is a merely question of trusting it or not trusting it” (Addams 1899), illuminating from her standpoint as a middle-class white woman that democratic values were taken for granted by US Americans. Therefore, she allowed anti-imperialists to use her social capital to support democracy.

In 1901, Josephine Shaw Lowell was the first woman appointed vice president of the New York Anti-Imperialist League. Lowell had lived with her husband in military camps during the Civil War. She subsequently devoted her life to philanthropic and reform work in the New York region. Like Addams, she was a seasoned and connected reformer when she took on the cause of anti-imperialism. As an anti-imperialist, Lowell was well into her 60s and deeply involved in the New York AIL. She gave opening and closing remarks at multiple AIL meetings. She had the most prolific correspondence with Ordway of any anti-imperialist, making suggestions as to the best and most effective courses of action. She agitated for more protests and public demonstrations against imperialism, specifically requesting something akin to what had been done during the abolitionist movement. She favored gathering petitions against imperialism in the Philippines with signatures of prominent Americans, and the New York AIL followed her preference.

However, Lowell was aware of the gendered politics around women’s involvement in anti-imperialist activities. She believed that keeping her name off petitions and other public matters would garner more support for anti-imperialism than taking credit for her activities. Therefore, Lowell asked to have her name left off petitions even though she had often conceived of and helped to implement them. She also feigned ignorance at how much money she was donating to persuade Ordway to take her frequent and generous donations. Lowell’s performance illustrates how she used her reformer experience as a subject and agent at the intersection of her race, class, and gender in the service of anti-imperialism by supporting and exploiting the coexistence of gendered contradictions.
Another woman who provided networks and labor for the AIL was Mary Storer Cobb of Northampton, Massachusetts, where she helped form a chapter of the AIL. With evidence of atrocities being committed by the U.S. military in the Philippines, most sensationally through the "water cure" torture and "reconcentration" camps, the AIL agitated public debate specifically on violence. This led to a Senate Investigation on Affairs in the Philippines (hereafter referred to as SIAP), which included lines of questioning on the violence committed by the U.S. military. Cobb’s unique contribution was preparing soldiers to go before the SIAP. Her work was behind the scenes, yet crucial to the anti-imperialist campaign to expose violence in the Philippines, which had been the central issue for anti-imperialist women, regardless of race, from the outset.

Women in the Public Debate on Imperialism

Mainstream research on social movements tends to focus on a narrowly defined political arena, which often misses the contributions of women made behind the scenes (Ferree and Merrill 2000; Taylor 1999), such as Cobb. Anti-imperialist women frequently made interventions in the public debate through poems. Kipling’s poem advising the U.S. on the Philippines, "The White Man’s Burden" (now infamous as a euphemism for imperialism), sparked a flood of anti-imperialist poems in response. At the turn of the twentieth century, poems were a legitimate public medium for both women and men (Harrington 2002; Nelson 2001). Contributing a poem to a public forum was just as appropriate as a letter to the editor for political expression, with newspapers allotting space specifically for the genre. The poems I select in this section directly respond to "the white man’s burden" and demonstrate the author as a subject of prior experience and as an anti-imperialist agent.

Women, in particular, were more likely to express their political views through poems. The less direct format of poetic imagery allowed these disfranchised citizens a more conventionally accepted but still public outlet for civic participation. One of these women, Alice Smith-Travers, contributed the poem, “The White Man’s Burden” published in the Black Indianapolis newspaper The Freeman, March 4, 1899, focusing on the horrors of violence and the "Judas"-like behavior of the United States. She wrote,

"'Take up the white man’s burden!’
That causes the heart to quake
As we read again with horror,
Of those burnings at the stake,

Of white caps riding in the night,
And burning black men’s homes,
Of the inmates shot as they rush out
And the awful dying groans,

Of crimes that would outnumber
Those in the foreign Isle,
Committed by heath[sic] people
'Half devil and half child.'

Then free those Filipinos[sic] people,
From the accursed rule of Spain,
And put on them the shackels [sic]
Of a haughtier nation's reign.

With 'Judas' acts in every form,
Conceivable by man,
And the thirst for blood, and greed for gold
Is surely the white man's plan. 19

Smith-Travers' analysis shows her criticism of “civilization” and “the white man's burden” as a subject produced through the experiences of witnessing violence as a Black woman in the U.S. Her clarity on the contradictions of imperialist violence, through irony, rearticulated imperialism as Anglo-Saxonist disagreements over (rather than with) “civilization.” Additionally in 1899, Anna Manning Comfort, a leading white suffragist, connected the problem of the “white man's burden” with lynching, treatment of Indians, and women's suffrage in her poem “Home Burdens of Uncle Sam.” 20 By 1902, this line of argumentation had been adopted (or co-opted) by the AIL in the campaign to expose violence in the SIAP.

As an organization the AIL also contributed poems to the debate, including some authored by women. In 1900, the New England AIL published a volume entitled, Liberty Poems: Inspired by the Crisis of 1898-1900, whose publication was underwritten by Mary Pickering, a substantial AIL donor (Zwick 2005). 21 In total, the volume included 76 poems, with most written by anti-imperialist leaders and 13 authored by women.
Expressing their standpoint in newspapers, women consistently highlighted the violence being committed in the Philippines and raised the question of women's suffrage, pointing out the hypocrisy of (purportedly) spreading liberty abroad while disfranchising citizens at home. They expressed their indignation concerning "the white man's burden" both as citizens without the vote and as women, many of them mothers, with a moral duty to show their abhorrence for violence committed in the name of liberty. However, these explicitly gendered anti-imperialisms were conventional women's issues and outside of the formal agenda of the AIL. Therefore, they did not disrupt the masculinist practices of the organization, but they did add another dimension to anti-imperialist debate.

Women's Monetary Contributions

Besides entering the public debate as women with criticisms of violence, women with anti-imperialist views were contributing monetarily to the AIL. Between 1898-1902, the dates recorded in the AIL ledger books, women gave $7,082, which was 29% of the total number of donations to the AIL's funds. Even more significant, in light of assertions of their noninvolvement and general inattention, is that of the total AIL budget between 1898-1902, multi-millionaire Andrew Carnegie--who contributed $1000 at a time--contributed $4,400, which was 20% of the total funds, while women's contributions totaled 33% of the AIL funds, and other men's contributions totaled $10,236, or 47% of the AIL funds.
Given the relative unavailability of independent expendable income for women during this period, the fact that women gave more than their representative numbers demonstrates anti-imperialist women’s deep concern and corresponding mobilization over imperialism. This is an economic example of the rupture between gendered schemas and resources that exemplifies masculinist ambivalence in the AIL, showing women's expanded role–nudging along their inclusion--despite the insistent exclusion of women’s leadership in, or public influence over, the AIL.

Women in the Philippines

Women also contributed to anti-imperialist activities from the Philippines. The wife of a captain stationed in the Philippines first wrote back to a newspaper in the United States, breaking the story on the military's use of the "water cure" in cooperation with her husband. Together they thought it better for her to expose the story as his wife than for him as a commissioned officer. This set anti-imperialists into a fury of investigations regarding violence used by the military and general conditions in the Philippines, leading directly to their involvement in the SIAP.

One investigator informing the AIL was Helen Calista Wilson. In 1903, under the anonymity of "A Massachusetts Woman," she published her impressions on the reconcentration policy while on a fact-finding mission sponsored by a former anti-imperialist executive committee member, F. Fiske Warren. Warren sponsored her independently of the AIL, although her information aided AIL activities at home. Her information on the reconcentration policy published in 1903 was the first information available to the public demonstrating how the military operations in the Philippines were affecting the Filipino people, not just insurgents. She later made more systematic analyses of the policy, sending back reports to the Springfield Republican, until reconcentration was abandoned in 1906 (Kramer 2006). As with Addams and Lowell, the AIL used her skills as an "individual" with the ability to speak Spanish and network both with U.S. colonials, especially other stenographers and teachers, in the colony as well as elite Filipino families.

One member of such a family, Clemencia Lopez, visited the United States as a guest of the AIL in 1902-1903 (Zwick 2001). She spoke to various groups across the U.S., specifically disputing the idea that Filipinos were too uncivilized for self-government. She was living evidence to the contrary according to instructors at Wellesley College, where she studied English and persuaded other women of the importance of the anti-imperialist cause (Zwick 2001). Lopez spent almost two years in the U.S. speaking on conditions in the Philippines. Because the U.S. military government in Batangas had imprisoned three of her brothers (Zwick 2001), she also made a special appeal to President Roosevelt on behalf of her family, which was submitted as evidence in the SIAP. In her farewell speech at a luncheon given in her honor by the AIL, she said,

"When I planned to return to my native land it never occurred to me that my friends would gather to bid me farewell. Still less could I have expected that the gathering should be presided over by the friend of John Brown [Mr. Sanborn]; that the words of parting should fall from the lips of the son of the Liberator [Mr. Garrison]; that I
should see among the guests the secretary of Charles Sumner [Mr. Storey]; and that there should be present in propria persona that aged and honored paladin of liberty, Gov. Boutwell. These names became famous at a time when the victim was the black man. Now it is the brown.  

Like other Filipino nationalists, she was familiar with the history of racist exclusions of U.S. democracy and understood the implications for new racisms on democracy in the Philippines under U.S. rule. As a woman, she was able to speak out in the U.S. without posing a threat, while her brothers were considered enemies of the state. In this context, "masculinist ambivalence" served her particular cause more than feminist politics espousing gender equality could have (see Murphy's (2009) "Women's Anti-Imperialism, The White Man’s Burden, and the Philippine-American War: Theorizing Masculinist Ambivalence in Protest" in Gender & Society for the original article giving the theoretical elaboration and application of masculinist ambivalence).

**Masculinist Ambivalence and Contentious Politics**

The creative application of prior experience influenced how anti-imperialists argued against "the white man's burden" and for democracy over time. Initially, the leadership of the AIL argued over ideals of masculine citizenship, middle-class white women argued over the ideals of civilization, Black men argued against the conflagration of race prejudice, and Black women argued with the existence of civilization as it was defined. Noting these differences is not enough; these differences were relationally constituted through the experience of being anti-imperialist as subjects constituted at the intersection of race, class, and gender. After the defeat of Bryan in 1900 and a period of shared anti-imperialist struggle, white men increasingly adopted arguments over ideals of civilization and all anti-imperialist debates focused on violence such as those Black anti-imperialists had earlier espoused regarding violence in the metropole (e.g. lynching) and violence in the Philippines. Pro-imperialists essentially won the debate over masculine citizenship. Therefore, the more inclusive and democratically based arguments proved to be the most robust for anti-imperialists over time.

The AIL struggled within the limits of gendered conceptions of citizenship and nation, rather than taking stances that posed challenges to gender inequality. It did, however, acknowledge the utility of women’s resources and adopt their focus on violence. Although the well-known anti-imperialist, Edward Atkinson, noted as early as 1899 that having influential women in public leadership roles would be beneficial for gaining the support of organized women’s groups in the U.S. (Hoganson 1998), and Herbert Welsh made efforts to obtain women activists, mentioning to AIL president, Moorfield Storey, that reputable women would be helpful for organizing other women, no organized plans were made to involve women as a group. Despite this, over time women were increasingly granted the symbolic office of vice president of the AIL. Therefore, in 1909 a committee was appointed to "consider the propriety of inviting women to become members" of the AIL (rather than the auxiliaries they had previously constituted). Following up at a meeting in 1910,
however, the AIL deemed inviting women members "inexpedient" and continued their formal exclusion. 29 Having been feminized by pro-imperialists, white anti-imperialist men faced a kind of "double bind" (Einwohner et al 2000) of formally identifying with anti-imperialist women and further delegitimizing anti-imperialism with the mainstream (although they had already lost widespread support by this time) and of not fully including women at the risk of alienating them and losing their resources. Although AIL leaders maintained male-domination as a strategic resource to secure legitimacy, “Paradoxically, diversity often increases the resources and power of challengers” (West and Blumberg 1990:21). This was recognized by some white anti-imperialist men but not fully embraced, ultimately limiting the appeal of the AIL. Just as the long list of vice presidents was a symbolic message of anti-imperialists' social capital, so was the official exclusion of women as members symbolic of who was qualified to be an "anti-imperialist" to those outside the anti-imperialist movement. Homosocial politics based on "the white man's burden" tightened the boundaries of exclusion around anti-imperialism, even as anti-imperialists struggled for democracy.

Conclusion

Anti-imperialists creatively deployed gendered resources without reconciling gendered contradictions. Masculinist norms were not disrupted, if sometimes questioned, creating a space where women's informal leadership was acceptable for extraordinary individuals, while women as a group were funneled into activities already established as gender appropriate, such as planning anti-imperialist luncheons, hosting Filipino guests, and forming auxiliary organizations. Within the AIL masculinist ambivalence stifled the possibility of explicitly gendered contentious politics opposing imperialism through informal inclusion of women's resources (such as money, social capital, and cultural capital) and formal exclusions of women's membership. Nevertheless, women were involved in the AIL to such an extent that the AIL would not have been able to achieve many of its goals without the monetary resources or the social networks of women. Women's contributions were key to the successes anti-imperialists did achieve.

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Notes

1 I enclose race in quotes in the first reference here to underline its socially constructed, time-dependent meaning.
2 Jim Zwick. "Colored National Anti-Imperialistic League." JZ.
3 Letter dated May 14, 1901, Box 1, EO.
5 Letter dated Jan. 20, 1900, Box 1, EO.
6 **Jim Zwick**, "Illinois Women's Anti-Imperialist League." And "Women's Auxiliary of the Anti-Imperialist League." JZ.
8 MSLC; EO; Record Book Vol. I, Anti-Imperialist League. MLC.
9 Newspaper clipping, undated. Herbert Welsh Papers, Special Collections, Hatcher Graduate Library, University of Michigan.
10 Anti-Imperialist League Papers, Swarthmore Peace Collection, Swarthmore College.
11 Letter dated October 19, 1899, Box 1, EO.
12 Letter dated November 27, 1901, Box 1, EO.
13 Letter dated January 10, 1902, Box 1, EO.
14 The exact amount is unclear as the New York AIL ledger books are not included in any of the collections. E.g., see letter dated January 25, 1902, Box 1, EO.
16 The "water cure" was an ironic label. The contemporary “water curist” movement encouraged drinking a lot of water to improve health and wellbeing.
17 Senate Investigation on the Affairs in the Philippines. 1902. Congressional Hearings.
18 Mary Storer Cobb Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society.
21 Jim Zwick compiled “ **Ladies for Liberty: Women's Poems Against Imperialism and War**” dedicated to Mary G. W. Pickering, who “paid the entire expense of publishing the [Liberty Poems volume].” Jim Zwick. "Ladies for Liberty: Women's Poems Against Imperialism and War.” JZ.
23 Ibid. These numbers come from my calculations based on the information found in the ledger books of the Anti-Imperialist League.
24 Correspondence from Herbert Welsh to Storey, January 31, 1902. MSLC.
26 **Clemencia Lopez**, “Reply by Senorita Lopez.” A Farewell Luncheon in Honor of Senorita Clemencia Lopez, October 5, 1903. (Boston: Fiske Warren, 1904). JZ.
27 Letter dated February 4, 1902, Box 1, MSLC.
28 Dissertation. MLC.
29 Record Books of Anti-Imperialist League, Vol. 4. MLC.

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Archival Sources With Multiple Citations
EO, Edward Ordway Papers Manuscript Division of the New York Public Library. Ordway was the secretary for the New York based AIL.

MSMHS, Moorfield Storey Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society. Storey was an anti-imperialist leader based in Boston, member of the AIL executive committee, and served as President after George Boutwell.

MLC, Maria Lanzar-Carpio Papers, Special Collections at Hatcher Graduate Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Lanzar-Carpio was a doctoral student at University of Michigan in Political Science through the Pensionada program.

MSLOC, Moorfield Storey Papers, Library of Congress, Washington DC.
Race-Making and Colonial Violence in the U.S. Empire: The Philippine-American War as Race War
By Paul A. Kramer

Speaking on May 4, 1902 at the newly-opened Arlington Cemetery, in the first Memorial Day address there by a U.S. President, Theodore Roosevelt placed colonial violence at the heart of American nation-building. In a speech before an estimated thirty thousand people, brimming with “indignation in every word and every gesture,” Roosevelt inaugurated the Cemetery as a landscape of national sacrifice by justifying an ongoing colonial war in the Philippines, where brutalities by U.S. troops had led to widespread debate in the United States. He did so by casting the conflict as a race war. Upon this “small but peculiarly trying and difficult war” turned “not only the honor of the flag” but “the triumph of civilization over forces which stand for the black chaos of savagery and barbarism.” Roosevelt acknowledged and expressed regret for U.S. abuses but claimed that for every American atrocity, “a very cruel and very treacherous enemy” had committed “a hundred acts of far greater atrocity.” Furthermore, while such means had been the Filipinos’ "only method of carrying on the war," they had been "wholly exceptional on our part." The noble, universal ends of a war for civilization justified its often unsavory means. "The warfare that has extended the boundaries of civilization at the expense of barbarism and savagery has been for centuries one of the most potent factors in the progress of humanity," he asserted, but "from its very nature it has always and everywhere been liable to dark abuses."
President Theodore Roosevelt addresses a vast Memorial Day crowd at Arlington Cemetery in May 1902 before assembled veterans and a journalist. In his “indignant” speech, he defended the U.S. Army against charges of “cruelty” in the ongoing Philippine-American War by racializing the conflict as one being fought between the forces of “civilization” and “savagery.” (Theodore Roosevelt Collection, Harvard College Library.)

As did Roosevelt, this essay explores the Philippine-American War as race war: a war rationalized in racial terms before U.S. publics, one in which U.S. soldiers came to understand Filipino combatants and non-combatants in racial terms, and one in which race played a key role in bounding and unbounding American violence against Filipinos. My concern with race is far from new in and of itself. Most of the war’s historians—whether writing the more traditional, campaign-driven U.S. literature or more recent and more nuanced local and social histories of the war—make passing reference to the racism of U.S. soldiers without thorough exploration.  

2 Stuart Creighton Miller, in his critical account of the war, places racism at the center of U.S. troop conduct.  

3 This essay begins from Miller’s starting assumption—that race was essential to the politics and conduct of the war—but also emphasizes the contingency and indeterminacy of the process by which these racial ideologies
took shape, against the assumption that these ideologies were reflexive “projections” or “exports” from the United States to the Philippines. Rather, as I will show, while race helped organize and justify U.S. colonial violence, imperial processes also remade U.S. racial formations. 4

Exploring this contingency requires attention to two dynamics which have up to now been largely ignored in existing literatures. The first of these is the contested character of race during the war. By 1898, Filipinos had been engaging the Spanish colonial racial precepts that undergirded the Philippine colonial state for at least two decades; they would continue to do so, in different ways, from the prewar Republic into the war’s conventional phase and ultimately in guerrilla struggle. These engagements often took the form of elite quests for recognition, especially the affirmation of civilizational status as the criteria first for assimilation and political rights and, ultimately, for political independence. As I suggest, similar Filipino campaigns for recognition from Americans—before, during and after the war—fundamentally shaped both U.S. racial ideologies and Filipino nationalism.

The second source of contingency is the war itself. Racial ideologies and changing strategies and tactics moved together in a dark, violent spiral. Within both Filipino and Euro-American political cultures, patterns of warfare were themselves important markers of racial status. “Civilized” people were understood to wage “conventional” wars while “savage” people waged guerrilla ones. Filipino guerrilla warfare eventually marked the entire population as “savage” to American soldiers: rather than merely a set of tactics undertaken for military purposes, guerrilla war was the inherent war of preference of “lower races.” This racialization of guerrilla war raised the central question of whether Filipinos, in waging a “savage” war, were owed the restraints that defined “civilized” war. Ultimately, I will suggest, many U.S. soldiers and officers answered this question negatively. In many parts of the Archipelago, the war in its guerrilla phases developed into a war of racial exterminism in which Filipino combatants and non-combatants were understood by U.S. troops to be legitimate targets of violence. 5 The heart of the emerging U.S. imperial racial formation was rich in contradictions: the people of the Philippines did not have sufficient “ethnological homogeneity” to constitute a nation-state, but possessed enough to be made war upon as a whole.

Questions of Recognition

By 1898, Filipino elites had been struggling against Spanish racism, as a key element of Spanish colonialism, for at least two decades. 6 An expatriate propaganda movement in Europe had help up Hispanicized “civilization,” advanced education and bourgeois sophistication as arguments for greater rights within the Spanish colonial system. 7 A common editorial stance in the pages of expatriate journal La Solidaridad faulted some Spaniards—especially the Philippine friars—for relentlessly denigrating Filipino “advancement” along these lines. 8 This was the strategy of a cosmopolitan, ilustrado elite with cultural capital to spare, one that reached its consummation with the triumph of the Philippine Revolution under Emilio Aguinaldo and the installation of the Philippine Republic in mid-1898. When
the Malolos Congress formed, it was done in the name of an emerging “civilization” finally capable of expressing itself as an independent state. The more radical, millenarian politics that had animated mass participation in the revolution’s Katipunan societies were marginalized in Aguinaldo’s Republic.  

The taking of Manila by U.S. troops following the Battle of Manila Bay introduced a tense six-month period characterized by Filipino-American interaction and competitive state-building, in which the stakes of recognition had never been higher. On the ground, relations between Filipinos and American soldiers in and around Manila during this transitional period were varied. U.S. soldiers found themselves in an enticing, disturbing and incomprehensible Filipino urban world; Filipinos unsure of the invading army’s status were wary of the Americans but eager for their business. Americans and Filipinos encountered each other in commercial interactions, especially those involving liquor and sex. As U.S. soldiers consolidated military control over Manila and its municipal government—from sanitation to law enforcement—and Filipino soldiers extended the Republic’s control in the wake of Spanish defeats, they also met as members of rival states-in-the-making.

During this period, colliding interests, failed translations, mutual suspicions and questions of jurisdiction easily boiled into animosity and conflict, especially where U.S. soldiers became drunk and disorderly or failed to pay their debts. Soldiers commonly characterized Filipinos as a whole as filthy, diseased, lazy and treacherous in their business dealings, sometimes applying the term “nigger” to them. One anonymous black soldier reflected back on this period that the subsequent war would not have broken out “if the army of occupation would have treated [Filipinos] as people.” But shortly after the seizure of Manila, white troops had begun “to apply home treatment for colored peoples: cursed them as damned niggers, steal [from] them and ravish them, rob them on the street of their small change, take from the fruit vendors whatever suited their fancy, and kick the poor unfortunate if he complained...”

At the same time there was a striking amount of mutual recognition in the interval between wars, as U.S. soldiers came to know individual Filipinos or their families and visited their churches and homes. Up until the very brink of war, American soldiers frequented Filipino concerts, dances, ceremonies and dinners, often recording their admiration for Filipino grace, hospitality and artistic achievement in their diaries and letters. One striking example was a poem presented at a Thanksgiving dinner thrown by the 13th Minnesota in Manila in November 1898, which recalled the recent fall of Manila and expressed the soldiers’ thanks:

We’re thankful that the City’s ours, and floats the Stars and Stripes;
We’re thankful that our cause is one that from these Islands wipes
The degenerate oppressors of a brother human kin
Who now—beneath ‘Old Glory’—a nation’s place may win.
To be sure, there were dark signs here: the U.S. flag as the sole guarantor of liberty; passive Filipinos as objects of U.S. redemption; the sense that Filipinos still had a "nation" to win ahead of them "beneath 'Old Glory.'” What was striking in light of future developments was that Filipinos were still "brother human kin."

In the last months of 1898, as the Treaty of Paris was being negotiated, Filipinos sought recognition by launching legal and historical arguments for the sovereignty of the Philippine Republic and the impossibility of the Islands' legitimate transfer from Spain to the United States. These claims were subtly and forcefully expressed by Felipe Agoncillo, representative of the Philippine Republic sent to the United States to lobby on behalf of Philippine independence before U.S. politicians and the general public. As expressed in his January 30, 1899 "Memorial to the Senate of the United States," Agoncillo's claim was that U.S. formal recognition of the Philippine Republic had already been established by U.S. consular and naval dealings with Emilio Aguinaldo's government. The army of the Philippine Revolution had advanced sufficiently against Spanish forces by the time of the U.S. declaration of war, he claimed, that Spain had no legal title or right to cede Philippine territory to the United States. Indeed, Christian Filipino rebellions against Spain had broken out "continuously with greater or less fury for the past hundred years," while "a large number of my countrymen," namely Muslims and animists, had "never been subdued by Spanish power." Agoncillo also appealed to U.S. history and political institutions, inviting American attention "to several notable and exact American precedents” and urging "the Republic of America” to “adhere to the teachings of international law as laid down by some of its founders.”

At the same time, the Republic sought recognition for its sovereignty in "civilizational" standing. This brand of argument was particularly common in the Republic’s official newspaper, La Independencia, itself meant to be a concrete and mobile representation of the Philippine Republic’s "civilization" and sovereignty before imagined audiences both within and outside the archipelago. In their first issue, the editors described "Our Program" as: "demonstrating the ideal and the supreme aspiration of the country; publicizing the priorities of our government; requesting recognition of our independence from other nations, grounding ourselves in the capacity of the race, in the deeds that outwardly reveal our culture and in the vitality that we demonstrate in governing 26 provinces with more than 3 million inhabitants...” Advertising correspondents in "all the provinces of the Archipelago, London, Paris, Madrid, Singapore, Hong-Kong and Saigon,” its pages in late-1898 and early 1899 highlighted erudite treatises on “modern” government, including civil service reform, municipal budgeting, public instruction, moral reform, public hygiene and “the spirit of association.”

One fascinating window onto Filipino efforts at recognition and their reception was the inland expedition of Luzon taken by two naval officers, William Wilcox and L. R. Sargent, in November and December 1898. While the two men’s task was "of a very indefinite nature," it was fundamentally a project of recognition: to determine whether the institutions controlling the Filipino countryside constituted a state and, if a state, whether it was hostile or not to two wandering U.S. naval officers. As
Sargent put it, they were "to proceed as far to the northward as the character of the country and the attitude of the natives would permit, and to return only when forced to do so." 17

If border control was a state’s measure, then the Philippine Republic was up and running. Aguinaldo offered the two friendship and verbal consent but no written passports. As a result, the two relied on local presidentes, who provided them passports, carriers and safe passage between towns, although at least one had hesitated to give assistance in fear that "any incident" might "create a wrong and injurious impression of the good faith of the Filipinos…." 18 Some members of the rural elite may have seen great advantage in winning over two naive Americans; others may have seen in them only the opening wedge of an invasion. At one town they might be greeted "by the ringing of the church bells and the music of the band, and at the next by the critical cross-questioning of the local authorities." 19

In either case, local officers of the Republic lost no chance to represent to visiting Americans their authority and popular support. Wilcox and Sargent were regularly treated to elaborate Filipino patriotic celebrations, stirring declarations of independence, and impressive military drills. "At that time the enthusiasm of the people was tuned to the highest pitch," reported Sargent. "In every village, every man was training in arms. Companies were formed of boys, from eight years of age upward." A new civil governor "declared the purpose of the people to expend the last drop of their blood, if necessary, in defending the liberty thus gained against the encroachments of any nation whatsoever." Many times villagers had gathered in the large room of the Presidencia, where they were quartered, and "put their whole hearts into the songs in which their patriotism found vent." 20 When asked about the Philippines’ status, "leading townspeople" had answered in unison that they would "accept nothing short of independence." 21
This photograph of soldiers of the Philippine Republic shows the efforts of the newly inaugurated state to convey the uniform, organized, “civilized” character of the republic’s army and its warfare. Wilcox and Sargent encountered many such forces on their late 1898 trip through Luzon (From Leon Wolff, Little Brown Brother: How the United States Purchased and Pacified the Philippines (Garden City, NY, 1961)), photographs after p. 49).

But even as Wilcox and Sargent worked their way across Luzon, the unstable political window through which they were traveling began to close. As steamers and telegraph lines brought word of the Treaty from Hong Kong newspapers, Wilcox and Sargent faced stiffer restrictions. “Already the hope was fading that freedom from Spain meant freedom of government,” wrote Sargent. “The feeling toward Americans was changing, and we saw its effect in the colder manner of the people, and in their evident desire to hustle us along the most direct road to Manila.” 22 As they reached the Western coast of Luzon, and the U.S. Commissioners at Paris moved towards formal acquisition of the Philippines, the party came under greater scrutiny and was detained or forced back. They were subject to a new regulation that travelers not “carry arms, nor approach within 200 meters of a fortification, not make any plans, or take photographs of them.” 23 Their final report, written upon their return in December, contained tactical data appropriate to war but also
recognized the fervor of Filipino revolutionary aspirations and the varied capacities of the Filipino people. Perhaps on these latter merits—perhaps due to bureaucratic inertia—it was issued into the public record as a Senate Document only in 1900, a year and a half after it was originally filed.

Even as they lobbied abroad and performed locally, Filipinos were highly suspicious of American capacities to recognize them in light of circulating rumors of race. Prior to the outbreak of the war, one of the chief Filipino suspicions of Americans had been their reputation for racial oppression. "One of the stories that received universal acceptance," reported General McReeve of the pre-war interlude, "was that ever since the Americans had liberated their negro slaves they had been looking around for others and thought they had found them at last in the Philippines." Filipinos that Wilcox and Sargent encountered had been "prejudiced against us by the Spaniards," charges "so severe that what the natives have since learned has not sufficed to disillusion them." Two points in particular had stood out regarding "our policy toward a subject people":

... that we have mercilessly slain and finally exterminated the race of Indians that were native to our soil and that we went to war in 1861 to suppress an insurrection of negro slaves, whom we also ended by exterminating. Intelligent and well-informed men have believed these charges. They were rehearsed to us in many towns in different provinces, beginning at Malolos. The Spanish version of our Indian problem is particularly well known.

Correspondent Frederick Palmer blamed the outbreak of war on these suspicions. "All prominent Filipinos" that Palmer had spoken with had agreed: "If the status of the negro, as they understood it, was to be theirs in the new system, they would have to leave the islands anyway, and they had concluded to make a fight before going." 27

While Wilcox and Sargent traveled in the Luzon highlands, U.S. and Spanish commissioners at Paris settled the disposition of the Philippine Islands, on December 10, 1898. McKinley had at first supported only the acquisition of coaling stations and naval bases, but had been persuaded over time to press for the entire archipelago. While the politics of recognition had been ambiguous in Manila and its environs, they would be stark and definitive at Paris, where Filipinos had been excluded from treaty negotiations. McKinley effectively closed the first chapter in the recognition debate in his statement of December 21, with Wilcox and Sargent scarcely out of the woods. Authored by Elihu Root and later known as the "Benevolent Assimilation" proclamation, it narrated the American destruction of the Spanish fleet and the Treaty of Paris and laid a claim to U.S. sovereignty over the entire archipelago. The proclamation was a sketch of bare-bones military government, laying out improvised ground rules for the maintenance of property rights, taxation and tariffs. McKinley seemed most concerned, however, with the Filipino recognition of U.S. sovereignty. In an effort to extend U.S. power “with all possible despatch,” U.S. military commanders in place were to announce “in the most public manner” that the Americans had come “not as invaders or conquerors,
but as friends, to protect the natives in their homes, in their employments, and in their personal and religious rights.” It should be the military’s “paramount aim” to win the confidence, respect, and affection of the inhabitants of the Philippines by assuring them in every possible way that they would enjoy a full measure of individual rights and liberties which is the heritage of free peoples, and by proving to them that the mission of the United States is one of benevolent assimilation, substituting the mild sway of justice and right for arbitrary rule.  

Most significantly, however, the proclamation was a formal derecognition of the Philippine Republic and established the relationship between the U.S. and Filipinos as sovereign state to passive, individual subjects. The term “assimilation,” by which the address would come to be known, held more than a hint of malice: the very fact that it required the adjective “benevolent” to soften it implied that there were kinds of “assimilation” that were not.

**Race-Making and Colonial Warfare**

The much-anticipated outbreak of war in early February 1899, just before the U.S. Senate’s confirmation of the Treaty of Paris, did not end the Filipino struggle for recognition. Long into the fighting, Filipino spokesmen revealed a continued preoccupation with promoting Filipino “civilization” to the wider world as a central rationale for claims to independence. “We, the Filipinos, are a civilized, progressive and peace-loving people,” stated Galiciano Apacible in the Spanish-language pamphlet, “Al Pueblo Americano” [To the American People] translated into English and published by the Anti-Imperialist League. The pamphlet praised Filipinos’ education, literacy, art and political and religious leadership, urging Americans to “weigh our statements against the misrepresentations under which Imperialism seeks to conceal its designs.” Following its defeat of Spanish forces, the Republic, rather than giving in to revolutionary excess, had established an orderly governing infrastructure, one whose hallmarks of science, technology and education conveyed its “civilization.”

[T]hey reorganized the administrative machinery which had been disturbed by recent struggles: telegraphs, railroads, and means of communication began to work regularly; we had adopted the electric light in some of our towns; and we had established a new university, four high and several primary schools. In brief, the new nation had entered upon a path of progress which already promised a bright future.  

Along with demonstrating their “civilization,” some Filipino leaders conceived of their struggle as explicitly anti-racial. One anonymous address “To the Filipino People,” captured by the U.S. Army in pursuit of Aguinaldo in March 1900, affirmed Filipino bravery and sacrifice and laid claim to divinely-granted freedoms. “We are living on one planet under the same celestial vault,” it stated, “and if we differ in color, it is because of the distant latitudes in which we are, and this difference in no way signifies any superiority of the one over the other.”
From its start, the war was challenged by U.S.-based anti-imperialist societies that had organized together into the Anti-Imperialist League in November 1898. The organization, which organized in Boston, Washington, Chicago and many smaller cities, drew on diverse political roots, many of them in earlier reform movements, from civil service reform leagues to single-tax leagues to abolitionism. In party terms anti-imperialism leaned toward independents and reformers, but brought together a loose coalition of conservative and white-supremacist Democrats with an older generation of liberal Republicans. Their initial hope was to turn U.S. public opinion against Philippine annexation in negotiations with Spain, using extensive lobbying and educational campaigns; following the outbreak of war in February 1899, they criticized the U.S. invasion as unjust in both ends and means. 31

Not all anti-imperialist argument hinged on the recognition of the Philippine Republic in national terms (as a state) or Filipinos in racial terms (as civilized). Indeed, many anti-imperialist claims, especially prior to outbreak of war, had been “internal,” focusing on the negative consequences of “empire” for the United States itself, especially the erosion of domestic republican virtue and freedom through imperial corruption, tyranny and militarism. 32 Many of these concerns were explicitly racial: annexation of the Philippines would lead to the “corruption” of the U.S. body politic itself through Filipino citizenship and the “degrading” of U.S. labor by additional waves of “Asiatic” immigrants. 33

This anti-imperialist cartoon by Charles Nelan seeks to illustrate the risks of “incorporating” the Philippines into the U.S. republican body politic by casting the Philippine population as a whole as “savage” and incapable of exercising political rationality. It suggests that because of Filipinos’ “incapacity for self-government,” imperialism could threaten the United States’ own political institutions. (Charles Nelan, Cartoons of Our War with Spain, New York, 1898)
But some anti-imperialists recognized the Philippine Republic, even after the outbreak of the war. Embracing a transnational strategy described by Jim Zwick, they assisted representatives of the Republic lobbying in the United States, translated and published their articles in the United States; and eventually carried out investigations into the conduct of the war. 34

McKinley’s strategy to counter anti-imperialist claims of authority was to appoint the first of two “Philippine Commissions,” the first arriving in the Islands in early 1899. Also operating on a transnational political terrain, the Commission had two primary goals. First, within the Philippine context, it was to serve as the crux of the War Department’s “policy of attraction,” the effort to draw ilustrado and principal elites away from the Republic. Once settled into the Audiencia, former home of the Spanish supreme court, the Commission’s daily sessions became the central ritual of urban, wartime collaboration, where informants exchanged testimony favorable to U.S. sovereignty for political patronage. 35 As early as May, this arm of the Commission’s work was showing results. There were key ilustrado defections and political placements—especially those of Benito Legarda, Felipe Buencamino, T. H. Pardo de Tavera and Cayetano Arellano—the inauguration of Pardo de Tavera’s pro-annexation newspaper La Democracia and the displacement of Mabini’s irreconcilable faction within the Republic by Pedro Paterno’s more conciliatory one. The Commission’s second project, however, was aimed at the domestic U.S. public: to produce an authoritative record of events in the Islands that would justify U.S. aggression and undermine anti-imperialist argument.

The task of rationalizing the war in its ends and means before the American public led to the active production of a novel, imperial racial formation by the war’s defenders. This formation had a dual character, simultaneously and reciprocally racializing Americans and Filipinos in new ways. Its first half racialized the U.S. population as "Anglo-Saxons" whose overseas conquests were legitimated by racial-historical ties to the British Empire. 36 Opponents of the Treaty and war frequently argued that while U.S. continental empire had involved the legitimate unfolding of republican institutions into empty (or emptied) space, the Philippine annexation constituted a disturbing “imperial” departure from the U.S.’s exceptional and exemplary traditions, one that would ultimately undermine the nation’s moral and political foundations. This apparent violation of U.S. historical laws was answered with extra-legal claims of racial essence. Specifically, the war’s advocates subsumed U.S. history within longer, racial trajectories of "Anglo-Saxon" history which folded together U.S. and British imperial histories. The Philippine-American War, then, was a natural extension of Western conquest, the organic expression of the desires, capacities and destinies of "Anglo-Saxon" peoples. Americans, as Anglo-Saxons, shared British genius for empire-building, a genius which they must exercise for the greater glory of the "race" and to advance "civilization" in general. 37 Unlike other races, they “liberated” the peoples they conquered, indeed, their expressions of conquest as “freedom”, proliferated as the terrors they unleashed became more visible. Anglo-Saxonist racial-exceptionalism was given its most resonant expression in February 1899, when, Rudyard Kipling published "The White Man’s Burden." The
poem condensed race and humanitarian martyrdom, recasting Americans as a "race" with an inevitable imperial destiny. 38

If the first half of the double-sided imperial racial formation “Anglo-Saxonized” Americans, its second half “tribalized” Filipinos. Contemporary social evolutionary theory held that societies, in evolving from “savagery” to “civilization,” moved in political terms from “tribal” fragmentation to “national” unity.” [39] Successfully identify “tribes”—marked by language, religion, political allegiance—and one had disproven a nation’s existence. Enumerate a society’s fragments, and what might otherwise have looked like a nation became merely the tyranny of one “tribe” over others; what might have appeared a state became a problem of imperial “assimilation.” The “tribalization” of the Republic would rhetorically eradicate the Philippine Republic as a legitimate state whose rights the United States might have to recognize under international law. 40

This argument was forcefully advanced by the Philippine Commission’s Report, its first installment issued in January 1900, which represented the most influential effort to reduce the Philippine Republic to what came to be called the “Single Tribe” of the Tagalogs. The Report’s section on “The Native Peoples of the Philippines,” written by zoologist Dean C. Worcester, began by admitting disputes over the “civilization” of the Filipino people.

The most diverse and contradictory statements are frequently met with concerning the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands, at present collectively known as ‘Filipinos.’ Some writers credit them with a high degree of civilization, and compare them to the Pilgrim Fathers or the patriots of ’76, while others regard even the more highly civilized tribes as little better than barbarians. 41

The Commission set out to “reconcile views which are apparently contradictory” based on their investigation of Philippine conditions. After a brief review of opposing views, they presented their conclusions: the Philippine population consisted of “three sharply distinct races,” the Negrito, the Indonesian and the Malayan. Early migrations by the Negritos, a group “near the bottom of the human series,” had been displaced by invasions of Indonesians and Malayans with superior racial constitution and civilization. Out of these three races had sprung “numerous tribes, which often differ very greatly in language, manners, customs, and laws, as well as in degree of civilization.” 42

The argument of “tribal” pluralism became the centerpiece of arguments against Filipino self-government. “The most striking and perhaps the most significant fact in the entire situation,” began the Commission’s report on “Capacity for Self-Government,” “is the multiplicity of tribes inhabiting the archipelago, the diversity of their languages (which are mutually unintelligible), and the multifarious phases of civilization--ranging all the way from the highest to the lowest--exhibited by the natives of the several provinces and islands.” 43

While Worcester admitted it was “extremely difficult to arrive at anything approaching a correct estimate of the numbers of even the more important civilized
tribes,” the report was a powerful representation of the Commission’s ability to encapsulate the Philippine population by scientific means, one that gave birth to one of its most widely-employed “facts”: the number “84” as the total number of Philippine “tribes.” In future debates, the figure, meant to convey impossible plurality, would echo through imperial argumentation in defense of the Commission’s central ethnological and political conclusion: “The Filipinos are not a nation, but a variegated assemblage of different tribes and peoples, and their loyalty is still of the tribal type.”

Worcester would be followed quickly into the “tribes” question by anti-imperialist and Filipino nationalist publicists. In 1900, for example, Filipino nationalist Sixto Lopez was asked by the New England Anti-Imperialist League to produce “a brief statement of the facts” on the “tribes” question, “as a native of the country, and as one who has given some attention to the ethnography of the Archipelago, both by personal research and by a study of the best works on the subject...” For Lopez, the Commission’s findings had been “entirely incorrect.” The number eighty-four had been the product of “imagination, bad spelling, translation, subdivision, and multiplication.” The Commission had badly transcribed already inaccurate Spanish records, mistaken the mountain peoples for lowland villagers, confused racial groups for language groups, and exaggerated the differences between these languages. “It would be just as absurd to regard the Americans as one tribe and the ‘Yankees’ as another,” he wrote, “and then to increase these two tribes into four or more by misspelling the word ‘Americans,’ or by translating it into French.” He claimed that the “so-called ‘tribes’” were actually a small minority of the Philippine population, analogous to “the uncivilized or semi-civilized remnants of the Indian tribes still inhabiting certain parts of the United States.”

Even as the administration “tribalized” Filipinos in its campaign to rationalize the war at home, U.S. soldiers on the ground racialized their opponents with striking speed and intensity. In the war’s early months, what had been diffuse and fragmented pre-war animosities quickly congealed into novel racial formations at the very center of U.S. soldiers’ popular culture, capable of defining a wartime enemy and organizing and motivating violence against that enemy. “A lively hatred of our newly declared enemy was the one enthusiasm of the camp,” wrote a corporal in the Montana regulars in July 1899. This race-making process is vividly illustrated by terminological shifts in the diaries and letters home of U.S. volunteers during the early months of the war. Although the linguistic starting-points and endpoints differed, many soldiers progressively racialized their terms for the insurgents specifically, and Filipinos generally, although in few cases did these terms entirely replace other terms like “insurgent” or “native.”

Andrew Wadsworth, for example, a twenty-eight year old sergeant in the First Nebraska Volunteers, had observed shortly upon arrival in Manila that “the natives are bright and intelligent as the average run of people,” and admired their art, musicianship and industriousness. Writing home from “the Field” two weeks after the beginning of the war, he wrote that “it was a hot time going over some of the
ground... [It] swarmed with the indians but we didn’t do a thing to them.” 49 Within another two weeks, his racism was more matter-of-fact. “[H]ave forgotten whether I have written any of you folks since we commenced to chase niggers,” he wrote off-handedly, “have no doubt read in the papers what we are doing...” 50 Despite rising tensions, Earl Pearsall of the same unit had recorded in his diary on January 5th, with some regret, that “the insurgents have not been as friendly lately as they have been for they have not visited our camp for three or four days.” 51 The day war broke out, he imagined that “the dusky fellows don’t care for any more of this warfare with the Americano.” 52 Less than three weeks later, however, he thrilled that U.S. artillery had “put the black rascals over the hills.” 53 Early in March, he reported being “attacked by the ‘Gugos’” on the Mariquina road. 54

South Dakota volunteer Louis Hubbard, a leader in his unit’s regimental band, had accepted the gift of a sword from “one of Aguinaldo’s sergeants” in December 1898 and recruited a Filipino musician, “the finest clarinetist I ever heard in my life.” 55 Two weeks into the combat, he wrote that it was “lots of sport to hunt these black devils.” 56 Angered by reports of Filipino atrocities against U.S. troops, he wrote that “[t]hey are just like any savage.” 57 In mid-March he recorded the hope for a speedy charge on Malolos, “for the quicker we get there and get these ‘gugos’ of [sic] the face of the earth the quicker we will be ready to start for home.” 58
Photographs of dead Filipino soldiers lying in trenches were often taken by U.S. soldiers and journalists and included in commemorative albums. Albert Sonnichsen wrote in his memoir of the “heaps of dead and dying natives... photographed by our people, and exhibited with such mottoes as: ’Can the _d Regiment boys shoot? You bet they can. Count the dead niggers.’” (F. Tennyson Neely, *Fighting in the Philippines: A Photographic Record of the Philippine-American War* (London, 1899); Sonnichsen, quoted in Russell Roth, *Muddy Glory: America’s “Indian Wars” in the Philippines, 1899-1935* (West Hanover, MA, 1981))

This racialization process attracted the attention of U.S. journalists and soldiers on the ground. Some understood rising pre-war hostility as the inevitable surfacing of latent “race differences” on all sides. “After the first glamour which surrounded our troops,” soldier-correspondent John Bass reported to Harper's in mid-October 1898, “a glamour due to an exaggerated and almost childish idea of the liberty and freedom we were bringing to the Philippines, the race differences have made themselves felt, which antagonize the natives and exasperate our men.” 59 Many journalists were struck by increasingly widespread use of the term “nigger” by U.S. troops. “Our troops in the Philippines... look upon all Filipinos as of one race and condition,” wrote Henry Loomis Nelson, “and being dark men, they are therefore ‘niggers,’ and entitled to all the contempt and harsh treatment administered by...
white overlords to the most inferior races.”  

Frederick Palmer, sympathetic to the war effort, was amused by the soldiers’ “good-natured contempt” toward “the little brown man,” but regretted the use of the term “nigger,” which “too often” included groups that were above it, however marginally:

If a man is white; if he speaks English; if he knows his lines as we know them, he is as good as anybody on earth. If he is white and yet does not understand our customs, we insist that he shall have equal rights with us. If he is any other color too often we include him in one general class called ‘nigger,’ a class beneath our notice, to which, as far as our soldier is concerned, all Filipinos belonged.  

H. L. Wells similarly noted that U.S. troops saw the enemy in racial terms. “Undoubtedly, they do not regard the shooting of Filipinos just as they would the shooting of white troops…” he wrote in mid-1900. “The soldiers feel that they are fighting with savages, not with soldiers.”  

The race-making process of the early phases of the war was revealed in the U.S. press in changing images of Emilio Aguinaldo. The first, from May 1898, is in the nature of a portrait; the caption refers to Aguinaldo as “the president of the republic of the islands,” and calls him “brainy,” “patriotic,” and “self-sacrificing,” while the image notably Europeanizes his features. The second, from March 1899, is a cartoon...
that represents him as a childish, ostentatious dictator being crushed by U. S. force; his skin tone is darkened here and his features are distinctly “Orientalized.” (Left image from Bonnie Miller, “The Spectacle of War: A Study of Spanish-American War Visual and Popular Culture,” Dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, 2003, 368; right image from Abe Ignacio, Enrique de la Cruz, Jorge Emmanuel, and Helen Toribio, *The Forbidden Book: The Philippine-American War in Political Cartoons* (San Francisco, 2005), 25

This "lively hatred" was not, however, simply a "projection" or "export," but a new racial formation developing on the ground. Its novelty was evidenced by the consistency with which reporters—imperialist and anti-imperialist—felt compelled to explain it to their domestic readerships. It was strikingly illustrated by the appearance of a new term, "gu-gu" or "goo-goo," in U.S. soldiers' discourse, almost certainly the linguistic ancestor of "gook." Veteran Charles A. Freeman, writing in the 1930s, noted that "[o]f recent years the world [sic] has been shortened to gook, but gu-gu persists in Philippine fiction and fact written by Americans, and applies to the lower class Filipino." If the term had a sinister future, its origins remain speculative. The first of two plausible explanations—far from incompatible with each other—roots the term in local dynamics: the term came from the Tagalog term for a slippery coconut-oil shampoo, pronounced gu-gu, which may have caught on a sense of the enemy’s elusiveness. A second account suggests the term was born at the intersection of immediate sexual tensions and racialized U.S. popular culture, as older idioms were reworked to suit volatile new surroundings. According to Freeman, among the songs sung by U.S. troops on the long voyage from San Francisco had been a minstrel tune "'Just because she made 'dem goo-goo eyes.'" When American soldiers first "gazed into the dark orbs of a Filipino dalaga" on arrival, they had commented to each other "'Gee, but that girl can make goo-goo eyes.'" Filipino men had taken the term as an insult; when American soldiers learned this, "it stuck, and became a veritable taunt." Whatever its specific origins, "gu-gu" formed part of a distinctive, new Philippine-American colonial vocabulary that focused hatreds around a novel enemy and lent American troops a sense of manly, insider camaraderie. The newness, immediacy and localism of U.S. soldiers' racial formation were suggested by the quotation marks and parenthetical explanations soldiers commonly included near terms like "gu-gu" in their letters and diaries, especially early in the conflict. On occasion, soldiers explained these terms to what they imagined to be befuddled family members at home. Peter Lewis, for example, promised in November 1900 to write home again about his "fights with the 'Guggoes' as the Filipinos [sic] are called." Race-making and colonial warfare were developing together as intimately linked projects.

**Racializing Guerrilla Warfare**

If one way to rationalize a war of aggression was to declare the enemy state a “tribe,” one way to end it was simply to declare it over by fiat. November 1899 saw the war's first end by U.S. proclamation. General MacArthur reported that there was “no organized insurgent force left to strike at,” and declared that all future
resistance be characterized as outlawry and the killing of U.S. soldiers murder. General Otis cabled Washington stating that the revolutionaries had been dispersed and that “claim to government by insurgents can be made no longer under any fiction.” In fact, Filipino tactics had undergone a dramatic shift toward a guerrilla strategy. Disbanding the regular army in the wake of defeats, Aguinaldo divided the country into military zones each under a guerrilla commander, preparing for a regionally dispersed set of smaller campaigns through locally-raised sandatahan units. It was hoped that in these new settings, tropical disease, impassable roads and unfamiliar conditions would weaken the American advance, while geographic knowledge and village-level support would sustain guerrilla ambushes and surprise attacks against isolated American patrols.

This guerrilla campaign, in turn, altered the command structure, tactics and knowledge requirements of the U.S. Army. General Otis decentralized his forces to match the Filipino army, splitting the army into four departments, his plan to advance outward into the hinterlands, fighting back Filipino rebels and garrisoning the towns that supported them. In these regional settings (eventually over 600 scattered posts), often cut off from Manila contacts, local commanders would by necessity take on greater autonomy, and be forced to adapt their tactics to local crises.

Guerrilla war involved not merely a set of tactics but a set of understandings: about the meanings of combat, about the means to victory, about oneself as a combatant, about the nature of the enemy. Although each side perceived it as a radical break, it held different meanings for Filipino and American troops. For Filipino officers, schooled exclusively in European conventional warfare, guerrilla warfare was largely unfamiliar, although at least some Filipino soldiers had encountered it firsthand while collaborating with the Spanish army against Muslims and animists. Filipino strategists were compelled to explain it using anti-colonial guerrilla struggles elsewhere. Filipino commanders, for example, took inspiration (most likely, unreciprocated) from the struggle of the Boers against the British Empire. Juan Villamor, advising General Antonio Luna in Ilocos, claimed to have taken his guerrilla model from the war in South Africa, probably learned through Hong Kong newspapers. In a speech to raise troops in February 1900, Villamor apparently noted that this warring style, "such as we are starting today," was "characteristic of a small nation when fighting a big one," and had produced "the most surprising successes" in South Africa.

One possible explanation for Aguinaldo’s delay in adopting guerrilla strategies and tactics may be the symbolic politics of war and preoccupations with expressions of "civilization." But there were other political reasons for the delay in adopting guerrilla warfare. As the Republic’s officials knew well, guerrilla war was a decentralized war that empowered local commanders at the expense of the center; it could also involve mobilizing the energy of, and handing power to, a rural base. This base was largely mistrusted by Aguinaldo’s cadre and was itself often ambivalent about the question of whether Republican “independence” and kalayaan were the same thing.
But it was particularly difficult to relinquish the quest for recognition. In its bid for international esteem and recognition, the Republic's self-representations to the world had nervously held itself to a standard of "civilization" in which war played a significant part. Officials of the Republic agreed with the Americans that, among many other things, "civilized" societies adhered to the laws of "civilized" warfare. The military drills witnessed by Wilcox and Sargent had drawn on a vocabulary of republican martial order imbued with notions of a "civilized" fighting force; Republic newspapers of 1898 had foregrounded the organized, hierarchical character of the Filipino army and the favorable condition of its Spanish prisoners as advertisements for its broader "civilization."

Guerrilla warfare, by contrast, meant scattered organization, loosely-disciplined troops little distinguishable from "savages," the securing of rural supplies inseparable from looting, a reliance on concealment and deception that violated European-American standards of masculine honor in combat. 75 Emilio Concepción, for example, a captain fighting in Namatay, later recalled that he "was vacillating for some time" before he reorganized his troops into guerrilla units, for reasons of honor. "In reality, when I took that step, I had thought about it well for some days before, because in principle I believed that if I made myself a guerrilla fighter, I would stop being a revolutionary, and at that time for me the title of revolutionary was much more glorious." 76 By winning a conventional war, the Philippine Army would win the world's support for independent Philippine statehood; victory in guerrilla battle, however, might mean losing the war for international recognition.

If on the Filipino side, guerrilla war was international politics by other means, on the American side, guerrilla war was both novel and disturbing. It meant dispensing with hopes for gallant rushes at the enemy and hunkering down for a protracted campaign that was both boring and anxious, with soldiers isolated from other units, in unknown terrain, unable to recognize the line between "amigos" and hostile peoples. It was little surprise that the term the war introduced furthest into American English was "boondock," drawn from a Tagalog term for mountain or remote area. 77
For U. S. troops, guerrilla-style warfare in tropical settings was unfamiliar and disturbing, subjecting them to exposure and disease and making it impossible to tell the “enemy” from “amigos.” The term “boondock” in American English would emerge from this disorientation. Filipino villagers and revolutionaries took advantage of American ignorance and their own local knowledge in prolonging resistance. (Library of Congress.)

"Uncle Sam's cohorts, set down in the Philippines at the beginning of the century, saw in everything something new, strange and utterly incomprehensible," recalled one veteran years later. "The enemy existed unseen in the dripping jungle, in the moldering towns and in the smoky clearings on the hillsides, and since a natural prudence bade him not risk any open encounter, the enemy was not to be found. But they existed nonetheless." 78 Even as U.S. soldiers relied on Filipinos as guides, translators, carriers and providers of food and intelligence, they found the task of distinguishing Filipino soldiers from “friendly” villagers in garrisoned towns, who declared themselves “amigos,” a frustrating and dangerous one. As Jacob Isselhard recalled, "[t]he natives of the towns in which these small bodies of our men were placed... with that particular faculty of all Orientals to say one thing and meaning another, professed to be 'mucho amigo' (good friends) to our faces, while secretly aiding the insurrection with all the means at their command." Those who stepped
forward as guides, for example, “would invariably and purposely get lost on a trail which led either to nowhere or into well prepared death traps.” Erwin Garrett put the problem succinctly in verse: “‘Amigo’ to your face, forsooth, / Or when you spend the dough, / But a red-handed ‘katipunan’ when / You turn around to go.”

The collision between Filipino revolutionary and U.S. Army perspectives on guerrilla war can best be witnessed in a brief written exchange in late-August 1900 between Mabini and General James Franklin Bell. Bell had written to pressure Mabini to reconcile himself to U.S. rule and to declare himself against continued resistance, as had an increasing number of revolutionaries. His argument hinged on the difference between “civilized” war and its opposites. War, he began, could only be justified by a combatant where success was possible; as soon as defeat was certain, “civilization demands that the defeated side, in the name of humanity, should surrender and accept the result, although it may be painful to its feelings.” Combatants who strayed from this principle “place themselves in a separate classification” as “incompetent in the management of civil affairs to the extent of their ignorance of the demands of humanity.” In this specific case, the end of conventional war and the dispersal of the Philippine Army meant that continued Filipino resistance was not only “criminal” but was “also daily shoving the natives of the Archipelago headlong towards a deeper attitude of semicivilization in which they will become completely incapable of appreciating and understanding the responsibilities of civil government.” Civilization meant “pacification” and the acceptance of U.S. sovereignty: “The Filipino people can only show their fitness in this matter by laying down their arms…”

Mabini countered with a brilliant riposte. Bell’s starting point, he noted, was simply the claim that might made right, that the U.S. war was “just and humanitarian” because its army was powerful, “which trend of reasoning not even the most ignorant Filipino will believe to be true.” If in real life, he noted, “the strong nations so easily make use of force to impose their claims on the weak ones,” it was because “even now civilization and humanitarian sentiments that are so often invoked, are, for some, more apparent than real.” No one deplored more deeply the “guerrilla and ambush system” the Filipinos had been “forced to adopt”; Mabini had always considered “the fight that offers equal risks to both combatants more noble and more worthy of men.” But the Filipinos had been left no choice. The very laws of war that authorized strong nations’ use of “powerful weapons of combat” against weak ones were those that “persuade[d]” the weak to engage in guerrilla war, “especially when it comes to defending their homes and their freedoms against an invasion.”

Guerrilla war was, in other words, tactical rather than ethnological: in this “extreme case,” the laws of war “implacably order the weak people to defend their threatened honor and natural rights under pain of being called uncivilized and incapable of understanding the responsibilities of a proper government.” Civilization meant neither capitulation nor conciliation, but resistance in the face of domination. Indeed, for Mabini, resistance to submission itself—even through guerrilla war—was the only mark of a “civilized” people. The Filipinos, he wrote, “fight to show to
the United States that they possess sufficient culture to know their rights even where there is a pretense to hide them by means of clever sophisms.” 85 Earlier Mabini had written, along the same lines, that “[a] humiliating peace is tolerated only in uncivilized countries.” 86 Asserting the logic of recognition, Mabini hoped the Revolution would in this way “remind the Americans of the struggle borne by their ancestors against the Englishmen for the emancipation of the colonies which are now the free States of North America.” At that moment, the Americans had been “in the same place which the Filipinos are in today.” Contrary to some, Filipino resistance was “not motivated by hatred of race, but by the same principles sealed with the blood of [the Americans’] own ancestors.” 87

Mabini was right that, in waging guerrilla war, Filipinos risked “the pain of being called uncivilized.” Throughout the colonial world, races were characterized by the way they made war. The General Orders No. 100, the Civil War-era regulations that were the U.S. Army’s principal reference-point on questions of “irregular” warfare in the Philippines, relied heavily on racial-historical dichotomies between “civilized” and “savage” war. While “barbarous armies” and “uncivilized people,” for example, offered no protection to civilians for example, the “inoffensive citizen” was protected in “modern regular wars of the Europeans, and their descendents in other portions of the globe.” While the Orders authorized retaliation by “civilized nations,” taken too far this principle quickly led nearer to “the internecine wars of savages.” 88

By these lights, those who waged guerrilla war were, by definition, “savage”: Filipino warfare did not take this form out of ignorance or strategy but out of race. Conventional wisdom to this effect issued from the top of the U.S. military hierarchy in the Philippines. “War in its earlier form was an act of violence which, from the very nature of primitive humanity and of the forces employed, knew no bounds,” General MacArthur declared in a December 1900 proclamation. “Mankind, from the beginning of civilization, however, has tried to mitigate, and to escape, as far as possible, from the consequences of this barbarous conception of warlike action...” 89 The Filipinos, in refusing these boundaries, had shown themselves to be less than “civilized.” “The war on the part of the Filipinos,” wrote Secretary of War Elihu Root, “has been conducted with the barbarous cruelty common among uncivilized races.” 90

This sense of race as the root cause of guerrilla war was also useful in explaining the guerrillas’ mass support as the U.S. effort ground to a halt in mid-1900. In his October 1, 1900 report, MacArthur sought to account for what he called, with begrudging respect, the “almost complete unity of action of the entire native population.” His conclusion was that Filipino participation was neither rational nor political. “[T]he adhesive principle comes from ethnological homogeneity,” he stated, “which induces men to respond for a time to the appeals of consanguineous leadership, even when such action is opposed to their own interests.” 91 General Young concurred. “The keynote of the insurrection among the Filipinos past, present and future is not tyranny,” he stated in an April 1901 address, “for we are not tyrants. It is race.” 92
U.S. soldiers also increasingly defined the entire Filipino population as the enemy. Race became a sanction for exterminist war, the means by which earlier distinctions between combatants and non-combatants—already fragile—eroded or collapsed entirely. As long as popular support for the rebellion was conceived of as “political”—as a matter of decisions, interests and incentives—within an ultimately pluralistic Filipino polity, the task of the U.S. Army was to “persuade” Filipinos of various sectors to accept U.S. sovereignty. That this “persuasion” might take terrible, total forms was something that U.S. officials readily acknowledged. But no such persuasion was possible where “ethnological homogeneity” governed over reason. The Filipinos were one united “race”; its “savagery” placed it outside the bounds of “civilized” warfare: the two explanatory halves converged, pincer-like, into racial exterminist war as the only means to “peace.”

Close ties between race and exterminist warfare can be found in the ever-present racial terms employed by U.S. soldiers in their descriptions of violence against prisoners and civilians. In 1902, for example, Albert Gardner, in Troop B of the 1st U.S. Cavalry, composed a would-be comic song dedicated to “water-cure” torture—in which filthy water was poured into the mouths of Filipino prisoners, drowning them—sung to the tune of the Battle Hymn of the Republic:

1st
Get the good old syringe boys and fill it to the brim
We’ve caught another nigger and we’ll operate on him
Let someone take the handle who can work it with a vim
Shouting the battle cry of freedom

Chorus
Hurrah Hurrah We bring the Jubilee
Hurrah Hurrah The flag that makes him free
Shove in the nozzel [sic] deep and let him taste of liberty
Shouting the battle cry of freedom. 93

Racial terms were employed in accounts of the shooting of Filipino prisoners, often disguised as failed “escapes.” William Eggenberger reported hearing at one point that the “niggers” would “all the am [sic] prisoners they capture from now on, and of corse [sic] we will ring [sic] all the damn necks of the ones we capture too…” 94 He recorded several occasions of shooting prisoners attempting to “escape,” but later confessed that

When we capture a suspicious nigger, we generally loose him in the swamps, that is he is lost and he isn’t lost but he never shows up any more. Turn about is fair play. They do it to us and we do it to them, they killed three of our fellows with out mercy but we have taken a very sweet revenge and a very clear revenge to them too. 95

One of the most banal and brutal manifestations of racial exterminism was U.S. soldiers’ imagination of the war as hunting. The Manila occupation and early conventional warfare had frustrated U.S. soldiers’ martial masculinity; the metaphor
of the hunt made war, at last, into masculine self-fulfillment. All at once, a language of hunting animalized Filipinos, made sense of guerrilla war to American troops, and joined them in manly fraternity. “I don’t know when the thing will let out,” wrote Louis Hubbard one week into the war, “and don’t care as we are having lots of excitement. It makes me think of killing jack rabbits.” Earl Pearsall jotted in his diary on the third day of the war that “[o]ur boys kept them on the run and shot them down like rabbits.” John F. Bright described one advance near San Juan Bridge: “As we advanced they would jump up like rabbits only a few feet from us, dead game ready to sell their lives as dearly as possible, but we shot them down before they could do any damage.”

Racial terms explicitly linked hunting to exterminism. “There is no question that our men do ‘shoot niggers’ somewhat in the sporting spirit,” admitted Wells. “It is lots of sport to hunt these black devils,” wrote Louis Hubbard just three weeks into the war. Private George Osborn of the 6th Infantry wrote home from Negros on January 15, 1900: “[j]ust back from the fight. Killed 22 niggers captured 29 rifels [sic] and 1 shotgun and I tell you it was a fight... we just shot the niggers like a hunter would rabbits...” In April 1899, Lieutenant Tefler wrote from Marilao that night-time scouting raids were his men’s only relief from the boredom of guarding a railroad, that it was “great fun for the men to go on ‘nigger hunts.’” Racial-exterminist sentiment of this kind was not uncommon in U.S. soldiers’ songs, diaries and letters. It was at the very center of the most popular of the U.S. army’s marching songs, which marked the Filipino population as a whole as the enemy and made killing Filipinos the only means to their “civilization.”

Damn, damn, damn the Filipino
Pock-marked khakiac ladrone;
Underneath the starry flag
Civilize him with a Krag,
And return us to our own beloved home.

One Nebraskan soldier boasted to his parents of his comrades’ bold, aggressive fighting spirit, restrained only by officers’ reticence. “If they would turn the boys loose,” he wrote, “there wouldn’t be a nigger left in Manila twelve hours after.” Henry Hackthorn explained to his family that the war, which he regretted, had been avoidable but “the niggers got in a hurry.” “We would kill all in sight if we could only receive the necessary orders,” he wrote. A dramatic monologue entitled “The Sentry” written and published by a U.S. soldier, features a sympathetic portrayal of a lonely U.S. sentry on watch-duty. “If I catch one of those bolo-men slinking around me, I’ll just plug the son-of-a-gun full of holes,” he says, just before he is treacherously killed. “I hate the very sight of their black hides.” Eggenberger reported happily in March 1900 that Macabebes had killed 130 “ladrones” without one escape. “[L]et the good work go on we will have the damn bug eaters civilized [sic] if we have to bury them to do it,” he wrote. The year before, he had casually urged his family to have an old friend write to him. “[T]ell him if he don’t rite [sic] to me when i get back i will take him for a nigger and bombard him, tell him no
Amegoes (friends) will go then, ha ha.” A war of “no amigos” was a war without surrender.

**Race and Atrocity**

Just as imperialists had mobilized racial ideologies to defend the war’s ends, so too was race made to defend its means, undermining moral and legal claims against American soldiers accused of “marked severities” in the halls of U.S. governance, in press debates and in courts-martial. When Senate hearings between January and June 1902 raised the question of U.S. atrocities, the U.S. Army’s defenders repeatedly held that abuses were rare; that where they occurred they were swiftly and thoroughly punished; and that testimony to the contrary was characterized by partisan and cowardly—possibly traitorous—exaggeration. But racial arguments, in at least three varieties, were central to the administration’s defense.

The first variant claimed that the Filipinos’ guerrilla war, as “savage” war, was entirely outside the moral and legal standards and strictures of “civilized” war. Those who adopted guerrilla war, it was argued, surrendered all claims to bounded violence and mercy from their opponent. Captain John H. Parker employed this line of argument in a November 1900 letter to President Roosevelt complaining that the U.S. Army should not “attempt to meet a half civilized foe… with the same methods devised for civilized warfare against people of our own race, country and blood.”

This point was also made at Senate hearings in 1902, when General Hughes described the burning of entire towns by advancing U.S. troops to Senator Rawlins as a means of “punishment,” and Rawlins inquired: “But is that within the ordinary rules of civilized warfare?..” General Hughes replied succinctly: “These people are not civilized.”

In their effort to depict Filipino combat as "savage," the war’s defenders made much of what they considered Filipino "race war" against whites. Racial exterminism by whites, it seemed, was merely the inevitable, progressive working out of history; race war took place only when non-whites resisted white domination, in violation of the natural order. Evidence of a Filipino "race war" was found in what was represented as an early 1899 military order by General Teodoro Sandiko, a document reputedly captured by U.S. soldiers. In it, Sandiko allegedly commanded Filipinos inside the U.S.-occupied city of Manila to revolt in preparation for an invasion of the city from the outside by the army of the Republic: not only U.S. soldiers, but all "whites" inside the city were to be killed. While evidence of U.S. racial exterminist atrocities was cut off by censorship, the "Sandiko order" was widely promoted in the U.S. press as early as April 1899 as signs of Filipino "savagery." "The war has developed into a race war," wrote John F. Bass of the Sandiko order in Harper's Weekly. "After this let no one raise his voice to favor Aguinaldo’s government or army." There was "no choice of methods" ahead, only the need for a "strong military government, untempered by mercy." Use of the "Sandiko order" intensified with the Presidential race of 1900, finding its way into Vice Presidential candidate Theodore Roosevelt's speeches, and even into the
Republican platform. The Filipinos’ "race war," it appeared, contrasted sharply with the war of "civilization" waged by the United States.

If the first argument defined U.S. actions as outside of the moral and legal framework of “civilized war,” the second explained American atrocities in a way that distanced them from U.S. initiative. “Civilized” men might reluctantly adopt “savage” methods to defeat savages, but they could do so without surrendering their civilization; guerrilla war was tactical for whites, “ethnological” for non-whites. This argument required emphasis on racial solidarity between domestic U.S. audiences and American soldiers. Maj. General S. B. M. Young accused those who had claimed “that our soldiers are barbarous savages... and not fit to be considered as civilized,” as “abusing their own flesh and blood” for political advantage. He found the anti-imperialists more traitorous even than the Civil War’s Copperheads had been; the latter, at least, had been defending “kindred,” where the current war had been “against a cruel and vindictive lot of savages, who were in no way related to us.”

Henry Cabot Lodge expressed similar sentiment in an address before the Senate. “One would suppose from what has been said here in debate,” he stated, “that it was an army of aliens and mercenaries; that we had out there in the Philippine Islands some strange foreign force which we had let loose upon that helpless people.” But this was not the case. “Why, Mr. President, those soldiers are our own. They are our flesh and blood, bone of our bone, flesh of our flesh.” If U.S. atrocities were not a matter of “race,” they must be a matter of emulation: Americans appropriated what little “savagery” they had undertaken from their immediate surroundings. “What is it which has led them to commit these atrocities which we all so much regret and over which we sorrow?” Lodge asked.

I think I know why these things have happened. I think they have grown out of the conditions of warfare, of the war that was waged by the Filipinos themselves, a semicivilized people, with all the tendencies and characteristics of Asiatics, with the Asiatic indifference to life, with the Asiatic treachery and the Asiatic cruelty, all tinctured and increased by three hundred years of subjection to Spain.

The third argument attributed U.S. atrocities entirely to Macabebe collaborators organized into Scout units. If the “emulation” argument suggested that Americans were merely imitating “savages,” the third argument was that atrocities had been committed almost entirely by cooperating Filipino troops over which American officers had little or no control. Call it a policy of outsourcing “savagery”: where the Macabebe Scouts had been earlier hailed as “Filipinos in Uncle Sam’s Uniforms,” they were represented during atrocity investigations as a kind of mad unconscious that could neither be dispensed with nor fully harnessed. In response to reports that certain Macabebe units had looted the town of Magallanes and raped women there, for example, General Wheaton noted that they were “in these outrages, conducting themselves in their usual and customary manner.” Brigadier-General Frederick Funston strongly denied his own troops had committed the “water cure,” but it was “common knowledge” that Macabebes had done so “when not under the direct control of some officer” and it was “utterly impossible to prevent a few offenses of
this kind." Responsibility went only as far as race. Funston had "never heard of its having been administered to a native by a white man." 120

The last act of the administration's political counter-offensive was an (almost) final declaration of the end of the war. As one Washington Post editorial noted, the McKinley and Roosevelt administrations had attempted, and failed repeatedly, to end the war by fiat; indeed, it observed, the conflict had been "brought to an end on six different occasions" since the first declaration of U.S. victory. "A bad thing cannot be killed too often," it stated. Two months after his address at Arlington, President Theodore Roosevelt attempted to "kill" the war yet again, declaring the Philippine-American War officially over on July 4, 1902, as if cued by John Philip Sousa himself.121 Returning U.S. soldiers, freed up by the transfer of military power to the Scouts and police power to the newly-formed Philippine Constabulary, were perhaps the most potent if illusory signs to American audiences of an "insurrection" well-ended.122 But this was a continually beleaguered fiction that sometimes resulted in unflattering reversals: between 1901 and 1905, parts of the provinces of Batangas, Cebu, Bohol, Samar, Cavite and Albay would be returned to military authority in response to persistent "ladronism." 123 The war's phantom life after mid-1902 was best indicated by the Commission's Bandolerismo Statute of November 1902, which even more than Roosevelt's declaration, ended the war by fiat, defining any remaining Filipino resistance to American authority as "banditry" rather than "insurrection." Second was the Reconcentration Act of 1903 which, to the contrary, extended the war in tactical terms by authorizing use of wartime measures where necessary under civilian authority; liberal use would be made of this in subsequent years, in Albay and Bicol in 1903 and Batangas and Cavite in 1905. 124 The Commission would pass specific, separate acts shifting authority from the military to civilians, officially "ending" the war in these regions in silent, piecemeal fashion until 1913.

As power shifted from the U.S. Army to civilian administrators, a process that was tense and reversible, so too did the racial formation that would organize U.S. colonialism in the Philippines. On the face of it, the new regime's racial terms—"tutelage," "uplift," "evolution," "assimilation"—were dramatic departures from the depths of racial exterminism, departures that closely corresponded to the needs of an emerging Filipino-American collaborationist state whose "internal frontiers" would emerge as the next ground of struggle.
This cartoon from Public Opinion of June 1902 offers civilian colonial rule, in the form of the Philippine Bill, as a favorable alternative to war. It does so by dividing the Philippine population into the “savage” population still resisting, and the “civilized” population collaborating peacefully with U.S. colonial state builders. Images like these paved the way for a postwar racial state predicated on notions of “tutelage” and “assimilation” and illustrate the political dynamism of race.

If the U.S. military’s distrust of the new administrators, and the frequent refusal of officers to take part in its new, inter-racial rituals, suggested conflict, there were also continuities: students needed to be tested and disciplined, children were to be supervised, controlled and punished. “Benevolent” assimilation could always, implicitly, be withdrawn for the other kind. During the Philippine-American War, U.S. soldiers had borrowed and adapted a Tagalog word to create “boondock,” a term for a liminal, border region, with connotations of bewilderment and disorientation. The “boondocks” emerged where older maps failed, where prior patterns and relationships could no longer be recognized. Making sense of colonial war required Americans to develop a novel racial formation that could reorient the United States at a crucial transition in its imperial career. Filipino revolutionaries had attempted to achieve American recognition through their “civilization” and even in their fighting, but as combat and race-making became entangled, the two processes fused into racial-exterminist warfare with devastating human consequences. The legacy of colonial violence
would continue to haunt both societies as empire building drew the United States and the Philippines together in the 20th century.

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Notes:


[5] For the purposes of this essay, exterminist warfare is warfare in which non-
combatants are viewed as legitimate targets during the duration of combat but co-existence is imagined as a postwar goal; I distinguish this from genocide, in which violence is organized around the deliberate elimination of all members of an "enemy" society. I refrain from the use of the category of "total war" due to the category's vague boundaries. On the concept of exterminism, see Dirk Bönker, “Militarizing the Western World: Navalism, Empire and State-Building Before World War I,” (PhD thesis, The Johns Hopkins University, 2002). On "total war" during the Philippine-American War, see May, “Was the Philippine-American War a 'Total War'?” in Manfred F. Boemeke, Roger Chickering, Stig Förster. eds., Anticipating Total War: The German and American Experiences, 1871-1914 (Washington, D.C.: German Historical Institute; Cambridge, U.K.; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999). For an intriguing comparative perspective on these questions see Helmut Walser Smith, “The Logic of Colonial Violence: Germany in Southwest Africa (1904-1907); the United States in the Philippines (1899-1902).” in Hartmut Lehmann and Hermann Wellenreuther, eds., German and American Nationalism: A Comparative Perspective (New York: Berg, 1999), 205-231. On other U. S. race wars, see John Dower, War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War, 7th printing (New York: Pantheon Books, 1993); Mark Grimsley, “'Rebels' and 'Redskins': U.S. Military Conduct toward White Southerners and Native Americans in Comparative Perspective,” in Mark Grimsley and Clifford J. Rogers, eds., Civilians in the Path of War (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, c2002), 137-161.


13 Felipe Agoncillo, "Memorial to the Senate of the United States" (Washington, DC, 1899), 2, 7.

15 “Nuestro Programa,” La Independencia, Year 1, No. 1 (September 3, 1898). All quotations from La Independencia are translations from the original Spanish by the author.

16 Advertisement for La Independencia, Year 1, No. 2 (September 5, 1898); See, for example, “El Espíritu de la Asociación,” La Independencia, Year 1, No. 5 (September 9, 1898); “De Higiene Pública,” La Independencia, Year 1, No. 36 (October 17, 1898); “Los Presupuestos,” La Independencia, Year 1, No. 41 (October 22, 1898); “Apuntes Sobre Enseñanza,” La Independencia, Year 1, No. 47 (October 29, 1898); “Moralización,” La Independencia, Year 1, No. 63 (November 18, 1898).


19 Sargent, "In Aguinaldo's Realm," 2479.


21 Report of Tour through the Island of Luzon, 20.

22 Sargent, 2481.

23 Wilcox and Sargent, 16.


25 Wilcox and Sargent, 20.

26 Wilcox and Sargent, 20.


28 William McKinley to the Secretary of War, December 21, 1898, in "Message from the President of the United States," Senate Document No. 208, 56th Congress, 1st Session (1899-1900), 82-3.

29 G. Apacible, Al Pueblo Americano/To the American People (Anti-Imperialist League, 1900).

30 "To the Filipino People," Exhibit 992, J. R. M. Taylor, ed., The Philippine Insurrection, Vol. V, 96. Taylor speculates that its author was Emilio Aguinaldo; a likely candidate is Apolinario Mabini.

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