The Japanese Empire: Colonial Lives and Postcolonial Struggles

Kirsten Ziomek

Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus

Course Reader no. 8
2013
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The article “Mamiya Rinzō and the Japanese exploration of Sakhalin Island: cartography and empire” by Brett L. Walker was originally published in the Journal of Historical Geography Vol. 33, pp. 283-313 (2007). © 2006 Elsevier Ltd. Used with permission. All rights reserved.

The article “Memories of Okinawa: Life and Times in the Greater Osaka Diaspora” by Steve Rabson was originally published in Islands of Discontent: Okinawan Responses to Japanese and American Power, ed. Laura Hein and Mark Selden. © 2003 Rowman & Littlefield. Used with permission. All rights reserved.

The volume editor can be contacted at kziomek@hamilton.edu. From Fall 2013 Ziomek can be contacted at Adelphi University, where she will begin her appointment as an assistant professor in the Department of History.
The Japanese Empire: Colonial Lives and Postcolonial Struggles

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Recommended Further Reading
Introduction

This reader analyzes the formation of the Japanese empire and also challenges traditional ideas about the origins and contours of the Japanese empire. Instead of viewing the 1895 Chinese cession of Taiwan as Japan’s first colonial acquisition and the start of Japan’s imperial drive, the authors featured in this reader locate the beginnings of Japanese imperialism earlier in the 19th century, when rising western powers created a sense of crisis and threat in Japan. These fears first led to the colonization of territories whose sovereign nature was ambivalent—namely Hokkaido (Ezochi) in 1869 and Okinawa (the former Ryūkyū Kingdom) in 1879. Locating the first imperialist acts here reminds us that some regions of Japan today were independent two hundred years ago. Essays in this reader examine how and in what ways the Japanese government simultaneously worked to evade becoming a colony of other powerful nations and asserted that it had the right to control other places.

While early Japanese imperialism was fueled by this attempt to resist colonization by western powers, this imperialist drive would later take on a more aggressive form. Japan’s increasingly isolationist policies and creation of the puppet state of Manchukuo would propel it into a multi-front war, known as the Asia-Pacific War, which ended in Japan’s defeat in 1945. The Japanese empire’s brutal wartime aggression during wartime led to many horrors: the recruitment of military “comfort women,” the medical experiments conducted on human subjects by Unit 731, the Nanjing Massacre, and the Japanese Imperial Army’s encouragement of Okinawans to commit suicide during the Battle of Okinawa, to name just a few. Although colonial policies restricted freedoms and the ways in which colonial subjects could participate in everyday life in Japan even before war broke out, the advent of war altered colonial subjects’ lives to an even greater extent. Some colonial subjects believed they could become Japanese by serving in the Imperial Army while other colonial subjects’ experiences of war reconfirmed their lowly status in the empire. For example, some were conscripted into forced labor typically under much worse conditions than experienced by Japanese. A second example is the many Okinawans who were singled out by the Japanese Imperial Army as “spies” during the Battle of Okinawa, since the Japanese distrusted the local civilians due to exaggerations of their supposed differences.

The Japanese empire comprised a variety of legally subordinated areas: formal colonies (Taiwan, Korea, Karafuto), an ostensibly independent puppet state (Manchukuo), and territories which it controlled under a League of Nations Mandate (islands in Micronesia). In addition, as mentioned above, the formerly independent areas of Okinawa and Hokkaido were naturalized (made to appear as if it already belonged) into the nation state proper (naichi).¹

¹ Although Okinawa and Hokkaido were both incorporated into the nation state some differences in their governance distinguished them from other prefectures. For example, the military conscription of Okinawans and Ainu began in 1898, twenty-five years after implementation of the nationwide conscription law in 1873. Furthermore, differences in educational and economic administration distinguished both Okinawa and Hokkaido from other prefectures. In Okinawa, land reform, tax reform, and full representation in the Diet were all delayed.
Most essays in this reader explain the contours of the empire, the processes of imperialisation, and what it meant for colonial subjects to “become Japanese.” These essays do not fully show the brutalities of the colonial experience, in part because some of the worst events took place during the Asia-Pacific War. Those interested in the wartime experiences of the colonized should also examine the APJ course readers, “Minorities in Japan,” edited by Gerald Iguchi (2013) and “War in Japanese Popular Culture,” edited by Matthew Penney (2012).

The essays chosen for Part I illustrate current trends in analyses of the Japanese empire, which consider the processes of empire building to be synonymous and intertwined with those of modern nation building. Each author uses a different lens to examine Japanese empire building, such as the colonization and transformation of urban and natural space, the mapping of territories, and the creation of new forms of imperialism that were not modeled on the empires of European powers. While these new forms of imperialism—as exemplified by Manchukuo—were influenced by the west and even shaped by that influence, their institutional framework and the rhetoric underlying their establishment were themselves original creations.

The essays in Part II all explore colonial subjecthood through an examination of colonial literature, non-fiction writings of colonial subjects, and the memories of colonial subjects seeking to “become Japanese.” All the authors in this section argue for a complicated and ambivalent understanding of the location of subalterns (those of inferior rank)\(^2\) in the empire. The diversity of colonial experiences and the complexity of relationships formed between colonizer and colonized cannot be depicted in the black-and-white terms of oppressor and oppressed. Essays in this reader illustrate this ambivalence by showing how colonial subjects understood and negotiated their place within the empire.

Beyond demonstrating this multiplicity of experiences, the essays in this collection also show how colonial subjects created mixed and hybrid identities in the postcolonial period: some former colonial subjects rejected their heritage to maintain their Japaneseness, some fiercely guarded their ethnic diversity with pride, and still others sought a dual identity as not either/or but both. Authors of these essays would agree that there is no singular Korean, Okinawan, Ainu, or Taiwanese Aborigine voice, and that ethnic identities are constantly being reformed and rearticulated well into the postcolonial period.

This postcolonial experience is the main theme of Part III. The harsh realities of forced labor and military conscription of colonial subjects before 1945 continue to affect diplomatic relationships between the Japanese government and former territories once under Japan’s rule, such as Korea and Taiwan. These tensions flare up over such issues as repatriating both people and the remains of the dead, and controversies over depictions of colonial histories and war. These issues illustrate the very real struggles by former colonized subjects to receive compensation or acknowledgement of their past oppression.

\(^2\) “Subaltern meaning ‘of inferior rank,’ is a term adopted by Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937) to refer to those groups in society who are subject to the hegemony of the ruling classes.” He defined peasants, workers and other groups denied access to “hegemonic power” as subaltern but in colonial and postcolonial studies subaltern has become synonymous with defining both the colonized and those at the peripheries of society due to their race or gender as well as Gramsci’s class concerns, or a combination of all these factors. See Bill Ashcroft, *Post-Colonial Studies: The Key Concepts* (London: Routledge, 2001): 177-8.
In the postcolonial world order, some former colonized people—such as the Ainu and Taiwanese Aborigines—have become involved in a transnational movement predicated upon a platform of indigeneity (the state of being native or belonging naturally to the land). As indigenous people they fight for three main goals: 1) the recognition of their indigeneity by the government, 2) a stake in the political process, and 3) redress for the effects of colonization, discrimination, or economic marginalization. Many former colonized subjects struggle to maintain their individual points of view in a climate in which various groups attempt to mobilize ethnicity and indigeneity for different geo-political purposes. The issue of indigeneity, and contestations over who has the right to speak on behalf of an indigenous group, remind us that claims of representation are often contested processes imbued with power struggles among the members of indigenous groups. For study beyond the introduction to the Japanese empire that these essays provide, interested individuals are encouraged to consult the suggested reading list at the end of this course reader.
Part I: "Expanding the Contours of the Japanese Empire"

The articles included in Part I challenge traditional understandings of Japanese empire, approaching the issue in three different ways. Brett Walker’s article counters the conventional thinking that the roots of Japanese imperialism began as a response to the 1853 arrival of Commodore Matthew Perry and his black ships, which forced the opening of Japan in the form of the unequal treaties he imposed upon Japan. Walker instead argues that the Tokugawa government was aware of many threats to its national defense in the early 19th century, and its attempt to map Sakhalin—a territory whose borders were already contested between Japan and Russia—was a way to claim sovereignty, backed by one of the traditional tools of empire, cartography. The next article, by Vivian Blaxell, examines how the colonization of Hokkaido was aided by efforts to naturalize and Japanize both its urban and rural space. Blaxell’s article does two things: first, it acknowledges that Hokkaido was the Japanese empire’s first colony; second, it treats nation-building and empire-building as twin forces that fed into each other and were often inextricable. Finally, Prasenjit Duara’s article points out that Manchukuo maintained the façade of a legally sovereign nation while it was in reality under the ultimate economic and political control of another power, Japan. Duara argues that Japan’s new kind of imperialism set the precedent for countries like the Soviet Union and the United States, who later adopted similar practices.
In this article Walker argues that Japanese imperial processes began much earlier than other scholars often assume; the Tokugawa government was well aware of various geo-political threats that certain countries posed to Japan's national defense in the early 19th century. Specifically, both the Qing Empire and Russia were poised to claim sovereignty over Sakhalin, an island in the North Pacific, through their competing attempts to map the territory. Walker examines the journeys of several Japanese cartographers, especially Mamiya Rinzō, who were commissioned by the Tokugawa government to map Sakhalin first and determine the borders between Japan and Russia. Walker argues that, while European countries were often “centers of calculation” that sought to amass scientific knowledge for the benefit of imperial projects, the Japanese cartographic efforts were an attempt by a “periphery of calculation” to rival these claims. The Tokugawa government's mapmaking activities were not only a way to fend off European colonialism, but used the same technology as the Russians, which allowed Japan to claim that it was a scientifically advanced society and therefore had a right to control Sakhalin. According to Walker, mapping distant lands was “an inherent exercise in state logistical power” because it showed that the state was strong enough to amass the manpower and ships to embark on such endeavors. The imperial processes that would enable Japan to successfully incorporate the southern part of Sakhalin (called Karafuto) into the Japanese empire in 1905 were thus set into motion almost a hundred years prior to Karafuto's colonization.

Throughout the 19th century the contested borders of the Kuril Islands, Hokkaido, and the Ryūkyū Kingdom provoked similar fears that if Japan did not act to claim sovereignty over these territories, other nations would. Walker goes on to discuss how Japanese surveyors tried to define the level of civility or barbarity of other people by examining differences in customs and practices. Early modern Japanese constructed notions of ethnic identity through a delineation of concentric circles, in which the people who were the furthest away from the Japanese core had the most customary differences from the Japanese, and thus were considered the most barbaric. While the Japanese saw these people as Other, in the first half of the 19th century they did not yet share the western analyses of biological race but saw these differences in terms of culture. The western discourses, which emphasized the idea that civilization was tied to race, only began to permeate Japanese articulations of empire in the late 19th century.

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3 Walker uses a “center of calculation” to denote an imperial power that was already globally strong and the “peripheries of calculation” to describe territories that had not achieved parity with the imperial powers.
Mamiya Rinzō and the Japanese Exploration of Sakhalin Island: Cartography and Empire

Brett L. Walker

A New Introduction by Brett L. Walker

Maps can be powerful tools of nation building and empire, and therefore powerful historical sources. Whether they delineate tidal patterns, measure altitude, chart seafloors, identify ethnic communities, or bind nations, maps provide a potent lens through which people view the world and, in turn, spatially contextualize their experiences. Because of their power as historical sources, maps also serve as useful pedagogical devices when teaching about Japan. Recently, major research universities have pushed the importance of “original” undergraduate research. This is complicated if the student’s interest is Tokugawa Japan, because archival documentation is notoriously difficult to read. Maps, however, offer an alternative. Of course, maps – particularly pre-modern maps drawn before the global spread of the cartographic sciences – contain marginal text; but because they are visual sources, they can, with the aid of an adept teacher, appeal to the creative inclinations of a notoriously visually oriented generation. Students learn that maps often represent – and often even drive – major historical events. This is certainly true of the maps drawn by Mamiya Rinzō, a collection of beautifully preserved pieces held at the Resource Collection for Northern Studies (Hoppō Shiryō Shitsu) at Hokkaido University.

Because they are such rich sources, and because there are so many kinds, maps can be interpreted in numerous ways. They can depict cadastral surveys; they can also depict Buddhist cosmologies. Bruno Latour argued that maps, when crafted by European imperialists according to the “language of science,” and then dispatched to “centers of calculation,” concentrated scientific knowledge in the hands of imperial states. In this process, local “beliefs” (of native groups) were transformed into normative “knowledge” to be deployed by European states in elaborate colonial projects. Indeed, with the crafting of maps according to the language of science, the “implicit” understanding of locals became “explicit” information used in Europe’s capital cities; and “local” ways of knowing succumbed to European “universal” knowledge. In this manner, maps were stable and movable inscriptions that charted the pathways and borders of the colonial enterprise. Michael Bravo, by contrast, has cautioned that even “stable, portable” maps, ones drawn according to the language of science, need to be seen as the results of the cross-cultural production of knowledge. European mapmakers negotiated with locals for access to geographical information. Even as the product of cross-cultural negotiations, however, they still proved compelling tools in the anticipation and creation of empire.

J.B. Harley argued that maps represent a kind of historical language, one that speaks as loudly as written documents. Sometimes they can speak even louder. Maps can be tricky, however, because, as a product of cartography, they can be disguised as just another “valueless” or “objective” science. Historians have become adept at interrogating and deconstructing written documents, but they have proven less adept at exposing the “historically specific codes” contained in maps. Because maps serve as an “authoritative” resource, one often controlled by the state, they were used to delineate nations and anticipate empires. That is, as Daniel Clayton writes, maps provided the scientific “geopolitical framework” for colonial projects. Mostly, they provided a “geopolitical framework” for nineteenth-century European powers; but China and Japan also deployed modern maps to anticipate their empires.
In this article, which appeared in the Journal of Historical Geography, I argue that early modern Japanese maps, specifically those drafted by Mamiya Rinzō (1775-1844) and Inō Tadataka (1745-1818), function in multiple capacities and, therefore, contain layers of “historically specific codes” that, if contextualized properly, enhance our understanding of Japanese history and, more broadly, East Asian history. To begin with, maps by Mamiya and Inō served as spatial parallels of an emerging “national consciousness” in Japan, one that was taking place in “nativist” (kokugaku) discursive communities around the country. These national maps, which traced the coastal boundaries of Japan, bound the abstract “collective memory” (as Eiko Ikegami describes it) or the “library of public information” (as Mary Elizabeth Berry describes it) that emerged in the late eighteenth century. In other words, if for “nativist” scholars, imagining the nation meant “restoring” the emperor to power through the study of ancient texts and poems, for cartographers such as Mamiya and Inō, it meant geographically binding (according to global, normative cartographic standards), and thereby delineating, the physical country called Japan. Cartographers, too, imagined the nation, only they did so with maps.

Maps also hastened Japan’s thrust into the modern age and, by anticipating empire and emptying foreign lands of their native inhabitants, facilitated later Japanese colonial projects in the North Pacific. Modern, scientific maps emptied lands of peoples, sequestering this information (peoples’ customs [fūzoku], for example) in illustrated ethnographies. Hence, maps vacated...
foreign lands, preparing them for occupation. Maps also brought foreign lands to the “centers of calculation,” among which Edo (and Tokyo), not only European capitals, must be included. Maps were brought to Tokugawa policymakers in Edo such as the astronomer Takahashi Kageyasu (1785-1829), who sought information on the borders that separated Japan, Russia, and the Qing Empire. Maps provided Takahashi with a “geopolitical framework,” one different from the Sinocentric tributary order that had dominated East Asian geopolitics for centuries. In essence, Takahashi sought a more modern way of looking at the world. Maps also facilitated the Japanese response to European imperialism by marking the boundaries of Japan in a language that Europeans understood, the language of science; but maps also facilitated Japan’s nineteenth-century move into Sakhalin Island and beyond by anticipating empire.

This article explores these facets of early modern maps, and many others, including where these two mapmakers came from and what their activities tell us about early modern Japanese society. It also narrates the travels of Mamiya and his Sakhalin guides (Mamiya’s partners in the cross-cultural production of cartographic knowledge), as they trod through these cold, northern territories, naming mountains (and thereby possessing them), surveying forests and fisheries (for future exploitation), and tracing the coastline of Sakhalin Island and beyond. Often, historians of Japan reserve discussion of the scientific mapping and surveying of foreign lands for the post-Meiji experience, when Japan imported the modern methods of nation building, industrialization, science, and imperialism. What the maps of Mamiya and Inō demonstrate is that Japan’s lurch into the modern age predates the Meiji Restoration, as does Japan’s emergence as an East Asian imperial power.

Mamiya Rinzō and the Japanese exploration of Sakhalin Island: cartography and empire
Brett L. Walker

Abstract
In 1808-1809, a Japanese cartographer named Mamiya Rinzō (1775-1844) traveled to Sakhalin Island, called Kita Ezo or Karafuto by the Japanese, to map the land and document its inhabitants and natural features. In the seventh month of 1809, according to the lunar calendar, Mamiya arrived at Deren, a Chinese outpost along the Amur River in the Heilongjiang region. When Mamiya mapped Sakhalin and central Heilongjiang, he employed Western cartographic sciences to guard Japanese sovereignty by delineating national borders between Russia, China, and Japan; but he also ‘anticipated empire’ in a manner reminiscent of European powers. His maps placed Sakhalin on a universally recognizable grid and emptied the land of its inhabitants, who were formally relegated to the pages of illustrated ethnographies. Mamiya’s activities, as well as those of cartographer Inō Tadataka (1745-1818), suggest a global early modern experience with cartography and ethnography, one in which Japan emerged as a periphery of calculation and deployed cartographic tools to construct nation and empire.

In 1808, only after ice on the North Pacific began to break apart, a Japanese explorer named Mamiya Rinzō (1775-1844), traveling with his colleague Matsuda Denjir (b. 1769), an ethnic Nivkh guide, and a handful of survey tools, was stopped dead in his tracks at Cape Rakka, on the west coast of Sakhalin Island, by deep, stinking beds of rotten kelp. Reportedly, the kelp covered the littoral landscape for as far as the eye could see and proved, along with cold weather, an
insurmountable obstacle for a survey mission that had held so much promise. The Tokugawa shogun and his chief science adviser, the astronomer Takahashi Kageyasu (1785-1829), had sponsored the mission, seeking to map, with the best survey technologies available, the national boundaries between Japan, Russia, and the Qing empire. Disappointed by the rotten kelp (but certainly not the existence of kelp given the ingredients of Japanese cuisine), Mamiya boarded a small boat and paddled westward, some 2000 m or so, off the coast and into the strait. Once there, he carefully positioned the craft and gazed northward and confirmed, as no other explorer had, that Sakhalin was an island and not a peninsula. Eventually, looming signs of Sakhalin’s harsh winter forced Mamiya and Matsuda to return southward, but the next year Mamiya traveled alone as far as Deren, a Chinese outpost in Manchuria, making contact with Qing officials and other local headmen and traders.1

When Mamiya had positioned his small craft in those cold waters, he navigated historical currents both common and uncommon to early modern experiences with the social construction of space. Mamiya’s mission to determine borders in the north constituted a calculated shogunal response to the threat posed by Western surveying in the region, an effort to turn European cartographic tools of empire into tools that resisted imperialism by geographically binding and, thereby, cartographically guarding Japan’s sovereignty: tools that proved capable of delineating Japan’s borders in a manner recognizable and hence more legitimate to predatory Western nations. But Mamiya’s scientific maps of Sakhalin proved not only instrumental in defending Japan’s sovereignty and regional interests, they assisted with later Japanese claims in the North Pacific. That is to say, Mamiya’s maps anticipated Japanese imperialism on Sakhalin in a manner reminiscent of the role maps played in British claims in Australia, India, and the Pacific Northwest of North America.

In the case of Japan, Mамиya’s maps evidenced a new manner of viewing national sovereignty and geographic space, similar to what Laura Hostetler has argued of eighteenth-century Qing Chinese cartography. In Mamiya’s Sakhalin maps no multiple or overlapping sovereignties existed and they, unlike earlier Japanese maps, could be deciphered by all who knew the language of the cartographic sciences, which made the shoguns covet them for several reasons.2 To begin with, Mamiya’s use of spatial technologies to delineate borders and anticipate Northeast Asian empire demonstrates that Japan, though not always motivated by the same goals as Western nations, was becoming part of a global early modern order, one where European countries, the United States, and the Qing empire (1644-1911) all deployed similar cartographic technologies in elaborate mapping projects that met the needs of mutually understood national and geopolitical concerns. Importantly, Mamiya drafted maps of Sakhalin simultaneous to Ино Tadataka’s (1745-1818) successful effort to map Japan’s entire coastline: Mamiya’s project illustrates Japan’s early anticipation of empire in the north, while Ино’s illustrates Japan’s cartographic fortification of the nation against the real threat of Western imperialism.

Such maps and, in the case of Mamiya’s writings, empirically-generated ethnographies, provided visual representations of Japan’s future empire and its people well before the Japanese ever formalized sovereignty over southern Sakhalin in 1905 after war with Russia. Placing the Qing empire, as Hostetler has done, and Tokugawa Japan within a global cartographic order serves to complicate the notion that early modernity (and its accompanying mapmaking projects) remains the exclusive domain of European countries. Western cartographers invented many of the cartographical tools used in China and Japan to map those East Asian realms, but more relevant is that Qing and Tokugawa policymakers invented new ways and discovered new places to
deploy them for their shared nation-and empire-building projects.\(^3\)

Hostetler also points out that such cartographic projects paralleled the development of an emerging ‘national consciousness’ in eighteenth-century China. Similarly, Inō’s mapping of Japan’s coastline and Mamiya’s mapping of Sakhalin paralleled the rise in prominence of ‘nativist’ learning, as represented by such figures as Motoori Norinaga (1730-1801) and Hirata Atsutane (1776-1843), and other ‘proto-modern’ national discourses, including the politically charged Mito School ideology, which sought to weaken the de-centered Tokugawa feudal order and ‘restore’ the emperor to his rightful position as ruler.\(^4\) Nativist scholars focused their considerable talents on parsing early Japanese songs and poems to distinguish them from writings that used Chinese characters, as well as to separate Shinto beliefs from imported Buddhist ones, the Japanese emperor from China’s less-majestic ‘Son of Heaven,’ and Neo-Confucianism from the native stories that, according to Eiko Ikegami, exemplified the Japanese ‘collective memory’. Ikegami argues that, through ‘tacit modes of communication’ that took place in public spheres outside the feudal order and that transcended the ‘status system,’ the Japanese forged mutual notions of public ‘civility’ in the early modern period and, in turn, developed a ‘proto-modern’ national consciousness by evoking the shared aesthetic networks and cultural assumptions in which all Japanese participated.\(^5\)

Mary Elizabeth Berry calls these networks the ‘library of public information,’ which, after the advent of Tokugawa rule, ‘created from fissured parts an integrally conceived “Japan”.’\(^6\) Of course, maps proved an important part of this process. For nativist scholars, however, the unifying symbol of ‘aesthetic networks’ or the ‘library of public information’ was the Japanese monarchy, which, they submitted in the early nineteenth century, needed to be ‘restored’ to power.\(^7\) Mapmaking was part of this project to imagine the nation: Japan’s late eighteenth and early nineteenth-century ‘collective memory,’ or nascent national consciousness, did not manifest itself in the flamboyancy of the crashing symbols and trumpeting brass of a European-style military parade, but rather more serenely in the national networks of \textit{haikai} poetry circles that brought together people from all walks of life to share in Japan’s ‘tacit modes of communication’. Such aesthetic modes of communication set Japan apart from its European counterparts to be sure, but they proved no less instrumental in the development of full-blown Japanese nationalism after the Meiji Restoration of 1868.

Late eighteenth and early nineteenth-century maps of Japan visually represented the spatial borders of Japan’s ‘collective memory,’ or what Benedict Anderson called an ‘imagined community’.\(^8\) Inō and Mamiya scrapped the traditional Japanese practice of writing extensive text or drawing taxonomic representations of barbarian ‘others’ on maps themselves in favor of longitudinal and latitudinal lines and other elements of the ‘language of science,’ ones more common to the global early modern community than to earlier Japanese practices. Ethnography, in turn, became characterized by empirical observations rather than second-hand information about fantastic ‘barbarians,’ mostly derived from older Chinese encyclopedias.

In other words, on Mamiya’s maps, the ‘land’ mapped cartographically became disassociated from the ‘people’ documented ethnographically; through separate categories of scientific knowledge the land was emptied, placed on a grid for all cartographically literate people to read, and then made available to policymakers in Edo (present-day Tokyo), the Tokugawa capital.\(^9\) As Hostetler writes in the case of China, ‘Both in the formation of modern nation-states and in expansion abroad, territory came to be viewed more and more as a resource to be dominated or
controlled by a political center. The land took on a value separate and distinct from those who occupied it.’ For his part, Mamiya defined ethnic groups not according to their relationship to the land, but according to important Confucian concerns, such as their various rites and rituals.

As with most eighteenth and nineteenth-century Japanese who wrote about their travel experiences, Mamiya focused on the ‘customary’ differences of Sakhalin people from Japanese, because highlighting such differences served as another powerful spatial tool, just as the compass, astrolabe, and map did. One aspect of Mamiya’s travel writings that differs from the European experiences with cartography and ethnography is that descriptions of different peoples and places still served as a spatial device, particularly when most people in Japan, including the Tokugawa shoguns, remained more or less illiterate to the intricacies of the newly imported European language of science. Generally, what they understood was this: the more differently people looked and acted from themselves, particularly when it came to food and hairstyles, the more distant they must be, because ‘Japanese-ness,’ as we shall see below, was largely (but of course not exclusively) defined in spatial terms, as proximity to the ancient capital and cultural center of Kyoto (Japan’s aesthetic hub and where the emperor resided) and a handful of other Japanese cities.

When he drew his maps, Mamiya abstracted Sakhalin from its local milieu and positioned it on a recognizable grid and its inhabitants within ethnographic categories so that it could be seen from a decidedly early modern vantage point. Mamiya initiated a ‘process of valuation’ that was the product of early modern imperial values and not native Sakhalin or even native Japanese ones, and such values framed the parameters of maps, ethnographies and, by extension, the organizational grid modern nations came to impose on their known world. The Mamiya expedition presented new ways of assigning value to Sakhalin, ones that contributed to nineteenth-century Japanese nation-building and, later, empire-building in the North Pacific. Once Mamiya’s cartographies and ethnographies were brought back to Edo, and then disembodied and calculated, Tokugawa officials proved able to ‘see like a state,’ as James Scott describes this simplified, modernist vantage point, on the northernmost boundaries of the Tokugawa realm.

Mamiya’s science

Most Japanese cartographers involved with the exploration of Sakhalin (and Japan’s early modern cartographic projects in general) came from the peasantry. In Japan, the Neo-Confucian ideology adopted by the Tokugawa shoguns in the seventeenth century established a natural hierarchy that placed the ‘samurai’ at top of the social heap, while the ‘peasantry,’ ‘artisans,’ and ‘merchants’ descended in that order. This brand of Neo-Confucianism, along with Shinto teachings and certain Buddhist creeds, formed the orthodox ideology of early modern Japan. As David Howell explains, the ‘status system,’ though supposedly static, remained quite dynamic and actually held little weight in Tokugawa legal practice. Often, in legal ledgers of various sorts, peasants, artisans, and merchants comprised the categories of ‘commoner,’ who were ‘townspeople’ when in the cities and ‘peasants’ when in the countryside. Therefore, peasantry, as a status category, needs to be seen more as an occupational title than an actual description of livelihood, because peasants worked many types of jobs. Subsequently, many peasants supplemented their livelihoods through non-agricultural means: this fact made Japan’s eighteenth-century commoner status an extraordinarily diverse segment of society.

Certainly, this helps explain why a number of explorers who emerged during Japan’s age of
exploration—roughly the period from the Tenmei era (1781-1788) through the first decades of the nineteenth century; an age that included Mogami Tokunai (1754-1836), Matsuda Denjirō, Inō Tadataka, Mamiya Rinzō, and others involved with surveying Ezochi (present-day Hokkaido), Kita Ezo or Karafuto (Sakhalin Island), and Chishima (the Kuril Islands)—came from among the commoners. Regrettably, the commoner background that makes Mamiya so fascinating also leaves most of his early life shrouded in obscurity. Historians know one thing for sure: he was born in Kamihirayanagi Village in Hitachi Province (Ibaraki Prefecture) along the banks of the Kogai River (see Fig. 1). His father, Shōbei, reportedly struggled to support his family and so he supplemented his income by crafting iron bands for wooden barrels. Mamiya’s humble background evidences the fluidity of Japan’s eighteenth-century society, including the ability of commoners to flow into the spatial sciences and other realms that required expertise, whether in the arena of road and dam designs or national mapping projects. It also suggests, however, that rural cultivators possessed knowledge and expertise beyond agronomics that proved useful to the Tokugawa state: the state relied on these rural cultivators for its national mapping projects. In other words, ‘seeing like a state’ in early modern Japan required a degree of negotiation with knowledgeable rural cultivators.
Walker: Mamiya Rinzō and the Japanese Exploration of Sakhalin Island

Fig. 1. Mamiya Rinzō’s travels on Sakhalin Island and in the Amur River Estuary, 1808-1809. Map by Dale Martin.
Mamiya garnered a local reputation in riparian engineering. By the eighteenth century, civil engineering in Japan had developed into a sophisticated science, one that principally revolved around *tsutsumi* (dikes, dams, and fortified embankments) construction. Engineers designed *tsutsumi* from soil, clay, and wooden posts and beams and, although solid for a time, they nearly always sprung leaks and eroded, because of the wear-and-tear of water pressure. By Mamiya’s day, engineers had started fortifying *tsutsumi* with an elaborate mesh of weight rocks in bamboo baskets supported by even more posts and beams; better designed ‘water gates’ served to alleviate water pressure and better irrigate even more far-flung paddies. Not surprisingly, the development of Japanese mathematics paralleled such elaborate riparian projects, as *tsutsumi* building necessitated complex calculations regarding water pressure as related to the slope, width, and depth of irrigation channels.18

While studying at a local village temple, Mamiya demonstrated a talent for mathematics, which played a critical role in his developing skills as a cartographer. Ironically, however, among the many sciences practiced in early modern Japan, the samurai elite held mathematics in the most disdain: Confucian scholars, such as Ōgyu Sorai (1666-1728), churlishly denounced higher mathematics, because of its association with the greedy, bean-counting merchant class.19 Early on, whatever mathematics the clever Mamiya did know, caught the attention of a traveling Tokugawa ‘construction official’ when Mamiya became involved with the Oka dam project just east of his home village. Importantly, historians speculate that this official was probably the ethnographer of Ainu ‘customs,’ Murakami Shimanojō (also Hata Awagimaru: 1764-1808), whose *Ezotō kikan* (‘Strange sights from Ezo Island’, 1800) endures as among the best ethnographic renditions of late eighteenth-century Ainu life.20 Around 1784, Murakami had caught the attention of the ‘senior councilor’ and conservative reformer Matsudaira Sadanobu (1758-1829), who dispatched Murakami to survey the various provinces of the Kantō (the agriculturally rich plain around Tokyo), a mission that lasted until 1798 and produced several surveys.21 The region of Shimōsa Province (Chiba Prefecture), where engineers built the Oka dam, was a likely stop on Murakami’s itinerary and where he probably met Mamiya.22

Every spring, during the equinoctial week, locals rebuilt the Oka dam, because it channeled water from the Kogai River and irrigated rice paddies connected to some thirty-three villages in Shimōsa Province; but the dam typically broke apart shortly thereafter. Mamiya impressed the visiting official and accompanied him back to Edo (probably in the early 1790s). After arriving in Edo, Mamiya became an assistant to Murakami and they even lived together for a spell while in the capital.23 Murakami and Mamiya surveyed together and alone, with the younger Mamiya sent to oversee surveys on Kyushu and Shikoku islands. The *Tōdatsu chihō kikō* (‘Travels in the region of eastern Tartary’, 1811), Mamiya’s main Sakhalin travel narrative—written with Murakami Teisuke (1780-1846), the adopted son of Murakami Shimanojō, and presented to Tokugawa officials in 1811—explains that

The author of this book, Mamiya Rinzō, was born in Hitachi and came from a peasant household. He departed for Edo where he became an attendant (*zuijin*) to [Murakami] Shimanojō and with whom he studied geography (*chiri no gaku*). With this geography, he explored between roads throughout the realm; he also knew to discern the local customs of these areas. Murakami, of course, investigated Japan thoroughly, including Hachijōjima, Ōshima, and other islands. Rinzō investigated Kyushu and Shikoku.

Mamiya’s later Sakhalin maps, as mentioned, emptied the land of people; but, in his earlier
surveys, the study of ‘geography’, as taught to him by ethnographer Murakami, included the need to ‘discern the local customs’ of peoples. But Murakami’s influence over Mamiya persisted even during the Sakhalin project, principally in the form of separate illustrated ethnographies: investigating the different ‘customs’ of people, whether Japanese or Sakhalin Ainu, became a technique for rendering nation and empire. Direct observations bolstered his ethnographies, such as the *Kitaezo zusetsu* (‘Illustrated explanation of northern Ezo’, published posthumously in 1855), which served as an instrument to document the inhabitants of Sakhalin and Manchuria.

In 1799, Murakami and Mamiya traveled together to Ezochi for the first time after the shogunate confiscated control of the island from the Matsumae family, who had overseen Ezochi for two centuries from its southern territory called Wajinchi, or ‘Japanese land’. The shogunate ordered surveys of its newly acquired northern territories. While the two stayed near Hakodate, the cartographer Inō Tadataka visited them (see Fig. 2). Later, Inō furthered Mamiya’s education in cartography and lent him important surveying tools (Indeed, we might speculate that it was under the tutelage of Inō that Mamiya began emptying his maps of human taxonomies and relegating the investigation of ‘local customs’ to separate ethnographies.) Himself born a commoner, Inō must have seen a younger version of himself in Mamiya. Before becoming a cartographer, Inō, perhaps Japan’s most famous mapmaker, had served as a ‘village head’ in Sawara Village (Chiba Prefecture) but, at the age of fifty, departed for Edo to study celestial topics with the astronomer Takahashi Yoshitoki and through their studies he had risen to hold samurai status. In 1800, Inō began surveys of the Pacific coastline of Ezochi. Seventeen years later, Tokugawa officials ordered Inō to survey the entire coastline of Japan and draw a map of the realm. He surveyed the coast and drew the map; but only after 1821, with Inō’s death, did the monumental ‘Dai Nippon enkai yochi zenzu’ (complete map of greater Japan’s coastline) become available. It makes sense that Mamiya assisted Inō with the section on Ezochi, because of Mamiya’s familiarity with the lands north of Japan.

![Fig. 2. The statue of Mamiya Rinzō located at the Mamiya Rinzō Memorial Museum, near his original home at Kamihirayanagi Village. Courtesy of the Mamiya Rinzō Memorial Museum, Kamihirayanagi Town, Ibaraki Prefecture.](image-url)
Countries other than Japan sought to accumulate cartographic knowledge of the Japanese archipelago and Sakhalin and their North Pacific environs, which proved one reason Tokugawa officials had sought to generate their own map. In the late eighteenth century, European kings and their cartographers had shown an interest in Sakhalin Island for reasons of commerce and empire. François La Pérouse (1741-1788) began surveying the coastal areas around Japan in the late eighteenth century. In 1787, under orders from Louis XVI, he surveyed the northern coastline of Japan, the Maritime Provinces, and the western coast of Sakhalin. He crossed the Sōya Strait (probably the first European to do so) and landed on the Kamchatka peninsula where another adventurer, Jean B.B. Lesseps (1766-1834), transported La Pérouse’s invaluable journals back to Versailles, where the Revolutionary Committee published them in 1797. La Pérouse navigated these northern waters searching for Sakhalin, an island he knew both as ‘Oku-Jesso’ (‘Inner Ezo,’ probably a term learned from Japanese) and ‘Ségalien’. La Pérouse instructed his crew to survey the contents of the ocean floor when dredging for oysters and to take depth soundings every half hour; he also fixed his location with a compass, took periodic longitudinal and latitudinal readings, and carefully monitored barometric pressure. Once his crew spotted Sakhalin, they began naming, and hence ‘possessing,’ prominent natural features. For the ‘loftiest of these mountains,’ explained La Pérouse, the name ‘Lamanon Peak’ was appropriate, because it honored the natural philosopher Robert de Lamanon (1752-1787). When La Pérouse named natural features on Sakhalin, he ‘effaced local designations and brought those spaces into European circulation for the first time.’

However, the ‘object of our mission,’ La Pérouse wrote, was to determine whether ‘Jesso,’ presumably Hokkaido and Sakhalin, was connected to the Eurasian continent. He never made this determination with his own eyes and instrumentation, but once he landed on the shores of Sakhalin, local islanders assured the cartographer that Sakhalin—the island locals called ‘Tchoka’—was indeed separated from Manchuria by a strait that could be navigated by even large ships. When he told local elders that he ‘wished them to delineate their country,’ the elders did so by drawing decidedly ephemeral maps of their island in the island’s tidal sands; they measured distance in relative terms by using hand gestures. Not surprisingly, La Pérouse likened the islanders to ‘noble’ savages and, not surprisingly, concluded that the ‘knowledge of the well-informed class of Europeans is in all points far superior’ to that of the Sakhalin natives. The shape of Sakhalin drawn in the sand did not qualify as knowledge for the cartographer: the relative and relational images they carefully traced and gestured with their hands remained useless until they had been placed on a longitudinal and latitudinal grid, ‘universalized’ according to the global rhetoric of science, and properly processed in the capitals of Europe.

William Robert Broughton (1762-1821), an English navigator, surveyed northern Japan, the coastline of Ezochi, the southern Kuril Islands, Sakhalin, and the Maritime Provinces between 1796 and 1797. During that time he visited Muroran, a port town in southern Ezochi, where he encountered stubborn, though curious, Japanese officials representing the Matsumae family. He was actually the first European to cross the Tsugaru Strait (separating Honshu and Hokkaido) and, though he surveyed the ‘Coast of Tartary’ (the northern Maritime Provinces and the western coast of Sakhalin), he erroneously concluded that Sakhalin was connected to the Eurasian continent and gave the waters contained therein the name ‘Gulf of Tartary.’ Less than a decade later, Ivan Fedorovich Kruzenshtern (1770-1846), born in Estonia but an admiral for the Russian em-
pire, commanded a vessel, with Nikolai Petrovich Rezanov (1764-1807) on board, that called on
the southern port city of Nagasaki, hoping, for a second time, to open formal diplomatic and
commercial ties with Japan. After being rebuffed by alarmed Tokugawa officials,
Kruzenshtern—on his way home—surveyed the coasts of Japan, Hokkaido, the Kuril Islands,
and the northeastern coast of Sakhalin; but he proved unable to navigate the Amur River and so
he surveyed the region from the south determining, erroneously as well, that Sakhalin was
connected to the continent by a reef or sandbar and hence was a peninsula.

According to Bruno Latour, these initial European forays to Sakhalin exemplify the means by
which European kings and their experts at the ‘centers of calculation’ sought to cumulate
scientific knowledge for the benefit of the state and imperial enterprises. That is to say, mapping
distant lands was inherently an exercise in state logistical power, as ships needed to be manned
with sailors and expensive instrumentation as well as financed. When La Pérouse landed on
Sakhalin on 17 July 1787, he did so because the French king had commissioned him and
equipped him with two ships, which weighed heavy with complex instruments of calculation, to
determine whether Sakhalin was an island or a peninsula. Shoring up French commercial lanes in
the North Pacific depended on La Pérouse’s ability to map the entire Pacific arena, which
required knowledge regarding Sakhalin. Latour likens La Pérouse’s two ships to orbiting
satellites today, with clocks to measure time and instruments to measure longitude and latitude;
botanists, mineralogists, naturalists, and artists surveyed and sketched the island, while cash
bought favor, food, and information from local peoples. Despite all this cartographic equipment,
however, La Pérouse remained unable to determine for himself whether Sakhalin was an island
or a peninsula and he relied on the islanders. Once his information arrived safely in Versailles,
La Pérouse made the ‘implicit’ native knowledge of Sakhalin, illustrated by maps drawn in the
sand, ‘explicit’ when he placed it on permanent, cartographically designed maps; he made ‘local’
knowledge ‘universal’ in the eyes of cartographers and their state sponsors; and the ‘beliefs’ of
natives transformed into scientific ‘knowledge’ to be utilized by Europeans in the creation of
domination. Importantly, this transformation from ‘ethno-geography’ to full-blown scientific
‘geography’—turning ‘implicit’ understanding to ‘explicit’ information and ‘local’
understanding to ‘universal’ knowledge—depended on La Pérouse’s ability to transport his
surveys and maps back to Versailles, where they could be calculated and cumulated for future
use. Indeed, when the next European ships arrived on the shores of southern Sakhalin, this
‘universal’ knowledge made it as if they had been to the island before.

When William Robert Broughton cruised these North Pacific waters ten years later he saw, for
all intents and purposes, the most prominent features of Sakhalin for a second time, because De
Lesseps, as we have seen, managed to transport La Pérouse’s maps back to Versailles to be cal-
culated. Sketches and ethnographies were included in this information, and so Broughton could
better ‘domesticate’ the islanders, because he understood them; they remained frozen in time and
space, basically ethnographic relics. With Broughton’s trip, there was, according to Latour, ‘less
sounding, less fumbling in the dark’. Latour calls this the ‘cycle of accumulation,’ when carto-
graphic and ethnographic information was brought back safely and placed in the hands of kings
and calculators so that, in the case of France, members of the Admiralty could spread out maps
and see Sakhalin and arrange expeditions for others to bring back even more information. When
cartographers rescaled these maps to conform to the needs of the state and other explorers, writes
Latour, the ‘cartographer dominates the world’. 32

As Michael Bravo has argued, however, the maps drawn in the sand by Sakhalin Ainu at De
Langle Bay need to be seen not as decisive metaphors for the creation of ‘stable, portable inscriptions,’ as Latour utilizes them, but as the product of lengthy field encounters and the linguistic ‘cross-cultural commensurability’ that occurs between people in order to generate the ‘geographical gift’. That is, La Pérouse oriented himself through ethnographic and linguistic mapping as much as he did through cartography, and he carefully orchestrated his encounters with Sakhalin Ainu in a manner that led to exchanges in knowledge that ultimately determined Sakhalin was an island. Bravo has concluded that the famous map traced in the sands of Sakhalin ‘comes into existence only as an ethnographic exercise in cross-cultural production of knowledge’. Sakhalin field encounters notwithstanding, however, Bravo follows the ‘metropolitan perspectives on science and engineering’ inherent in ‘actor-network’ theory, because, ultimately, the maps do travel to European ‘centers of calculation’. But the case of Mamiya’s Sakhalin maps demonstrates that the metropolitan perspective of ‘actor-network’ theory is not immune from criticism, especially where it is assumed that those metropolitan centers be European ones. Tokugawa officials deployed the same cartographic tools and maps to resist European domination: they turned the science of cartography, with its claim to ‘stable, portable inscriptions,’ against their would-be colonizers by creating competing peripheries of calculation.

In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Japanese scholars, many students of ‘Dutch learning,’ became interested in the question of whether Sakhalin was an island or a peninsula; they also sought to determine if the location Japanese called ‘Karafuto’ was the same as what Europeans called ‘Ségalien’ or ‘Sakhalin’. In effect, their interest in Sakhalin hardly differed from those of their European counterparts, though many early Japanese surveys focused on the discovery of sea cucumber fisheries and other potential resources not shipping lanes for global commerce. Long before Tokugawa officials discovered Mamiya in Shimōsa Province, explorers associated with the Matsumae family had already traveled to southern Sakhalin to survey the island.

In 1635, for example, the Matsumae lord dispatched three vassals—Murakami Kamonzemon, Satō Kamoemon, and Kakizaki Hiroshige—to survey potential fisheries along the coast of southern Sakhalin. They brought back some geographic information to Fukuyama Castle (the stronghold of the Matsumae family), but, apparently, most of it burned in later fires. Nonetheless, traces of the geographic information they gathered appeared on two seventeenth-century maps of Ezochi, which included crude renditions of Hokkaido, Sakhalin, and the Kuril Islands (see Fig. 3). One year after this expedition, the Matsumae lord dispatched Kōdō Shōzaemon to Sakhalin and he traveled as far as Taraika, on the eastern coast of Sakhalin. Throughout the eighteenth century, Japanese merchants, associated with the Matsumae family, continued to travel to Sakhalin, but they did so principally to exploit herring and sea cucumber fisheries, as well as such valuable pharmaceuticals as eburiko lichen (Ainu: siw karus or kuy karus; Linn.: Fomes officialis). At this juncture, Japanese interest in Sakhalin related to the identification of commercial ports and remained linked to Japan’s eighteenth-century economic expansion: merchants and their feudal allies crafted space in the context of Japan’s ‘proto-industrialism’. But in the 1790s, just two decades before Mamiya’s journey, Tokugawa officials began to investigate the ‘Santan’ trade route and, later, the Russian presence on Sakhalin. Basically, the ‘Santan’ trade was a commercial network that stretched from Qing posts along the Amur River region to Ainu villages in southern Sakhalin and northern Hokkaido. The trade route brought a variety of valuable items, including rare silk clothing. In 1792, Mogami Tokunai traveled to
Sakhalin, along with several other Tokugawa officials; but he, like later officials, mainly documented trade abuses perpetrated by Japanese merchants on Sakhalin islanders. The fear was that Ainu would defect to Russian controlled areas and convert to Christianity. Of course, he included some ethnographic information and maps in his writings; but his mission was never to thoroughly map Sakhalin. Interestingly, Mogami actually served as an assistant to Aoshima Shunzō (d. 1790), another Tokugawa official, who the shogun had dispatched along with Yamaguchi Tetsugorō, Satō Genrokurō, Ôishi Ippei, and Ihara Yaroku to survey Ezochi and determine the extent of the Russian presence. On two different occasions, elements of this 1785 survey team traveled as far as Tarantomari and Kushunnai on the western coastline of Sakhalin.

By the late eighteenth century, Japanese cartographers had, like their European colleagues, become interested in the question of whether Sakhalin was a peninsula or an island. Indeed, Japanese, including Mamiya, had come into contact with copies of La Pérouse’s map (that depicted Sakhalin as an island); but they also viewed maps by Broughton and Kruzenshtern (that clearly depicted Sakhalin as a peninsula), and so the actual geographic status of Sakhalin continued to be debated even in the peripheries of calculation. Only three years after Kruzenshtern’s diplomatic mission to Nagasaki, Tokugawa officials dispatched Mamiya to determine the exact geographic status of Sakhalin according to the global language of science—the same language being used in European maps. But what made Tokugawa officials interested in mapping the North Pacific at this time was less contributing to European debates regarding Sakhalin and more anxieties concerning Russian designs for Sakhalin, the Kuril Islands, and
even Hokkaido. Once alarmed, they sought to deploy maps and ethnographies as a means to project national borders between Japan and the Qing and Russian empires. In the minds of Tokugawa officials, geographic and ethnographic continuities translated into national ones, which, with the steady increase of Russian ships in Japanese waters, could spell trouble for the Japanese presence on Hokkaido. This attempt to ‘fix the territorial consciousness’ of the Japanese, as historian Akizuki Toshiyuki has identified it, corresponded with two raids on Japanese fishery posts in the North Pacific by disgruntled Russian captains in the wake of Kruzenshtern’s failed visit to Nagasaki.

In 1804, when Kruzenshtern’s ship had sailed into Nagasaki harbor, the ambassador Nikolai Petrovich Rezanov had eagerly awaited to disembark and proceed with his mission to strike a diplomatic arrangement with the shogunate. The Russian czar had ordered Rezanov to open trade with Japan, and the ambassador carried a promissory letter, stamped by earlier Tokugawa officials, that had been received by diplomat Adam Kirillovich Laksman in 1792-1793, when he attempted to make first contact with Japanese officials on Hokkaido. Typical of Tokugawa tactics for diplomatic relations with European countries, the shogunate, after six months of stalling, ordered Rezanov to go home; but Rezanov believed that trade with Japan was critical to the economic development of the Russian empire. In 1807, without authorization (and seemingly counterproductive to the goal of opening peaceful trade), Rezanov ordered naval officers (also employees of the Russia-America Company) Nikolai A. Khvostov and G.I. Davydov to attack Japanese possessions in the North Pacific. They attacked fishery outposts on southern Sakhalin, Rishiri Island, and defeated Nanbu and Tsugaru garrisons on Iturup (Etorofu) Island and took several Japanese prisoners. Illustrating how people (even if reluctantly) exchanged scientific information within the fluid ethnic and political space of the North Pacific, there is evidence that one of these Japanese prisoners, Nakagawa Gorōji (1768-1849), returned to Japan in 1812 with the ability to perform Jennerian smallpox vaccinations. A precious handful of documents suggest that Nakagawa vaccinated a Japanese woman in Hokkaido in 1824; while one of his disciples, Shiratori Yūzō, appears to have vaccinated people near Akita. But medical historians still debate whether these vaccinations actually occurred, at least as how existing documents describe the procedure as having took place.

Stationed at Shana on Iturup Island (or Etorofu Island) when the Russians attacked in the fourth month of 1807 was Mamiya and his actions, as depicted by at least two firsthand observers, provide a window into his personality and motivations; they reveal Mamiya to be a stern nationalist when it came to the defense of the realm, which provides some insight into what he thought he was doing when he, a year later, mapped Sakhalin. In 1807, a Matsuyama domain physician named Kubota Kentatsu (or Itō Kentatsu) accompanied Japanese garrisons to Iturup Island. His unpublished diary, Hokuchi nikki (‘Diary of northern territories’, 1807), portrays the Japanese defense of the island as a farce; but he also befriended the hotheaded Mamiya at Shana. Kubota wrote that he knew the Japanese defense of Iturup was off to a terrible start when, during one of his first nights there, he fell into a pit toilet and, despite his best efforts to scrub himself clean, reeked of human excrement thereafter. His assessment of the legendary samurai fighting prowess was not flattering: shot molded on the island was not sized properly for the guns and hence proved useless; gunpowder had been used up for a fireworks display and the barrel contained only items traded with local Ainu; and field captains had even forgotten how to properly fasten their decorative battle helmets. Of Mamiya, Kubota wrote that initially, Tokugawa captains had ordered him to head the kitchen, which he staunchly resisted: he proved far more anxious to offer
advice on how to deal with the Russians. According to Kubota, Mamiya became extremely upset when officials disregarded his advice to shoot Russians on sight for disobeying orders to not approach Japanese territory. In the end, Mamiya proved highly critical of the handling of the defense of Iturup. But taking Mamiya’s advice could be dangerous. Ōmura Jigohei (d. 1813), in his Shizanki (‘My bequeathed diary’, 1809), had a far less flattering portrayal of Mamiya during the defense of Iturup. According to Ōmura, when the Russians first approached, they fired three shots from their boat. Fancying himself as an expert on Western manners, Mamiya insisted that this was a form of ‘decorum’. Sadly, when a Japanese translator was dispatched to exchange the courtesy, Russians shot him. From this point forward, Ōmura had few generous things to say about the know-it-all Mamiya.

During the 1807 attack, along with maddening Mamiya, routing Japanese garrisons, and taking Nakagawa prisoner, Khvostov and Davydov left a letter e written in Japanese, Russian, and French, so as not to be misunderstood that if shogunal officials continued to stall, Russian ships would take over Japanese territory in the North Pacific. They then demanded an answer by the following spring. In response, the Matsumae magistracy, the shogunal authority on southern Hokkaido, suggested that Japan open trade relations with Russia; but they also suggested that, because the Russians had ‘called Karafuto “Sakhalin,” and speak of it as their own territory,’ surveyors be dispatched to determine the actual boundaries between Japan and Russia. Councilors in Edo agreed and in response to their recommendation, the Matsumae magistracy dispatched Mat-suda Denjirō and Mamiya to survey Sakhalin. Having experienced firsthand the humiliation at Shana, Mamiya was no doubt itching to resolve the Russian question: this time with maps.

Anticipating empire

Eighteenth-century transformations in European politics and culture compelled cartographers such as La Pérouse, Broughton, and Kruzenshtern to explore and, in their travel writings, to map and document the peoples and places they encountered. Mary Louise Pratt argues that such explorers had ‘imperial eyes,’ because they understood that all the natural things they saw could be scientifically ordered and classified and, by extension, systematically named, controlled, and possessed. Previously, the triumph in the seventeenth century of a more quantitative and, hence, more measurable manner of understanding their surroundings underwrote the science and the classificatory system that, once provided with political and economic incentives, propelled European cartographers and explorers to all corners of the globe. Of course, that La Pérouse’s ship, the Astrolabe, bristled with powerful geodetic and other quantitative measuring devices enabled him to fix Sakhalin on a globally understood longitudinal and latitudinal grid and, thereby, enabled Broughton and Kruzenshtern to ‘return’. Starting with La Pérouse’s expedition Europeans began to see Sakhalin with ‘imperial eyes’.

As J.B. Harley has famously argued, once historians see maps as a form of language it then becomes easier to identify and decipher the ‘historically specific codes’ embedded in them. These codes include questions regarding readership and authorship, local and global cartographic literacy, and the ‘nature of the political statements which are made by maps’. Disguised as just another benign, ‘valueless’ science, cartography and the knowledge it produced represented a form of power that reproduced the world abstractly and that reflected the expansive geopolitical imperatives of eighteenth-century European states. As forms of ‘authoritative resources,’ or knowledge controlled by the state, maps engendered forms of spatial control that facilitated
imperialism.\textsuperscript{44}

‘Insofar as maps were used in colonial promotion, and lands claimed on paper before they were effectively occupied,’ writes Harley, ‘maps anticipated empire’.\textsuperscript{45} Similarly, in his study of Australian exploration, Simon Ryan observes that the map, when designed according to the global, measurable, and divisible language of science, became ‘an imperial technology used to facilitate and celebrate the further advances of explorers, and display worldwide imperial possessions’.\textsuperscript{46} Daniel Clayton has identified this as the ‘spatiality of imperialism,’ a process wherein maps created the ‘geopolitical framework’ for colonial projects around the globe, even before there were colonial boots on the ground.\textsuperscript{47}

Japanese explorers and cartographers such as Mamiya Rinzō and Matsuda Denjirō also saw Sakhalin with ‘cartographic’ and ‘imperial’ eyes, and their travel literature—both cartographies and ethnographies—anticipated Japanese empire-building in the early twentieth century. Interestingly, similar to Mamiya, who we discussed above, and other age of exploration cartographers, Matsuda was the son of a commoner from Echigo Province (Niigata Prefecture). In Echigo, Matsuda demonstrated a knack for surveying when he became a supervisor of a road construction crew and, later, rose to become a Tokugawa official in Edo. In 1799, when the shogunate took direct control of affairs in Ezochi, Matsuda volunteered for service in the newly acquired territory. Not only did he open up an Ezochi products ‘trade post’ in the capital of Edo to promote goods from Japan’s northern territory, but he made several trips to Hokkaido, wintering at the Shana post on Iturup in 1803 and, while on Hokkaido for a third time, accompanying thirty Tsugaru samurai to Sōya, on the northernmost tip of Hokkaido. He received orders from the shogunate to explore Sakhalin Island with Mamiya while he wintered at Sōya in 1808. Until control of Ezochi again reverted to the Matsumae family in 1821, Matsuda, for a period of over two decades, oversaw and explored much of Hokkaido and Sakhalin. In 1809, one year after exploring Sakhalin with Mamiya, he became a regional governor of sorts, representing Japanese interests on Sakhalin. He was also commander of the military escort that famously imprisoned the Russian Vasili Mikhailovich Golovnin (1776-1831) in Fukuyama in 1813, who, incidentally, met Mamiya personally while incarcerated.\textsuperscript{48}

Mamiya and Matsuda departed for Sakhalin from Sōya, on the northernmost tip of Hokkaido, on the thirteenth day of the fourth month of 1808, landing at Shiranushi that same day.\textsuperscript{49} Once at Shiranushi, Matsuda and Mamiya went separate ways: Matsuda traveled northward in a small boat up the western coastline of Sakhalin to Noteto and then, from there, traveled on foot, becoming the first Japanese to reach Cape Rakka. From Cape Rakka, as mentioned earlier, Matsuda was not able to proceed, because of beds of rotten kelp and weather. Nonetheless, from the cape, Matsuda saw that the sea ran between Sakhalin and the Eurasian continent and came to believe that Sakhalin was an island and not a peninsula. Later, he reported this information to Takahashi Kageyasu and officials with the Matsumae magistracy. Meanwhile, Mamiya had traveled up the eastern coastline of Sakhalin in a small Ainu boat. He passed Naibutsu where, several years earlier, the Matsumae explorer Nakamura Koichirō had arrived, and landed at Taraika, home of the Uilta people. Mamiya then turned south, crossed Taraika Bay, and landed on the northern side of Sakhalin’s Shiretoko Peninsula (the explorer C.J. Coen had also attempted this route). He retraced his steps, crossed the width of Sakhalin to Kushunnai; he then followed Matsuda’s route landing just north of Cape Rakka. As mentioned in the introduction, he then paddled a small boat some two thousand yards off the coast and confirmed as no other cartographer had (with the exception of Matsuda) that Sakhalin was an island. Mamiya and
Matsuda both returned to Sōya in the sixth month of 1808.50

That winter, Mamiya remained disappointed that he had been unable to survey the northernmost reaches of Sakhalin and so, while in Sōya, he sought permission from Matsumae magistrate Kawajiri Haruno (1756-1815) to explore the island again. On the thirteenth day of the seventh month of 1808, Mamiya crossed over to Shiranushi alone.51 After securing an Ainu boat (another important cartographic technology), he reached Tonnai, the northernmost Japanese fishery on the western coastline of Sakhalin, and there he recruited six Sakhalin Ainu guides. Together, on the fifteenth day of the eighth month, they reached Riyonai by boat; but because of a lack of provisions they returned to Tonnai where they spent the winter. Mamiya then sent a written report and draft map to Tokugawa officials (much as La Pérouse had to Paris decades earlier), detailing the initial phase of his expedition. He sent the map to an ‘inquiry official,’ Takahashi Shigeakata (also Sanbei: 1758-1833), a figure concerned principally with political boundaries on Sakhalin. No doubt alarming Takahashi, Mamiya explained that on the west coast of Sakhalin, Ainu living north of Nayoro paid tributary visits to Qing officials at Deren; Qing officials then bestowed official titles on Ainu elders.52 These tributary titles consisted of haraida (xingzhang, ‘head of surname group’) and gashanda or gashanida (xiangzhang, ‘village elder’) and, once bestowed, they entrusted local Ainu elders with the task of ‘keeping the peace’ on the boundaries of the Qing empire. By the mid-eighteenth century, Qing officials had appointed some fifty-six surname groups as haraida; of these, six clans and 148 households were those of Ainu and Nivkh living on Sakhalin.53 As Mamiya discovered, overlapping Japanese ‘proto-industrial’ space on southern Sakhalin was Qing colonial space in the form of the tributary order; and one way that the Qing oversaw the ‘production of space’ on Sakhalin was through the dissemination of official titles and tributary duties. But for his part, Mamiya was struck less by economic and political borders than by the ethnic fluidity on Sakhalin, as the northern Sakhalin Ainu had converted to the customs of the Ul’chi people (called ‘Santan’ in early modern Japanese documents), and many other continentals just came and went on the island as they pleased.

At the end of the first month of 1809, Mamiya and his guides again traveled north to Noteto, on Cape Tuiku. North of Noteto, the ocean was still frozen, and so they could no longer proceed by boat. Mamiya decided to stay in Noteto until the seventh day of the fifth month of 1809, when he, now with two Nivkh guides, departed for Pokob6e (along the Mamiya Strait on the Sakhalin side). He made it as far north as Nanio, in northwestern Sakhalin, but rough seas made him cancel his plans to go any further north. Mamiya then returned to Noteto where he stayed in the home of a Nivkh chief named Kōni. Once again, much as La Pérouse had done with other native headmen, Mamiya listened eagerly as Kōni told him stories of the northern territories and the two became friends. Even though Mamiya relied heavily on his Nivkh guides and Chief Kōni, in his maps he ‘erased all traces of the indigenous knowledge [he] had relied on’. In his maps, Mamiya carefully ‘dissolved the local geography of native peoples’ and, ultimately, one is left with the impression that Sakhalin was empty, an ‘unoccupied land’ ready for Japanese occupancy.54

To complete these maps, Mamiya departed Noteto with Kōni and arrived on the Eurasian continent where they entered Kiji Bay. From Kiji Bay they navigated up the Amur River and arrived at the Qing outpost of Deren on the eleventh day of the seventh month of 1809. There, Mamiya noted that some fifty or sixty Qing officials had gathered for the tributary trading season. Three officials summoned Mamiya to their boat, and there the four men had a written conversation using Chinese characters.
Unlike most European explorers who traveled across space but, because of assumptions regarding historical progress, also back in time, to confront more ‘savage’ peoples, Mamiya confronted Qing officials who were not only highly literate, but who wrote using more or less the same Chinese characters as the Japanese. Mamiya had encountered, in the Amur region, the edge of a rival center: the ‘Central Kingdom’ (Chinese: Zhongguo). Mamiya departed shortly thereafter (on the seventh day of the eighth month), and en route to Sakhalin surveyed the width and route of the Amur River, sketched roughly on the map ‘Mankō bunzusho’ (Map of the Amur region; 1809). Mamiya parted with his travel partner, Kōni, on the eleventh day and shortly thereafter met with Matsuda in Shiranushi on southern Sakhalin.55

When Mamiya and Matsuda returned to Sōya after the first attempt to explore Sakhalin, they reported to officials at the Matsumae magistracy. They also presented a map, the ‘Karafuto tō taigai chizu’ (‘A general map of Sakhalin Island’, 1809), to officials with the magistracy. Importantly, the map depicts Sakhalin as an island and not a peninsula; the southwestern and southeastern sections of the island (where Matsuda and Mamiya had traveled) contain fairly detailed geographical information. The shape of Aniwa Bay, for example, was better represented than on an earlier map, the ‘Karafuto kenbu zu’ (‘A map of Sakhalin’, 1801), drawn by explorers Takahashi Jidayū and Nakamura Koichirō. Moreover, Takahashi and Nakamura, as demonstrated by their highly innovative map, had fallen short of determining whether Sakhalin was an island or not and so improvised with a roll-down flap (see Figs. 4 and 5).

![Image](image_url)
shogunate issued an official copperplate engraving of the map, one with revised sections of Sakhalin based on the Chinese ‘Huangyu quanlan tu’ (‘Map of a complete view of imperial territory’, known as the Kangxi Jesuit atlas) from 1718.\(^{56}\) In order to contribute to the ‘Shintei bankoku zenzu,’ once Mamiya had returned from his second expedition, he stayed in Sōya and began, under the direction of Arao Nariaki of the Matsumae magistracy, to consolidate his maps and notes with the help of Murakami Teisuke, the adopted son of Murakami Shimanojō. In the seventh month of 1810, Mamiya completed draft manuscripts of *Kitaezo chibu* (The region of northern Ezo) and *Tōdatsu kikō*, as well as the ‘Kitaezo tō chizu’ (A map of northern Ezo island), a monumental map divided onto seven large sheets with a scale of 36,000 to 1. The *Hoku bunkai yowa* (Reflections on northern barbarian borders) appeared at the same time of the final version of the *Tōdatsu chihō kikō*, in the third month of 1811. Mamiya presented both texts to officials at the shogunate. Mamiya reduced the monumental ‘Kitaezo tō chizu’ map to one sheet, giving it the rather exotic scientific title, ‘Kokuryūkō chūshū narabi tendō’ (Central Heilongjiang [Amur River] with latitudinal lines) (see Figs. 6 and 7).

Cartographically speaking, the ‘Kokuryūkō chūshū narabi tendō’ was more useful than earlier Sakhalin maps. The one cartographic discrepancy with the map was a product of Mamiya’s being unaware of how to calculate latitude based on celestial surveys. Mamiya used Inō’s meridian calculation that one degree equaled 28.2 *ri* (one *ri* equals 3.93 km), and then conducted linear measurements to determine the latitudinal numbers. According to Akizuki Toshiyuki, when Mamiya calculated the distance between Shiranushi and Natsuko (at 137 *ri*), this put him off by about 4.9 degrees.\(^{57}\) Nonetheless, Mamiya had fixed Sakhalin on a globally recognizable grid as no other cartographer had. He also contributed to resolving global scientific debates at the periphery of calculation by determining that Sakhalin was an island rather than a peninsula.
Fig. 5. Takahashi Jidayū and Nakamura Koichirō, ‘Karafuto kenbu zu’ (1801), depicting Sakhalin as an island. Courtesy of the Resource Collection for Northern Studies, Hokkaido University Library.
Fig. 6. A detail of the northern section of Takahashi Jidayū and Nakamura Koichirō, ‘Karafuto kenbu zu’ (1801). With the innovative flap down, Sakhalin could be depicted as a peninsula. Courtesy of the Resource Collection for Northern Studies, Hokkaido University Library.
Cultural difference and spatial distance

In seventeenth-century Europe, a decidedly quantitative and empirically based ethnography had developed simultaneously to the cartography that allowed kings and their calculators to see foreign territories and future empires on maps. This new ethnography allowed Europeans to see other people more scientifically and quantitatively as well; as disassociated from their lands and relocated to taxonomies related to their degree of ‘savagery’ or ‘progress.’ In the Japanese case, Mamiya’s travel writings, after fixing Sakhalin’s cartographic information on de-humanized maps, investigated the customs and practices of the peoples who called Sakhalin home. His maps emptied Sakhalin of human inhabitants, preferring a scientific grid over relative and relational
information; similarly, his ethnographies employed empirical observations to classify the islanders of Sakhalin, as well as other useful flora and fauna, according to early modern Japanese taxonomies and economies.

Most likely, in 1809, when Mamiya had reached the Qing post at Deren, he had traveled as far northward as any Japanese had ever ventured, at least officially. Today, we know where Mamiya ventured: through Sakhalin into the Heilongjiang (or Amur River) region and back. Nonetheless, for most learned Japanese, the North Pacific had remained mysterious. In the medieval years (1185-1568), Japanese had referred to the region explored by Mamiya—not only Sakhalin, but Hokkaido and the Kuril Islands as well—as Ezogashima, or ‘barbarian islands’. For medieval Japanese, the beginning of Ezogashima represented the northern edge of the medieval Japanese realm: the end of Japan’s geopolitical knowledge. Later, in the early modern years (1600-1868), Japanese simply referred to the region as Ezo or Ezochi, an ethno-geographic term that referred to both the land and its Ainu inhabitants. When Japanese spoke of Ezo (or the Ezojin, ‘Ezo people’) they spoke of the Ainu; but they might also refer to other ethnic groups that inhabited Hokkaido, Sakhalin, and the Kuril Islands, including Sakhalin Ainu (Hatsushima people), Ulita (Orokko people), Nivkh (Sumerenkur or Gilyak people), and Yukagir of Sakhalin Island, as well as Kuril Ainu and the Kamchadal of the Kamchatka Peninsula. Exploring Sakhalin meant encountering foreign peoples, exotic animals, and alien environments. Sakhalin, as seen with Japanese ‘imperial eyes,’ was indeed an exotic and distant place, but one directly related to Japanese geopolitical concerns.

One manner in which early modern Japanese constructed notions of their own ethnic identity was through the delineation of concentric circles of lessening degrees of customary difference that emanated out from the Japanese core. According to this epistemology, ethnic space was entirely relational to the Japanese and, to a lesser degree, the Chinese core and the Confucian customs practiced there. For this reason, civility was more a spatial experience than a temporal one: space—not history in the form of historical ‘progress’—provided the measure of Japan’s moral civilization. The signposts designating these concentric circles of civility were the ‘customs’ of different people—customs described or depicted in illustrated ethnographies as their industry, housing, tools, hairstyles, food, trade, marriage practices, and ancestral rites—and so Japanese explorers traced the distance of their travels not only through days of travel (their actual temporal distance from home according to linear measurements of ri and the Chinese zodiac), but through carefully documenting their ethnographic encounters. As Marcia Yonemoto explains, Japanese travelers in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries often embellished the landscapes and customs they wrote about because that helped to ‘conjure up for the reader visions of unknown places’. Even within Japan, travelers sought to ‘witness, analyze, and catalog difference’ because difference implied distance, and so they focused on ‘defining and measuring degrees of strangeness within the homeland itself’. ‘The eye of the historian,’ writes Tessa Morris-Suzuki, ‘tends to look for change over time rather than diversity across space,’ but prioritizing time over space only distorts the experiences of early modern Japanese explorers. In short, she argues for sensitivity to ‘spatial diversity’ as well as ‘temporal change’. Morris-Suzuki writes that the ‘cornerstone’ of Japan’s frontier relations was ‘the logic of difference,’ even if Japanese sometimes exaggerated or trumped up differences. Importantly, Japanese, through encyclopedias and maps, created a ‘world made up of concentric circles of increasing strangeness, stretching almost infinitely outwards from a familiar centre,’ and to explore was to travel through these concentric circles, in effect measuring
distance from the orbit of the Japanese core through descriptions of rings of cultural difference. This is not to say, however, that Japanese maps or portrayals of customary difference did not erect boundaries between Japan proper and the outside world; rather, only that these boundaries were never neat and clear cut, as modern borders often are, but instead represented the ‘ragged edges’ of Japan.

Although Mamiya described many encounters with customary difference in the *Tōdatsu chihō kikō*, his best ethnography is the *Kitaezo zusetsu* (‘Illustrated explanation of northern Ezo’, 1855), which was published nine years after his death (see Fig. 8). If the *Tōdatsu chihō kikō* produces space through narrative, geographic names, and descriptions of distance based on Chinese calendric months and days and Japanese linear measurements, the *Kitaezo zusetsu* offers a more poignant sense of distance through empirical renditions, both narrative descriptions and carefully drawn images, of the peoples who called Sakhalin home. In effect, Mamiya, through the illustrated ethnography, created a sense of distance in the Japanese spatial imagination: the sheer cultural ‘strangeness’ of these people conjured a far away place, and so let us turn to this important document by exploring what it says about the peoples of Sakhalin, specifically their hairstyles and culinary cultures, as both hair and food served as important cultural signposts for early modern Japanese. Indeed, exotic hairstyles and food proved such potent signposts of customary difference that Nagakubo Sekisui (1717-1801), in his domestic travel writings, conjured a sense of foreignness and distance even while describing the Dutch and Chinese in the decidedly Japanese city of Nagasaki.

![Fig. 8. A detail of the strait between Sakhalin Island and Amur Estuary from Mamiya Rinzō, *Kokuryūkō chūshū narabi tendō* (Central Heilongjiang [Amur River] with latitudinal lines). Courtesy of the Resource Collection for Northern Studies, Hokkaido University Library.](image-url)
In the *Kitaezo zusetsu* (Fig. 9), Mamiya described his encounters with Sakhalin Ainu, as well as the Uilta and the Nivkh. When describing Sakhalin Ainu, Mamiya started out by highlighting cultural signposts all Japanese could understand—their strange hairstyles or general hairiness. In early modern Japan, hairstyles were extremely important, as they served to demarcate the place of people within the status system; but hairstyles also became what historian Ronald Toby refers to as ‘codes of Other,’ identifying, as few physical and cultural attributes do, people not members of Japan’s cultural or ethnic community. Perhaps even more importantly, the trope of hairiness—many northern peoples were described as *mōi*, or ‘hairy barbarian’; most Europeans were known as *kōmō*, or ‘red hairs’—remained common throughout East Asia for describing exotic ‘barbarian’ people.

![Fig. 9. The four volume *Kitaezo zusetsu* (1855).](image)

Courtesy of the Resource Collection for Northern Studies, Hokkaido University Library.

Tapping into such traditions, Mamiya explained that Sakhalin Ainu resembled Ainu on Hokkaido, but that many did not have ‘connected eyebrows’ and they had ‘less robust beards’. Women’s hair hung down about shoulder length. In contrast to Sakhalin Ainu, Uilta and Nivkh men did not cut their hair and let it hang down their backs in flowing and stylized bundles. Uilta women also wore their hair hanging down their backs, as well as bundled on top of their heads. Unlike Ainu women, Uilta and Nivkh women combed their hair and adorned themselves with earrings and other elaborate jewelry. In short, Mamiya colored his ethnographic discussion with
cultural signposts, including brief descriptions of native Sakhalin hairstyles. These were simple yet extremely pregnant descriptions, and served to delineate spatial distance.

Conclusion

In the aftermath of the Khvostov and Davydov attacks of 1807, Takahashi Kageyasu, the shogun’s official astronomer, oversaw the creation of a world map that could structure Japan’s approach to diplomatic affairs at the dawn of a new century. In order to depict the most contested area—Kita Ezo, or Sakhalin Island—Mamiya Rinzō was dispatched to explore the northernmost reaches of Japan’s geopolitical knowledge. In doing so, Mamiya did not really explore Sakhalin, but rather he created it anew, and thereby positioned it in the context of the boundaries of Japan’s burgeoning nation state and empire. The importance of this process is hard to overestimate. Because maps played a critical role in the establishment of European empires, the creation of universally comprehensible cartographic renditions of Sakhalin proved critical to the national security interests of Japan as well as to the imperial ambitions of Russia and other European powers.

As L.M. Cullen explains, Sakhalin served as an important steppingstone for Russian ambitions in the North Pacific, but because Sakhalin’s exact geography had been unknown, Mamiya’s maps ‘had the security rating of, say, drawings during the Cold-War period of highly secret nuclear installations’. The ‘Von Siebold Affair’ of 1828 illustrates this point: when Takahashi Kageyasu ill-advisedly handed over some the most up-to-date maps of Ezochi to Philipp Franz von Siebold (1796-1866) in 1826, who was then caught with them two years later when trying to leave the country, the shogunate (apparently spurred on by the patriotic Mamiya) started proceedings against Takahashi and later jailed him along with several of Von Siebold’s students (even though Von Siebold himself was later vindicated). In effect, Takahashi’s surrendering of Ezochi maps proved contrary to the state’s interests and, in effect, treasonous. When Mamiya mapped Sakhalin with European surveying technologies and according to the logic of scientific cartography, he positioned the island on the global grid—its locations fixed for all nations to find and see—but he had also placed early modern Japan among those nations competing to implement their imperial designs in the North Pacific. This process of placing Sakhalin on a global grid proved common to other early modern experiences with the science of cartography and the anticipation of empire.

The nineteenth- and early twentieth-century history of the colonization of Sakhalin Island is complicated. Basically, after the signing of the Treaty of St. Petersburg in 1875, Japan gave control of all of Sakhalin to Russia after a period of joint occupation, and the island served as a brutal penal colony for the czarist regime for decades. After its military victory over Russia in 1905, Japan declared control over all of Sakhalin; but, following the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth on 5 September 1905, Japan departed negotiations with control over the southern half of the island below the fiftieth parallel, which it called ‘Karafuto’. The Ainu inhabitants fared poorly under Japanese rule. In 1875, after Japan conceded Sakhalin to Russia in exchange for the Kuril Islands, Japanese officials relocated some 841 Sakhalin Ainu, now Japanese nationals, from the Aniwa Bay area to Hokkaido. These Ainu hoped to settle on northern Hokkaido, which was similar ecologically to their native Sakhalin home. Instead, Japanese officials relocated the Sakhalin Ainu to the Tsuishikari settlement, near the Ishikari River and the northern capital of Sapporo. A decade later, nearly 350 members of the
settlement—almost half of the total population—died in smallpox and cholera epidemics caused by their close proximity to Japanese, who carried the smallpox virus endemically.70 Many Ainu also fled back to Russian Sakhalin to labor in fisheries. By the time southern Sakhalin reverted to Japanese control, only about 120 Ainu lived at the Tsuishikari settlement; and all but twenty-seven of them decided to return to Sakhalin after 1905.71 Japanese control over southern Sakhalin persisted until 11 August 1945 when, in the concluding days of the Pacific War, the Soviet Union thrust across the fiftieth parallel and drove the Japanese from southern Sakhalin.72

Mamiya’s maps signify more than the anticipation of empire: they also provide evidence that the ‘universality’ of cartography could be a sharp, double-edged sword for Western imperial designs. Given Japan’s brutal imperial legacies in Korea, China, and elsewhere, it is easy to forget that Japan, in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, was once menaced by predatory Western powers, ones that circled the small island chain in their gunboats like sharks around a fragile raft. Indeed, the same Western surveyors that sought to place Sakhalin on a scientific grid did the same with the Japanese Islands, sending information about the island country to Europe’s ‘centers of calculation’. But Japan’s embrace of Western cartography to guard its national sovereignty and to anticipate empire demonstrates that the mapmaking tools of empire could also be wielded as tools to resist empire, particularly when underwritten by developing native conceptions of the nation. That is, in the peripheries of calculation, such as the Tokugawa capital of Edo, surveyors deployed the science of cartography as a means to guard newly articulated notions of sovereignty. Think of it this way: in the 1850s, Western diplomats, circled around a negotiating table at Yokohama, might have yawned at claims of Japanese national sovereignty based on cherished aesthetic networks of haikai poets, but they knew well the power of maps, particularly ones constructed according to their own cartographic standards. In other words, Mamiya’s maps reveal Japan’s early commitment to modernization in the face of Western encroachment well before the Meiji Restoration and, in turn, how cartography mastered in the periphery of calculation could be used to foil Western imperial designs.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Montana State University postdoctoral emeriti Bob Wilson and Arn Keeling, as well as their skillful mentor Graeme Wynn, for their thoughts, insights, and editorial comments related to this article. Generous funding through a National Science Foundation Small Grant for Training and Research, titled ‘Mile High, Mile Deep: Imagining and Modifying Topographical and Subterranean Environments,’ allowed these geographers to visit MSU and, in turn, made publishing this article possible. Participants at the following conferences and lectures also offered helpful advice: ‘Exploration, Encounter, Empire: The Lewis and Clark Expedition in Comparative Perspective,’ University of Nebraska, Lincoln, NE (2003); NEH Faculty Humanities Seminar, MSU (2003); ‘Japanese Border Histories and Transnational Contexts,’ Western Conference of the Association for Asian Studies, Tempe, AZ (2003); ‘Creating Spaces’ Conference, part of the ‘Mile High, Mile Deep’ project at MSU (2004); Travel Literature Lecture, University of Oregon (2004); and Geography Colloquium, University of British Columbia (2005). Yet, despite the best efforts of the talented scholars at these venues, mistakes surely remain, and those are my responsibility.
Notes

1 See T. Akizuki, Nichirō kankei to Saharin tō: Bakumatsu Meiji shonen no ryōdo mondai, Tokyo, 1994; more recently, T. Akizuki, Nihon hokuhen no tanken to chizu no rekishi, Sapporo, 1999.

2 The importance of not having multiple or overlapping national sovereignties on maps would be clear to Japanese policymakers once they entered the modern diplomatic treaty regimen with the Euro-American powers in the 1850s. Mamiya, by drawing cartographically accurate maps, not only anticipated Japanese empire in the North Pacific, but anticipated one of the tools required in negotiating with the West. On these treaties and the clever Japanese negotiating that went into them, see M.R. Auslin, Negotiating with Imperialism: The Unequal Treaties and the Culture of Japanese Diplomacy, Cambridge, MA, 2004, 11-33.


5 This sophisticated and compelling argument is advanced in E. Ikegami, Bonds of Civility: Aesthetic Networks and the Political Origins of Japanese Culture, Cambridge, 2005, 46, 47, 230, 231. This is a departure from earlier debates on the topic of the origins of a national consciousness in Japan. Famously, theorist M. Maruyama argued that the eighteenth-century de-centered feudal order inhibited the emergence of a national consciousness in Japan. He submitted that only with the arrival of European ships in the nineteenth century did Japan begin to develop a sense of ‘political solidarity’ and ‘national unity’. For more on this line of thinking, see M. Maruyama, Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan, M. Hane (Trans), Princeton, 1974, 327.


9 For another example of people being mapped out of the landscape by others with imperial designs, see K.G. Brealey, Mapping them ‘out’: Euro-Canadian cartography and the appropriation of the Nuxalk and Ts’ilhqot’in first nations’ territories, 1793-1916, The Canadian Geographer/Le Géographe canadien 39, 2 (1995) 140-156.

10 Hostetler, Qing Colonial Enterprise (note 3), 15, 16.

11 Hostetler, Qing Colonial Enterprise (note 3), 5, 6.

14 This point regarding a Confucian orthodoxy is a bit of an overstatement. Herman Ooms has demonstrated that the Tokugawa ideology took longer to coalesce and was not as strictly Confucian as often claimed. See H. Ooms, *Tokugawa Ideology: Early Constructs, 1570-1680*, Princeton, 1985.

16 By far the most comprehensive treatment of Japanese social history comes from Amino Yoshihiko. Although he wrote on Japan’s medieval years, his books do illustrate the incredible diversity of Japanese society in the late medieval and early modern years. See Y. Amino, *Nihon chūsei no minshūzō*, Tokyo, 1980; Y. Amino, *Nihon shakai no rekishi*, 3 Vols, Tokyo, 1997.
20 An original copy can be found at the Resource Collection for Northern Studies, Hokkaido University Library.
23 Akizuki, *Nihon hokuhen no tanken to chizu no rekishi* (note 1), 286.
24 Maps and surveys emerged as just one part of a more comprehensive shogunal policy to assert control over Ezochi and its Ainu inhabitants. For more on Tokugawa policies in Ezochi, particularly with regards to disease and medicine, see B.L. Walker, The early modern Japanese state and Ainu vaccinations: redefining the body politic, 1799-1868, *Past and Present* 163 (1999) 121-160. On the manner in which Japanese policies of assimilation reconfigured Ainu relations to once-worshipped animals such as wolves, see chapter 2 in B.L. Walker, *The Lost Wolves of Japan*, Seattle, 2005; see also J.J. Stephan, *Ezo under the Tokugawa Bakufu, 1799-1821: an aspect of Japan’s frontier history*, Ph.D. Diss., University of London, 1969.
25 Astronomy (and its close-cousin calendar making) was among the more prominent pre-industrial sciences in Japan. For more on pre-industrial Japanese science, see M. Sugimoto and D.L. Swain, *Science and Culture in Traditional Japan, A.D. 600-1854*, Cambridge, MA, 1978.
For more on the science of Inō Tadataka’s cartography, see R. Ōtani, Tadataka Inō: The Japanese Land-Surveyor, K. Sugimura (Trans), Tokyo, 1932; more recently, M. Hoyanagi, Inō Tadataka no kagakuteki gyōseki: Nihon chizu sakusei no kindaika e no michi, Tokyo, 1974.

Akizuki, Nihon hokuhen no tanken to chizu no rekishi (note 1), 287.

Akizuki, Nihon hokuhen no tanken to chizu no rekishi (note 1), 285.

D.N. Livingstone, Putting Science in its Place: Geographies of Scientific Knowledge, Chicago, 2003, 156.

A Voyage Round the World, Performed In the Years 1785, 1786, 1787, and 1788, By the Boussole and Astrolabe, Under the Command of J.F.G. De La Pe’rouse: Published by Order of the National Assembly, under the Superintendence of L.A. Milet-Mureau, Brigadier-General in the Corps of Engineers, Director of Fortifications, Member of the Constituent Assembly and Fellow of several literary Societies at Paris, Vol. 2 (London: G.G. and J. Robinson, Paternoster-Row; J. Edwards, Pall-Mall; and T. Payne, Mews-Gate, Castle-Street, 1799), 18-27.

W.R. Broughton, A Voyage of Discovery to the North Pacific Ocean: In which the Coast of Asia, from the Lat. of 35 degrees North to the Lat. of 52 degrees North, the Island of Insu (commonly known under the name of the Land of Jesso), the North, South, and East Coasts of Japan, the Lieuchieux and the Adjacent Isles, as well as the Coast of Corea, have been Examined and Surveyed. Performed in His Majesty’s Sloop Providence, and her Tender, in the years 1795, 1796, 1797, 1798 (London: T. Cadell and W. Davies in the Strand, 1804), 274-297.


K. Kubota, *Hokuchi nikki* (1804). Resource Collection for Northern Studies, Hokkaido University Library, Sapporo, Japan. I am grateful to Tsuchiya Tatsuhide for bringing this document to my attention and for helping to decipher it.


In the meanwhile we formed an acquaintance with a geometrician and astronomer, named Mamia Rinso, who had been sent from the Japanese capital. [He] shewed us his instruments, which consisted of an English sector, an astrolabe, with a compass, a case of mathematical instruments, and quick-silver for forming the artificial horizon, and requested that we would shew him how the Europeans employed these things. He visited us everyday, and frequently remained with us from morning until evening, during which time he gave us an account of his travels, and produced his plans and sketches of the different countries he had visited. We inspected them with the greatest curiosity. The Japanese looked upon him as a very learned man. They always listened to him with the utmost attention, and wondered how he could have travelled to so many different places: he had visited all the Kurile
Islands, as far as the seventeenth, Sagaleen, and even the land of Mandshuren [Manchuria], and had sailed through the river Amur.


50 Akizuki, *Nihon hoku hen no tanken to chizu no rekishi* (note 1), 288.


52 Akizuki, *Nihon hoku hen no tanken to chizu no rekishi* (note 1), 290.


54 Livingstone, *Putting Science in its Place* (note 29), 155.

55 Akizuki, *Nihon hoku hen no tanken to chizu no rekishi* (note 1), 290-292.

56 Akizuki, *Nihon hoku hen no tanken to chizu no rekishi* (note 1), 435, 438, 439.

57 Akizuki, *Nihon hoku hen no tanken to chizu no rekishi* (note 1), 294.


For more on this literature, see B.L. Walker, Foreign affairs and frontiers in early modern Japan: a historiographical essay of the field, Early Modern Japan: An Interdisciplinary Journal 10, 2 (2002) 51-55. This essay can also be found in J.E. Hanes and H. Yamaji (Eds), Image and Identity: Rethinking Cultural History, Kobe, 2005.


Yonemoto, Mapping Early Modern Japan (note 61), 78, 79.


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Howell, Geographies of Identity (note 15), 186-189.

Stephan, Sakhalin (note 69), 142, 143.
“Designs of Power: The ‘Japanization’ of Urban and Rural Space in Colonial Hokkaidō”
Vivian Blaxell
August 31, 2009
http://japanfocus.org/-Vivian-Blaxell/3211

Blaxell treats the naturalization and Japanization of the land formerly known as Ezochi (literally “land of the barbarians”) into Hokkaido. Blaxell discusses the transformation of the urban space of Sapporo in the 1870s and 1880s by Japanese working with American advisors. The result was neither Japanese nor American, but distinctly modern and evocative of the imperial age. Blaxell touches upon the simultaneous erasing of the indigenous people, the Ainu, from the land during this re-conceptualization of Hokkaido as Japanese space and land. (The policies directed toward the Ainu after Hokkaido’s colonization are discussed in Hirano Katsuya’s article in Part II.) Blaxell uses the importation of a quintessentially Japanese characteristic—rice—to the unforgiving climate of Hokkaido and its eventual acculturation as an example of how the processes of colonization helped to naturalize a landscape as Japanese. Her article encourages us not to take for granted the geographic space—whether urban or “natural”—and understand how it is the result of both constructive (for some people but not others) and destructive human actions.
Designs of Power: The “Japanization” of Urban and Rural Space in Colonial Hokkaidō

Vivian Blaxell

It is Japan, but yet there is a difference somehow.
—Isabella Bird, 1878.

A whole history remains to be written of spaces—which would at the same time be the history of powers—from the great strategies of geo-politics to the little tactics of the habitat.
—Michel Foucault, “The Eye of Power”

Though Hokkaidō may seem a natural part of Japan, manacled to Tokyo as it is by law, by language, by economics, and by the 54 kilometer undersea Seikan Tunnel, Hokkaidō was not always Japan. Hokkaidō was not always Hokkaidō. Hokkaidō was modern Japan’s first foreign conquest; its first colony in a deliberate imperial trajectory begun in 1869, concluded in 1945 and eventually encompassing vast tracts of East and Southeast Asia. The colonization of Hokkaidō took place in many ways, most especially through the catastrophic de-culturation, dispossession and subjugation of the island’s indigenous population, the Ainu. [1] Yet, the business of making Hokkaidō, “Hokkaidō,” of turning the island known as Ezochi, a wild untrammeled sort of place, into an integral part of modern Japan was also about space, about creations of space and about remaking local space in ways that delivered Ezochi up to Hokkaidō and surrendered Hokkaidō to Japan.

To be sure, the late 19th century sequestration of the Ainu on small farms and in designated villages, conversion of the landscape from forest and grasslands into mines and fields for cash crops, immigration of Japanese settlers, along with the simple privatization of the island’s geography produced spaces within which colonial subjects and the colonial political entity could themselves be effectively produced. But Hokkaidō’s colonization occurred before the geopolitical gesture contained in the 1918 Wilsonian ideal of self-determining nation-states. Hokkaidō became Hokkaidō at a time when Japan’s imperial discourse and its elaborations in the material realm tended to vigorously assimilate colonized space and colonized subjects as Japanese (Hokkaidō, Okinawa, Korea) or represented colonial spaces and subjects as becoming Japanese (Taiwan and Micronesia.)[2] In Hokkaidō, this “being Japanese” required more than destruction of Ainu economics and culture, more than the introduction of American and European cash crops. It required careful productions of Japanese spaces on the island. Without Japanese spaces elaborated from Japanese myth, history and contemporaneous discourses about modernity, the Japanese identity of the island could not be well forged and thus its subjects’ “Japaneseness” could not be assumed. This essay attends to the elaboration of discourse in, and the production of, Japanese spaces in colonial Hokkaidō: the design of Sapporo; the architecture of some of Sapporo’s most important 19th century buildings; the introduction of wet rice agriculture, for it is at these historical spaces that more about the technologies of Japan’s takeover of Ezochi and its transformation into Hokkaidō, into Japan, more about Japanese colonialism, and more about what Foucault calls “the history of powers”, is to be found.

The samurai and the city

For more than 200 years the shoguns in Edo (Tokyo) asserted rights of suzerainty over Ezochi, the island that would become Hokkaidō. Matsumae, the northernmost feudal domain in Tokugawa Japan, held a border fief with a small castle town capital at the far south of the island.
Yet for most of the Tokugawa era the shoguns’ claims to Ezochi were rhetorical rather than substantive. The Matsumae clan used Japanese middlemen to control a profitable trade with the Ainu in herring and other small fish processed and sent south to the island of Honshū to be used as fertilizer for rice cultivation. The trade resulted in Ainu adoption of elements of Japanese culture: rice consumption and the use of lacquerware, for example, but beyond the small space governed by Matsumae at the extreme southern tip of a peninsula just across the strait from Honshū, Ezochi was essentially a foreign land in theoretical fealty to Japan. The arrival of foreigners in Japanese waters during the 1840s culminating in the demands for treaties and trade made by the American, Matthew Perry, in 1853 changed all that.

The treaty concluded with the United States by the shogun, Tokugawa Iesada, in 1854 stipulated the opening of two ports where foreign ships could re-supply and consular representatives could be stationed. One of those ports was Hakodate. The southernmost harbor settlement in Ezochi, Hakodate was under direct control of the shogun in Edo and the resting place of the first American citizen to be buried in Japan. In almost immediate response to American demands, the shogunate posted a governor to Hakodate, an early sign of the importance Ezochi would henceforth assume in Japanese national projects. At the same time, fear of the expansionist tendencies of the Russian Empire in Siberia turned Ezochi from a foreign land into a Japanese fortification against the designs of Saint Petersburg. Even as it was disintegrating, the shogunal government began plans for development of Ezochi. For a brief period at the end of the civil war between the shogunate and the supporters of Emperor Meiji, Ezochi became the site of a short-lived republic after the northern clans still loyal to the Tokugawa regime retreated across the strait. But with the Boshin War concluded, the ingestion of Ezochi began in earnest. In early July of 1869 the new Meiji government established the Kaitakushi (Hokkaidō Colonization Commission), an official entity to lead and oversee colonization of Ezochi. Less than a month later the government in Tokyo re-named the northern island: Ezochi became Hokkaidō and Hokkaidō became a vital part of Japan’s plans for the future. Officials departing Tokyo for tours of duty in Hokkaidō left with exhortations at once imperious and benevolent ringing in their ears:

Hokkaidō is the most important place for the Northern Gate of the Empire. With regard to the proclaimed development, sincerely carry out the Imperial Will, and make efforts to spread welfare, education and morals with kindness. With the gradual immigration of mainlanders, make sincere efforts to encourage harmony with the natives and a prosperous livelihood. [3]
The Imperial Will demanded a capital city for the newly named island. The Kaitakushi charged Shima Yoshitake, a former samurai of the Saga domain, with the design and construction of Sapporo. In surviving pictures, Shima is grave for the camera, the beard of a Chinese sage garnishes his chin, and in one, perhaps taken at the time he received honors from the Meiji emperor, he is dressed in the formal headgear and kimono of a senior feudal retainer.

He looks very much a traditionalist. And in the syncretic revolutionary fashion of the first Meiji modernizers, he was: born to substantial privilege on October 26, 1822 (Bunsei 5) into an uma-mawari (around the lord’s horse) family that had been on the inner circle of the Saga lords for generations. The family was entitled to the generous income of 300 koku of rice.[4] Shima inherited the family fortune in 1844 and went to study with Satō Issai and Fujita Tōko in Edo.
According to Kōzen Noburu, Shima appears to have been especially influenced by Fujita, a senior retainer in the Mito domain and a central figure in the 19th century intellectual attempt to reconcile neo-Confucianist ethical universalism with the Japanese nativism of kokugaku (national learning) in which the source of Japanese history and culture was not China but Japan itself. Kōzen argues that Shima agreed with Fujita that the right course to set for national independence and strength was to actively open the country to modern technologies and methods; keep the Westerners out and retain a “traditionalist” even “native” form of politics and culture with the resuscitated imperial institution above it all. Shima also agreed with Fujita that the island of Ezochi was vital to the defense and future of Japan. [5]

Back at Saga, Shima resumed service to the Saga daimyo, Nabeshima Naomasa. Even six years prior to the intrusion of the United States in Japanese waters, Shima was much concerned about how Japan was to respond to foreign efforts to engage with Japan. In this context, Shima and Naomasa demonstrated significant concern with the defense of both the Saga domain and of Ezochi. Though far to the northeast of Saga, the island that would become Hokkaidō held a place of keen interest in the intellectual and political life of the domain leadership which, having been in contact with Russian ships at Nagasaki and elsewhere on the southwestern coast, saw a clear threat to Japan’s northern borders posed by the flimsy Japanese sway over such a large and undeveloped island proximate to the eastern borders of the Russian Empire.

In 1856 Naomasa sent Shima on an official expedition to survey and assess Ezochi and Karafuto (Sakhalin). Upon his return the following year, Shima produced a record of his expedition,
Nyūhokki [Account of being in the North]. Shima also wrote kanshi (Chinese language poetry) during his travels in 1856 and 1869. Kanshi was an essential art for a samurai of Shima’s status and time, but though its genealogy harked back to Chinese poetry and it was written using only Chinese characters, by the nineteenth century kanshi in Japan had become a “native” Japanese poetic form. Shima’s kanshi constitute a sort of abbreviated biography of his experiences, his impressions, and his consciousness, a “poetic journal.” The 1869 kanshi are rich in all the sorts of tropes and figures one might expect of an early Meiji official, educated in Mitogaku and charged with colonization, indeed “civilization,” of territory: imperial edicts linked to the landscape and Shima’s journey to it and through it; invocations of Shinto deities as protection and as witnesses of his submission to the Imperial will. The poems work less as poems than as signs of Shima’s interior discourse and his place in the exterior ideologies and discourse of his times. His kanshi reveals the late Tokugawa vision of the island in Shima’s thinking: inhospitable; frightening; exotic:

Mountain after mountain, heavy going,  
scaling the next mountain keeps the chill windy days warm.  
Suddenly, the howling voice of a wolf echoes lonely in the ravine below,  
desolate crescent moon in the sky above  
glitters coldly on the mountain peaks.  
In the valley, hanging clouds hide the moon  
the path ahead is dark,  
a mountain rivulet flows at my feet, its waters sounding angry.  
I am quite unnerved,  
but then local people come to welcome us  
bearing scarlet paper lanterns.  
A tradition of the land, used in place of normal torches.  
And as we travel on, our hands light up, a blushing red.

But in another poem we find signs of a different consciousness about Ezochi and mobilization of a Japanese screen through which to understand the island:

I peek at the deep drop from a cliff 100 feet high,  
The steep path snakes right and left again.  
The scenery here is astonishingly beautiful.  
It seems to be a sansui landscape painting, just like nanga. [6]

Shima’s concern with the natural landscape is a standard trope for this type of Japanese poetry. Like other cultured, high-ranking samurai, Shima cultivated an aesthetic and spiritual sensitivity to nature. More importantly for the discussion here and for the design of Sapporo, the final line of the latter poem with its attempt to frame the landscape of Ezochi in nanga painting, itself a nativized Chinese art form like the kanshi poetic form, domesticates the new and strange by framing them in the old or familiar. This is of course a conventional strategy for understanding the new and the other in travel writing. On her visit to Hokkaidō in 1878, Isabella Bird could not resist likening the island to Scotland, Ireland and even Gibraltar. In the 1940s as the Japanese empire pushed into tropical Southeast Asia, newspapers and magazines published photographs, cartoons and drawings of Filipino and Javanese volcanoes and likened them to Fujisan, while elements of Malay culture were identified as proto-historical Japanese characteristics, all as a way of making the new, old, and the strange, familiar. But while Shima’s poems about Ezochi
employ this common device of travel narratives, there is also a repeated framing of the island in terms of Japan and its nativist or mythical traditions throughout the poems. In some, Shinto deities inhabit the landscape. In others, the island is a geographical subject of the emperor. Mountains, lakes and rivers remind Shima of Saga or of tales from the Kojiki and the Nihongi. Ezochi is at once foreign and Japanese to Shima.

Shima’s repetitive slippage into writing Ezochi in terms of a nativist vision of Japan and its history suggests something beyond making the strange, familiar, and the incomprehensible, comprehensible. Just as the sonnō jōi (revere the Emperor; expel the barbarians) samurai envisioned a future Japan by simultaneously looking back at an imaginary time when the Japanese emperor was revered and foreign influences had done nothing to sully the purity of Japanese culture, yet at the same time bought guns and Western technology, Shima looked at the spatial future of Japan in Ezochi in terms of a largely invented Japanese past yet one tempered by the sort of pragmatism required for the emerging nation to survive in a world dominated by the western imperial powers. We can find delicate traces of this future/past vision of Ezochi in Shima’s poetic voice, but when it came to the design of Sapporo, Shima turned explicitly to the old to make the new. In July 1869 Shima’s aging daimyo, Naomasa, appointed Shima to the position of Kaitakushihangan, Hokkaidō Colonization Commissioner, charged with designing and building a capital city for the new territory. Shima was already 49 years of age, no longer a young man by the standards of Japan at the time and already beyond retirement age for an upper level feudal retainer. But he was close to Naomasa; his committed service to the forces leading the fight against the shogunate and for the restoration of the imperial institution to its political place above politics, along with his knowledge of Hokkaidō brought him the reward and burden of imperial service in the northern district.

Shima saw his work as a service to the emperor but also to his vision of a Japanese imperial state with its modernity profoundly conditioned by the nativist vision of the past. His design of Sapporo stands as a spatial testament to his imperial loyalty and his concept of a natively modern state. The received wisdom has it that the vision for Sapporo came to Shima in the autumn of 1869 as he viewed the Ishikari Plain from the high flanks of a hill to the west of where the city now stands. Even today, there are still patches of old growth forest here where Shima sat, and a zoo where in winter one can encounter giraffes looking bemused in the snow. Shima designated the hill as a city park. He named the park “Maruyama,” which is the name of a famous park in the heart of Kyoto, Japan’s imperial capital city until 1868. Then Shima situated a Shinto shrine next to his Maruyama Park and in it, he installed the tamashiro of three deities newly dedicated to colonization by the religious office of the government in Tokyo, the Jingikan.[7] Construction and dedication of a jinja at the site of Sapporo represented a vital step in the creation of Japanese space in the regions of Hokkaidō beyond Shiraoi and what had been the Matsumae domain. The shrine that was to become the Hokkaidō Jingu elaborated the ideological and administrative discourses about Shinto and its power to unify the state and its subjects around the imperial institution in material space. Thereafter, construction of jinja became a central spatial technique of Japanese colonialism, a means of Japanizing possessions from Toyohara and Naha to Seoul, Taipei, Shinkyō in Manchuria, Rangoon and Singapore.

By the time he arrived on the Maruyama belvedere, Shima already had a design for the city of Sapporo in mind, a plan for a new city inspired by the ancient imperial capital of Kyoto, a design for the future of Hokkaidō grounded in the Japanese past.[8] The 8th century planners of Kyoto had imported and adapted the Chinese imperial design of the Tang capital city, Chang’an, into
Japan to produce Kyoto as “a magical act, the aim being to bestow on the Yamato Court the power of its Chinese counterpart.”[9] For Shima, however, the act of importing Kyoto into Hokkaidō for the production of Sapporo was both magical and political. In his design for Sapporo, Shima found new meanings “for older materializations of space and time.”[10] In Hokkaidō the gobannome (Go board rectangular grid plan) of Kyoto and its spatial orders (governmental power to the north, trade to the south) achieved two ends: it brought the center to the periphery so that the periphery could be brought into the Meiji imperial order, and it gave spatial elaboration to the ideology circulated by Shima and other leaders in the early Meiji modernization of Japan that modern and western were not coterminous and that the new was in fact the old.

Shima Yoshitake’s Plan for Sapporo

Although other important cities were built in colonial Hokkaidō and played major roles in the island’s political economy and in its colonization, they were designed on the principles of American urban planning and Sapporo with its spatial recovery of the past for the purposes of modernization remained at the heart of colonial governance. As Japan’s first planned colonial city then, Sapporo stood as a material elaboration in space of a particular 19th century Japanese vision of Japanese modernity based on a mythical historicism and founded in an ideological effort to remake Japan as a natively modern state. Sapporo stood too as a stamp of Japanese imperial ambitions and practices on the face of Hokkaidō. In its spatial elaboration of nativist discourse and Heian imperial symbology recovered for a modern future, Shima’s Sapporo represents a first pass at the practice of colonial urban design by a Japanese planner. In later years other Japanese planners would design and produce colonial urban spaces at Toyohara in Karafuto, Japanese settler towns in Japanese Micronesia and the cities of Dairen and Shinkyō in the puppet state of Manchukuo, all imbued with the ideological and symbolic freight of their discursive times.[11]

In January of 1870 Shima was dismissed, ostensibly for fiscal extravagance in the construction of Sapporo, but more likely because of deep differences with his superior, Higashikuse, over what sort of modernity Japan should have. Yet his vision of Sapporo as a new but also traditional Japanese space persisted. In 1873 Shima penned a jōsho memo to Iwakura Tomomi arguing that Sapporo should be renamed with the same characters used for Peking, the imperial capital of
Qing China, and designated as the imperial residence for the emperor during his summer retreat.[12] Sapporo was thus a spatial container for Shima’s dream of a modern Japan uncontaminated by foreign forms, the same dream that led him with Eto Shimpei into the failed Saga Rebellion, itself an act of protest against the western forms Japanese modernity had begun to take by 1874. Beheaded for his role in the rebellion, his head was displayed to the public.

**Discursive architectures**

After Shima, the development of Sapporo came under the direction of Kuroda Kiyotaka, who went on to become Japan’s second Prime Minister from 1888 to 1889. Kuroda sometimes drank far too much, turned nasty and violent when inebriated, and later was rumored to have killed his wife in a drunken fury. But Kuroda was one of the heroes of the war against the shogunate and the job of managing the colonization of Hokkaidō was a reward for his services. Born into a family of samurai retainers to the Satsuma daimyo, Kuroda had once imagined a native form of Japanese modernity.

![Kuroda Kiyotaka](image)
This vision he shared with Shima, but only for a time: after a visit to the United States in 1871 Kuroda quickly adopted the view that the form of modernity mattered less for Japan’s survival in the world of the imperial powers than modernity itself. As head of the Kaitakushi, Kuroda secured a huge increase in the budget. He used a substantial part of it to employ Americans to shape the colonization of the island and its transformation into a productive and placid part of Japan. Soon a variety of men “bitten with Orientalism”[13] or simply in need of a job, or nostalgic for a “frontier experience” already elusive in America, arrived from the United States to help the Japanese government enact its imperial dream in Hokkaidō. The conduct of some of these men in Hokkaidō was at times violent and licentious: one shot six Ainu hunting dogs while in a drunken rage, smashed up an inn and stabbed the Japanese military officers who tried to restrain him, but the miniaturized American look of rural Hokkaidō, still much remarked upon in travel literature today, is part of their legacy. The barns and silos that remind 21st century tourists of Wisconsin were ordered from the Sears Roebuck catalogue and assembled in a landscape now “rural-ized” and given over to orchards, dairy farming, corn and beet cropping.

Under Kuroda, Sapporo grew beyond its original design. New buildings rose along Shima’s geomantic streets. Several of these buildings survive today and supply some of the city’s identity, just as they did when Kuroda and the Kaitakushi undertook their construction. Indeed, one of the most enduring symbols of Sapporo for Japanese from other islands is the Sapporo Clock Tower, built in 1878 as the Drill Hall of the Sapporo Agricultural College (the predecessor of Hokkaidō University) to an American design by William Wheeler. With white clapboards, sash windows and fretwork eaves, the Sapporo Clock tower could have been lifted directly from almost any New England town. In 1970 the government in Tokyo designated the Clock Tower as an Important Cultural Property. Visitors to the city invariably stop to admire it, though it now seems so diminished in a surrounding thicket of office towers that the Clock Tower is classed by some as one of the “three great disappointments of Japan” (Nihon san-dai gakkari), the two other great disappointments being the Harimayabashi, a tiny red painted bridge spanning a filled-in river in the city of Kochi on the island of Shikoku, and the Eiffel-esque Nagoya Television Tower.[14]

But disappointing or not, the 19th century buildings of Sapporo look very American. The first head office for the Kaitakushi burned to the ground in 1879, yet from the perspective drawings and photographs available in the archive, it was a neat blend of the design of the original Massachusetts state house and the Maryland capitol building in Annapolis. Its successor, the Akarenga, was built of red bricks. In 1888 bricks were still a novel and expensive construction material in Japan: it was bricks along with gas lighting that had made the Ginza such a vital sign of modernity and the power of the Meiji state in 1872, and the red brick Akarenga provided an important symbol of state authority and modernity in Hokkaidō; the building is an elegant Japanese rendition of late nineteenth century American Baroque revival architecture. The house of the prefectural governor might pass as a neo-Tudor mansion in Bethesda or Bel Air, except that there is something not quite right about the half-timbering. But European or American looking as they were, these Sapporo buildings from the 1870s and 1880s were also quite Japanese; products of a Japanese spatial practice in which the debates about Japanese modernity were elaborated in architecture and architectural embellishment. The red bricks of the Akarenga repeated in Hokkaidō a particularly Japanese vision of modernity and state power previously elaborated in Ginza, and the uncanny neo-Tudor half-timbering of the governor’s mansion
gestures to debates about how perfectly “western” modern forms in Japan needed to be to build the state.

In contrast to Shima’s city plan with its modernity grounded in an imagined Japanese past, many of the new buildings constructed under the aegis of Kuroda took their principles of construction and the bases of their design from architecture in the West, principally from the United States. But their details and often their interiors derived as much from Japanese architectural themes and visions as they did from America. In this at least, such buildings complied with the beginnings of a discursive resolution reached in the second decade of Meiji as traditionalists like Shima, Eto, and Saigo Takamori increasingly lost control over meaning to men like Ito Hirobumi and even Iwakura Tomomi, whose vision of Japanese modernity ousted the last nativist mutterings of “revere the emperor; oust the barbarians” and replaced them with their opposite: Western learning; Japanese spirit. Now the Japanese modern took a newer form than that imagined by Shima. And we can detect this in two Hokkaidō buildings: the Seikatei and the Hōheikan Guest House. While not among the grandest of Sapporo’s buildings from the period, both were designed and built to accommodate the Emperor Meiji on his visits to the city. The alloy of American, European, and Japanese design found in these buildings was carefully formulated, attesting to the effort to transform built space in the city in ways that recirculated the prevailing discourses of modernity and Japaneseness.

Both the Seikatei and the Hōheikan guest house were built in 1880. The mix of Western style with Japanese features that creates a distinctive spatial realization of Japanese modernity is immediately apparent in the little Seikatei house, where a bay window and horizontal clapboards consort with a glassed-in traditional Japanese porch, engawa.

The interior is divided between washitsu traditional Japanese rooms and western rooms in a fashion that continues in Japanese houses to the present day. The kitchen has a floor of earth in the traditional Japanese manner. At first glance, the Seikatei in its stand of hemlocks evokes an unpainted New England house, or summer cottage on the shore of one of the Finger Lakes in
upstate New York, but the alloy of Japanese and western design testifies to something different, a spatial operation most apparent in Hōheikan.

William Coald rake suggests that the American expert Louis Boehmer supervised construction of Hōheikan, but Boehmer can only be credited with design of the gardens in which the building originally stood. [15] Certainly the method of construction was western. Certainly too, as Coaldrake suggests, it is easy to imagine Hōheikan as home to a rich nineteenth century New England family in the Pondside neighborhood of Boston: the architectural foundations of the design are patently American. But Hōheikan is more complex and interesting than that. The design of the building owes as much to a Japanese way of doing modernity as it does to an American template. Hōheikan was one of only three major Kaitakushi building projects during the 1870s and early 1880s: the Kaitakushi headquarters building; the Kaitakushi Bussanurisabaki-sho trading and reception center in Tokyo; Hōheikan. [16]

![The Hōheikan](image)

Unlike the original headquarters of the Kaitakushi building which appears to have been almost entirely free of Japanese characteristics and was reportedly designed by Horace Capron, and unlike the Bussanurisabaki-sho Kaitakushi trading center designed by Josiah Conder, Hōheikan’s “architect” was Japanese: Adachi Kikō, a senior Kaitakushi construction department official. [17] Ōoka Sukeemon managed construction. [18] The technical fundamentals of Hōheikan are American: a timber frame behind clapboards. But many of the details of the design are Japanese. The balcony above the main entrance to Hōheikan is topped by an open segmental pediment, itself descended from the pediments on Michelangelo’s tomb for Lorenzo di Medici but also common in late nineteenth century American Georgian Revival and Beaux Arts architecture. There is nothing Japanese about this. But the Georgian style pediment transported to Hokkaidō has a *gegyo*, a traditional decorative Japanese gable pendant that recovers the Japanese architectural conventions of an earlier time. And the pediment has a prominence on the front of Hōheikan more Japanese than American, a prominence that refers us to the considerable frontality of *karahafu* entrance gate gables in elite Tokugawa dwellings and temples.
The interior of the Hōheikan seems to be an especially Japanese translation of an American interior. The ceilings are astonishingly high, meters higher than any Japanese traditional ceiling and much higher than those in any Boston ballroom. These days the interior of Hōheikan is decorated in a Victorian style, but much of the interior fittings and furniture were added in the late twentieth century as exhibits, an evocation of the period that does not well represent the stark appearance of the rooms and public spaces in the 1880s. Even the famed chandeliers depending from plaster mouldings embellished with a cherry blossom theme were added to Hōheikan some years after construction. This alloy of American construction and basic design with Japanese motifs, themes and stripped down interior represents the 1880s Meiji moment in a built structure and invokes the rhetoric of “Japanese spirit, Western learning.” Hōheikan is less American than it is Japanese and, as one of the three major built spaces designed and constructed the Kaitakushi in the 1880s, it must be understood as a major architectural elaboration of discourse and colonial purpose: its design played a role in Japanizing the still uncertainly domesticated space of Hokkaidō.

The core design of Sapporo and the design of Hōheikan and the Seikatei house embody two different points in a uniquely Japanese project: the construction of a unified modern Japanese identity drawing on reworked forms from Japan’s past and selected Western forms. As such, they do not then represent the American or Western impact on the development of Hokkaidō so much as they show how vigorously the Kaitakushi and the Meiji government in Tokyo sought to Japanize the island by reworking its built space into Japanese spatial orders that elaborated discourses of modernity and furthered the mission to subjugate Hokkaidō in service to a Japanese dream.
**Rice and the Postmaster**

While the urban design and the design of public buildings in Sapporo functioned as instruments of power elaborating Meiji ideologies about Japanese identity and modernity on the island space, they did so in a sort of delimited and talismanic space. For Japanization of space to be more widely implemented, ideological signs of Japanese identity needed to be elaborated on a wider scale. This meant the island landscape. “Landscape patterns are both material and conceptual” writes Andrew Sluyter.[19] They are comprised of physical matter and symbolic communications and capital. Colonial transformations of landscape space change both the physical matter of the land and what the land means. In the Hokkaidō countryside north of the southern Hakodate region, Tokyo engaged in two sorts of landscape transformation after 1868. Initially, American and Japanese experts acting on Kaitakushi policy began the job of turning the indigenous Ainu off their land, turning forest and grassland into farms for crops of beets and corn, into orchards, and into pasture for cattle. The impact on the landscape and human life in the landscape space was significant and included eradication of the local wolf [20] and catastrophic destruction of Ainu culture and economics. Hunting and gathering, subsistence agriculture and indigenous fishing enterprises were replaced by a landscape transformed both materially and symbolically for the modern business of colonists, cash-cropping, resource exploitation and commercial fishing. These transformations of space represented significant instruments of power for Japanese colonialism, yet in symbolic terms it was the introduction of wet rice culture to Hokkaidō that did most to turn the landscape of the island into Japanese space.

The matrix of rice, Japanese territory and Japanese identity has been well set out by Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney, but it bears reiteration here.[21] Rice is Japan, and rice in Hokkaidō makes the island Japanese. Nothing is more a complete and doxological sign of the business of being Japanese than rice and rice paddies. Rice and wet rice fields do two things in Japan: they signify what it is to be Japanese, and they constitute or make the Japanese, Japanese, and Japan, Japan. The signs of rice and rice fields as both symbols and instruments of Japanese identity spread thickly and historically through Japanese culture, society, politics and business. Rice, not coin or precious metal, was the currency of feudal Japan; samurai stipends were paid in rice, though by the end of the Tokugawa period the line between rice and coin was quite blurred. Traditional Japanese flooring, *tatami*, is made from woven rice stalks. Rice bran provides a facial scrub and rice starch, glue for binding books. Where Americans and Australians might imagine a man in the moon, Japanese see a rabbit pounding rice to make sticky rice cakes. During the time of Japan’s imperialism in Asia, rice came to symbolize the purity of Japanese intentions in a world of struggle. It was rice, and thus the Japanese themselves, that was to be saved by territorial expansion and wars to preserve expansion. Lunch boxes appeared with representations of the national flag: a square of white rice with a red pickled plum in the center. And this was only natural: both emperor and the imperial institution were and still are powerfully linked to rice. Rice plays a crucial part in the imperial enthronement and accession ceremonies. Japanese emperors bless the rice crop every year and bear ritual responsibility for good harvests, for Japanese rice is not just a grain it is a divine being: each grain of Japanese rice has a soul (*ina dama*) and each *ina dama* is a Shinto deity, a *kami* known as Uka no Kami. In the 1990s huge furors erupted in Japan about the importation and sale of rice grown in California, Western Australia, and Thailand, and though the uproar was usually couched in economic terms, the fuss was less about the economics of an increasingly uncompetitive Japanese agricultural industry than it was about Japanese identity. Rice is at the center of both community and ownership in
Japan. In Japan rice is “our” food and rice paddies are “our” lands, and when it comes to Hokkaidō, it was rice, rice paddies and their spatiality that transformed this chilly northern island into a home island of Japan.

Wet rice cultivation should be impossible in all but the southern tip of Hokkaidō. Sapporo and the surrounding regions in which wet rice is grown are at the same latitude as Marseilles and Milwaukee, but the climate is more like Wisconsin than southern France. Thanks to mountain ranges, cold ocean currents originating in the Arctic, the Yamase winds and the proximity of the Siberian landmass, winters are brutally cold. In January the average temperature ranges from a low of minus 12 degrees Celsius to a high of minus 4 degrees Celsius. Hokkaidō summers are very short with up to 15 hours of daylight. These were not conditions for growing wet rice. Rice accumulates amylose, a kind of starch, if the temperature remains low for an extended period of time when its grains ripen. That causes the rice to become less sticky when cooked and then its taste suffers. In Hokkaidō, Japanese immigrants had their Shinto deities newly minted by the Emperor Meiji. They had land. They had government money to build homes and barns. They had the beginnings of a modern infrastructure. They even had ample supplies of rice imported from the islands further south. But what the immigrants to Hokkaidō did not have was a vital practice of Japanese space and Japanese identity: wet rice agriculture.

This represented a serious absence. How could the land and its new inhabitants be Japanese without the business of rice? How could rice be grown in such inhospitable climes? It fell to Nakayama Kyūzō, an amiable looking postmaster, to make Hokkaidō truly Japanese. Born second son into a reputable family of farmers in the Kansai region, Nakayama seemed to be constantly heading north. In 1845 at age 17 he defied his family, left the family farm at the village of Kasuga near Osaka and moved to Edo, the great capital city of the shoguns. For a while Nakayama became a bit of a wanderer along the Tōkaidō highway between Osaka and Edo, but in 1853 he met Katakura Eima and headed further north. Katakura was a member of a high-ranking samurai family, senior retainers to the Date lord. Nakayama entered service to Katakura as hanshi, a low-ranking local retainer. He moved from Edo to Sendai, the Date clan’s castle city in the northern Tōhoku region. Still moving northward, Nakayama shuttled between Sendai and Shiraoi, a little settlement on the southern coast of Hokkaidō where the Date clan was attempting to establish afoothold. In 1868, the Date clan sided with the Tokugawa Shogunate in the civil war against the modernizing samurai and the Emperor Meiji, fighting on even after the last Shogun had surrendered and Edo had fallen to the Imperial forces. The final defeat of the Date clan and their allies and retainers in the autumn of 1868 sent Nakayama Kyūzō and many other loyalists into a sort of exile near the vanquished shogun Tokugawa Yoshinobu at the pretty seaside area of Shizuoka for a while, but the attraction of the northern regions never left him. In 1869 Nakayama made his way back to Sendai, apparently a troubled and sorrowful man, full of doubts about the course his life had taken. At Sendai, Nakayama made what must have been the very difficult decision to quit his service to Katakura Eima, and he returned to Hokkaidō, to Shiraoi, but not for long, before he left the island again and travelled to his hometown near Osaka. In 1871, however, the urge to go north reasserted itself and Nakayama traveled back to Hokkaidō, this time as an immigrant, first to Tomakomai and then to the wetlands of Shimamatsu where he settled on the south bank of the Shimamatsu River, an area between present-day Eniwa and Kitahiroshima. He returned to farming and in 1884 also became master of the Meiji communications station at Shimamatsu, handling postal services and at one point, a visit by the Meiji emperor.
Determined Japanese patriot and adventurer that he was, Nakayama saw the problem posed by the absence of rice cultivation in the northern island, and set about solving it. He struggled for years to germinate rice in wet fields on the Hokkaidō plains. He used a variety of rice that was resistant to cold: Akagi. Cold days and even colder nights in the growing season reduced the temperature of the water in the paddies too much for germination, so Nakayama cut shallow zig-zag canals in his fields, filled them with water taken from the river, and left it to warm in the sun before carrying it to the rice plants. On especially cold nights he toted warm water from his bathtub into the fields. Finally his tenacity paid off and in the autumn of 1883, Nakayama produced 345 kilograms of rice per 1000 square meters. Nakayama’s success encouraged other immigrant farmers to grow wet rice and to stamp the occupied land with the geometry of wet rice fields, to mark Hokkaidō with the insignia of Japanese identity and possession.[22] Just as Shima’s historically inspired grid design for the city of Sapporo produced an urban space that recovered a Japanese past for deliverance of a Japanese future for Hokkaidō, Nakayama’s victory over the limits to rice cultivation in Hokkaidō produced a specifically Japanese landscape characterized by both production of a central sign of Japanese identity and culture and by a geometry analogous to the gobannome Go board rectangular grid plan of both the city and the rural landscape of the rest of Japan.
For years, wet rice cultivation challenged farmers in Hokkaidō and each killing summer freeze, each dismal harvest seemed to threaten the miracle of possession wrought by Nakayama’s transformation of heterogeneous rural space into home space. Reversing its policy of encouraging alternative crops, and ignoring the evidence that rice cultivation in Hokkaidō might never turn a profit, the government in Tokyo now opted to promote rice cultivation and thereby promote the rhetoric of Japanese identity and ownership articulated in the spaces required for rice cultivation. It fixed the price of rice high enough to make even the most capital intensive forms of rice cultivation profitable, and it encouraged the Chubetsu Agriculture Experimental Station, set up in 1886 at Asahikawa, to develop a new strain of rice that could be sown, germinated, grown, ripened and harvested in Hokkaidō’s short growing season: a hundred days or less. The project succeeded, or it succeeded enough to make wet rice cultivation and the marks of Japaneseness that cultivation bears, an enduring feature of Hokkaidō. But the solution, though clever, was never perfect and Hokkaidō’s farmers always battled crop failures, poverty, sometimes famine, when winter arrived too soon. The land under rice cultivation expanded until by the end of the twentieth century it represented approximately 20 percent of all cultivated land in Hokkaidō. In 1940, Hokkaidō produced 3.2 percent of all rice grown in Japan. By 1968, the island produced 6.8 percent.[23] At the end of the 20th century, rice grown in Hokkaidō represented 10 percent of the total Japanese rice crop.[24] These days Hokkaidō Oborozuki rice is one of the most prized rice varieties in the cities of southwestern Japan: transformed from other to self by the practices of space, the colony exports the identity of the center back to its origins and the imperial transaction is complete; a transaction begun with Nakayama Kyūzō’s transformation of rural space in Hokkaidō into rice cultivation space, from foreign to domestic.
Concluding remarks

As Henri Lefebvre argues, when space is understood and analyzed as empirical material rather than mental matter, social and political relations appear as operations within space and both produced by and productive of space.[25] Attention to the material spaces of late 19th century Hokkaidō reveals the spatial technologies of modern Japan’s first colonial project. Meiji designs of built space in the city plan of Sapporo, the architecture of some of its major buildings, and the transformation of a landscape seemingly inhospitable to wet rice agriculture into a landscape marked by rice paddy provided Tokyo and its colonizers with a central strategy of colonialism; with ways to pacify the problem of Hokkaidō’s otherness. Here the destructive practices involved in Ainu dispossession and subjugation and in turning the island into a part of the new nation state’s modernizing economy occurred in concert with constitutive practices, for in Shima’s city streets with their recovery of a certain history, in the syncretic architectural styles of public buildings and in the spread of wet rice fields, discourses and ideological registers about Japanese identity and Japanese modernity were elaborated in material form to produce spaces at once Japanese and productive of “Japanese-ness” in Hokkaidō thereby easing the passage of the island from wild and foreign place to a productive and naturalized unit of the Japanese state.

I thank David Tucker, Philip Seaton and Verena Laschinger for their incalculable and generous assistance in the preparation and research for this work.

Notes


[9] Berque, Augustin. 1997. Japan Cities and Social Bonds. Yelvertoft Manor, Northamptonshire: Pilkginton Press. Translated by Chris Turner, pp. 51-52. Berque insists, however, that though the go-board pattern of urban design originating in Kyoto was used in Sapporo, the urban plan itself was very much influenced by American urban planning principles and by American experts. There is no evidence for this. Shima’s plan was developed and put into construction at least two years before the arrival of American expertise.


[14] See this link and numerous other websites such as this when 日本三大がっかり is used as a search term in Google.


Duara argues that the relationship between Manchukuo and Japan was a new form of imperialism, rather than a mirror-image of European imperialism. As Duara explains, the political relationship between the two showed “a strategic conception of the periphery as part of an organic formation designed to attain global supremacy for the imperial power.”

The Japanese developed this strategy in response to growing nationalist movements by colonized people for independence after World War I. Many Japanese also thought they could win the cooperation of those movements by stressing their own frustrations at racial discrimination in the international sphere. Further exacerbating the sense that they were criticized by everyone, the Japanese faced racial discrimination when they tried to emigrate to Europe and North America and were refused even the principle of racial equality at the Paris Peace conference in 1919. Japan thus began to articulate itself as the anti-imperialist leader in Asia, set to lead the other Asian nations and throw off the yoke of western imperialism.

While the Japanese presence in Manchuria began shortly after its victory in the Russo-Japanese war in 1905 with its acquisition of the Kwantung Leased Territory, soon the presence of the Japanese Kwantung (Guandong) army, numerous Japanese settlers, and the extension of the South Manchurian railroad enabled the Japanese to claim that they had a vital interest in the area. After the 1931 Manchurian Incident, the Japanese recognized Manchukuo as an independent nation in 1932, and propped up the last Qing Emperor, Puyi, as its ruler. Unlike colonies where relationships were based on differentiating between colonized and colonizer, Manchukuo was rearticulated as a model of racial harmony in which five races co-existed peacefully although of course the reality was very different. Unlike colonies, which were often left with inferior economic infrastructure, the Japanese government poured money into Manchukuo, making it a highly developed region, which functioned purely to help the Japanese metropole achieve economic autarky. Duara argues that Japan’s relationship with Manchukuo later became the model for the relationships the Soviet Union and the United States of America had with Eastern Europe and Latin America respectively, places they had under their economic domination.

Duara not only challenges conventional wisdom that Japan’s imperialism was based on European models, but inverts it with his argument that Japan’s relationship with Manchukuo was a template for future international relations in the 20th century. That is, large superpowers would come to dominate subordinate regions and use their resources for their own benefit, all the while discussing the relationship in anti-imperialist terms, in the same way that Japan dominated Manchukuo. This “new imperialism” was demonstrated by Japan which “sought to bring its client-states into a structure of governance that not only permitted dominance but integrated them into a regional and ultimately, global game plan.” This form of control, later copied by the Soviet Union and the United States, is, as Duara reminds us, still imperialism, even though the old forms have ceased to exist.
The New Imperialism and the Post-Colonial Developmental State: Manchukuo in comparative perspective

Prasenjit Duara

With recent developments in Iraq and elsewhere, an argument is beginning to appear—or reappear—that much of twentieth century imperialism might better be thought of as a kind of federalism. Thus, Anthony Pagden, who provides the most cogent version of this argument, believes that “it would be far wiser to look upon both the United States and the European Union as, in their very different ways, attempts to revive a federalist rather than an imperial object.” Pagden traces his ideas to thinkers like Joseph Schumpeter and Jean Monnet (credited with the idea of a “United States of Europe”). According to Pagden, the ages of conquest and commerce were, by the twentieth century, being replaced by a global order in which the 18th century European idea of sovereignty was transferred from the nation-state to “something more amorphous: a modern, or postmodern, global society.” At the base of this development was the idea of empire, which survived the competitive nationalisms of the 19th century, as an “extended protectorate” and in the words of Edmund Burke, a “sacred trust”.

A closer look at the mid-twentieth century transformations of imperialism suggests that Pagden’s argument has greater credibility than many might want to give it. But I believe Pagden is fundamentally mistaken in his assumption that nationalism has basically been overcome, especially on the part of the imperial or “federating” power. Ironically, one of the earliest and best instances of what Pagden describes is not one that Pagden writes about: the relationship between imperial Japan and Manchukuo, its puppet state in northeast China that existed between 1932 until 1945.

Manchukuo was the first full-blown instance of what I call the “new imperialism”—an imperialism rooted in the historical circumstances of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Japan, rather than in those of the older European colonial powers. The new imperialism reflected a strategic conception of the periphery as part of an organic formation designed to attain global supremacy for the imperial power. The imperialism that evolved through the middle fifty or sixty years of the twentieth century differed especially from earlier European colonial imperialism in several ways. While the new imperialists maintained ultimate control of their dependencies or clients through military subordination, they often created or maintained legally sovereign nation-states with political and economic structures that resembled their own.

The new imperialists espoused anticolonial ideologies and emphasized cultural or ideological similarities; they made considerable economic investments, even while exploiting these regions, and attended to the modernization of institutions and identities. In other words, these imperialist formations were not founded in principle upon the sustained differentiation between rulers and ruled characteristic of most colonial formations.

Moreover, the new imperialism occasionally entailed a separation of its economic and military-political dimensions. Although subordinate states were militarily dependent upon the metropole, it was not necessarily in the latter’s interest to have them economically or institutionally backward. In some situations, as in the Soviet Union-Eastern Europe and the Japan-Manchukuo relationship, massive investments and resources flowed into the client states thus breaching the classical dualism between an industrialized metropole and a colony focused on the primary sector. In this way, too, my conception of the new imperialism differs from theories of
neocolonialism, which continue to emphasize underdevelopment and traditional forms of exploitation. (3)

Another aspect of this new kind of imperialism was its tendency to form a regional or (geographically dispersed) bloc formation, promoting economic autarky as a means for the imperial power to gain global supremacy or advantage. In this formation, while benefit to the metropole continues to be the rationale for domination, benefit does not necessarily derive from transferring primary wealth to it but often entails the industrialization of the puppet- or client-state. Thus, the new imperialism depended on a variety of nationalism that extends the benefits and pains of creating an integrated, globally competitive entity, but extends them unevenly over the whole. By the same token, the imperial formation is often ripped apart by enduring nationalist prejudices fostered in earlier and simultaneous processes of nation-building, especially within the imperial metropole.

The Japanese Empire, 1942
Anti-imperialism and Imperialism in the Interwar Period

The emergence of anti-imperialist nationalism represented, of course, one of the most important conditions for the transformation of imperialism. Anti-imperialist nationalism attained a new height in East Asia with the March 1919 protest against colonialism in Korea and the May 4th movement in China of the same year. While both movements were directed against Japanese imperialism, ironically the Japanese also began to develop an anti-imperialist discourse—the discourse of anti-Western pan-Asianism. Japanese nationalists tended to represent themselves as victims of Western imperialism and racism while building their own empire and brand of racist nationalism. But they were also bound by a pan-Asian rhetoric of common victimhood as they developed their contiguous empire in a region occupied by people whom the Japanese perceived as culturally or racially continuous with themselves. In other words, while Japanese imperialism targeted East Asian societies, it at the same time sought to incorporate them through ideas of pan-Asian brotherhood. It is, I believe, less fruitful to view this idea of brotherhood as a smoke screen than to understand it as a self-contradictory ideology of the new imperialism, in which domination and exploitation coexisted with development and modernization.

Of course, historically, modern imperialism had always been closely identified with nation-states. From a world-systems perspective, capitalism was a product of competition between states for global resources: the more sophisticated versions of this theory eschew simple economic arguments. According to Giovanni Arrighi, the creation and maintenance of global capitalism was made possible by the fusion of “two logics,” territorial and capitalist. Competition among states in the early modern period entailed the capture of mobile capital for territorial and population control, and the control of territories and people for the purposes of mobile capital. Beginning in the seventeenth century, the territorial state (possessing absolute jurisdiction within its boundaries and growing military and organizational capabilities) became necessary to control the social and political environment of capital accumulation on a world scale. In Arrighi’s scheme, the hegemonic power in the competitive system of European states—Dutch power in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, British power in the nineteenth—was successively challenged by latecomer territorial states that sought, in the drive to become globally competitive, to first mobilize the economic and human resources within their own jurisdictions, thus producing some aspects of nationalism. Immanuel Wallerstein is more explicit, declaring that nationalism became the means whereby a state or social formation sought to leverage itself out of the periphery of the world system and into the core.(4)

By the twentieth century, nationalism had become the driving force behind imperialism, just as imperialism had become an important means in the formation of some nationalisms.(5) Nationalist principles became still more deeply implicated with imperialism in the intensifying competitive environment. Responding to this heightened competition among themselves, including military competition, several imperial formations sought to organize colonies into relatively autarchic regional structures or economic blocs. In Britain and France, the value of empire for military competition was not fully recognized until World War I when colonial troops and resources played a vital role. In Britain, Joseph Chamberlain’s neomercantilist ideas of colonial development (which had been largely ignored before the war) and ideas of “imperial preference” began to be taken more seriously. Even so, only once before 1940 did expenditure on colonial development creep above 0.1% of British Gross National Product.(6) The post-World War I transformation of French attitudes to the colonies is summed up in Albert Lebrun’s words that the goal was now to “unite France to all those distant Frances in order to permit them to
combine their efforts to draw from one another reciprocal advantages.”(7) But while the French government extended imperial preference and implemented reforms, particularly with reference to legal and political rights in Africa during the 1930s, investments in economic and social development projects were insignificant until the creation of the Investment Fund for Economic and Social Development in 1946.(8)

In order to compete with Britain and France, Germany had sought to develop a regional bloc in Central and Eastern Europe since the end of the nineteenth century.(9) This trend accelerated during the interwar years, and German commercial influence before the war reached its peak in 1938 when Austria was incorporated into the Reich and Hitler annexed the Sudeten region of Czechoslovakia. The German economic New Order in Europe, built upon states that were essentially German puppets or had German military governors, was designed to supply the Nazi war effort. However, there were also plans to build an economic region around a prosperous Germany, linked to new industrial complexes in Central Europe and the captured areas of the western Soviet Union. This unitary European market, however, remained a nationalistic German vision—and we should be wary of seeing it as a predecessor of the European Union. The German plan represented in several ways no more than an aborted version of the new imperialism.(10)

The Japanese economic bloc built throughout the 1930s and intensified during the Pacific war resembled the German New Order in that the entire occupied zone became subordinated to Japanese war needs and Japan’s defeat represented a failure of the new imperialism. Still, Japan’s initial experience with Manchukuo reveals the lineaments of a more functional version of the new imperialism, not entirely driven by wartime needs, though often representing a preparation for war. Moreover, beginning especially in the 1930s after the establishment of Manchukuo, the Japanese exploitation of colonies such as Korea was accompanied by increases in productive capacity. As the Korean economist Sub Park has demonstrated, while Indian growth between 1900 and 1946 was under 1% annually, the yearly mean growth rate of gross domestic production in Korea was 3% during the period from 1915 to 1940.(11) The accumulated per capita British investment in India and Japanese investment in Korea were eight dollars and thirty-eight dollars respectively in 1938.(12) Given the common global climate, how and why did Japanese colonial policy become more oriented toward economic development than European colonial policy did? Pan-Asianism had emerged as an ideology incorporating Japan’s curious role as both victim and victimizer in the imperialist game; and that ideology permitted the Japanese the conceit that it was obliged to lead the Asian nations against the West. Such claims were, however, belied by the vigorous nationalism of Asian peoples against the Japanese. In response to this complicated scenario, Japanese colonial bureaucrats, military officers, and intellectuals began to experiment with modes of association and alliance that would reinvent empire and nation.

**Manchuria and Japanese Imperialism**

From early in the Meiji period, Japanese imperialism was justified by nationalism, and mainland northeast Asia was characterized as the outer zone of national defense against the advancing EuroAmerican powers. Japanese expansionism in northeast Asia during the first three decades of the twentieth century was accompanied by the rhetoric that Korea, Manchuria, and Mongolia represented the “lifeline” of the Japanese nation. The Treaty of Portsmouth which concluded the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, while acknowledging in theory China’s sovereignty in
Manchuria, granted Japan the Russian lease on the Kwantung peninsula and the South Manchurian Railroad. From this time, Japanese interests and influence grew, particularly after the annexation of Korea in 1910 and during the imperialist power vacuum in East Asia during World War I. (13)

The economic and political affairs of the leased territories were managed by the Kwantung government and the South Manchurian Railway Company, a quasi-governmental corporation with many subsidiary enterprises and one of the largest research organizations in the world until 1945. Japanese investment in the South Manchurian Railway Company in 1920 alone was 440 million yen. By 1927, 85% of Japanese foreign investment was in China, and of its Chinese investments, 80% was in Manchuria. In 1932, Japan’s share of the total industrial capital in Manchuria was 64%, while the Chinese share was 28%. (14)

As early as the 1920s, the Japanese controlled Manchuria economically and militarily by means of an unstable alliance with the warlord of the region, Zhang Zuolin. Each party had its own reasons for the alliance and Zhang’s desire to control Beijing increasingly militated against the Japanese interests in Manchuria, whereupon the Japanese murdered Zhang. Zhang’s son and successor, Zhang Xueliang, was, however, even more China-directed and declared his allegiance to the KMT. It was under these circumstances that elements in the Kwantung army overthrew the Zhang regime on September 18, 1931 and established the puppet state of Manchukuo in 1932.

Until recently, Manchukuo was thought to represent a break in Japanese imperial policy. In this scenario, the Japanese government in the 1920s sought through diplomacy to secure concessions from imperial powers and subject nations such as China. The 9/18 Manchurian Incident is said to constitute a new turn because army officers took the initiative and presented the Japanese government with a fait accompli. This event may be seen as the first in a sequence of faits accomplis in the 1930s, enabling the military to take over the civilian government in Japan and ultimately lead Japan into the China war (1937), the Pacific war (1941), and ignominious defeat. But recent scholarship has changed this account of events in several ways. First, while military officers, with or without the tacit approval of higher authorities, did present the Japanese government with imperialist faits accomplis, there was enormous popular support mobilized for their actions. After fifty years of steady and forceful nation-building, by the 1920s Japanese nationalism had developed a life of its own not fully within state control. The emergent mass media, the various social and political organizations such as labor unions, political parties, and social associations, were infused with high nationalist—and imperialist—sentiment that military officers could and did easily mobilize. By the late 1920s, with the onset of the depression which affected Japanese farmers acutely, agrarian radicals, together with young disgruntled military officers—the Showa restorationists, who felt that capitalists, politicians, and bureaucrats had abandoned the true bushido spirit of Japan—catalyzed this popular nationalism and laid the conditions for support of imperial expansion.

Second, as Yoshihisa Matsusaka and others have pointed out, new imperialist ideas had been incubating, especially in the military stationed in the colonies and Manchuria since the last years of World War I. The primacy of diplomatic and multilateralist approaches of party governments during the 1920s kept these ideas out of the limelight, but several advocates of the new imperialism were busy experimenting with them in the 1920s, especially in Manchuria. The scale and duration of World War I convinced the Japanese military that the competition for global resources would be a long-drawn-out war for which Japan would need to be economically self-
The idea of “strategic autarky” which entailed an entirely new conception of imperialism: the colony or dominated region was to be made structurally and organizationally amenable to imperialist intent by utilizing the principle of the nation-state and nationalism. Military analysts like Major Koiso Kuniaki, who would later become chief of staff of the Kwantung army, conceived of resource mobilization within a regional rather than merely national framework. For Koiso, the idea of autarky implied an alliance: the Chinese would supply land, resources, and labor, and the Japanese would furnish technology and capital. He was mindful that a genuine autarky would involve some sacrifice of Japanese interests for the sake of the whole.

With the growth of nationalism in these territories and the spread of pan-Asianist ideas among various Japanese groups in the 1920s, the conditions for regional control came to be seen, increasingly, to involve cooperation (or forced cooperation) with potential allies. Matsuoka Youseke, who argued the Japanese case for the independence of Manchukuo from China at the League of Nations in 1933, best exemplified the strategy of the new imperialism. In the 1920s, when he served on the board of directors of the South Manchurian Railroad Company, he developed the idea of autarky by creating a relationship of dependent alliance with Zhang Zuolin; and Matsuoka’s ideas were embraced at the time by the Kwantung army. Through a series of loans for railroad construction and other projects, Matsuoka sought to transform Zhang’s administration into a client state. At the same time, according to Tak Matsusaka, Matsuoka’s vision transcended the old imperialist game of dealing with native allies merely to gain concessions and privileges. Rather Matsuoka’s goal was first to bring the regional government, principally through financial ties, firmly under Japanese control, and subsequently to pursue economic policies for developing Manchuria as a whole. Development was to take place not by excluding Chinese and others but by encouraging them to contribute to the prosperity of the region. The Japanese (who were presumed to be the principal actors and natural leaders of this effort), could only benefit from this general development.

While the new imperialism was being tested in Manchuria, experimentation with strategies of colonial development also characterized the 1920s in Korea. The shock, to the Japanese, of the March 1919 nationalist uprisings in Korea was processed originally by academics, journalists, and colonial bureaucrats, and emerged as a policy called “Cultural Rule.” Cultural Rule was designed to produce cooperation between colonizer and colonized in economic and political matters. Characterized by slogans of “Japanese Korean joint rule” (Nissen dochi) and doctrines of “coexistence and coprosperity” (kyoson kyoei), Cultural Rule was in many respects a failure: the Japanese would have had to give more autonomy to the Koreans than they were prepared to do. The new thinking in Japanese colonial discourse was driven, according to Michael Schneider, by middle-class professional and managerial classes keen to align Japanese colonialism with the norms of international modernization, respond to the rising nationalism of the colonized, and develop the colony within a wider program of regional integration and management under Japanese leadership. The policy of Cultural Rule was, as Schneider has said, “an attempt to fit Japanese colonialism into the new internationalism of the 1920s.”

In the aftermath of World War I, Japanese imperialism came to be rethought radically in the context of pan-Asianism, the new discourse of civilization that began at the time to burgeon in Japan and many other parts of the continent. Pan-Asianism also had a special meaning for Japanese nationalists and thinkers during the 1920s because of the growing perception that,
despite Japan’s effort to become a world-class nation-state (with colonies to boot), the Japanese continued to encounter racism and discrimination. Discrimination was perceived in the international conferences in Washington (1922), the London Naval Conference (1930), and wherever Japan was allotted a lower quota of ships than the British and Americans. But most of all, it was the build-up of exclusionary policies in the United States and the final Exclusion Laws prohibiting Japanese immigration in 1924 that galled Japanese nationalists. In their view, Asian civilization did not exhibit inhuman racist attitudes and policies of this kind, and for militants like Okawa Shumei and his followers in the Kwantung army, these ingrained civilizational differences would have to be fought out in a final, righteous war of East against West.

In providing a moral explanation for wrongs inflicted upon Japan, pan-Asianist discourse also demanded empathy for the other exploited peoples of Asia, including those that Japan itself colonized. The ideas behind the Cultural Policy in Korea reflected, in theory, some of this empathy. During the 1920s, many intellectuals argued that Japanese and Koreans had the same ancestors, and this idea grew together with a theory of the mixed origins of the Japanese. Note that this expression of pan-Asianism led ultimately to the policies of assimilation of the Koreans (and Taiwanese) into the Japanese nation. In Manchuria, pan-Asianism was expressed not in a strategy of assimilation and homogenization but of independence and alliance. Not only would it have stretched the contemporary imagination outrageously to argue that the Chinese and Japanese had the same origins, but the national movement and international opinion regarding the status of China was much too strong for the Japanese to seek to assimilate the Chinese in Manchuria, whom they insisted on calling “Manchurians.” Here pan-Asianism, expressed as shared Asian ideals and common history (especially against Western imperialism), spoke to the new conceptualization of global domination through regional autarky.

In order to achieve an industrial-resource base in Manchuria, the Japanese military had to develop an alliance with key groups in this society, among the Chinese but also among the Japanese settler community in the Kwantung peninsula. Accordingly, the military was compelled to champion the rhetoric of these allies, which included talk of a sovereign state. Ishiwara Kanji and his associates in the Kwantung army, Itagaki Seishiro and Doihara Kenji, recognized that they could ignore the new discourse of rights and autonomy only at their peril. Pan-Asianism thus necessarily served as the basis of this alliance and “economic bloc.” Whereas figures like Ishiwara were motivated primarily by Japanese nationalism, their nationalism was itself framed by a vision of the inevitable confrontation between East and West. The cooperation of China and Manchuria under Japanese leadership was necessary for success in this holy war or righteous duty (zhengyi, seigi). Ishiwara allegedly became a convert to the pan-Asianist idea of the formal equality of Asian nations. He found no contradiction between viewing the alliance as representing the supposed difference between Asian ideals and Western imperialism or viewing it as a means in a final war for global dominance.

The idea of an autarkic Japan-Manchuria bloc was influenced by models of autarky in fascist Europe but was understood within the civilization discourse of pan-Asianism. By the mid-1930s the bloc idea had helped to produce the East Asian League (Toa renmei) and the East Asian Community (Toa kyodotai), and still later the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere (Dai-Toa Kyoeiken). Indeed, figures associated with the propagation of these institutions were critical of Nazi theories of racial superiority and emphasized cooperation with the Chinese in a regional alliance under Japanese leadership. To be sure, commitment to the idea of an alliance—and even to the notion that Japan should renounce extraterritoriality in Asian countries—was
premised on the Japanese belief in their intrinsic superiority and the need for these Asian nations to accept Japanese leadership. Yet it is impossible to fully understand why the military encouraged the rapid modernization and industrial build-up in Manchuria without grasping the framework of pan-Asianism.

**Manchukuo**

In an earlier period, Manchukuo might have become a colony. But the new conceptualization of imperialism entailed that the might-have-been colony become more like a subordinate ally or client-state in global competition. The status of the dependent state under the new imperialism was quite fluid, in part because the rapidly changing demands of global competition could, depending upon the circumstances, give it more leverage (as in the case of the relationship between postwar Hong Kong and Britain) or generate more resistance and further subordination. The status of Manchukuo over its fifteen-year history gradually shifted, in official rhetoric, from that of an independent nation-state—with Japan conceived as a friendly country (Ch. youbang, J. yuho) and ally (Ch. mengbang)—to that of a dependent kinsman, even a child or younger brother. In the end, the rhetoric used was Confucian: the language of the “family state” model of imperial Japan. By the time of the Pacific war, Manchukuo had become, in the words of its ambassador to Japan, Li Shaogeng, “the eldest son of the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere.”

Pu Yi, the last Manchu emperor—who became first president and then emperor of Manchukuo—underwent a rebirthing ritual in 1940, from which he emerged, as from the womb of Amaterasu, as the younger half-brother of Hirohito, the Japanese emperor.(23) Ridiculous as this may sound to us (and as it did to the Chinese), it is fruitful to think of this ritual relationship as an innovation made possible by the theory of the mixed origins of the Japanese nation, a theory studied closely by Oguma Eiji. According to Oguma, the imperial “family state” ideology was able to incorporate this theory because it privileged the (modern) Japanese ideal of the ie or household which, unlike the lineage model, could accept outsiders by adoption into the family: “In this system,” Oguma writes, “as long as ancestors of the ie are linked to the current membership, blood is of secondary importance.”(24) Becoming the younger brother of the emperor, entailed, of course, a strictly dependent and subordinate status. Brotherhood in the Confucian understanding reflected a hierarchical relationship. In more modern rhetoric, brotherhood was often invoked instead to characterize egalitarian relationships: Sun Yat-sen used the slippage in this trope to rally secret fraternal societies (of the inegalitarian kind), while entering them in the historical record as at the core of revolutionary brotherhood (of the egalitarian kind).(25) The same slippage in the idea of brotherhood was also very important in pan-Asianism, and we might even say that brotherhood was the pivot that joined the hierarchical “family state” ideology with pan-Asianism.
Brotherhood or, more broadly, the family relationship among East Asian peoples implied sharing a mission regardless of one’s preferences. It was the obligation of the patriarch or the older, dominant brother to create the ethos of the family, its enterprise, and deliver the goods it promised. Japanese rhetoric did not fully develop this metaphor to embrace the relationship between Japan and Manchukuo, and the rhetoric always appeared somewhat contradictory, perhaps because of the continued lip service to the independence of Manchukuo. Nonetheless, by 1940 the “family state” model was utilized to characterize the relationship of citizen to state within Manchukuo: “National citizenship is the expanded version of family membership. Just as the family member has an obligation to obey the family unconditionally, so does the citizen have to obey the state.”(26) Manchukuo was developed as an East Asian brother or son who set up a house modeled closely upon, and subordinate to, that of the Japanese patriarch. Practically, this structure meant using Chinese officials at all levels, including in the top administrative and political positions, but having their activities supervised by Japanese officials responsible ultimately to the Kwantung Army.

Developing the family enterprise and delivering the goods amounted to creating the modern developmental state in Manchukuo, which emerged as the most industrialized part of Asia outside Japan. The Manchukuo banking system was reformed and for the first time the currency of the region was unified. The new currency was made equivalent in value to the Japanese yen, which facilitated its integration into the yen bloc. There was a dramatic rise of Japanese investments which, according to Louise Young, grew to almost six billion yen between 1932 and 1941 (in 1941 exchange rates)—a figure far greater than any other transfer from a metropole to a colony. By 1945, Japanese investment in Manchukuo exceeded the combined total of its investment in Korea, Taiwan, and the rest of China.(27) Industrial production tripled between
1933 and 1942, and producer goods output grew the fastest. (28) Considerable attention was also paid to the social infrastructure, at least in the urban areas: to the system of public health and education. (29) The new regime always touted these achievements as having reversed the decades of warfare and economic chaos perpetuated by the previous warlord government.

Manchukuo’s industrial production

The rapid increase in industrial employment meant that immigration from China continued to pour in, although the government sought to limit it for a while. Koreans came into Manchuria in large numbers from the 1920s and their numbers reached almost 800,000 by 1935. The Japanese had a plan to bring in five million Japanese settlers into Manchukuo, but the rural settler population never exceeded 250,000. In the mid-1930s, the total Japanese population was under 600,000. Demographically, over 90% of the population was Han Chinese. (30)
The other side of this development state was the brutality of an occupying army. The massacres of the resistance, the notorious human experiments with bacteriological toxins developed by Unit 731 in Harbin, the dispossession of agricultural land from Chinese farmers, and other brutal crimes have been well recorded. Manchukuo presents us, on the one hand, with a record of cruel violence; and, on the other hand, with the record of a developmental state.

There is perhaps no better symbol of the antithetical structure of the modern state in Manchukuo than its police. Manchukuo’s huge police force conducted punctiliously detailed censuses and surveys; made extensive and complex plans for settlements; paid close attention to hygiene and welfare; made available education, drinkable water, and shelters; and mobilized the population for inoculations—sometimes at gunpoint. But there were many modern states characterized by this duality. What made Manchukuo different from Italy, Germany, the Soviet Union, or Japan was that it lacked the legitimacy of a nation. In a time when nation-states allegedly represented the “will of the people,” the Manchukuo regime claimed instead to represent the essence of Asian culture.
The “kingly way” was presented as the ancient Chinese ideal of the just and moral ruler, a trope that Sun Yat-sen extended beyond Chinese civilization in a lecture on pan-Asianism delivered in Kobe. In Manchukuo, the kingly way, related notions, and the example of the Manchu emperor were deployed as symbols of pan-Asian civilization, bringing together diverse groups who, whether by choice, opportunism, or necessity, came to support the new regime. These included many of the warlords and political leaders of the old society, dyed-in-the-wool Confucian monarchists, and, most numerously, the deeply religious and universalist redemptive societies. The followers of the redemptive societies in China and Manchuria included many millions, and, while some were closely associated with sectarian traditions including the worship of Buddhist and folk deities, they mostly represented the late imperial syncretic tradition (sanjiaoheyi), which combined the three religions of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism into a single universal faith. These societies had historically been persecuted by the Chinese state, both imperial and modern; and the Japanese in Manchuria sought to reach out to them. Tachibana Shiraki, architect of Manchukuo ideology, said that the redemptive societies exemplified the essence of Asiatic civilization and were amenable to mobilization as civic organizations. Less easy to manipulate than the Japanese had hoped, these societies seized the opportunity to pursue their own goals: by the late 1930s, the Morality Society of Manchukuo claimed a membership of eight million out of a total population of forty million.

The second legitimacy claim made by the puppet regime was that it represented the “concord of nationalities” (minzoku kyowa) a conceit that was supposed to represent two advances over older colonial ideas. Not only was the concord supposed to reject exploitation and the reproduction of difference between ruler and ruled, but it was also designed to counter the homogenization of differences that nationalism had produced and that had led to nearly insoluble conflicts. By allegedly granting different peoples or nationalities their rights and self-respect under a state structure, Manchukuo presented itself as a nation-state in the mode of the Soviet “union of nationalities”. Among others, Tominaga Tadashi, the author of Manshu no minzoku (Nationalities of Manchuria), wrote copiously about the early Soviet policy towards national self-determination. It was a policy that fulfilled the goals of federalism and protected minority rights, while at the same time it strengthened Soviet state and military power particularly with regards to separatism in the old Tsarist empire. Thus, nationalism ought not to be suppressed, but rather utilized positively for the goals of the state.
The “concord of nationalities”

These sources of support were managed, maintained, and mobilized by the Concordia Association (Ch. xiehehui, J. kyowakai), which was effectively the Manchukuo regime’s party. But whereas in theory the Association was to represent the will of the people and was ultimately destined to replace the Kwantung army, by mid-decade it was purged of its original leadership and made into an instrument of the army and government. Less a means of ethnic, cultural, and occupational representation than of mobilization and surveillance, the Concordia Association closely resembled contemporary “totalitarian parties” in Europe. The leaders refrained from calling it a party precisely because the appellation smacked too much of partisanship. The association enrolled all officials and government functionaries, including teachers, as well as important figures in society. All youth between the ages of sixteen and nineteen were compulsorily enrolled beginning in 1937; and by 1943, the association included about 10% of the population (as compared to 5% for the Chinese Communist Party in the PRC today).

Like its fascist counterparts, the Concordia Association was corporatist, anticommunist, anticapitalist, and sought to overcome class divisions by organizing people through their communities, both occupational and ethnic, while promoting a dirigiste economy. But the
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association was distinctive in representing Asian communities—Mongols, Manchus, Hui Muslims, Koreans, Japanese and white Russians accounted for about 10% of the population), as well as the majority Chinese—and their traditions. This commitment often meant supporting the religious leadership among these peoples: Mongol lamas, Manchu and Daur shamans, Muslim ahongs, Bud-dhist monks, and Confucian moralists. The regime’s control of local society was enhanced by the work of association units established within, for example, Manchu villages, Hui mosques, and the Chinese community self-surveillance system (baojia). Thus pan Asianism came to play an important role in maintaining both the corporatist, fascistic character of the regime and its claim to legitimacy based upon adherence to the “kingly way.”

At the same time, the Concordia Association had been founded to realize the modern goals of jianguo (Ch: nation-state building; J: kenkoku). Japanese ideologists like Tachibana saw no contradiction between the goals of republicanism, equality, and modernization, on the one hand, and the “Eastern” values of community, solidarity, and the moral state, on the other. After all, did not Japan exemplify a synthesis of the best of both worlds? In practice, however, the very different programs and interests pursued by modernizers and pan-Asianists led to many tensions and conflicts that leave us with a view of Manchukuo as a polarized rather than harmonious society. Mongol youth demanded modern education and the elimination of the power of the lamas; Chinese supporters were fiercely divided between those who favored the restoration of the emperor and those who opposed it. Propaganda activists were frustrated by their inability to mobilize redemptive societies for wartime work. The contradiction reflected in particular the tensions of an artificial nation-state dominated by an imperial power in an age of nationalism. The inability to construct a truly independent nation-state led Manchukuo to cling to constituencies that would have to be gradually overcome in the process of national modernization. As it was, the wildly ambitious Japanese imperialist military leadership derailed the entire process by plunging this carefully constructed state into a mad and destructive war.

Conclusion: Trajectories and Affinities

The Japanese domination of Manchukuo represented a new form of imperialism. As nationalism, rights consciousness, and social mobilization developed in the colonized and semi-colonial world, the costs of direct colonial rule increased while the conditions for indirect rule were enhanced. With the creation of modern institutions in the military dependencies, it became possible to control them more economically by dominating their institutions of resource and social mobilization (such as the Concordia or redemptive societies). Japan, like the later Soviet Union and the United States, sought to bring its client-states into a structure of governance that not only permitted dominance but integrated them into a regional and ultimately, global, game plan.(36)

We have already alluded to the perception and influence in Manchukuo of the Soviet Union’s internal nationality policy as an instrument of control. During the post-World War II era, the Soviet Union’s creation of a regional system of militarily dependent states in Eastern Europe reflected many features of the new imperialism. A shared anti-imperialist and anticapitalist ideology sanctioned a centralized economic and political system. The Soviet Union combined economic leverage and military threat to integrate what were often states more economically developed than itself into a regional economy. In some ways, the imperialism of the Soviet Union revealed the counter-economic consequences of this logic of empire. Not only were the client-states of the Soviet Union in Europe often more developed, the U. S. S. R. may have been
subsidizing their economies by supplying them with cheap oil and raw materials while importing finished products from their economies. This was the price paid by the imperial power to create and maintain dependence upon it and assure its security.(37)

In part because of the consciousness of its own colonial past, and with the exception of a few places (most notably, the Philippines), the U.S. had long practiced imperialism without colonialism. After the Spanish war in 1898, the U.S. created a system of client states around the Caribbean basin in Central America. These nominally independent states became increasingly dependent on the United States, which accounted for more than three fourths of the region’s foreign trade as well as the bulk of foreign investment.(38) During the decade of the 1920s, when Japan was experimenting with indirect imperialism in Manchuria, the US too was seeking to develop and refine informal control over Central American countries especially as it faced anti-Yankee, and frequently revolutionary, nationalism in the region. Officials, diplomats and business groups stressed means such as US control of banking, communication facilities, investments in natural resources, and the development of education—particularly the training of elites in American style constitutions, “free elections” and orthodox business ideas. But the threat and reality of military intervention remained close at hand.(39)

Of course, American imperialism was characterized not only by the Monroe Doctrine but also by the Open Door policy. Although there were contradictions and tensions between the two approaches, there were also continuities, most importantly, in the practice of using sovereign or nominally sovereign polities to advance American interests. In 1917, Woodrow Wilson saw the continuities when he declared that the nations of the world should “with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world…..no nation should seek to extend its polity over any other nation or people.” But just two weeks before, Wilson had sent troops to the Dominican Republic and committed US military forces in Haiti and Mexico as well.(40) The US sought to foster an ideological and economic hegemony among its client states by creating them as reliable emulators subject to external economic and military constraints. Note, however, that this imperialism did not become developmentally oriented until the 1950s in response to the Cuban revolution.(41)

The tensions between American interests and global enlightenment were to be contained not only by military power, but perhaps more importantly by the notion of a limited self-determination, the idea of tutelage. As Secretary of Interior, Franklin Lane wrote in 1922: “What a people hold they hold as trustees for the world…It is good American practice. The Monroe Doctrine is an expression of it….That is why we are talking of backward peoples and recognizing for them another law than that of self-determination, a limited law of self-determination, a leading-string law.”(42) Little wonder then that the Japanese representative at the League of Nations hearings on Manchukuo repeatedly insisted on the Asiatic Monroe Doctrine as the basis of Japan’s prerogative in Asia.

In the post-WWII period, this combination of interest, enlightenment and military violence has developed into what Carl Parrini has called “ultraimperialism.” The latter refers to U. S. efforts to maintain cooperation and reduce conflict among imperialist nations who were busily scrambling to create monopolistic or exclusive market conditions in various parts of the world during the first half of the century.(43) “Ultraimperialism” is secured by a chain of military bases around the globe—and structures such as the International Monetary Fund, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and the World Bank—to enable the conditions of cooperation among
advanced capitalist powers and to facilitate the new (developmental or modernizing) imperialism in the decolonized world.(44) Although the U. S. is hardly a regional power any longer, as a global empire it employs, in the words of Arrighi, Hui, Hung and Selden, a vast system of “political and military vassalage” and fosters a “functional specialization between the imperial and vassal (nation) states…. In this respect, the post-war US represents the apogee of the new imperialism.\(45\)

Looking at Manchukuo comparatively, it is clear that its creators were influenced by both the US and the Soviet Union and by German ideas of the economic bloc. But Manchukuo also synthesized and crystallized these ideas into the prototype of the developmental client state within a new imperialist formation that could be found after World War II in Eastern Europe, French Africa, the British sterling zone and the US empire. The US in particular favored the model of modernizing client nation-states centered on royal identity in Asia, witness Japan, Vietnam, Iran, Saudi Arabia and others.

Despite the differences between this form of imperialism and the “classical” nineteenth-century form, nationalists emphasize the continuities between the “classical” and the clientelistic or dependent forms, and they are right to note the lack of autonomy in both.(46) But does the ability of power-holders to influence and manipulate institutions and rhetoric overwhelm the effects of new institutions and policies in changed domestic and international circumstances?

To be sure, Manchukuo remained a highly exploited society. For instance, rural society remained stagnant largely because the landowning classes represented an important base of support for the regime. Chinese workers received less than a third of wages paid to Japanese workers in state factories. The Manchukuo government and Japanese enterprises, which controlled 72% of total invested capital, made it hard for Chinese capital to penetrate the modern sector.(47) At the same time, the idea of strategic autarky necessitated the development of Manchukuo as a developmental state with advanced technologies of economic growth, generating higher standards of urban life until the Pacific war.

In general, the state in Manchukuo was able to deploy modern technologies of control, surveillance, discipline, and mobilization among the populace. The regime and its affiliated organizations—such as the Concordia Association and the redemptive societies—penetrated the lives of people to keep a stricter watch on them but also to generate new consciousness regarding, for instance, the proper nuclear family, consumer spending, engagement in afforestation programs and other projects prioritized by the mobilizing state. If some of these projects were driven by the immediate needs of the metropole, others were driven by the logic of a modernizing state.

The immediate factors behind the failure of Manchukuo had to do with its growing dependence on Japan and the role that it was forced to fill in the Japanese wartime empire. Indeed, the Manchukuo model of client states was partially extended to regimes in occupied China and in Southeast Asia during the Pacific war. This regional imperial formation bent upon global domination was characterized by a set of interdependencies within an imperially-dictated enterprise. A simple model of economic exploitation, utilizing existing modes of production and colonial difference, was to be supplemented (if not replaced) by high levels of investment, the development of new modes of mobilization and identity production, and a rhetoric of brotherhood and regional federalism. All of this came to nought with defeat.
Ultimately, however, the case of Manchukuo reveals the fault lines of the new imperialism. By pointing to the wartime emphasis on the fact that the Japanese were of mixed origins, Oguma Eiji has stressed the importance of assimilation over nationalist-racist elements within Japanese imperial ideology. Others, such as Komagome Takeshi have persuasively argued that while Japanese imperialism reflected the extension of the principles underlying national integration, Japanese nationalism was a contradictory affair composed not only of the principle of common language and culture (or civilization) but also of “blood descent.” Whereas language and culture created possibilities of integrating the colonized based on assimilation or alliance, historically the exclusionary principle of blood descent invented new ways—institutional, legal, or attitudinal—to circumvent the incorporation of non-Japanese in the empire as equal citizens. (48)

Imperialist competition in the first half of the twentieth century was catalyzed by a particular configuration of capitalism and nationalism. Although novel formations and ideals—then and now—have sought to transcend both capitalism and nationalism, the force of nationalist identity and interests from the earlier period has proved remarkably tenacious, particularly as they develop new linkages with competitive capitalism. The globalization, cooperative economic blocs, and regional formations of our own time are not unprecedented developments—and the precedents are not encouraging.

Notes


2) The German case also exhibited many aspects of this new imperialism (see below). However, Nazi racism and defeat in the war obscure the extent to which Germany would have developed along these lines. Manchukuo, on the other hand, represents a moment of the new imperialism before the wartime drive destroyed it.

3) It is also to be distinguished from the older historiographical term “new imperialism” referring to the late 19th century scramble for Africa and efforts to “slice the Chinese melon” among other developments that destabilized the imperialism of free trade. Creating nominally sovereign modern nation-states was not part of that imperialism.


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23) Yamamuro Shinichi’s Kimera emphasizes the parent-child relationship between the Japanese emperor and Pu Yi, but the image of brotherhood was also current, even in the passages that Yamamuro himself cites (261–64).
24) Oguma Eiji, Genealogy, 337.


26) Chianbu keisatsushi (Law and Order Ministry, Police Dept), ed. Komin (Citizen) (Xinkyo: Manshukoku tosho kabushi geisha, 1940), 41.

27) Louise Young, Japan’s Total Empire, 183–84, 213–15. Francis Clifford Jones, Manchuria Since 1931 (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1949), 139.


29) Suk-jung Han, “Puppet Sovereignty: The State Effect of Manchukuo, from 1932 to 1936” (PhD diss, University of Chicago, 1995), chaps. 3-4.


31) Suk-jung Han, “Puppet Sovereignty,” chaps. 3-4.

32) Komagome Takeshi, Shokuminchi Teikoku no Bunka Togo 265.

33) Shao Yong, Zhongguo huidaomen (China’s Religious Societies) (Shanghai: Renmin chubanse, 1997), 321.

34) Tominaga Tadashi, Manshukoku no minzoku mondai Shinkyo, 1943, 43-45.


36) Further, creating similar institutions fostered a similarity of interests and goals between elites in the metropolitan and dependent societies. Thus Latin American societies have found it difficult to sustain socialist states or even large-scale public expenditures without incurring the disfavor of the United States; and the Soviet Union would not tolerate “market-happy” bourgeoisies. Manchukuo too began to resemble (and in several instances, led) the military-dominated dirigiste economy and centralized political system that developed in Japan beginning in the 1930s.


42) Quoted in Robert Freeman Smith 1972, 271.


46) To be sure, even within the power structure in Manchukuo there were forces working for autonomy. On several occasions, special Japanese rights were attacked by the Kwantung army, most notably in 1936 when extraterritorial rights for Japanese citizens were abolished and a series of significant privileges began to unravel. The Japanese government also raised tariffs against the overwhelming exports from Manchukuo. In general, more recent research takes seriously the Kwantung army’s autonomy from the despised civilian governments at home—at least until the war in Asia. Suk-jung Han, “Puppet Sovereignty,” 257–58. Young, Japan’s Total Empire, 205, 211.


48) Komagome Takeshi, Shokuminchi Teikoku Nippon no Bunka Togo, 356–70.
Part II: Experiences of the Colonized

The articles in Part II explore life in the Japanese empire for colonized people. They faced various assimilation policies, endured discriminatory treatment, and reacted with a wide range of responses. For example, Chiri Yukie, a young Ainu woman featured in Hirano’s article, helped Japanese linguist Kindaichi Kyōsuke translate volumes of Ainu oral stories and poems, proudly asserting her Ainu ethnicity. Her ethnic pride was apparent in the way in which she promoted the transcription of the Ainu language into the Roman alphabet, and in her claim that some Ainu expressions could not be translated into any language. Hirano refrains, however, from upholding Chiri’s actions as an example of resistance, advocating for a more nuanced and ambivalent understanding of the complex negotiations involved between those who were dominant (the Japanese) and those who were dominated (the Ainu).

In juxtaposition, Park focuses on Korean literature written during the Japanese colonial period by individuals who hoped to “become Japanese,” as some Koreans actively self-assimilated. Park’s conclusions are grounded in the analysis of discourse, that is, through analyzing the set of meanings through which a group of people communicate, often via written text and spoken word. In contrast to Park, Tomiyama examines actual scenes of imperialism; he explores the process by which colonial subjects in Okinawa became Japanese through lifestyle reform. Lastly, Rabson discusses Okinawans living on the mainland of Japan and the variety of their responses to assimilation policies and discrimination. All these articles explore ways that Japanese colonial subjects defined being “Japanese” in their daily lives and what was at stake for those who chose not to assimilate. No matter the choice, they faced unequal treatment institutionalized by law and social practices.
“The Politics of Colonial Translation: On the Narrative of the Ainu as a ‘Vanishing Ethnicity’”
Katsuya HIRANO, trans. Gavin Walker
January 12, 2009
http://japanfocus.org/-Katsuya-HIRANO/3013

Japanese imperial authorities sought to justify their imperial project in Hokkaido by racializing the Ainu, whom they displaced in 1869. At the time, the Ainu, with their Caucasian features and beards, were considered racially and culturally distinct from the Japanese (wajin), explaining why some western anthropologists marveled at the feat of a yellow race colonizing a white race. Therefore, the Japanese racialization of the Ainu as a culturally inferior and primitive race at the brink of extinction turned conventional racial taxonomies on their head. In this article Hirano introduces the term “colonial translation,” referring to the process by which the cultural and social differences between the Ainu and Japanese were rewritten to cast the Ainu as primitives. The institutionalization of these depictions of Ainu as primitive people enabled the colonizer to justify rule over the colonized. Although by the turn of the 19th century the majority of Ainu were engaged in wage labor or trade with the Japanese, the passage of the 1899 Protection Act attempted to turn the Ainu into farmers. More precisely, the imperial project in Hokkaido was justified by the argument that the Ainu were not capable of settling the land and cultivating it; the Japanese as a more civilized and advanced race needed to take charge. Expropriation of land and the limitation of Ainu hunting and fishing rights all occurred simultaneously with the "nativization" of the Ainu.

Using this idea of colonial translation, Hirano then discusses the relationship between Japanese linguist Kindaichi Kyōsuke and Ainu Chiri Yukie. Kindaichi worked to preserve Ainu oral stories; he thought they were primitive relics of the past that faced oblivion if not collected soon. He also thought of Chiri as an intermediary between that soon-to-disappear past and contemporary Japanese society. According to Hirano, the dynamic behind Kindaichi and Chiri’s collaboration was predicated upon the understanding that Chiri would record and preserve her culture “just as it was,” while Kindaichi’s role was to provide ethnographic interpretation and meaning for the “raw data” Chiri supplied. In reality, however, Hirano argues that Chiri’s active involvement in translation as well as her numerous other writings illustrates how she went beyond being a supplier of raw data—she was actually a voice asserting Ainu pride, rejecting assimilation. Her insistence that the Ainu language be translated into Roman letters and not into Japanese script was a way to emphasize Ainu uniqueness. Furthermore, in her writings she argued that there was an Ainu voice that could not be expressed in any written forms of language. Hirano is careful to warn the reader away from concluding that Kindaichi was merely an oppressor and Chiri a victim or resister. Instead, he describes a more ambivalent relationship in which Chiri and Kindaichi had a mutual affection for each other. Hirano uses the example of Chiri Yukie to illustrate how “the politics of colonial translation were incapable of completely taming the voices of the colonized Ainu” and how her relationship with Kindaichi was more a negotiation between the dominant and dominated than pure subjugation, which is often the case during colonialism.
The Politics of Colonial Translation: On the Narrative of the Ainu as a “Vanishing Ethnicity”

Katsuya HIRANO

Translated by Gavin Walker

*The History of Hokkaido*, compiled and published by the Hokkaido regional authority in 1918, explains why the Hokkaido frontier was “opened” (*kaitaku*) by the Japanese (*wajin*) rather than by the Ainu: [1]

With respect to their old customs, the great majority of the Ainu have not yet managed to escape a savage and uncivilized stage…From the very outset, the task of opening the frontier can only be accomplished by an ethnos that has reached a certain cultural level. It is of course impossible to hope that this opening of the frontier could be performed by the people of Ezo themselves, a people that has not yet left behind a period of primitive savagery – the only ethnos among those close to Hokkaido and near to the Ezo people which possesses a culture capable of enduring this duty is unquestionably the Japanese. [2]

The formulation of a cultural hierarchy seen in this passage provided the logic that enabled the Japanese state to justify the necessity for its people to appropriate and rule the territory of Hokkaido in place of the Ainu by making the former the assumed subjective motor-force of this “opening,” while rendering the latter into an ethnicity (*minzoku*) that had “not yet managed to escape a savage and uncivilized stage.” Further, the new anthology of Hokkaido history compiled in 1937 insisted on the point that the “opening” made it possible for the Japanese to “enlighten the Ainu,” who had “for a long time continued their primitive lifestyle,” through the imperial assimilationist educational policy (*kominka kyoiku*) and it brought about a real possibility for the Ainu to “be granted universal brotherhood, and treated as national citizens.” [3]
Ainu group in a Japanese representation in Edo

Thus the territorial expropriation of, and assimilationist policy towards, the Ainu was rationalized through this term “opening,” which in turn rested on two of the major ideological
standpoints of the modern world, that is, historicism and ethnocentrism. The former was an ideology linked to an understanding of time in which all human societies, despite their historical differences and diversities, follow the exact same linear path of progress; the latter was an ideology linked to a spatial understanding in which people who share the same cultural origins – language, history, religion, customs – form the nucleus of the community as a specifically national community.

What allowed historicism and ethnocentrism to become such hegemonic ideologies—and not only in Japan—was precisely that they were so successful at rewriting and representing in the former case, the history of capitalism, and in the latter case, the history of the nation-state as universal narratives. In other words, history came to signify the process by which the universal manifested itself in particular forms (cultural or territorial difference). The ethnos was thereby posited as a supra-historical subject whose existence predated history, and history itself was determined as the process (whatever its variations) by which ethnicities proceeded from the backward circumstances of the primitive era to a higher form of civilization (capitalist civilization). As a result, the historical process through which capitalist society and the ethnic community were produced – a contingent and hazardous process – was concealed and forgotten. This conception of history is precisely what Foucault referred to as “metaphysics,” that is, it is an ideology which is formed through the presumption of “the existence of immobile forms [i.e.,
ethnicity, the universal law of progress] that precede the eternal world of accident and succession.”[4]

Seen in this way, we can understand that the discourse of “opening” operates as a universalistic expression of the ethnic enterprise and its progressiveness. A society like that of the Ainu, possessing neither the form of the nation-state nor the structure of capitalism, is thus posited as an ethnicity which utterly lacks the ability to manage itself, to say nothing of the ability to “open” frontiers. It is the “undeveloped” or “childlike” remnant left behind by the historical law of “progress,” one whose only option is to survive through the leadership and patronage of a more “progressive” ethnicity. Consequently, historicism and ethnocentrism resolve themselves in reducing the rich historical experience of mankind to the binary structure of “progress or stagnation,” and each ethnicity is thereby rewritten into a narrative of its oscillating rise and fall.

Rewriting social difference or heterogeneity as “savage” or “backward” and the task of substantiating and institutionalizing it is a strategy of control that every colonial system engages in – I refer to this here as “colonial translation.” “Translation” in this sense does not merely indicate the process of the linguistic or semiotic symbolic operations related to the strategies of colonial rule, but rather points to the application of material power to fundamentally dismantle and then reorganize the social, economic and political relations that obtained prior to colonization (the inscription of heterogeneity on the land) in order to insert them into the capitalist production process. In other words, this translation should be understood not as a form of free and equal “exchange” or “communication,” as theorized within nineteenth century
liberalism, but as an instance of the destruction, expropriation, and absorption of the heterogeneous and multiple forms of life under conditions of the inequality of power, what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as “deterritorialization” and “reterritorialization.” [5] The quotation at the beginning of this article splendidly illustrates the narrativization of this process by which, once the difference and heterogeneity of the Ainu had been reread into the form of savagery, their land and water, that is, the provisions for their livelihood were “legally” expropriated. While the Japanese state, not to speak of the Ainu themselves, had recognized nighttime trout and salmon fishing in the Ainu rivers and their tributaries as legitimate Ainu activities during the Tokugawa period, by the beginning of the Meiji era this was considered a “failure to address a long-standing abuse” and was summarily prohibited in 1879. For the Meiji government, whose avowed aim was modernization of Ainu life, this was justified as a means to transfer the right to fish from Ainu to Japanese while promoting the fisheries industries on a massive scale under the rubric of policies intended for the “increase of production in industrial enterprise” (shokusan kyogyo). The Ainu, who had thus been robbed of their livelihood, appealed to governmental agencies for a delay of the ban on nighttime fishing, which covered not only the major rivers but the smaller tributaries as well. This was denied on the basis of the “former natives’ illiteracy and ignorance of law.” Thereafter, it was the Japanese “openers” of the frontier who, with the backing of the Meiji government, “legally” expropriated and monopolized the fisheries industries in Hokkaido. [6]
It is crucial to heed the fact that the expropriation of territory and their rights to life proceeded simultaneously and parallel to the process by which the Ainu, a term connoting a proud person or people, was transformed into the humiliating term “native” (dojin), a word indicating a savage or uncivilized people. Because, when we turn our attention to this historical fact, we can immediately understand that the operation of the representation of the subject (from human to “native”) and the material destruction and expropriation of non-capitalist society are two deeply imbricated strategies. Racism (one form of the representation of the subject) justifies the operation of reification in capitalism (in a Lukascian sense) as natural – social relations amongst human beings are formed through the mediation of things (the commodity), and thus humans themselves come to exist as things or commodities. The slave trade, in other words, the exemplary commodification of human beings, cannot be explained without an understanding of the justifications of racism or its operations of representation, nor can we understand the history of the expropriation of the Ainu without considering the relationship between racism and reification.

Yet the position of the Ainu as enclosed within Japanese capitalism also differed from that of the poor peasantry, who were torn from the earth in the process of the accumulation of capital and made into “free” labor – in other words, labor as a commodity (the proletariat). Through their enclosure into the name “native” and the system of racism, it was not merely that their means of livelihood were expropriated, but that their very right to life was lost. That is, the lesser or the powerless (mu no mon tachi) who were left out of this struggle for survival were reduced to an existence incapable of even becoming wage labor (incapable of even being commodified). The only path of existence left for them was to irrevocably discard their “Ainu” ways of life and become as close to human (Japanese) as possible; in short, the only path left for them was assimilation. In fact, those who “succeeded” at assimilation were consolidated into the system as the lowest strata of labor or came to be fetishized as a “rare material” of disappearing species. It seems necessary for us to once again examine Marx’s crucial insight – that the primitive accumulation of capital and the advent of the new mode of production that accompanies it is formed and unified through the violent disintegration of the foundations of traditional society – from the viewpoint of translation (the total reorganization of non-capitalist society, including the strategies of the rewriting of history and culture). In any case, the Japanese state created its “ideal” national subjects (those with absolute loyalty to the divine authority of the Emperor) in the form of the “imperial subject” (komin, or “loyal subject,” shinmin) in order to spur on modernization and the transition to capitalism. The fact that the Ainu were situated and subjugated as the polar opposite of this imperial subject suggests that the formation of the modern Japanese state and people was from the very outset developed around the axis of racism, that this process also connoted the formation of the imperial world and the annexation of its various neighboring societies. [7]

*   *   *

In this short essay, I want to consider the politics that emerge from within the process of colonial translation by focusing on the role played by Japanese linguistics, in particular through the prism of the relation between Kindaichi Kyosuke (1882-1971), known as the father of linguistic research on the Ainu language, and Chiri Yukie (1903-1922), an Ainu woman who worked as his assistant and passed away at the age of 19 in his residence in Tokyo.
There are three characteristics of the politics that become visible in colonial translation: 1) Colonial enterprise is intrinsic to the institution of the nation-state and in the creation and reinforcement of its ideology. 2) The relation between discrimination and assimilation (difference and identity) which forms the basis of colonial rule, is not an opposition as is generally thought, but rather must be understood as a mutually complementary, complicit relation. 3) Colonial rule does not succeed in perfectly subjugating and subordinating the colonized through assimilation and discrimination, but rather is always and constantly exposed to contradictions, cracks, frictions, and tensions through the enunciations and actions of the colonized.

In order to grasp the first point, we must consider for what purpose the National Language Research Center at Tokyo Imperial University was established. Tsuboi Hideto points out that it was “precisely based on the premise that by investigating and researching peripheral languages, and seeking out their relation to Japanese, their work would connect to the search for an ancient Japanese language, that is, proto-Japanese.”[8] Subsequently, research on ancient Japanese, Korean, Ryukyu, Chinese, and Ainu began in the middle of the Meiji Period under the direction of Ueda Kazutoshi (1867-1937). Kindaichi Kyosuke’s words, in reflecting on his motives for making Ainu the object of his research, confirm this:

Everyone was doing linguistics in relation to Japanese – questions like, what are the origins of Japanese, where in the world were languages spoken which had the same origins as Japanese, where was Japanese spoken before it came to these islands? These questions were shared by all of us. Each one of us took up this question in our own ways, and we had to clarify the relation between Japanese and the other surrounding national languages. So it was clear that someone had to deal with the relationship between Japanese and Ainu…[9]

Thus Japanese linguistics began as a discipline from the overarching goal of starting a study of “national language” through the classification and analysis of the languages of neighboring
societies. This research methodology, whereby Japanese is placed at the center, and Ainu, Ryukyu, Korean, and Chinese are located on its periphery, could only exist on the basis of the premise that these languages reflect the origins of this central language, in other words, the assumption that the traces of proto-Japanese remain in these latter four languages. What this means therefore, is that they objectivized, mobilized, and utilized the neighboring languages in order to affect the beginnings of Japanese as an institution. Kindaichi recalls his excitement upon encountering the oral epic stories of the Ainu, the Yukar:

They had no writing, so it wasn’t in the form of a book, but it was something guarded by the elders, passed down from mouth to mouth up until the present day. It was a thoroughly rare set of materials for someone investigating ancient times…I felt that I was touching on the life of the ancients within the present age, that I was seeing a primeval form of literature before my very eyes.[10]

The notion that the Ainu language retained within it a form of the “ancient past” through its oral tradition would never have emerged without the presumption that (in comparison with Japanese culture), Ainu culture still continued to be “primitive.” In order for Ainu language to become an important research object for linguistics (the study of the “national language (kokugo)”), this presumption of “primitiveness” was essential. The heterogeneously inscribed, fertile history of the Ainu was renarrated as “primitive” and frozen in time. Where Japan’s history was viewed in terms of progress, the Ainu culture of oral tradition was positioned as merely a set of “rare materials” dealing with the ancient past, reduced to the status of a “specimen.” And a specimen, moreover, which could reveal clues to the Japanese past.

This notion of a search for the “origins of the Japanese language” was born from the desire to explain and clarify the cultural origins of the Japanese ethnos, a desire shared on a general level by the statesmen and intellectuals of the Meiji era. This desire itself was generated by the will to ground the Japanese ethnos as a self-identity, a drive which was popularly encouraged by the Meiji state. It was not only a case of linguistics – rather, from the late Meiji era onwards, history, folklore studies, anthropology, archeology, aesthetics, literature and so on all tried to explain the “particular” cultural-historical character of the Japanese people through a search for its “ethnic origins.” It goes without saying that in examining the various nearby societies from this particular perspective, these disciplines were organized through a Japanese ethnocentrism. This problematic is clearly and thoroughly conveyed in the memoirs left behind by Kindaichi on the subject of his encounter with Chiri Yukie and their exchanges. Just when Chiri Yukie was undertaking the task of translating the Yukar into Japanese, Kindaichi’s words are recorded in one of their exchanges as follows:

Because the Ainu live on a far-away island where the light of civilization was delayed in reaching, you are like children born late – there’s nothing embarrassing in the fact that your older brother has run ahead while you are still only crawling. […] I believe that, in addition to the Greek, Roman, Indian, and Finnish epics, the Yukar is one of the world’s five great epic poems. In the distant past there were also narrative storytellers in Japan, and in the same way they too continually recited their tales, but as it was an era when there were not yet phonetic letters, and in which writing instruments and materials were hard to come by, none of these tales were written down in their full forms – O no Yasumaro instead left us mere summaries, and these are the oldest extant classics at present. Anyway, you are all still living through the conditions of this pre-literary era –
personally, I don’t find it regrettable to devote my lifetime to this task, but for you young people it’s different. Despite all this ancient stuff, please go on steadily learning new knowledge and become fine Japanese people who no one can criticize. [11]

Precisely because the Ainu were considered a remnant left behind in a barren wasteland untouched by the light of civilization, they were thought to have retained an archetype of an ancient culture predating written language, as in the form of oral storytellers, who had disappeared from Japan long ago. Thus this logic according to which research into the Ainu constituted a mirror image illuminating the origins of ancient culture (Japanese ethnic-national culture) is stated here as something self-evident. Consequently, the “civilized” Japanese intellectuals unquestioningly believed that their destiny was to make these childlike, immature people of the periphery, who were incapable of self-sufficiency, into an object of research, and at the same time, to extend a helping hand to them so that they might “become fine Japanese people who no one can criticize”: this is precisely the space where we can locate Kindaichi.

Kindaichi’s “sympathy” for the Ainu is well known, but it is inextricably linked to this sense of destiny; in fact, he could possess this sentiment only because he grasped the Ainu from the outset as a “vanishing ethnicity.” Nothing expresses this more clearly than Kindaichi’s comment that the Ainu shinyoshu (Anthology of Ainu Mythology), the slender volume of Yukar that Chiri translated and compiled, was the work of “a young woman who was determined to attempt to transmit and record for eternity a commemoration of the existence of her race.”[12] For him, the Shinyoshu signified the tombstone of an ethnicity on the verge of extinction, a last will and testament.

His contemporary, the ethnographer Torii Ryuzo (1870-1953) approached his interest in the study of the Ainu, Ryukyuan, Korean, and Indo-Chinese from the same vantage point. It is well known that when Torii investigated Northern Sakhalin and the Amur River Basin, he constantly compared the customs of the Stone Age within the Japanese islands to those of the Ainu, and emphasized their similarity. According to Tessa Morris-Suzuki, while Torii paid great respect to various aspects of the cultures of these indigenous peoples, in particular to the beauty of their traditional woodcraft and embroidery, he simultaneously considered them to be “peoples that are naturally destined to vanish.”[13] Precisely because Torii believed that the Ainu retained the traces of the primitive past of Japan’s Stone Age, he paid respect to their vanishing culture, becoming interested in them as an object of investigation.

What I want to emphasize and ask here is: what were the ideological conditions that gave rise to this view of the Ainu held by Kindaichi, Torii and their colleagues? As briefly explained above, we can consider two conditions here. First and foremost, during the 1880s-90s at the dawn of modern Japanese anthropology and linguistics, the discourse of the Japanese as an independent “ethnic group” or “race” was continually propagated. Similar to the notion of a unique language and culture. This ideology saw the unbroken line of the Imperial family in the same light as that which ensured the historical continuity of homogeneous language and culture (this was referred to as the theory of the national polity [kokutai], and Japanese ethnocentrism was formed on this theoretical basis). Secondly, driven by Social Darwinism (“the survival of the fittest”), there was an increasingly widespread belief around the same time that history was the unilinear and incessant movement of progress. Kindaichi and Torii were well aware of the actually occurring plunder of the Ainu at the time (the expropriation of the right to livelihood, as exemplified by fishing and hunting rights, affected through the policies associated with the opening of the
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frontier that I mentioned earlier). They chose to frame this as the inevitable outcome of “nature” or “destiny”, holding that the only path available for the Ainu was assimilation (“becoming a fine Japanese”). In other words, Kindaichi and the leading historians, anthropologists and linguists of the time continued to repeat this patently contradictory mantra according to which the Ainu could only continue to live precisely by their own total negation – becoming one part of the Japanese ethnos or national body – without feeling the slightest ethical misgiving. In fact, the “sympathy” shown by Kindaichi towards Chiri Yukie should be understood as the product of a colonial relation of power utterly lacking any consideration of alterity.

If these intellectuals believed that Ainu’s “survival” depended on the complete eradication of their culture, it comes as no surprise that they saw the need to record Ainu culture at the moment of its rapid extinction not because they were concerned with the actual causes of Ainu’s tribulations but because they wished to uncover a “primordial” cultural form that might offer clues to the cultural origins of the Japanese ethnos. It is precisely here that we can see how colonial enterprise is intrinsic to both the self-formation of the nation-state and its reinforcement. The study of the other was purported to serve the purpose of discovering oneself. Or the interest in Ainu culture was based on the lack of interest in their actual/historical conditions. This very paradox – a deep structure of colonial epistemology shared by many colonial powers, as Michel de Certeau points out in The Writing of History, explains why people such as Kindaichi and Torii unconditionally accepted the discourse of the “peripheral ethnicities destined to vanish” despite their close relations with the Ainu.

On the second point: how did this mode of recognition of “difference and identity” function within Japanese colonial policy on the level of the creation and implementation of colonial relations of power? Here the fact that Kindaichi constantly emphasized that Chiri Yukie had a working knowledge of two languages, in other words, that she was bilingual, has a crucial significance. Kindaichi praised her command of the “national language” (Japanese) as so perfect that “even a local aristocratic lady could not measure up,” and noted that her Ainu language, learned by conversing with and listening to her grandmother recite the Yukar, was exceptional, superior even to Ainu adults.[14]

This bilingualism, the object of endless praise from Kindaichi, was of course a by-product of the colonial policy of assimilationist education pursued by the Japanese government.[15] In 1899, the year of the enactment of the “Laws for the Protection of Former Natives,” the percentage of Ainu children attending school was 22.5%, while in 1909, the year Chiri Yukie entered elementary school it had risen to 89.8% and in 1915 to 95.9%.[16] From these statistics, we can see that the saturation of Japanese-language education took place with frightening speed: without this type of colonial policy, Kindaichi’s research into the Ainu language could not have existed. To put it another way, the system of knowledge in linguistics produced by Kindaichi was deeply connected to the process through which the Japanese state assimilated the Ainu.
The collaboration which Kindaichi so eagerly sought in his relations with Chiri Yukie has to be understood within this context. The organizing principle of their relationship for Kindaichi was the division of labor between object and subject, between the native informant as object of research and the researcher who analyzes her. Since it was “destined to vanish,” the role expected of the Ainu object was to record and preserve her culture “just as it was,” and therefore to “faithfully” visualize (alphabetize) her own statements, enunciations, and oral traditions. It was Kindaichi’s role to provide these with an ethnographic interpretation. This relation of knowledge production in which the Ainu is the supplier of “raw data” while Kindaichi gives “meaning” to this data thus exactly reflects the power relations between the colonizer and the colonized. The Ainu can never become the subject of the interpretive act; rather it is the self-appointed Japanese guardian or leader who provides the interpretation in their place. Thus the world of meaning is appropriated from the Ainu, and they are dispossessed of their enunciative subjectivity. Perhaps we can define assimilation as the attempt to control the other’s world of meaning. Linguists and ethnographers attached a crucial significance to the fact that Chiri was conversant in her native language and possessed sufficient ability in the “national language” to faithfully translate it insofar as she performed her bilingualism within the limits of the colonial relations of power. (Kindaichi did not encourage Chiri to compile the Ainu shinyoshu with a hope that the work would raise a fundamental question about Japanese colonial policies or urge the government or scholars towards a deeper sense of reflection. Rather, the Ainu shinyoshu was nothing more than a “commemorative” monument for the preservation of the “vanishing” Ainu culture, a set of “materials” through which the cultural origins of the Japanese ethnos might be understood)

At this point we need to further consider the question of what exactly assimilation is. As Frantz Fanon and Albert Memmi have pointed out, assimilation does not at all signify the attribution to
the colonized of the same civil rights that the colonizer possesses, nor does it mean to be respected as an equal human being. However much the colonized attempts to assimilate (the attempt to acquire the language, culture, and knowledge of the colonizer), in the end he/she is merely seen as a skilled “mimic,” but is never treated as an equal human being. At the same time as the colonized is transformed into a member of society, he/she remains an “other” eternally inscribed with this heterogeneity.

Through assimilation, the Ainu were given the position of loyal subjects (shinmin) of the Japanese empire, but were never permitted to become truly “authentic Japanese.” The Ainu of Hokkaido were included into the family register system as “former natives,” and although they held Japanese citizenship, attended Japanese schools and were subject to taxation and the draft, but prior to Japan’s defeat in the Pacific War, they were not guaranteed equal civil rights, such as the right to vote or the right to participate in government. The Ainu of the Sakhalin islands were referred to as “Sakhalin natives” (the fact that the term “former” is not used here reflects the judgment that they were considered even more “backward” and “uncivilized” than the Ainu of Hokkaido): just like those in Hokkaido, these Ainu were given Japanese names, and spoke Japanese, but were not included in the family register; rather they were entered into a “Native Name Register” (dojin meibo). Further, since Sakhalin Ainu were not under the protection of Japanese criminal or civil law, not only were their rights to acquire property or administer a business not recognized, they possessed no representation in the Diet. In other words, assimilation indicates the operation by which the “heterogeneous other” is subordinated and is at the same time integrated under the sovereignty of the empire. It was precisely this seemingly contradictory mechanism of discrimination and integration that formed the nucleus of the colonial policy of the Japanese empire. Etienne Balibar argues that the modern state requires the nation-form in order to successfully facilitate the capitalist system. The form is made up on the one hand of patriotism, the principle of equality which inspires the spontaneous participation of the people, and on the other hand it rests on the principle of discrimination on the basis of gender, race, and class, which legitimizes and justifies difference as something natural. This double principle of the nation form is the essential condition for the state’s management of capitalism because a creation of patriotic sentiments of common destiny and spontaneous participation inspired by the sentiments help neutralize or dissipate potential antagonisms emanating from fundamental inequalities such as division of labor and the wage differential necessary for profit-making. In the same way, we can say that the imperial state, which requires the loyal subject in order to profit from exploitation and expropriation, depends on this double principle for its survival: on the one hand, the loyalty of the subject to the empire (being Japanese) engendered through assimilation, and on the other, political and economic discrimination based on ethnocentrism (not being fully Japanese).

It is by no means an accident that this double principle exists in a disquieting imbrication with the structure of the linguistic doubling, or bilingualism of Ainu people such as Chiri Yukie (difference and identity, in other words, the heterogeneity or primitiveness of the Ainu and their assimilation or belonging to the Japanese empire). Why is there such a crucial significance to this operation by which the Ainu replaced their “primitiveness” with the language of the Japanese, this “national language,” by their own actions? It is precisely because it was this process of translation which verified and substantiated the fact that the Ainu were a “different” ethnos and at the same time belonged to the Japanese empire. In fact, without this effect of making difference and identity something substantialized, the Ainu shinyoshu would not have been
conceived of by Kindaichi. In other words, without the premise of the Ainu language’s primitiveness, its subordination to and eventual destiny to be replaced by Japanese, the “national language,” it would not have been compiled in the first place.

Ainu language was therefore enclosed within the Japanese empire, and yet continued to be its outside. Ainu thus bore the sign of an exteriority within the interior. The empire configures its own continuity through the production, maintenance, and mobilization of precisely this type of exteriority. While the Ainu people were seen as the origin of the Japanese ethnos as a result of their “primitiveness,” and thus as the interior of the empire, they were constantly made the object of discrimination as something eternally different (an inferior race). The Japanese empire cleverly utilized these policies of assimilation and discrimination, ensuring the flourishing of its capitalist development by dispossessing the Ainu of the land and water that had been the basis of their livelihood, and silencing their voices of resistance by denying them civil rights.

On the third point: during the preparation of the *Ainu shin’yoshu*, it seems that Chiri Yukie made the point to Kindaichi that there was something like an Ainu “voice” that could not be expressed in any written forms in any language. Tsuboi Hideto refers to this as Chiri’s “modest resistance.”[19] Leaving aside the question of whether Chiri consciously attempted to resist, this example exactly demonstrates that the lived history of the Ainu and the narratives that transmitted it always held something unrepresentable, something that could not be assimilated to the institution of language, through the hegemonic linguistic system, the “national language” (Japanese). We might say that it shows us that assimilation policy and the politics of colonial translation sustaining it does not simply end with the relation of unilateral domination.

It is true, as Fanon brilliantly outlines in *Black Skin, White Masks*, that the inferiority complex implanted within the interior of the colonized through a socially, institutionally, and educationally formulated system of discrimination plays an essential supporting role for colonial rule. The Ainu people were also made to internalize the racial discrimination forced on them by the Japanese, gradually accepting this negative self-image as an irrefutable truth. In 1913, one of the Ainu from Sakhalin, Yamabe Yasunosuke stated, “Somehow, someway, I really want to quickly make those poor Ainu children into good imperial subjects, just like the average Japanese.” In 1917, Takekuma Tokusaburo, also from Sakhalin, recorded that it “is my long-cherished desire for the Ainu to assimilate to the Japanese (wajin) and become fine citizens of the Japanese nation (nihonjin).”[20] Here again we can see that assimilation and discrimination are not an oppositional relation, but rather function in a mutually complementary fashion. The desire for assimilation was here spurred on precisely by the sense of anxiety or despair at the fact that they could never attain the ideal of becoming Wajin (the perfect, true Japanese).

Yet, Chiri Yukie held her own position in her refusal to submit to this ideal of becoming *Wajin* despite being tormented and perturbed by her racial inferiority complex and its horrific psychological violence. When Kindaichi’s friend Okamoto Chiaki, who wanted to include an advertisement for the *ShinÅšÅ«shô* in the magazine *Jogaku sekai* solicited a contribution and photograph from Chiri, Chiri hesitated to have her picture taken (in fact, it was Kindaichi who wrote this “contribution”). Noticing Okamoto’s puzzled responses to her reluctance, Chiri speculated that Okamoto saw it as stemming from “an anxiety along the lines of “If I remain silent about my Ainu origin, nobody would notice who I am, but, contributing to magazines like *Jogaku sekai* (Women’s World) I would expose and thus denigrate myself, and I wouldn’t like that.”[21] Chiri went on to write as follows:
To think that way seemed a bit strange to me. I’m Ainu. Completely Ainu. What part of me is supposed to be shisamu (wajin; Japanese)?! Wouldn’t I still be Ainu whether or not I called myself shisamu? The idea of becoming shisamu just through that kind of lip-service is ridiculous. Who cares about becoming shisamu? I’m Ainu, so doesn’t that make me another human being? I’m still a human being just like them. I’m happy being Ainu. […] Because I’m Ainu, I’m looked down upon, but it’s still fine. If my utari (compatriots) were looked down upon but I wasn’t, what kind of a situation would that be? I’d rather that I was looked down upon together with my utari. [22]

Chiri’s sensitivities about Okamoto’s gaze and her adamant assertions and defense of her Ainu identity indicate the degree to which the abject subject of the “inferior Ainu” deeply impinged on Chiri’s consciousness. Nonetheless, Chiri refused to embrace this “destiny” to vanish assumed by Yamabe and Takekuma, and hoped for the possibility to save the Ainu from this “destiny.” When she states, “I’m still a human being just like them. I’m happy being Ainu,” we can clearly see the affirmative meaning she gave to Ainu identity in her determined declaration to share the fate of her compatriots.

Chiri Yukie’s avowal that “there is something like an Ainu ‘voice’ that can not be expressed in any written forms in any language” needs to be understood in relation to this positionality. And the fact that she produced such a high level Japanese translation of the Yukar, one that effortlessly crosses the linguistic boundaries of Ainu, Japanese, and the Roman script, demonstrates not only her mastery of the dominant language, but also perhaps shows her determination to safeguard the inassimilable otherness of the voices of the Ainu themselves. This extraordinary achievement by Chiri would not have been possible without her acting out what Fanon called “mimicry,” the attempt of the colonized to behave in perfect synchrony with assimilation. It is a tragic irony of colonialism that the voices of the colonized were “savable” only through the mediation of the colonizers’ language, an impeccable mimicry. [23]

In the Ainu shinyoshu, Chiri Yukie never clearly explained what she intended by expressing the Ainu language in the Roman script, then placing her Japanese translation of the text in parallel, that is, in opposition to it, but Sato-Rossberg Nana argues that Chiri Yukie produced a superlative and unprecedented Japanese translation, one that uses a variety of devices to effectively convey the rhythmic movement and vitality of its retelling and performance of the Yukar.[24] This translation, which places its emphasis on the performative aspect, allows us to recall the fact that the Yukar is an orally narrated story configured around the narrator’s improvisation and creativity. In this sense, it is not a “tradition of thousands of years” safeguarded through recitation, but a form of art continually emerging anew in the here and now. Further, Chiri successfully re-introduces the voices of the Ainu by utilizing the Roman script in place of the Japanese katakana, which had previously been used to express Ainu phonetics. In particular, Chiri’s annotations in the Roman alphabet differed from the previously standard system of John Bachelor, the English missionary and researcher of Ainu culture, in that they came to be regarded by linguists as closer to the phonetics of the Ainu language itself. A good example is the term Yukara – in Bachelor’s system this ends in a vowel, while Chiri renders it “yukar,” ending in a consonant. Today this has become common knowledge, but at the time it seems to have been a groundbreaking innovation. [25] In any case, this new method of translation and transcription expressed a certain rhythmic movement of the Ainu voice, a voice that cannot be entirely captured in writing, and thus this method itself can be viewed as a trace of
Chiri’s desperate struggle to seek out the possibilities of Ainu survival, a task she regarded increasingly as unattainable.

I think the fact that Chiri re-introduced the voices of the Ainu by choosing to notate the Ainu language in the Roman script bears some important implications. In particular, if we consider the variant meanings ascribed to the Roman alphabet in modern Japan, we can see the topology of Chiri’s annotations. For example, Kindaichi’s friend, the poet Ishikawa Takuboku (1886-1912), considered the Roman alphabet to be a method of representation for the direct exposure of human interiority and desire, while Kindaichi’s teacher, who guided him into the study of the Ainu language, Ueda Kazutoshi, argued that, in aiming to build a new civilized nation, Japan ought to use the Roman alphabet, since learning Chinese characters was a massive waste of time and energy. Whatever the case may be, we cannot merely grasp the attention paid at the beginning of the Meiji period to the Roman script as a new method of transcription as a form of Eurocentrism or its adoption. By using the Roman script, an “ambiguous” system of annotation, Chiri attempted as best she could to restore the rhythmic movement of the voices of the Ainu, to communicate something that could never be represented within the existing linguistic systems (the hiragana and katakana syllabaries, as well as Chinese characters). In other words, the Roman script was used here to liberate the voices of the Ainu from the yoke of the institutionalized and dominant language. Chiri’s creativity, which amazed Kindaichi and his friends, precisely indicates that, far from being a mere informant, she was an enunciative, interpretative subject in her own right. Chiri’s mimicry and act of translation suggested a possibility of dislocating, upsetting, even threatening the colonizer’s putative superiority and racism that supported it by appropriating the colonizer’s language and creating new semantic horizons. [26] Thus the division of labor that I previously mentioned, the relation of subject and object (analyzer and analyzed) between Kindaichi and Chiri, was something far more unstable and volatile than is generally thought.

Representation of Chiri Yukie’s “Fox’s Song”
The complex relations of power that emerge from this process of translational mimicry warn us against any simplistic schematics of Kindaichi as oppressor and Chiri as victim or resister. In fact, Chiri harbored great affection, gratitude, and respect for Kindaichi, while he never ceased praising her character, ability, and creativity (of course, as I have already argued, we can never consider this affective level of relationality as separate from colonial relations of power).

Further, their collaborative work continued without a clear self-awareness of the latent discordance and incongruity between the differing goals each may have had in their transcribing, translating and editing of the Shinyoshu (later the linguist Chiri Mashiho, Chiri Yukie’s brother and Kindaichi’s disciple, would confront this problem)[27]. For instance, it seems that Chiri fully accepted Kindaichi’s understanding of the meaning of the Yukar. In 1922, as soon as she arrived in Tokyo to live with the Kindaichis, she asked herself why she would sit down at a desk every day and pursue this translation work, writing in her diary as follows:

Jotting down letters in blue ink on the white page that look like the tracks of earthworms as they crawl...that’s it. What will just doing this lead to? For me, for my ancestors, and....In order to share reference materials with my teacher who continues to research our language (akoroitaku) and the precious work he’s doing in line with it, for the sake of learning, for the nation of Japan, for all the nations of the world....what an immense task. I have to wrench these things from out of this little head and into my brush...just doing this much – I have to write, as much as I know, as much as my life can bear, I have to write – this glittering morning – this green morning.[28]

Here in discussing her goals, she states that the translation is for herself, the Ainu, Japan, the world, and Kindaichi, and seems to see no contradiction or difficulty in reconciling these with each other. We can certainly glimpse the optimism and strength of her spirit in this declaration of intent to expend all the energy in her “little” self on this immense task. But in a poem written just before her death, this somewhat naïve optimism has completely vanished to be replaced by tragedy and despair:

In the evening moon
When the leaves show their pale undersides in the autumn wind
The leaves at night
And the flickering lamps
The lizards awed by its beauty
At last forget the ugliness of their bodies
And crawl into the light
Burning to death in the flame
I saw them leave behind
These ugly carcasses.
We Ainu women
Are exactly like
The lizards of Tokyo.
Those who can do nothing
Will remain
Stuck in a dark place
In the corner of the world.
Like the lizards
Bewitched by the beauty and splendor
Of the light of the world,
Whose white underbellies are showing
And who leave behind their ugly carcasses
The Ainu
Are vanishing.[29]

Chiri’s conception here of the Ainu, whose spirits were bewitched by the dazzling light of civilization, only to be destined to be burned to death by this light, leaving behind their unsightly and hideous corpses, is diametrically opposed to the optimistic sentiments expressed in the previous quotation. Although in the previously quoted passage she saw no contradiction in translating for the survival of the Ainu and participating in the light of Japanese, and indeed world civilization, here she comes to understand that it is precisely this lure and power of civilization that is destroying the Ainu. For the Ainu, civilization does not mean salvation or a promised future, but rather it leads to death and extinction, in other words, a place where a tombstone awaits them. It seems that Chiri, in approaching death at the age of 19 in the land of modern civilization, this foreign land of Tokyo, opened her eyes to the violence and destructive force of civilization experienced by the Ainu, and for the first time, came to accept an understanding of the Ainu as an “ethnicity destined to vanish.” Further there is significance in the fact that she came to understand herself as an Ainu woman. Although she does not elaborate, she must have come to consciousness of herself as an Ainu woman while feeling the (discriminatory) gaze of the Japanese (wajin) in this metropolis of Tokyo where she spent the last four months of her life (she records in her diary that after coming to Tokyo, she is tormented by her “ugly” body). Whatever the case may be, the “ugliness of the body” that Chiri spoke of is perhaps a figure of speech directed also at herself, not merely as “Ainu” but also as “woman,” an expression of the alienation, loneliness, and despair she felt at the rejection and negation of her body and spirit by the force of “civilization.” She passed away a mere four months after arriving in Tokyo. Approximately one year later, the Ainu shinyoshu was published, in which she was introduced not as the “translator,” but as the “editor,” once again erasing Chiri as interpretive, enunciative subject from the face of the world and consigning her to oblivion.

As we have seen above, when we turn our eyes to Chiri’s translation of the Ainu “voice,” a transversal crossing of the boundaries of several linguistic systems, with all the allegories and indeterminacies of meaning produced by it, we come to understand the politics of translation not simply as the one-sided exercise of power on the part of the dominant order, but as a subtly unfolding process of negotiation within the relationality between the dominant and the dominated. In other words, although Chiri was frightened and alarmed in the face of the subordination and the threat of extinction visited upon the Ainu by Japanese assimilation policies, she simultaneously opened up a path through which the Ainu could go on living, by translating their voices into both the dominant language (Japanese) and the Roman script. She did this not to preserve Ainu epic stories as a set of “materials” for academic research, a “commemorative” tombstone of a vanishing ethnicity, or a body of “primitive literature” of a people left behind by civilization, but as an attempt to continue the narration of a living language and society. In the violently contradictory and ruptured feelings she expresses in the preface to the Ainu shinyoshu – self-respect and inferiority, hope and despair, resistance and submission – we can hear Chiri’s cries, her plaintive wish for the survival of the Ainu:

The forms of nature of the ancient times faded into the shadows before we knew it, and the whereabouts of the many peoples who used to live joyously on the plains are also
unknown. The small number of us in our tribe who remain can only watch the world as it moves onwards with an astonished and overwhelmed gaze. But we have lost the beautiful and radiant spirit of the ancient people whose eyes were governed by their religious sentiments as they took in every action, every movement, and now full of anxiety, we burn with distress, growing ever more dull and unable to see with discernment – now we can only depend on the compassion of the outside, oh, the wretched forms of those who are vanishing….This is what we are known as now – vanishing – what a sorrowful name we have come to possess.

Our blessed ancestors of long ago could scarcely have imagined that their native land would end up in such a miserable state. Time constantly flows and the world ceaselessly moves forward. Perhaps the day will come when, even among us, who now face the shame of defeat in this fierce realm of competition, two or three strong ones among our number might emerge, capable of walking in step with the world as it progresses forward. This is our ardent wish, what we pray for continually, day in and day out.

And yet, perhaps the many languages, the old sayings and tales that our dearly loved ancestors used with each other to ascribe meaning to the rhythms of their daily life may disappear along with the timid, vanishing, and weak among us. Oh, this is the most heartbreaking anguish we face. [30]

The politics of colonial translation was incapable of completely taming the voices of the colonized Ainu. The proof of this lies in Chiri’s voice, full of irreconcilable thoughts and feelings, her prayers and outcries, an essential site of materiality where no power can claim a total interpellation. [31]

To reclaim and listen carefully to these voices, long ago consigned to oblivion by modern historiography and literature, is to come face-to-face with the fact that the systems of knowledge gathered and centered on the nation-state were deeply complicit with the legitimation and institutionalization of the violence of the imperial state and its capitalist enterprise. This requires us to reconsider the process through which the oppressed are forced to live the “state of exception” (the violence of discrimination, assimilation, expropriation, and subjugation) as “normality.” [32] But above all else, these voices alert us to the fact that the situation in which the “state of exception” operates as “normality” is by no means merely something in the past, but rather is an ongoing and continual reality of our “here and now,” a reality that will exist as long as the institution of the nation-state itself, and the relentless capitalist expansion that accompanies it, continues to shape and dictate the possibilities of our imagination and praxis. Whether Chiri Yukie’s voice will be a mere tombstone which continues its eternal silence or a living voice is a question that will be determined by how we choose to face the past and the future.

Notes

This article is based on comments in Japanese prepared in response to Tsuboi Hideto’s presentation “Mizukara no koe o honyaku suru” for the workshop Gurobarizeshon to imin (Globalization and Migration), held at Cornell University in 2007. Gavin Walker translated the original version of this text which has been expanded and substantially revised for The Asia-Pacific Journal. I wish to thank Tom Lamarre, Tessa Morris-Suzuki, and Mark Selden for their valuable comments on the earlier versions of the article. My thanks also go to Gavin Walker who
translated the original version of the article which has been expanded and substantially revised for The Asia-Pacific Journal. Walker is a Ph.D. candidate in East Asian Literature at Cornell University. His article, “The Double Scission of Mishima Yukio: Limits and Anxieties in the Autofictional Machine,” is forthcoming in positions: east asia cultures critique.

[1] The difference in use of the terms “wajin” and “Nihonjin” from the Meiji to the Taisho periods is a crucial point. While “wajin” was meant to connote the pure ethnicity of the people living in this archipelago from the Yamato period (300-550 CE) onwards, the term “Nihonjin” (“Japanese” in contemporary language), was used for any single citizen of the Japanese empire, and therefore indicated membership. At the base of this differentiation is the assumption that while the Ainu or the Ryukyu people could become “Japanese” through the process of assimilation, they could never become “wajin.” Clearly, Ainu themselves came to use wajin as a way to distinguish themselves from people on the archipelago in the process of assimilationist policies. Chiri, Yamabe and Takekuma all used this term to mean “authentic Japanese ethnos” as opposed to “Japanized” Ainu.


[4] Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” in Language, Counter-Memory and Practice (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), 142. My addition in brackets. Foucault goes on to argue that “if the genealogist refuses to extend his faith in metaphysics, if he listens to history, he finds that there is something altogether different behind things: not a timeless and essential secret, but the secret that they have no essence or that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms.” My critique of history based on the conceptions of ethnicity and progress is aimed precisely at this kind of metaphysical assumption of essence and timelessness. And I believe that the perspective of colonial translation is an important corrective to historicism and ethnocentrism because of its ability to unpack historical processes in their singularity, heterogeneity, and contingency.

[5] Deleuze and Guattari use the term “deterritorialization” to explain the process by which the right to utilize a certain piece of land is revoked, and the land itself expropriated from those who previously used it for their own livelihood. They use “reterritorialization” to indicate the reordering of the multiplicity of place and territoriarity into a unitary space, the process by which the heterogeneous inscription in the land is translated into a homogenized, geometric space. In the context of colonialism, “deterritorialization” is the process of the violent seizure from its indigenous people of the means of production (land and the forms of life based on it) necessary for their existence, while “reterritorialization” is the reintegration of these means, now transformed into the means of capitalist production, into a homogeneous, geometric territoriality. What I refer to in this article as “colonial translation” indicates this total process. See Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Mille plateaux (Paris: Gallimard, 1980); A Thousand Plateaus, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988).


[7] The history of Japan’s early colonies such as Okinawa also attests to the point here.


[15] This bilingualism should be distinguished from that which Ainu had gained long before the Meiji period in order to trade with the “Wajin.” The former was a by-product of colonial policy of monolingualism that forced Ainu to renounce their language and adopt Japanese as their own.


[23] Of course, this is not necessarily the case for other colonial societies. Neither did the people of the Dutch East Indies lose their languages to the Dutch, nor did the Koreans or the Taiwanese lose theirs under Japanese colonialism. It would be important to point out that one important dimension for the elimination of language is that it often took place in societies whose linguistic system was grounded in oral transmission. The question of the size of the colonized and colonizer populations is also a factor.


[26] Yukie’s reminder that Yukar was an improvisational art form suggests that storytelling was understood by Ainu people not primarily as an act of reciting/recording but of creating/writing. In this regard, the conventional wisdom that Yukie’s contribution in Ainu shinyoshu was to
record the vanishing Ainu language needs to be reconsidered: she was an author of the stories in the volume.

[27] Chiri Mashiho (1909-1961), a younger brother of Yukie, was a linguist trained at the Imperial University of Tokyo. He taught at the University of Hokkaido while conducting extensive research on Ainu language and culture. He remained critical of his mentor Kindaichi’s scholarship about Yukar and Ainu language throughout his life.


[31] After having been neglected for years, Chiri’s Ainu shinyoshu was republished by a major publisher, Iwanami, in 2001. There is clearly a marked resurgence in serious scholarly interest in Ainu history in Japan and elsewhere in recent years. This seems to correspond to the rising tide of postcolonial studies in the global scene in the last few decades or so. It is yet to be seen whether this renewed interest in Ainu history could be an important momentum for rethinking the very conditions of modernity.

“Victims of Japanese Imperial Discourse: Korean Literature Under Colonial Rule”
PARK Yuha, trans. Gavin Walker, ed. Melissa Wender
October 16, 2008
http://japanfocus.org/-Park-Yuha/2923

In contrast to the previous article, in which Hirano upholds Ainu Chiri Yukie as an example of a colonized subject who established an ethnic pride in her Ainu identity, Park’s article examines the other side of the colonial coin by focusing on the notion of self-assimilation in “pro-Japanese literature” (shin’ichi bungaku in Japanese, chin’il munhak in Korean). Such writing was written in either the Korean or Japanese language by Koreans who portrayed Japanese colonial rule in positive terms. Park argues for a re-evaluation of this literature which is “often taken as nothing more than an explicitly state-approved literature;” the writings can provide insights into the thinking of Korean colonial subjects of the time. He claims that “in fact, no writing more effectively expresses the confusion of Koreans during the late 1930s to mid-1940s, when the pressure to become ‘Japanese’ took place under the banner of ‘Japan and Korea as one body’ (naisen ittai).”

Park analyzes the work of several Korean writers to show various experiences of Japanese rule and provides several interpretations of what “becoming Japanese” meant. His study of Yi Kwang-su first defines becoming Japanese as a physical and mental process in which the body becomes regimented and orderly. Instead of viewing assimilation as a process that was forced from the top-down, Park uses Yi to examine colonial subjects who willingly participated in assimilation, and became Japanese by changing their daily routines, bowing in the direction of the imperial palace, and speaking Japanese. In Yi Kwang-su’s writings, the imitation of everyday life and customs of the Japanese was a “world of discipline modulating everyday behavior;” everything from how one dined to how one sat could bring an individual closer or farther away from becoming Japanese. To become Japanese was “loyalty manifested through ritual,” so every morning repeatedly bowing while facing toward the imperial place (kyūjō yōhai)—a practice that many Japanese themselves adhered to in their affirmation as Japanese subjects—could make one Japanese. Park next discusses writer Sō Jōng-ju, whose work demonstrates the idea that eventually one could become Japanese—as Park terms it—through the “renunciation of individuality and subjectivity, and placing the nation state as [the] pinnacle.” In other words, the final step in the renunciation of self was becoming a soldier and dying for the emperor.

Park also examines pro-Japanese literature to uncover the gender implications in the process of becoming Japanese. Korean women could only express themselves as Japanese by supporting men going off to war. Korean women were therefore often characterized as hindrances to men becoming Japanese if they hesitated when sending their sons off to the military. The model for Korean women was to become more like Japanese women who purportedly could stoically send their sons and husbands to war without shedding a tear. Park contends that many Korean men fought in the military in part to become Japanese and to differentiate themselves from and assert their superiority over Korean women. By serving in the Japanese army—a privilege open only to men—Korean men simultaneously became Japanese and found a sense of empowerment in a society that had previously emasculated them as non-Japanese. Thus, Park sees the subordination of Korean women in colonial society as the result of actions by Korean men as well as of Japanese policies.
Victims of Japanese Imperial Discourse: Korean Literature Under Colonial Rule

Park Yuha

Translated by Gavin Walker

Edited by Melissa Wender

It is by now commonplace to observe that Japanese imperial ideology, or tennōsei, whose roots can be traced to the Meiji state, subjugated individuals in the name of the progress of the nation-state. [1] One element of tennōsei, as is also now well known, was the notion of kokutai, literally “the national body,” the idea of Japan as functioning as an organic, even human, body. What has been examined less frequently, however, is the character of the oppression faced by residents of Japan’s colonies, particularly Korea. The Japanese empire not only took over the governance of the Korean peninsula but obliterated the very bodies of Korean imperial subjects by subsuming them into the larger body of the empire. Or, I would argue, this is how we should understand the catchphrase naisen ittai, or Japan and Korea as one body.

While the catchphrase naisen ittai might seem to suggest that Koreans were accepted as being Japanese in their very bodies, in fact, it required considerable effort on the part of Korean colonial subjects to acquire a national identity as “Japanese.” For example, evidence suggests that many volunteer soldiers believed that it was only through death that they could finally prove to themselves and others that they had become Japanese. Near the end of the colonial era in Korea, the notion that Japanese national identity was neither a given nor a unitary experience became widespread. Interestingly, we can find clearest evidence of this fact within the body of so-called pro-Japanese literature (shin’nichi bungaku, chin’il munhak). Indeed, pro-Japanese literature itself can be understood as part and parcel of such efforts to acquire “Japanese” national identity, speaking as it does of the stories of individual people under the spell of Japanese imperial ideology.

However, these texts have been largely ignored until recently, mostly for ideological reasons. Their importance for gauging the effects of the ideology of the Japanese empire is unparalleled, since despite the fact that the colonial era in Korea lasted for 40 years, there are few other works of Korean literature of the colonial period that contain “true to life” depictions of Japanese people and Koreans’ everyday interactions with them. If we consider that even before annexation there were many Japanese migrants to the Korean peninsula, the period during which Koreans could actually observe Japanese up close lasted for more than 50 years. [2] Given both this fact and that imperial discourse insisted that Korean people become Japanese, one would expect there to be works contemplating just what it meant to be Japanese. However, for the most part modern Korean writers did not include Japanese characters in their texts. When they do appear, for example in what is known as “resistance literature” (teikō bungaku), they generally emerge only in stereotype. In this sense, perhaps we might say that in Korean literature of this time, Japan appears only as a shadow. So, although colonialism meant that most Koreans had direct contact with Japan, Japanese, and Japaneseness, ironically Japanese people rarely appear as an object of direct representation.

Even after independence, when there was no need for Korean authors to fear censorship, and Japan could be freely depicted, Japanese generally appeared only in the stereotypical form of an “evil” aggressor. Cho Chŏng-nae’s 12 volume serial novel Arirang (Arirang), published in the
1990s, is representative of this tendency: It portrays the Japanese of the colonial period as invariably cunning and violent, cruel and lewd. [3] Much the same is true of Kim Chin-myŏng’s Mugunghwa kkoch’i p’ŏssŭmnida (The Rose of Sharon Bloomed, 1993), which sold millions of copies on the strength of this image of Korea as beautiful and good in contrast to “evil Japan.” This image of the cruel ruler was the easiest — and most politically correct — means of depicting Japanese for Koreans in the 1990s.

Thus it is that although they afford us only the barest glimpse of the everyday life of Japanese and Koreans living in the colony, the texts of so-called pro-Japanese literature, they are invaluable. These works are often taken as nothing more than an explicitly state-approved literature, but in fact, no writing more effectively expresses the confusion of Koreans during the late 1930s to mid-1940s, when the pressure to become “Japanese” took place under the banner of “Japan and Korea as one body” (naisen ittai). For example, full-blown imperialization policies (kōminka seisaku) such as forced name changes from Korean to Japanese (sōshi kaimei) or “worshiping the Imperial Palace from afar” (kyūjō yōhai) were required rituals for becoming “Japanese.” Because these policies affected all Koreans, in contrast to the expropriation of land or labor-power, they constituted the first form of directly experienced Japanese rule for most people. This body of “pro-Japanese” literature effectively enables us to reflect upon how people experienced this immediate connection to policies of control.

1. Japan as Ordering Mechanism

Although he is known for his significant contributions to early modern Korean literature, Yi Kwang-su has been treated dismissively as a representative pro-Japanese writer. In his novel Their Love (Kŭ tŭl ŭi sarang; Karera no ai), Yi portrays the feelings of a Korean student living in a Japanese household for Japan as follows:

What Wŏn-gu was most strongly struck by was that the Nishimoto family went to bed and woke up at the same times every day. Even though there wasn’t an alarm that would go off, it was as if everyone in the house heard a bell inside themselves saying, “go to sleep” and “wake up.” It seemed like it was the chimes of the old clock on the second floor in the Professor’s study that let the house move forward from moment to moment. Wake up at 6:00 am, go to bed at 10:00 pm, breakfast at 7:00 am, lunch exactly at noon, be at the table for dinner at 6:00 pm. [4]

For the Korean student, the everyday life of the Japanese is more than anything understood as a type of “ordering mechanism,” marking the sensation of the passage of time from moment to moment. He is “strongly struck by” this well-regulated life in which the “sound of the chimes” “let the house move forward from moment to moment.” The student protagonist soon becomes accustomed to and trusts in this lifestyle, while the author, Yi Kwang-su, was in his non-fiction writings promoting a Japanese style of living: “We must work vigorously towards the goal of reconstructing ourselves in our everyday lives as imperial subjects. The new spiritual system will only come to be completed in as much as it manifests itself in everyday life”. [5]

For Yi, it was through the imitation of “everyday life” that Koreans would be able to effect a “reconstruction [of themselves] as imperial subjects” (kōminkateki kaizō). What he meant by everyday life or the Japanese style of living was, for example, that adults and children should not eat “separately,” but rather “the entire family should gather around the table with correct
manner” and “should sit correctly [Japanese-style] to the extent possible.” One ought to “keep one’s back straight,” “children should remain silent,” and meals should be treated as “important events and at the same time as rituals.” Yi remarks that “at meal times, it is the Japanese spirit to first make an offering to the gods and Emperor and then eat.” He argues that this is due to the fact that “every grain, every drop of liquid is thought to be changed into something given by the gods and His Majesty the Emperor, and at the same time one should think of the hardships endured by one’s ancestors and brethren and give thanks, expressing true feelings of appreciation.”

This is the type of setting in which the official gaze begins to enter the private space known as the ‘everyday’. For Yi the everyday life of Japan was a world already rooted in a totalitarian order, as in the “entire family gathering around the table,” a world of discipline of the body wherein one “should straighten one’s back” and “sit correctly.” Thus, as expressed in the precept that the meal should be conceived as a type of grace conferred by the gods and the emperor, we can see that what unifies and controls this order and discipline is the emperor. More precisely, Yi understood the existence of the living emperor as giving a physical reality to the discipline and order maintained by imperial subjects.

Through the act of “worshiping the Imperial Palace from afar” (kyūjō yōhai), the emperor’s ostensibly official existence is invited into the space of the everyday, and thus it is precisely by means of the existence of the emperor and nation-state that the private space of the individual is mentally and physically ingrained. This ritual of kyūjō yōhai, in which one turns to face Japan – or more precisely, the emperor in the Imperial Palace – and bows, began in tandem with the Third Chosŏn Educational Act (1938), which had been amended by Minami Jirō, the Governor General in Korea, and which was enforced with a siren in the cities that rang out at 7:00 am every morning. Yi Kwang-su describes it as follows:

I first opened my eyes at 6:00 in the morning. The 6:00 a.m. siren rang. It was the siren that told all Japanese nationals (Nihon kokumin) to get out of bed. Nothing like this had happened before. We were free to choose when to sleep and when to get up. From now on, the fatherland (sokoku) told all nationals (kokumin) to get up at 6:00 am. If we didn’t do it, the great work being carried out by the state (kokka) would be difficult. I finally opened my eyes at 6:30 in the morning. I couldn’t hear the 6:00 a.m. siren anymore. I got to sleep late because I was working on my manuscript last night. The manuscript is also something for the state, but that still no excuse to oversleep. As I was told by the mother’s association (mama-kai), I read a book after cleaning. Another siren rang out. “What do you think it’s for?” Since I still haven’t gotten used to this type of national life (kokumin seikatsu), I didn’t realize that it was the 7:00 am siren for worshiping the Imperial Palace from afar. When you hear that siren, the whole family, even servants, immediately clean up and stand in place, worshiping with all their hearts. [...] Yesterday, at the Great Chosŏn Fairgrounds, I heard the noon siren and thought to set my watch, but I forgot to offer a silent prayer. I’m still not that good at national life. I suppose you’ve probably got to really try for years before you learn how to live like this. [6]

National education to become Japanese began with controls such as regulating the time when the entire nation woke up “at once.” Private time, in which “we were free to choose when to sleep and when to wake up,” was for the first time in modern Korean history under official control. It goes without saying that this was an unmistakably modern experience of oppression.
Like being trained to think of one’s meal as something given by the grace of the emperor, this was an experience designed to make one conscious of being in “official” space from the very moment one opened one’s eyes. It is the emperor that is at the apex of the segmentation of everyday time through sirens and clocks, and thus the possibility for Koreans of rapidly becoming “Japanese” was based on how quickly they could effectively internalize the existence of the emperor. In this sense we can say that in their everyday lives “Japanese-ness” was synonymous with the “emperor.”

This means, ironically, that anyone who honored the emperor could become Japanese. In a certain sense, we can say that the regulated “national life” required to become a “national subject” (kokumin) of the emperor could be acquired simply by doing things like making sure to listen for the morning siren, and making sure not to forget the silent prayer at noon. The condition enabling one to become Japanese was neither language, culture, nor blood, but rather a loyalty manifested through ritual.

Of course, Yi points out that “mastering” (mi ni tsuku) or making this life one’s own requires “many years of effort,” but this indicates precisely that even only with “many years” and some “effort,” the national identity called “Japanese” could become a possibility. When it compelled Korean people to refashion themselves as Japanese, the Japanese empire stressed that this was a possibility because of the fact that Koreans and Japanese shared a common ancestry (Nissen dōsōron). And yet, while it touted the notion that this common fountainhead was the essence of national identity, at the same time the very idea that Koreans had to become Japanese exposed that in fact national identity had to be acquired belatedly through bodily training, or, in other words, that was not something essential, or in-born.

In reality, Yi’s children had already completed adapted to this “national life.” The “six year-old girl” did as her father told her, and quietly worshiped the Imperial Palace from afar, while his young son and daughter stopped in the middle of eating to worship, and upon their father’s return to the room, turned toward him and said with concern in Japanese, “Father, that siren just now was the siren for worshiping!” These children had become nearly perfect young Japanese imperial subjects not through any blood connection but through the acquisition of language and physical discipline. What had allowed these children to adopt the physical code or discipline of “worshiping the Imperial Palace from afar” so readily was precisely that their bodies had not been already inscribed into another regime of discipline that might conflict with the new one.

This is not to imply that Korean children could become truly Japanese, because in reality they continued to be treated differently from the Japanese. But these children, who used “Japanese language,” who performed rituals as “Japanese people,”” never doubted their own “Japanese-ness.” [7] In a certain sense, the greatest problem for the colonial peoples was not the act of being colonized per se, but rather the wide gap between the official rhetoric, which proposed that they could become Japanese and thus equal members of the empire, and the true nature of colonial rule, which would keep them forever subjugated.

2. The Sorrow of “Pro-Japanese” Literature – The Case of Sŏ Jŏng-ju

Sŏ Jŏng-ju, perhaps post-liberation Korea’s greatest poet, published a short story called “Postman Ch’oe’s Military Longing” in October 1943, conveys understanding of the national identity “Japanese” as the internalization (mi ni tsukeru koto) of order and discipline. [8] In Sŏ’s
story, the protagonist, Ch’oe, a “postman in a small town by the sea in southern Korea,” is desperately trying to acquire Japanese identity. Ch’oe is a “reliable and trustworthy man of average build,” who delivers the mail not only in his own village, but also far and wide to “small villages in the deep mountains and down by the seashore.” Although his wife has passed away, he has a “mother who is blind in one eye,” and “a son who is a second-year student in elementary school.”

A bronze statue of Sŏ Jŏng-ju. While respected as Korea’s greatest poet, the controversy surround his work as a pro-Japanese writer continues to rage in Korea.

In the text he is portrayed as a hardworking and sincere person who wakes up before dawn every morning in order to clean the house and garden, make breakfast for his mother, and help his son get ready for school.

While he was doing this, the sun had risen, so Ch’oe stopped what he was doing and changed into his postman’s uniform. He left the garden and, gazing to the east, called out to his son,”Toshio!” As soon as Toshio heard his father’s voice, he immediately responded in military style, “Hai!” and stood in line next to his father. They both wore somewhat worn-out uniforms, but the buttons were all neatly in place.
“Kyūjō yōhai!” In fact, the one who barked this out like an order wasn’t the father but the son. The truth is that it was Ch’oe who used to say it when they first started “worshiping the Imperial Palace from afar,” but he always mispronounced it as “Ku-jo-yo-uhai.” Ever since his son corrected him one day after he’d become a second-year student, Ch’oe passed that duty onto his son. [9]

Even though no one is watching them, they gather at the same instant to perform this ritual as soon as the sun rises – for this father and son, “Japan” itself is a regime of discipline and control of the body which manifests itself in a precisely ordered physical style and command to ritually bow. Not only in his “military style response,” “Hai!” to being hailed by his Japanese name, but also in his continual chiding of his father’s halting Japanese through the use of “correct” Japanese, this young boy has already thoroughly internalize this discipline. In the figure of the father, who accepts his son’s admonishment for his incorrect Japanese pronunciation, we can see precisely the pitiful reality of the colonized position, making this work a type of inconspicuous resistance literature.

In any case, it shows that while the acquisition of the national identity “Japanese” was not easy for him, simultaneously we can see that simply by sufficiently learning the discipline of being a “national subject” (kokumin), he can express a certain degree of “Japoneseness.” His growing accustomed to “belonging to the military” (gunzoku) is a direct result of this.

On the other hand, this text reveals one instance which powerfully resists this type of internalization of national identity as “Japanese.”

After the ritual of worshiping the Imperial Palace from afar was over, Ch’oe’s mother always prepared a modest breakfast, and then sat waiting for her son and grandson. When Ch’oe first started worshiping the Imperial Palace from afar, he tried to persuade his mother to do it together with them, but no matter how many times he asked her, she never agreed. “She’s getting on a bit, and her back’s not what it was, so it’s fine if we just do her share ourselves.” Thinking this to himself, Ch’oe realized that he’d better give up trying to convince his mother.

Ch’oe understands his mother’s unwillingness to worship the Imperial Palace from afar because her “back’s not what it was.” But in fact, his mother’s refusal to participate in a ritual to “become” “Japanese” is her negation of their “performance” of national identity. [10] Later, after Ch’oe enters the military, she participates in this “performance,” but this does not directly constitute proof of any kind of “pro-Japanese” sentiment (shin’ nichisei). Indeed, there had arisen by this time generational differences in Koreans’ receptivity to becoming Japanese. For example, some of those who willingly accepted the idea of becoming Japanese even criticized their parents for their resistance to Japanization. Here we might read the mother’s decision to engage in the ritual of bowing toward the palace as her recognition that she has no other choice because she will be living off her son’s earnings and she cannot make him look bad.

As he walked in the door, taking off his cap, Ch’oe would sometimes try to exclaim “I’m back!” (Tada ima!) in Japanese (kokugo), not to Toshio, but to his mother. As he would have rather just said, “ōmōni!” (“mother!”) I’m sure you can all understand his lonely state of mind.
After silently eating his dinner, he would ask, of course in Japanese (kokugo), “Toshio, have you done all of your studying?”

Only after checking his son’s answers would he relax and close his eyes, which had been open throughout the day. [11]

Having begun his day by worshiping the Imperial Palace from afar, Ch’oe returns home at the end of the day and greets his mother by saying “Tada ima!” in Japanese, the national language. Although he uses the Japanese phrase “tada ima,” Ch’oe would prefer to “just say ‘ŏmŏni!’” and feels lonely and confused as a result of his as-yet imperfect acquisition of “Japan.” The complexity of this depiction undercuts the typical analysis of Sŏ Jŏng-ju as merely a pro-Japanese writer.

3. Renunciation of the Individual - Permeation of the Official

When brushing your teeth, do it with all your might; when washing your face, do it with all your might; when eating a meal, devote all your energy to eating; when playing, concentrate hard. Wŏn-gu felt that this was the Japanese spirit, the Japanese way. [12]

For this boy who thinks that the “Japanese spirit,” the “Japanese way of life,” is signified by “enthusiasm,” “sincerity,” and “devoting all your energy” to every aspect of everyday life, it isn’t just that Japanese people work at everything with all their might – as he watches the people around him work neatly and diligently, he thinks to himself: “As if you could stand before the gods at any moment.” This was a phrase that Wŏn-gu mulled over a lot. [13]

In other words, the individual who sincerely follows the “official” demands of everyday life is one who is always conscious of the eyes of the gods or the Emperor as “official,” and it is this preparedness – never forgetting the nation-state – which is precisely the “Japanese spirit” he identifies. At the time, it could also be seen in imperialization policies being put into practice. No Ch’ŏn-myŏng referred to this as “taking to heart both divine favor and indebtedness to the emperor, becoming an imperial woman appropriate to the new system, and at the same time learning knowledge and capabilities for the expansion of production.” We can see it in things such as training through communal living from 6:00 am to 9:00 p.m., “without even the slightest waste,” or in impressions such as “to feel things most sincerely is the life of duty.” [14]

In the phrase, “This life becomes possible only in as much as you know divine favor and indebtedness to the emperor,” there is a self-awareness that individual life is possible only predicated on the existence of subjects of the nation-state (kokka shutai) encapsulated in such phrases as “divine favor” and “indebtedness to the emperor.” We can say that this is not a vision of the nation-state as a collection of individuals, but rather a moment of inversion founded on the notion that the individual can exist only in as much as there is a nation-state.

Precisely because this process existed, an almost religious schema, emphasizing the renunciation of individuality and subjectivity, and placing the nation-state at its pinnacle, could be created: “Your brother belongs to His Majesty the Emperor. Your husband belongs to His Majesty the Emperor. Your body belongs to His Majesty the Emperor. This is the Japanese spirit.” [15]

In an essay in which he emphasizes individual responsibility toward the nation-state, Yi Kwang-su more clearly develops this idea:
In other words, if you eat the grain of the nation-state, you should work for the nation-state. In the new order, there will be nothing like your own body, your own property, or your own son. Everything will belong to the nation. The way of thinking which says – this is mine, so I will do with it what I like – is inexcusable, it is individualism, liberalism, and it is incompatible with the ideology of the new Japanist value system (Nihonshugi shintaisei shiso). [16]

For Yi, who speaks about his own text as a “service to the nation,” the “new system” of “Japan” is one in which there is no longer “your own body, your own property, or your own son.” Even if they were to exist, “body,” “property,” and “son” can only exist as belonging to the nation. Beyond understanding “Japanism” merely in this sense, it is a matter of course for Yi that “individualism and liberalism,” which emphasize the right to exist as an “individual,” are incompatible with it.

It is also a given that this “Japanese spirit,” which does not even categorize the family in its relationship to the self, necessarily acts to negate the “self”, and thus “it is clearly understood that making excuses for yourself, overemphasizing yourself, showing off, and so on, have little to do with the Japanese spirit.” [17] The fact that in colonial Korea the “Japanese spirit” was one that would not allow for making excuses for or overemphasizing the self demonstrates that the new Japanese spirit is merely a new appellation for that which formerly had been valorized as the “Meiji spirit,” and which likewise had required the destruction of the “self” (onore). [18]

Another example of a Korean subject’s recognition of the degree to which participation in the empire require suppression of the self can be found in what the poet Sŏ Jŏng-ju, whom I referred to above, wrote about his military training:

I’ll tell you something truly important. For some reason, ever since I came here, my voice has gradually been sinking into my interior. Far from orders like, “come here,” “stay there,” and so on, I don’t even have the confidence to raise my voice and respond, “Yes!” when someone calls to me, “Shizuo!” I see my “self” becoming completely formless and fading away. Perhaps this feeling is making me realize and reflect on how much I used to meaninglessly rely on this thing called a “self.” I guess I need to be reborn into some totality. [19]

He is unable to hide his confusion at the thought that his “self” is “becoming formless and fading away,” but is also able to make himself comprehend this by means of another type of understanding: “I” “need to be reborn into some totality.” Within an oppressive situation in which the “self” was fading away into nothingness, colonial Koreans, in order to make themselves understand themselves, required precisely this collective fantasy of “being reborn into some totality.”

4. The Inversion of Loyalty

Amongst the colonized, those who most required this image of being “reborn” into a “totality,” were the soldiers. Here is a contemporary description of the situation:

In any case, it has been continually reasserted that the foundation of the urgent task we bear, that is, the great work of historical creation, is located in individual national self-awareness (kokuminteki jikaku). In other words, as is often said, the individual is
connected to the whole, and totality is formed by means of individuals. Individual and whole are not established through mutual separation; in our country, thankfully the whole is the emperor, while the individual is the “people,” as derived from the leading families. It goes without saying that the Western view of the world and life, formed through the traditional principle of the individual, has been corrected in our country and returned to its original true form through the supreme idea of the nation-state as the basis of a new worldview and view of life. That is, there is a people only because there is a nation-state, and there is culture only because there is a nation-state. Thus, to rid yourself of petty thoughts of the ego and die a noble death (tōtoi sange) that dwells in the greater self is to live forever in that totality. [20]

What this final sentence emphasizes in order to justify offering up one’s life in a “noble death” (sange) is that the emperor is not an individual but a totality, and that in living for this totality one has the possibility of becoming not merely “ego” but part of? a “greater self.” To die a “noble death” itself is to “live forever in the totality” of the emperor, that is, to accomplish a true “unification” with Japan, the expected outcome of which is becoming Japanese. Koreans were, after all, nothing more than the man-made, or artificial, children of the Emperor, but just as for Japanese soldiers dying for the Emperor meant becoming natural, authentic “people” of the Emperor, thereby guaranteeing an eternal cycle of birth-rebirth as “Japanese,” so too for Koreans. This type of logic is what allowed them to so easily rush into the negation of the self as an “individual.” [21]

Becoming a soldier was, for Koreans moreover, a method for maximizing their internalization of “Japan” as an ordering mechanism. Another text written to encourage Koreans to become volunteer soldiers discusses this method of internalization in the context of a critique of Korea’s “neglect of military training” during the Choson Dynasty:

For Koreans in particular, a sense of proper hierarchy was disrupted, and the respect and love between older and younger students were lost. Koreans are now agitated -- much like a fish thrown onto a stove begins to twitch of its own accord when a flame is lit under it.

Training as volunteer soldiers has opened a new path to Koreans who have been living in a world lacking order. Not only has it become possible for Koreans in this untrained and unordered situation to learn discipline, this system of volunteer soldiers has enabled a recognition of a sense of a duty to the nation-state, and has thus made the Korean spirit purer. [22]

For them, Japan more than anything represented an existence in which discipline of military training had been internalized, a mode of being through learning by example.

Yet, we must not forget that more than Japanese, this type of ordering and discipline is modern. While depicting the everyday soldier’s life from waking at 6:00 am to clean, worship the Imperial Palace from afar, and recite the oath of imperial subjects (kōkoku shinmin Joshi anshō), Ham praises them for “maintaining order even when eating,” in the belief that “trained people, and a trained nation (minzoku) are indeed strong.” It should be noted here that the Japanese ideology of strength that had aimed, since the Meiji period, for a strong sense of nation (minzoku), was spreading its roots to the colony.
That is to say, for Koreans, to neglect your body, given to you by your parents, was to go against the Confucian conception of filial piety to which they were accustomed, and thus in this sense, the concept that dying for the nation-state constituted an act of “loyalty” ran counter to ingrained notions of filial piety.

For example, in Chang Hyŏk-chu’s “Saeroun ch’ulbal” (Atarashii shuppatsu), the young man who enters the training camp writes a letter to a friend saying “All I think of every day” is “how to revive our concept of filial piety more broadly as a spirit of loyalty.” The friend who receives this letter thinks, “The greatest task of spiritual education consists in bringing the unique ethical sense of young Koreans into the Japanese spirit and remolding it into something new.” They think this is something “truly important,” but simultaneously recognize that it is nearly impossible.

We clearly understood the true feelings of the imperial soldiers for their parents, as they would happily go to their deaths for one parent, in this case, the emperor. There were a variety of tasks in the training camp, but the primary one was the correction of this notion of loyalty, and the next was becoming habituated to life in Japan proper (naichi) – in other words, we lived our everyday life in Japanese style (naichi shiki).

When it came time for correcting his views of loyalty, no matter how different he was from the other Korean trainees, he too couldn’t completely discipline his spirit. In as much as he was quite patriotic, he still had a lot of things in himself that he needed to correct before he could understand the correspondence between his patriotism and loyalty to his rulers as well as filial piety. [23]

“Patriotism” is the subject here, but there is a young Korean boy who hasn’t yet reconciled patriotism with imperial loyalty. Just as the unity of loyalty and filial piety, which became possible only in as much as the emperor was positioned above the parent, was also debated in Japan at the end of the Meiji period, this was not something easily internalized by a Korean youth of the time. But he thinks, “The ability for Korean youth to become excellent Imperial soldiers will depend on their ability to correct their views on loyalty and filial piety.”

We must think of filial piety as not only pertaining to our biological parents, but also to His Majesty the Emperor, who is also our parent. This is the spirit of loyalty, in which the lesser piety is contained within the greater piety – that is, there must be development from the lesser piety towards the greater piety. To put it another way, this is the unity of loyalty and filial piety. The primary goal in the training camp is to cultivate the spirit to understand that to be loyal is itself to demonstrate filial piety. However, to stop at filial piety and not develop it into loyalty is an outdated merely filial spirit of the former family system, one that is unsuitable for our country. To correct our views of loyalty and filial piety, everyone must take up the training of the spirit as the single most essential task. [24]

Because of this troubling incompatibility between loyalty and filial piety, Chang and other so-called pro-Japanese Koreans treated piety towards one’s parents as “lesser piety,” and piety towards the emperor as “greater piety,” and through this schema in which greater piety is prioritized over lesser piety, they came to understand and accept themselves.
In a poem called “Student Soldiers of Korea.” [25] Yi Kwang-su advises young men debating whether or not to become volunteer soldiers not to “hesitate,” precisely at this moment of inversion, when for the first time in Korea, the “nation-state” was elevated into a position superior to the categories of “father” or “individual” based on the logic of “if there is no nation there are no parents.” What sustained this inversion were the two notions that individualism was something Western, and that the doctrine of filial piety, which elevated parents to the highest position, was outdated. In this sense, both the position of the emperor and the centrality of the nation-state were justified through the convenient use of the ideologies of civilizational difference and traditionalism.

5. Colonial Desire and Gender

However, while certain intellectuals provided such rationales, the young men of the time absolutely were inclined to “hesitate.” These problems were real for them. What is especially worthy of notice is that it was not they but their mothers who were strongly criticized for this “hesitance.” For example as Chang Hyŏk-chu argued, “Korean mothers are engrossed with love for their children,” and “never think of making their children strong or sacrificing them for the nation.” The young man in Chang’s novel thinks that “this coddling weakens the youth of Korea,” and that responsibility for preventing them from “training of the soul” lies with the “expressions of affection of the mothers of the Korean peninsula.” Conversely, when one young man sends his mother a letter worrying about her, she responds by saying that it is unbecoming for one “becoming a soldier of His Majesty the Emperor” to worry about family. Consequently, she is praised as an “excellent Japanese mother.”

Of course, the model against which this is measured is the group of genuine (honmono no) Japanese mothers. Here is the logic of one Korean observer:

The reason that Japanese women are today revered as the most devoted mothers of all the military powers in the world derives from their religious faith, the foundation of which is the tradition of the emperor. Thinking about the practical orientation of Korean families, I feel anxious, doubting that Korean women will be able to act as such noble wives and mothers to military men. We should consign our rationalistic and practical lifestyle to the past, raise our children with constant prayer, and send them out into the world with faith [that allows them to] happily give up their lives for the emperor. [26]

Choosing “faith” is to eschew “practicality” and “rationality,” and to embrace something “irrational” is considered worthy. In their “traditional religious belief in the emperor,” this author argues, the women of Korea ought to mimic the women of Japan.

This praise for “Japanese mothers” can also be seen in the following example from a play set in the coal mines. Two young men criticize one of their mothers for hesitating to send the younger brother, who wants to be a soldier, into the military.

Kanemura: “The women in Japan were just as amazing as I thought. I saw this for myself, you know, I was really moved. At Osaka station, a mother was with her son, who was departing for the front. When I saw it, I thought, this country of bushidō is really something else. She didn’t shed a single tear in front of her son, just sent him off cheerily and waited till he’d gone to feel sad. It’s a bit embarrassing to say, but what’d happen if this were in Korea? It’d be awful if she grabbed her son and started wailing.”
Kil-dol: “Yeah...the reason Japanese soldiers are the strongest in the world must be because they’ve got mothers like that, huh?”

Kanemura: “That’s right, it’s ‘cause Japanese mothers all think of their sons as something to sacrifice for the nation, not just as their own individual child. So they can offer their child to the state at any time, and send them off to the front with encouragement, never shedding a tear.” [27]

For these young men, “Japan” is an attitude in which certain things are possible – for example, even if you are a mother, you give up your “individual child,” and rather than protecting your son, send him “without shedding a single tear” to the battlefield. At the time, this type of understanding was the backdrop against which women took up drill training. But it wasn’t so simple for Korean women to become “Japanese mothers.” In the end they were presented through the male author’s image of the exemplary woman: “Older brother, please become a soldier. I’m a woman so I can’t go. You’re a man, aren’t you? So please join the army. Please become a brave soldier and fight for His Majesty the Emperor.” [28]

That is, for Korean men whose aim was to become “Japanese,” Korean women were presented as a hindrance. In the colony, to become a “soldier” was to express your value as a “man,” the path to realize the dream of a bright future. For example, here a young man who has sent his younger brother off to the army, turns to his mother and says: “I wanted him to just go to a good school, and be a success too. But these days, the only way for him to be a success as a man is to be a soldier.” Of course, this primary type of ability to make oneself a success is a privilege only afforded to “men”:

“Women seem pretty clever, but they’ve got less brains than us, don’t you think?”

“Yup.”

“Listen, it’s a real privilege that we were born men. Got it? The point is, men are greater than women. So we’ve got to do at least that much.” [29]

For these men, the notion that men are greater than women is connected to their sense of mission, the feeling that they “must accomplish something for the world.” They understand their personal choice to become soldiers as a means of quickly becoming “Japanese,” and that it is their duty as men to demonstrate this ability not in the private space of the household, but in the official space of “the world.” To be a soldier and subject of the Emperor, something a woman can never be, is to be a privileged “chosen one,” thereby giving proof of “greatness.” In other words, they come to see the act of choosing itself as what proves their masculinity, but in the end this masculinity is only attainable through becoming a soldier, and through “Japan,” a fact obscured by the attention paid to public participation as men’s responsibility. [30] Here we can clearly see the way that men became complicit with both the sovereign power and the colonized nation because it gave them some sense of themselves as powerful.

That is, in colonial society, one of only a few ways, and arguably the most effective way, for a man to assert his masculine identity was to join the Japanese military and become an imperial soldier. In this manner Korean men could fulfill their notions of superiority over Korean women, deeply rooted in society, and escape the oppression and emasculating effects of Japanese colonization within their own society.
We must grasp Chang’s novel from this perspective. In it, a young man who is encouraged by the news that his friend has decided to join up, is subsequently ashamed to learn that he cannot join the military because he is too old. He has been in Japan a long time, and faithfully attends the sending-off party for the soldiers, expressing feelings of gratitude. In the end, he is forced to say,

“Well, I can’t go into the army ’cause of my health, so the least I can do is see you off…”

Hearing this someone said, “Really? But you seem so healthy!”

He explained that when he was younger, he had eagerly considered doing so.

“But the truth is that at the time there wasn’t a system of conscription in the Korean peninsula yet.”

However, perhaps he was being a bit too easy on himself. Still, he comforted himself by thinking that he was thankful that the volunteer system was [now] in place, so just as in Japan (naichi), many young Korean men on the continent who wanted to be a shield for and give their lives for the emperor could do so.” [31]

This still relatively young man, who says that his health and age prevented him from entering the army shows us that “going into the army” was seen by some to be a privilege. We can see his inferiority complex here, as someone who, while he seems to “be so healthy,” to have all the physical characteristics to become a soldier, nevertheless cannot enter the military.

The right to “become the shield of the emperor” or to give one’s life was only conferred upon those who had gone through physical and spiritual “training,” and had passed the test of becoming “Japanese” by training as soldiers. “Giving your life” was therefore a privilege, since it was the sole way for Korean men to become equals as both “Japanese” and “masculine.” This is why the man here feels it necessary to explain why he had not joined the military by noting that he had been too old to join under the extant regulations. Koreans who wanted to become Japanese, or rather who felt that they had to become Japanese, discovered their difference from Japanese people when their loyalty was called into question.

Let us examine a passage from Yi Kwang-su on the concept of “Japan and Korea as one body” (naisen ittai):

Until now, “Japan and Korea as one body” meant throwing away that which is Korean and learning from that which is Japanese. This in the first place means cultivating the spirit of loyalty towards the Imperial Household. The feelings of Japanese people towards the Imperial Household are truly unique, and it will require a great amount of study for Koreans to approach this level. It is not the same thing as what we used to call “loyalty to the ruler and love of country” (chūkun aikoku).

The feeling of loyalty of Japanese people cannot be explained merely with the Chinese character “loyalty” (chū, 忠), but rather resembles the loyalty of the Jews to Yahweh. Japanese people think of all good fortune bestowed on them as something that stems from the Emperor. One’s land belongs to the Emperor, one’s household belongs to the Emperor, one’s children belong to the Emperor, one’s body and life belong to the Emperor. Because your body belongs to the Emperor, if the Emperor calls upon you, you
happily give up your life. The Emperor is a living god. This is an entirely different relation from that found in China or Europe between the ruler and subject. [32]

Koreans in the colonial period tried to acquire the national identity “Japanese” by means of learning what constituted loyalty the Emperor. The different significations of Japan, for instance “order” and “discipline,” were fully integrated into the figure of the Emperor. In my mind, the definition of Japaneseness through the use of such terms was a consequence of the success of the ideas about “Meiji spirit,” which had allowed Japan to resist the incursion of the West. The “Japanese spirit,” like the Meiji one, required the populace to be willing to give up their lives for the nation-state or Emperor. Many colonial men came to deeply internalize this logic and even to sacrifice their lives for the empire. To understand why they did so, we must not forget that doing so also made it possible for them to differentiate themselves and assert their superiority over the women of the colony.

6. War and Death/Poetry in Kike, Wadatsumi no koe

The internalization of such ideologies of self-sacrifice from the Meiji period onward not only affected the men of the colonies, but obviously also can be found in the writings left behind by the young men who lived in Japan itself. Kike, wadatsumi no koe (Listen to the Voices From the Sea), which became a widely-read “classic” after Japan’s defeat, and which clearly documents the internal struggles of student-soldiers who had misgivings about the war, demonstrates for us how deeply rooted this mode of thought was for the wartime generation. [33] The text was an important one for postwar anti-war thought, yet some of the sentiments expressed in it also reveal how thoroughly the Meiji ideology of self-sacrifice had permeated the populace.
As mentioned above, Kike, wadatsumi no koe, which clearly records the inner thoughts of student soldiers who felt ambivalence about the war, was very important for postwar anti-war thinkers. However, at the same time, the unfortunate truth is that those on the right wing also have taken up the memoirs and letters published in Koe to argue that “all of the students killed in the war were troubled by the illogicality of the war, and yet affirmatively accepted the way things were, came to terms with it, and went to their deaths. It is unconscionable to stress only half the story, to forget their [having ultimately decided to go to their deaths].” [34] In The Fatherland and Youth (Sokoku to seinen), we see the students of Koe being utilized in propaganda to spur Japanese young people to war: “In the students who rose up to help when their fatherland was in trouble, we see what is a universal will or spirit, and that which also was the key to Japan’s rebirth” [after the war]. That is to say, while Koe surely has these two sides to it (despite having been used far more frequently been used for anti-war purposes), neither the right wing nor the left has done anything but propagate its own understanding of the text.

When members of the right wing talk about these students, they do so in order to praise them for having gone to their deaths having accepted their need to go to war. Our efforts to discredit this understanding of the students’ actions will be most effective if we can show what sort of thought it was that made the students “accept” what they had to do. Here I would like to point out simply that they fell into a similar trap to that of colonial men who participated in the war (and saw themselves as one with the nation-state): They acted as “subjects” within a structure that did not allow them to be free subjects, within a backdrop of the exclusion of women, and both traditional
and enlightenment thought being used whenever convenient (and inconsistently, because they contradicted one another). [35]

That is, the young men in Kike wadatumi no koe also believed that sacrificing their own lives was something they “must do to connect the individual to the greater life of the nation-state,” that they should “cut off personal feelings” for “blood relatives.” We have already seen the concept of the nation-state as a “greater life” in the thought of the colonial men examined earlier. I would argue that this mode of thinking finds its origins in the idea of the nation as an organic body (minzoku yūkitai shisō), a notion that was influential from the Meiji period onwards. Belief in such ideas, of course, helped these men to “plunge in headlong while continually praying only for the eternal development of Japan’s life” (Mikuriya Takuji).

One can also see this in the attitude of the “abandonment of the individual” - “At the moment I both am and am not myself. Or I am the concentration of the prayers of a billion national citizens” (Ichijima Yasuo). Here again, in order to be unified with the nation-state, it is necessary to hollow out the hitherto-existing “I” or regard the self as “the concentration of the prayers of a billion national citizens,” a receptacle filled with the “will” of an imagined “totality.”

Further, for these soldiers, “spirit” and “science” confront each other, and they understand Japan as an existence placed on the side of “spirit”:

I want to confirm that it is a fact that what can ensure the final victory is not something material, but spiritual power. I’ve come to this harmonious way of thinking. Or rather, in order to save the nation-state, I realized that I had to think like this. (Takushima Tokumitsu)

If we compare the Russo-Japanese War and the Great East Asia War, we can see that the relation of material and spiritual forces is being inverted. The history of humanity’s development is vividly displayed here. He who honors culture will prosper, he who ignores it will perish. The power of culture is terrible. (Uehara Ryōji)

In America, there is no “spirit.” If anyone in America truly had a heart, I’m sure they would be aware of this. In emphasizing the Japanese “spirit” and “heart,” I believe I’m certainly not the first to point this out. (Sugimura Hiroshi)

This type of framework, which grasps the “West” solely as the world of “science,” and Japan as the possessor of “culture” and “spirit,” is of precisely the same strain of thought as that of Natsume Sōseki in the early twentieth century.

Thus the soldiers aestheticize “death” into “poetry,” and valorize this way of thinking as something stemming from Japan’s unique “culture”:

Even if there is science in foreign (ketō) thinking, there is no poetry. Only Euclid got to the single absolute origin of learning. But even though it’s incisive, it has no elegance. Even journalists are throwing away the pen and relying on machines. By contrast, even an illiterate Japanese takes poetry to heart. Originally, poetry did not signify material forms of expression such as tanka or free-verse poetry. Poetry was a type of leisure of the spirit, a refined state of mind delighting in for example, thinking of the cause of the cold wind as the sprouting of the evergreens. (Nishimura Hidehachi)
In this sense, the schema since Meiji of “West = civilization = science” played an important role in the soldiers’ decisions to take the path towards death. They discover “poetry,” “spirit,” and “culture,” in throwing away their lives, and are thus able to repress their natural fear of killing and dying. The following words show us once again that for the Japanese soldiers, the battlefield was, more than anything, something which confirmed themselves as “men”:

Argh! I’ve got to stop these sissy feelings. My affairs are in order, nothing left to do, my body condition’s in perfect shape, I’ve done my duty standing guard, my life’s in my hands, and I’ve headed off towards where it’s covered in palm trees. It’s a man’s lifelong ambition, if I hear the call, I swear to stand ready without shame as one soldier in the Imperial Army. Ready to suffer. (Shinozaki Jirō)

One part of a man is devoted to the family he supports, while in another part things like pride and ambition come together and rise to the level of society. That’s where wars without the fireworks always start. (Tasaka Tokutarō)

Since the Meiji period, a national identity rooted in empire and tennō led to the sacrifice of the young men, not only of the colonies, but of Japan. However, I would not argue that Japanese and Korean youth were equally oppressed by this ideology. Korean men participated in the war, but they did so in an effort to become “Japanese,” a desire that rather indicates the extent to which the discriminatory structure of the Japanese colonial system was both deeply-ingrained and obscured. Nonetheless, Korean soldiers became wrongdoers by virtue of their participation in the war effort, and it is necessary for us to examine that wrongdoing if we are to truly understand the complicated nature of the wrongs done to them. I am not suggesting that Japan and Korea should be evaluated with the same criteria, but rather that by more carefully identifying the complex manner in which the colonial structure is implicated here, we will be able to better recognize the ingenuity of imperial discourse. For example, in Korea today, it is entirely forgotten that during the colonial era, Korea acted as an aggressor vis-à-vis both China and the Allies, and even B and C-class war criminals are classified as “victims” of the colonial period. In the end, this sort of historical amnesia results in the continued obscuration of the multiple contradictions of the colonial era.

What directed both Japanese and Korean men towards the battlefield without the slightest skepticism about their membership in nation or empire was the discourse originally formed in Meiji modernity. Here the word modernity never connoted the freedom of human beings to do what they will, but instead functioned as a vehicle for internal oppression. In this sense, we cannot appraise the actions of these young men of Japan and Korea as the free choice of true subjects. Rather, they were the victims of the discourse and discipline of their era. Yet at the same time, we must acknowledge that their sense of themselves as worthy human beings was acquired through the very thing that victimized them, participation in nation/empire through military service. We must also recall that the notion of such actions as worthy was, in turn, predicated on the exclusion and subordination of women. Only when we confront the multiple conflicting emotions and senses of obligation that faced these men will we be able to comprehend what drove them to offer up their very lives to the nation-state.

Notes

[1] This article is based on a presentation given in September 2001 at Nihon University’s post colonial studies group. An earlier version of the text was published as “Meiji gensetsu no
The Japanese Empire: Colonial Lives and Postcolonial Struggles

giseisha tachi: ‘Shin’nichi’-sha to gakutohei tachi no shi ni itaru shisō,” chapter 9 of Nashonaru aidentiti to jendā:Sōseki, bungaku, kindai (Kurein, 2007), 261-288 [Trans.].

[2] According to the 1876 Japan-Korea Treaty of Amity signed in the wake of Japanese gunboat diplomacy, Japan had the right to create a settlement for Japanese within the Korean peninsula, and the ports of Pusan and Inchŏn were subsequently opened. As a result, the immigration of Japanese to Korea began before annexation, and by the time of annexation in 1910 there were already 20,000 Japanese living in Pusan, and more than 10,000 in Inchŏn. See Hashiya Hiroshi, “Busan, Inchon no keisei” in Iwanami köza: Kindai Nihon to shokuminchi 3: Shokuminchika to sangyōka (Iwanami Shoten, 1993).


[7] In Kurementain no uta (Bunwa Shobŏ, 1980), Kim Si-jong writes of the crisis of identity experienced by a 16 year-old boy celebrating the independence of the colonies.


[9] In November 1939, one aspect of all-out imperialization policy, the policies related to changes of name from Korean to Japanese (sōshi kaimei, literally “creating family names and changing given names”), took effect, and were enforced beginning in February of the next year. See Miyata Setsuko et al. Sōshi kaimei (Akashi Shoten, 1992). Since the protagonist is called “Ch’oe,” but his son’s name is Toshio, we can assume that they also had a Japanese family name. Emphasis mine.


[11] In 1911, the year after annexation, the first Chosŏn Educational Act was promulgated, making Japanese the “national language” (kokugo), and referring to Korean as “Chŏsengo.” See Ch’oe Yuri’s “Ilche malgi hwangminhwachŏngch’akkŭsŏnggyok: Ilbonŏpogup undong ŭl chungshim ŭro” in Hanguk günhyŏndaesa yŏngu 2 (Seoul: Hanguk günhyŏndaesa hakhoe, 1995). After the third Chosŏn Educational Act of 1938, policies which had allowed for the joint use of “Chŏsengo” were changed, and Japanese was enforced not only as a “classroom language” but also as the language of “daily use.” nationwide. See Miyata Setsuko’s Chŏsen minshu to kōminka seisaku (Miraisha, 1985). Subsequently, in 1942, the movement for the diffusion of Japanese language went into full-blown enforcement under such names as “Movement for Universal Understanding of National Language” and “Movement for the Use of
National Language,” but this was something designed in preparation for the enforcement of conscription in 1944. In fact, in August 1944, the slogan “Let us carry out our lives in the national language to become excellent soldiers” (“Rippa na gunjin ni naru tame ni kokugo seikatsu o jisshi shiyō”) was widely propagated (see Ch’oe Yuri, above).


[13] Yi Kwang-su, “Kū tūl ŭi sarang” (“Karera no ai”) in Sin sidae, January-March 1941. The “Korean League for the Total Mobilization of National Spirit” (Kokumin seishin sōdōin Chosen renmei) adopted the principle of “Japan and Korea as one body” (naisen ittai), and publicized its articles for practice in 1939. Included in their platform, known as “The Cultivation of the Imperial Spirit,” was an article called “Life Reform” (seikatsu no kakushin). See Son Chŏng-mok, Ilche kangjŏmgi tosi sahoesang yŏngu (Seoul: Iljisa, 1996). In the training camps for volunteer soldiers, “Japanization” was always the aim, even in minor matters of everyday life. Baths were taken together, and the correct style of bathing was taught, meals were overseen in detail, designed to instill correct manners and feelings of gratefulness. Things such as the correct way to use the toilet, how to walk through the halls, and how to enter a room were all taught.” See Miyata’s article cited in note 10 above.


[16] Yi Kwang-su, “Simjŏk sinch’eje wa Chosŏn munhwa ŭi chinro” (“Shinteki shintaisei to Chosen bunka no shinro”) in Maeil sinbo 1940, September 4-12.


[21] As a result of the Special Army Volunteer Act, the military volunteer system came into effect in Korea in 1938. Only those who were recognized to have the characteristics of an “Imperial subject,” as observed in certain types of training, were allowed to volunteer. They entered the forces as new recruits on active duty, and after their discharge would return to their hometowns to become the driving forces of imperialization policy. See Miyata’s article cited in note 10 above.

[22] Ham Tae-hun, “Uridŭl kwa chiwŏnbyŏng” (“Bokura to shiganhe”) in Chogwang, December 1940.


[32] Yi Kwang-su, “Simjŏk sinch’eje wa Chosŏn munhwa ūi chinro” (“Shinteki shintaisei to Chōsen bunka no shinrō”) in Maeil sinbo 1940, September 4-12.


[34] See Suzuki Yoshimitsu, “Sengo, gakutohei no shuki wa dō yomarete kita ka: ‘Kike wadatsumi no koe’ to ‘Senkan Yamato no saigo’ o megutte” in Sokoku to seinen (Nihon seinen kyōgikai, October 2003). The quoted portion is the statement of Satake Ichirō.

[35] Ibid., the lead sentence of the title page in the special collection “Gakuto shutṣujin rokujū shūnen.” Sokoku to seinen (Nihon seinen kyōgikai, October 2003).
Tomiyama addresses the main issue introduced by Park and Hirano, the process of becoming Japanese. While Park analyzes literature to argue that becoming Japanese involved individuals disciplining their bodies and everyday actions, Tomiyama explains how lifestyle reform movements were ways in which the Ainu, Koreans, and Okinawans worked to improve themselves and become Japanese, or “good people of society.” Tomiyama uses a different approach to explore this question because he believes that analyzing discourse is limited; instead he argues that we must consider “imperialism’s actual scenes” and understand that, for colonial subjects, becoming Japanese was realized through concrete actions that “unfolded as the performance of a model lifestyle.” Tomiyama also stresses a connection between this self-disciplining in everyday life and mobilization to work and fight for the nation. Tomiyama argues that colonial subjects’ mutual surveillance of each other and auto-surveillance of themselves in everyday life was the first step in their “mobilization for the violent invasions of others.”

In the second half of his article Tomiyama focuses on one such actual scene of imperialism: Teruya Chuei, an Okinawan teacher who promoted lifestyle reform, in ways that amounted to “surveillance over and denunciation of detailed aspects of everyday life” that failed to conform to the Japanese norm. Then, during the Battle of Okinawa Teruya fought on the side of the Japanese. Ironically, however, the Japanese military eventually executed him as a “spy.” It was common for Japanese soldiers to suspect Okinawans of spying for the Americans if they heard them speak an Okinawan language, because it sounded foreign to them and thus aroused suspicion. Tomiyama situates Teruya’s death within the larger context of Japanese imperialism by focusing on the trauma of Teruya’s execution rather than blaming his death on the confusion of the battlefield, the violence of the Japanese troops, or on the policy of imperial subject making. If one blames his death on any of those causes, his death is explained away as a regrettable mistake—and Teruya’s thwarted attempt to become Japanese is reduced to “oblivion.” If they were to focus their attention on Teruya’s execution, the Japanese could not remain a “community of oblivion,” a term Tomiyama uses to highlight the deliberate forgetting of Japanese imperial violence.
On Becoming ‘a Japanese’: The Community of Oblivion and Memories of the Battlefield

Tomiyama Ichiro

Translated by Noah McCormack

Written in the aftermath of the first Gulf War, and later re-worked in Memories of the Battlefield published on the fiftieth anniversary of Japan’s surrender, this essay presents wartime violence not as something distant and exceptional, but rather as a pervasive condition of our lives. Tomiyama attempts here ‘to bring out the battlefield in the everyday’, and then from the battlefield, ‘to reconstitute the everyday’. In a time when war and violence can be seen everywhere and yet felt at a remove, his ideas are as pertinent as ever. N.M.

The community of oblivion

Just what sort of business is it, to become ‘a Japanese’? Given that ‘the Japanese’ exist as an outcome of imagining, it is necessary to examine how they are concretely enacted as an ‘imagined community’. [1] Without such an examination, we cannot critique the ‘myth of the mono-ethnic nation’. For, merely to propose the existence of ‘minority groups’, including the Ainu people, Okinawan people, Korean people and ‘foreign people’, thereby to point to the ‘diversity’ of Japanese society, leaves intact the ‘ethnic myth’ that there exist ‘the Japanese’, merely restating it into the gentler language of ‘we “Japanese people” who are the majority group in Japanese society’. This essay problematizes ‘the Japanese’, and what it is to become ‘a Japanese’.

Needless to say, when problematizing ‘the Japanese’ as an outcome of imagining, the main issue is the ‘invented tradition’ [2] of the ‘emperor system’. But the perspective of ‘Japanese Orientalism’ drawn from Edward Said’s concept of ‘Orientalism’ and used by Kang Sangjung and others to explore ‘the Japanese’ as a mode of controlling and re-making Others [3], is also extremely important in analyzing ‘the Japanese’ in the emperor-system state that from the first so consistently conducted the colonization of the Ainu Moshir, the Ryukyus, Taiwan, Korea, the Southern Islands, ‘Manchuria’, and Asia. Here, I wish to take up Murai Osamu’s work in which he, like Kang, uses the perspective of ‘Orientalism’, in Murai’s case to examine Yanagita Kunio’s concept of ‘the common people’ (jomin). [4]

An underlying concern with the question, ‘who are the Japanese?’ ran through Yanagita’s thinking, and this concern is inseparable from his concept of the ‘common people’. Murai sees two critical moments in Yanagita’s forging of that concept. The first was when, himself deeply involved as an official in the ‘annexation’ of Korea, and witnessing at first hand the massacre of Koreans in the aftermath of the Great Kanto Earthquake, Yanagita found himself unable to assimilate the emperor-system state’s imperialist violence into his own theory of Japanese-ness, and sought refuge in flight. The second came when Yanagita discovered the ‘Southern Islands’ (Nanto), the destination of his flight, as a ‘place of healing’. These ‘Southern Islands’ were an Other, to be ‘taken, domesticated, and modelled into a difference, thereby to create a “Japan” that could be identified with’ [5]; this Other was to be discovered, educated, and disciplined as ‘a proto-Japanese’ or as a child of ‘Japan’. In short, having fled because of an inability to face down the Others subjugated by imperialism’s violence who yet irressibly rose up against it, Yanagita attempted to retain his identity as ‘a Japanese’ by re-establishing a subservient Other who required instruction.
Murai’s essay directs our attention to how the ‘imagined community’ of ‘the Japanese’ was born of the discovery of an Other, as well as to how the power of discourse determines our relations with the Other in, for example, the very instant are uttered the words, ‘we Japanese people’. More concrete inquiry along these lines is necessary. Here, however, rather than looking at issues relating to this kind of discourse analysis, I would like to make some points concerning the limits of discourse analysis.

In examining the discourse equating ‘the common people’ with ‘the Japanese’, it is highly significant that Murai directed his attention to the turning points of Yanagita’s life history: ‘flight from the site of imperialism, oblivion, and then his discovery of a subservient Other’. He thereby makes the point that, above all, ‘the Japanese’ are ‘a community of oblivion’ [6], as well as a discourse that requires oblivion to come into being. So what is it that needs forgetting? Nothing other than the actual sites of imperialism, and imperialism’s violence.

The major pitfall of discourse analysis lies in supposing that power operates exclusively through discourse and speech acts. However, it was not discourse, but primarily the state apparatus of violence that is the military, which realized the processes of invasion so consistently conducted by the emperor-system state against the Ainu Moshir, the Ryukyus, Taiwan, Korea, the Southern Islands, Manchuria, and Asia. And it is none other than ‘the Japanese’ who first come into being through flight from these sites of violence, who are oblivious to imperialism’s violence. Further, the Other who is inaugurated together with the ‘Japanese’ is not just an Other in cultural and social relations, but also in state-mediated relations. [7]

If in this way we consider imperialism’s actual scenes, which exceed the discourse of ‘the Japanese’, it becomes necessary to examine ‘the Japanese people’ at these sometimes violent actual scenes, rather than the intellectuals’ visions of, and structured discourses about, ‘the Japanese’.

In a letter from the battlegrounds of Bougainville Island, a Japanese soldier from Okinawa wrote on his son’s birthday, ‘From the dawn of our victory in this Greater East Asian War, we people of Okinawa will be treated the same as the Japanese people. That’s why, if we win this battle, our family will be able to go to Japan, to live in friendly harmony.’ [8] In these short last words, the aggression that was the Greater East Asian War and a family life of ‘friendly harmony’ are laid out together as the process of becoming ‘Japanese’. This series of linkages, in which everyday yearnings beget the dream of becoming ‘a Japanese’, and eventuate in the exercise of violence against others, encompasses all the issues that I wish to consider in this essay.

There are two points of note. One is that everyday life is where one actually becomes ‘a Japanese’. The other is that related to this process of becoming ‘a Japanese’, it is from the sites of everyday life that mobilization for the violent invasion of others is realised. At these sites, there is a risk that actual scenes of imperialism, which cannot be explained within the ‘community of oblivion’, of the sort from which Yanagita fled, may come into view. Since this violence that comes into view needs already to have been forgotten, it is not immediately voiced, but gives rise to silence. However, silence is not oblivion, but no less than internalized memory. [9] How should memories of the past be narrated as experience?

Tsurumi Shunsuke says, ‘from the kitchen, there is no severance in history on the 15th of August 1945’, and attaches importance to this ‘unsevered kitchen’ as a site of resistance. [10] But whilst fully agreeing with Tsurumi’s point, or precisely because I agree with him, I want to draw
attention to the point that many people marched forth from their kitchens as imperial soldiers. Becoming ‘a Japanese’ is no less than a process mediating everyday life and mobilization for the battlefield, enacting them as one. The imperial soldier from Okinawa died in battle. The Greater East Asian War ended in defeat, and his attempt to become ‘a Japanese’ ended in failure. However, this failure was neither the death of ‘emperor-system ideology’ nor of ‘ultra-nationalism’, but first and foremost the death of everyday life, the death of the kitchen. It is true that everyday life was not severed on the fifteenth of August 1945. But surely its continuity must be informed by the deaths within it. How should the death of daily life, that battlefield mobilization etched as memory, be narrated?

**Lifestyle reform**

With reference to Koreans resident in Japan, Kang Sangjung writes about the current situation of ‘Japanese Orientalism’ as follows. ‘Because of the astonishing “productivity” of [Japanese] Orientalism, “South Korean and North Korean people resident in Japan” have continually been tempted to apply it to themselves and to others.’ [11] The lure of daily life being improved and getting better inclines them towards becoming ‘Japanese people’. This is by no means an issue concerning only Korean people resident in Japan. In the psychological make-up of Japanese colonists in Korea and ‘Manchuria’, Yoon Keuncha sees the coexistence of a sense, which was expressed as imperial consciousness in colonial society, of being Japanese, with animosity towards hometowns, of a sense of victimhood. [12] Concerning the latter, this sentiment can also be seen among those who were forced to leave their villages by economic circumstances. Therein lies bitterness at no longer being able to survive at home, together with a powerful desire to better everyday lives. The wish to improve everyday living even a little is connected to becoming ‘a Japanese’.

Of course, the existence of living people who ply their Japanese nationality strategically must also be noted here, for to assume that such a wish for betterment leads directly to becoming ‘a Japanese’ would be to lose sight of their ‘soft resistance’. [13] However, as mentioned above, here I wish to emphasize the point that it was from everyday life that mobilization towards the violent invasion of others was realized.

As is well known, many of the colonists of Manchuria, whose imperial consciousness Yoon demonstrates, were recruited from peasant villages during the Economic Reorganization Campaign starting in 1932, in which lifestyle reform was a central pillar. However, it was not for impoverished peasants alone that lifestyle reform was tied to ‘the Japanese people’. For Ainu people, Okinawan people, and Korean people resident in Japan too, all invaded and violently ‘annexed’ by the emperor-system state, lifestyle reform lay at the heart of the so-called *kominka* or imperial subject-making policy.

It must not be overlooked that in the case of the Ainu and the Okinawans, lifestyle reform was by no means just a government-devised slogan. Among the activities of the Hokkaido Ainu Association founded in 1930 was lifestyle reform conducted by the Ainu people themselves, and their activities connected up with the campaign to abolish the ‘Hokkaido Former Aborigines Protection Law’. [14] The case of Okinawa was analogous. As I will explain below, the campaign for the promotion of standard Japanese, which was a central element in lifestyle reform, penetrated profoundly. Use of the Okinawan language was subjected to daily surveillance, such that by the 1930s, it is said that people spoke standard Japanese even within their homes. Similarly, the campaign for the abolition of secondary Okinawan-style funeral rites
(senkotsu) was conducted by Okinawan women and was aimed at their own liberation. [15] Further, these lifestyle reform movements linked up with Ainu people’s push into a ‘Manchuria without discrimination’, as well as with the southern push by Okinawan people as ‘leaders of the Southern Ocean’.

For anti-discriminatory movements to be co-opted by nationalism even as they proclaim lifestyle reform, thereby to be mobilized towards invasion, is a pattern that not even the Levelers’ Association (Suiheisha) that combatted Buraku discrimination was able to avoid. As Kim Jonmi points out, the National Levelers’ Association, some members of which saw themselves at the time as being of a different race from ‘the Japanese’, converted to Japanese nationalism during the [Taisho – early Showa] Conciliation Movement centered on lifestyle reform, and promoted emigration by Burakumin to ‘Manchuria’ on the grounds that, ‘if we live in Manchuria, discrimination will fade away’. Kim strongly attacks this switch as ‘an alliance for “defending lifestyle and rights against Buraku discrimination” based on the sacrifices of the people of Asia’. [16]

Lifestyle reform meshed with becoming ‘a Japanese’, with the result that people were mobilized into violent invasion of Others. Thus lifestyle reform offered people a path to participation in the ‘community of oblivion.’ Focusing on this point, let us consider a framework in which to think about lifestyle reform. [17]

Firstly, just what did lifestyle reform target for improvement? To list the categories for lifestyle reform in the case of Okinawa, they reached deep into everyday life, including such things as the Okinawan language, going barefoot, pit toilets, graves, Okinawan-style funeral rites, family names, divining, shamanism, Ryukyuan clothing, drinking alcohol, dating parties, songs accompanied by the sanshin, festivals, hygiene, and local methods of keeping time. The categories for reform in the case of Okinawans who had come to live in Osaka likewise touched on all parts of their lives, including the Okinawan language, Ryukyuan clothing, Ryukyuan dance, songs accompanied by the sanshin, living in enclaves of Okinawans, festivals, child-rearing methods, diet, the drinking of Awamori liquor, and so on. A similar attention to detail can be seen in the lifestyle reforms of the Ainu people.

From these few examples, rather than concluding that imperial subject-making, in the form of ‘becoming Japanese’, constituted the oppression of a specific culture, we can make the point that it unfolded as the performance of a model lifestyle, and of improvements towards its achievement. The categories targeted by lifestyle reform were both tangible and detailed; these directives indicated the requisite or model lifestyle in various daily scenes. If one were to take just the case of the eradication of the Okinawan language, that is indeed the elimination of a particular language. However, I would like to concentrate on the point that such eradication, in combination with, for example, reforms targeting drinking and bare feet, constituted the performance of a model lifestyle. Of course, no doubt there were degrees of difference in the importance of each directive, and it is necessary to consider those differences. But whatever the case may be, the categories for improvement must not be construed as a particular culture that can be somehow objectively defined. It was concrete ways of doing things in everyday life that were problematized. For people generally, to become ‘a Japanese’ was to engage in lifestyle reforms aiming for the better life performed by ‘the Japanese’.

Why, then, were these detailed directives accepted as improvements towards a better life? There is another aspect of lifestyle reform here, which cannot simply be reduced to the issue of
nationally. Concrete directives about everyday life do not alone constitute lifestyle reform. Polarized normative values such as ‘clean / unclean’, ‘healthy / sick’, ‘science / custom’, ‘advanced life / backward life’, and ‘prosperous people / poor people’ are also involved. The various categories needing to be improved are set up so as to indicate the negative values of ‘uncleanness’, ‘sickness’, ‘customs’, the ‘backward’, and so on, with their improvement posited as proof of the positive values of the ‘clean’, the ‘healthy’, the ‘advanced’, and so on. As recent work in urban history and social history indicates, a society in which people are caught between such polarized normative values, and in which they begin to move unidirectionally, is precisely a modern society. Following Anbo Norio, let us call that society possessing the desirable positive values, the ‘society of good people’. [18] Lifestyle reform is a movement aimed at attaining this ‘society of good people’.

In the better life performed by lifestyle reform are joined the two vectors of becoming ‘a Japanese’ and becoming ‘good people’. And everyday life is where the joining of the ‘society of good people’ and of nationality actually takes place. Consequently, moves seeking participation in the ‘society of good people’ connect with nationalism. It needs to be noted that no society constituted by ‘good people’ exists separate from nationality. It is the joining of ‘the Japanese’ and ‘the good people’ that indicates the very ‘society of good people’ of Japan enclosed by the state. Thus, this tendency for nationality and ‘good people’ to join, that can be seen in the lifestyle reform of the Okinawan people and the Ainu people, is by no means a limited issue solely concerning Okinawans and Ainu contained within Japanese society as ‘heterogeneous groups’. [19]

Also, the fact that ‘the Japanese’ and ‘the good people’ are joined allows the suggestion that non-Japanese people’ are associated with those various values, namely ‘uncleanness’, ‘sickness’, ‘customs’, ‘backwardness’, ‘poverty’ and so on, that are excluded from the ‘society of good people’. Non-Japanese people’ can consequently be set up as objects requiring education, treatment, and improvement. This point overlaps with the above-mentioned issue of the other in ‘Japanese Orientalism’.

Edward Said writes, ‘The Oriental was linked thus to elements in Western society (delinquents, the insane, women, the poor) having in common an identity best described as lamentably alien. Orientals were rarely seen or looked at; they were seen through, analyzed not as citizens, or even people, but as problems to be solved or confined or – as the colonial powers openly coveted their territory – taken over.’ [20] There is a need to examine concretely just what sorts of others are made to embody the various elements excluded from the ‘society of good people’ as needing treatment and improvement, in the process of becoming ‘a Japanese’.

The particularity of lifestyle reform is that it is a form of self-help, in which one attempts to improve one’s own daily life. In other words, one attempts to improve the self, thereby to become ‘a Japanese’. This involves a subjectivity like that of a good patient who treats and improves the self to get better, as well as an auto-disciplining of the self, in which one engages in surveillance over one’s own everyday life. Moreover, because the categories of surveillance cover everyday minutiae, this also advances the disciplining of everyday life. In exhortations such as ‘don’t lose to the Japanese! (yamatonchu)’ or slogans such as ‘advance Okinawa, beginning with its language!’ that surfaced frequently in lifestyle reform, there can obviously be grasped a dynamic that can be called subjectivity, but which at the same time is also oriented towards disciplining.
If ‘the Japanese’ were exclusively defined as a ‘natural entity’ and the boundary between ‘Japanese people’ and non-Japanese people were postulated to be natural, or in other words if ‘the Japanese’ were to be set as something utterly unalterable, then discrimination against the Ainu people and the Okinawan people, contained within ‘the Japanese’ as ‘heterogeneous groups’, would become an unrelenting racism. However, as a consequence of the joining of ‘the Japanese’ and ‘the good people’, it is not simply ‘different races’ who are excluded, but ‘different races’ who are ‘lazy’ and ‘unclean’.

Étienne Balibar has made this point with reference to France’s ‘foreign labour problem’. Namely, it is not the ‘Arab’ or the ‘Black’ who is excluded, but the ‘Arab (as) junky’ or ‘delinquent’ or ‘rapist’ and so on, or equally, ‘rapists’ and ‘delinquents’ as ‘Arabs’ and ‘Blacks’. Balibar considers this to be a new development in racism, terming it neo-racism. [21] Underlying the self-help attempts by the people of Okinawa to eliminate ‘Okinawan people’ who are ‘unclean’ and ‘lazy’ is precisely this kind of complex condition that Balibar terms neo-racism.

This structure of self-help signifies that even as the Other is excluded, it is also internalized. And it is precisely this internalized Other which functions as the menace that brings about discrimination against, surveillance over, and disciplining of, the self. Further, to promote that function, the internal Other is sometimes given a concrete face and excluded so as to provide a cautionary example. This can be said to correspond to Kan Takayuki’s point about the structure of the emperor system, in which ‘only on assenting to discrimination can one become a member of the community’. [22]

Incidentally, the kinds of subjectification and self-disciplining visible in self-help have the potential to tie up readily with labour discipline and military discipline. That is, self-help unfolds as the process of becoming ‘a Japanese’, but the eventual outcome is a disciplining that lays the groundwork for mobilization as labour force or military force. Even so, the processes in which people are constituted as labour force or military force proceeds as the fact of subjectively becoming ‘a Japanese’. Based on this point, the ‘Japanese people’ is none other than an aggregation of ‘resourceful persons’. [23] The everyday life that lifestyle reform performed was one that induced mobilization.

**Death of a teacher**

Keeping in mind this somewhat abstract framework concerning lifestyle reform, I would like to take up the life history of a teacher who set about lifestyle reform in Okinawa. [24]

Born in Izumi, Motobu village, Okinawa prefecture in 1892, Teruya Chuei entered Okinawa Teacher’s College in 1911. In Okinawa at that time, apart from success outside of the prefecture, prospects for advancement were largely limited to accumulating schooling and becoming an official or a teacher. And even for success outside of Okinawa, academic qualifications were a decisive factor. Consequently, the notion that advancement required education was extremely powerful. But people were confronted by the economic problem posed by education fees; the proportion of the peasant strata able to cover secondary education costs was less than 20 percent. [25] There was, however, a somewhat unusual way of getting ahead in the world, in which this obstacle was overcome by means of parents going overseas as migrants, and remitting funds for their children’s secondary education. [26] And so it was in Teruya’s case, with remittances from his father, who had migrated alone to North America, enabling him to proceed on to Okinawa Teacher’s College.
After graduating from Okinawa Teacher’s College in 1914, Teruya began his teaching career as an instructor at Ogimison Kijoka Middle School, and he then became primary instructor at Haneji Yagachi Middle School in 1916. In 1919, he was named deputy to the headmaster at Motobu Middle School. In 1920, he began as an instructor at Okinawa Teacher’s College Elementary School, and in 1924, at the youthful age of 32, he became the headmaster of Kunigami Middle School. After that, in 1927 he took the position of headmaster of Nakijinson Amesoko Elementary School, working there for 15 years. In 1942, he became Motobu National School headmaster. While Teruya may have devoted himself to public education, his curriculum vitae obviously reflects a record of personal advancement.

During his teaching career, and especially during his long stint as headmaster at Amesoko, Teruya actively promoted lifestyle reform. To give a few examples of his activities, firstly regarding hygiene issues, to borrow the words of one of his then colleagues, he bewailed ‘constantly the Okinawan people’s deficient sense of hygiene’, and strived for ‘domestic cleanliness, order and neatness, and the eradication of trachoma and skin diseases such as scabies’. He also took part in study groups and educational activities, and as headmaster, undertook analyses of drinking water quality in the school area, stationed a hygiene officer at the school, encouraged the installation of improved toilets, and so on. [27] These lifestyle reform activities brought not just students but people in the 6 districts and 41 hamlets of the school area to establish and follow comprehensive standards of living. In 1938, he was decorated by the Imperial School Hygiene Association in recognition of his activities.

About Teruya’s education in standard Japanese, a former student related that, ‘One day, I was cleaning the classroom with a few friends. It was after school hours, and perhaps we relaxed a little. Before we knew it, we were speaking in dialect, which was easier for us. Then suddenly Teruya appeared, his angry voice roared out like thunder, and he hurled chairs at us.’ [28] Similar unswerving insistence on the education of standard Japanese appeared also on the occasion of the establishment of a Children’s Association, in Teruya’s declaration that he wished to ‘discipline the sluggish minds of the Okinawan people, who are unable to present their own opinions before others confidently.’ [29] Teruya was also enthusiastic about improving Okinawa’s ‘outdated customs’, and patrolling at night with a bamboo staff, he would rail against dating parties and the singing of songs accompanied by the sanshin. [30]

It is easy to see an orientation towards becoming ‘a Japanese’ in Teruya’s lifestyle reform. As we can see from his statements, when he said ‘the Okinawan people’ had a poor sense of hygiene and were poor speakers, ‘the Japanese people’ were always in mind as the model objects of comparison. When Teruya was a youth, the Moral Improvement Campaign – part of the post-Russo-Japanese War Local Improvement Campaign – was unfolding in Okinawa. This Moral Improvement Campaign, which was to link up with lifestyle reform, targeted not just the Okinawan language, Ryukyuan clothing and tattoos, but also called for hair to be cropped short. Given the existence among the former Ryukyuan military classes of an ‘Obdurate Party’ of Sinophiles opposed to ‘annexation’ by Japan, cutting one’s hair became an important act in becoming ‘a Japanese’. Teruya was a primary school student at the time of the Moral Improvement Campaign, and said that when he had his hair cut short, he was overjoyed at his success in becoming ‘a Japanese’ [yamatonchu]. [31] Teruya grew up in the midst of the lifestyle reforms that modern Okinawa ceaselessly promoted.
This orientation of Teruya’s, towards becoming ‘a Japanese’ or ‘a Yamato’, can also be discerned in the fact that during his time as headmaster of Amesoko Elementary School, he was the first in the prefecture to construct a shrine to house the Imperial Portrait and the Imperial Rescript on Education, and to erect a statue of Ninomiya Sontoku [the nineteenth century model of the upwardly mobile Japanese peasant]. But in those acts there was, at the same time, a concern for his ‘native land’, Okinawa. What Teruya emphasized above all in his educational practices as a teacher was education about local and rural matters. In his essay, ‘Thoughts on the subject of geography’, published in the journal Okinawa Education (vol. 12, 1928), he raised the case of Okinawa in arguing for the need for a geography education that drew on local resources, from which can be grasped his strong attachment to his ‘native land’ of Okinawa. Further, he delimited this native land as ‘that area which the children are able constantly to see and hear’, with local resources comprising ‘everyday living materials’. His concern for his ‘native land’ of Okinawa tied up with the area that one could ‘constantly see and hear’, and was further to link up with lifestyle reform.

In the midst of the Lifestyle Reform Movement in 1939, the then Okinawan governor Fuchigami Fusataro argued for the ‘annihilation of Okinawan culture’, and he and the Folk Art Movement’s Yanagi Soetsu, who visited Okinawa the following year, engaged in the ‘Okinawan Dialect Debate’. Born in Fukuoka prefecture, Fuchigami became an Interior Ministry bureaucrat after graduation from Tokyo University’s Law Faculty, and in that capacity he was dispatched to Okinawa as prefectural governor in 1938. While it can be said that both Fuchigami’s call for the ‘annihilation of Okinawan culture’ and Teruya’s lifestyle reform both arose within the same process of imperial subject-making that took the form of ‘becoming Japanese’, I wish to distinguish clearly between the two. What can be grasped from Teruya’s orientation towards Japan as Yamato is concern for his ‘native land’ of Okinawa, and his discovery of everyday life as the site in which to translate that concern into practice. An acquaintance of Teruya’s later termed him ‘a teacher who loved Okinawa, and a teacher who loved Japan’. [32] These two facets, which at first glance appear contradictory within the context of the policy of imperial subject-making, were understood to be the same thing in the domain of everyday life. Because he loved his ‘native land’ of Okinawa, Teruya neither called for the ‘eradication of Okinawan culture’, as Fuchigami did, nor did he urge the protection of ‘Okinawan culture’ as having a ‘national treasure-like value’, as Yanagi Soetsu did. Instead, he turned to the site of practice that was everyday life. This means, to put it differently, that becoming ‘a Japanese’ is something ceaselessly confirmed within specific individual practices.

People like Teruya were by no means exceptional cases. Many Teruyas existed throughout Okinawa’s modernity, practicing lifestyle reform. This is why there is a need to confirm the social consequences of that fact. It can first be pointed out that wherever his concern for improvement sprang from, Teruya was a leader who engaged in surveillance over and denunciation of detailed aspects of everyday life. On hearing the Okinawan language being spoken, he would hurl chairs at the speakers, while at night, he would patrol with a staff, listening for echoes of the sanshin. Many such Teruyas created and maintained the mutual surveillance regime of Okinawan society manifested in people’s secret denunciations of each other as ‘moral criminals’ for speaking the Okinawan language [33], in the policing by regulations of going barefoot as ‘unclean’, and in the massive crackdowns on shamans as symbols of ‘outdated custom’. Moreover, surveillance extended to the leaders themselves. At the time, the leaders of lifestyle reform, as moral leaders who engaged in surveillance over ‘moral
criminals’, themselves had to present a model to emulate, through embodying the morality that was lifestyle reform. [34] It is this self-disciplining, in which people engage not just in mutual surveillance but also in auto-surveillance, that is the social result of lifestyle reform.

There is another point that needs to be made regarding the union of Teruya’s concern for his native land and his orientation towards becoming ‘a Japanese’. Namely, from the latter part of the 1930s, a path enabling the two to join without the mediation of everyday life was being formed. This path was provided by the emergence of the discourse of Okinawa as the ‘leader of the Southern Ocean’, which accompanied Japan’s southwards advance. From the late 1930s to the 1940s, when it is generally held that imperial subject-making policies penetrated Okinawa even more profoundly, a positive reappraisal of Ryukyuan culture, especially by the Okinawan Cultural League, was taking place. In this reappraisal, as can most evidently be seen in Asato En’s History of Okinawa’s Oceanic Development [35], the tradition of ‘the Okinawan people’ as ‘an ocean-going people’ was lauded, and the tradition of ‘the Okinawan people’ as leaders of the ‘Southern Ocean’ was ‘invented’. This new discourse did not replace lifestyle reform; rather, it functioned to reinforce it. That is, in order to become ‘a Japanese’ and ‘an Okinawan’ who was a ‘leader of the Southern Ocean’, it was even more necessary to improve daily life. [36] I wish to draw attention to the point that the Other known as the ‘Southern Ocean’ appeared in the process of becoming ‘Japanese people’ that gripped the people of Okinawa.

Lastly, the fate of the discipline constructed by lifestyle reform must be mentioned. As Japan advanced into Asia, the work of Teruya in, for example, organizing women’s patriotic labour units and soliciting and convincing volunteers for the navy took on the character of war mobilization. And when prefectural administrative functions were transferred to the 32nd Army stationed in Okinawa, and as a full battlefield administration was established, those teachers and officials and others who until then had been the leaders of lifestyle reform began preparations for the steadily approaching battlefield mobilization by arming the populace, forming militias and defence units. A certain Colonel Udo’s unit was stationed in Motobu, where Teruya had been appointed school headmaster after his time in Amesoko, and it is said that Teruya’s cooperation in assisting in the provision of food and labour was quite exceptional.

The moral leaders of lifestyle reform changed into leaders of battlefield mobilization, just as the discipline that lifestyle reform gave birth to changed into military discipline. And another name was given to those ‘moral criminals’ who were interior Others: that of ‘spy’. During the battle of Okinawa, Japanese troops massacred numerous residents for being ‘spies’. A violence beyond words rules the battlefield, and at first glance, this discourse about ‘spies’ is but the written form of allegations made by Japanese troops as they exercised violence. But more than that, it was the wartime shape taken by the peacetime discourse about ‘moral criminals’. For it was the ‘suspicious characters’ of peacetime who were re-construed as wartime ‘spies’. [37]

Having furthered lifestyle reform and enthusiastically cooperated with the Japanese military, Teruya Chuei was slaughtered as a ‘spy’ by Japanese forces at the height of the battle of Okinawa. News of his slaughter spread rapidly across the battlefields. In the midst of incredulity, anger, and fear, one person, his whole body shuddering violently, cried out, ‘If it has come to this, then even my own life is no longer precious! What is this talk of friendly troops, they’re worse than the US forces!’ [38] Teruya’s death decisively propelled residents’ estrangement from the military discipline of the Japanese troops. This estrangement was not just driven by fear, it also contained an anti-military resolve replete with anger. This was an anger at having
been betrayed, fuelled by the fact that Teruya had so obviously been a fervent cooperator with the Japanese troops. This anger at betrayal, intense because of the prior cooperation, was widely seen on the battlefields of Okinawa, and led to the formation of various anti-military movements.

However, the impact that Teruya’s death had upon people was not solely due to the fact that he had been a cooperator with the Japanese military. It was also conditioned by Teruya’s own life, which had led him to cooperate with the Japanese military, and ultimately mobilized him to his death.

**Memories of the battlefield – back in daily life**

Tsurumi Shunsuke introduces as an exemplary case of a soldier’s ideological conversion that of Yoshida Mitsuru: ‘Although aware of the collapse of the old hierarchical order in the external world’, Yoshida Mitsuru, a communications sub-officer on board the battleship Yamato that was sunk en route to the Battle of Okinawa, ‘continued in his own inner world to cling to a correctly-ordered hierarchy of the past that he held separate from the outside world.’ [39] The discipline that brought about his mobilization into the navy survived intact into the post-war as a bank worker’s discipline. Everyday life gave rise to discipline, and discipline tied up with mobilization. Regarding Yoshida’s ideological conversion, in which discipline carried over into the postwar, it is necessary first to point out the continuity of the everyday life that enabled conversion. Given this continuity, ‘the post-war situation, in which more Japanese people are company employees and civil servants than soldiers, does not constitute proof that Japan has switched to pacifism from militarism.’ [40] However, it is also the case that Yoshida Mitsuru was troubled by this continuity; he tried to stop to consider it, and that brought him to write his recollections of war.

While attempts to narrate battlefield memories are premised on an everyday life that preserves an astonishing continuity with the pre-war even as it moves into the post-war, they are also concerned with discovering and trying to explain battlefield memories that do not harmonize with that continuity. Furthermore, and to repeat the point, the everyday life that continues is still one that fosters mobilization. How are memories of the battlefield narrated? Or how are they forgotten? To consider these questions is also to discover everyday life as the scene of ideological struggles over mobilization.

In 1977, on the 33rd anniversary of Teruya’s death, a memorial stone was erected in Motobu town, Okinawa prefecture, and the following year in 1978 appeared a compilation of memoirs about him written by 67 of his friends, acquaintances, former students and relatives. It is entitled Spirit Appeasing Elegy. But the writings collected within it feel as if thoughts that people had stored away in their hearts for 33 years after the war had suddenly erupted. Rather than ‘appeasing spirits’, it raises them. [41]

It hardly needs to be said that the cause of this ‘spirit raising’ is the fact that Teruya was not just killed in action on the battlefield, but was killed by Japanese troops as a ‘spy’. On this point, memories of the battle of Okinawa concerning Teruya differ from those relating to Yoshida Mitsuru. For Teruya was not only mobilized towards his death, he was killed as an ‘enemy’ despite being mobilized.

Discipline did not only bring about mobilization towards death. There is no telling when the internal Other who maintains discipline will appear as an enemy. We must look here at the
intervention of the state, which organizes and conducts mobilization. But graver still, since the enemy is tied to the internal Other, the enemy may appear as one’s own self. Teruya’s tragedy lies in the fact that the Other born of his lifestyle reform suddenly appeared as his own self, to be killed as the ‘enemy Other’. The Teruya who lived for lifestyle reform and the Teruya as the ‘enemy Other’ are mutually exclusive. Herein lies the reason why Teruya’s death exists as a trauma for all those involved in lifestyle reform.

How can this trauma be narrated? The most common approach in the above-mentioned compilation was to praise the Teruya who lived for lifestyle reform, and to denounce the Japanese troops who attributed to him the face of the Other and killed him as an enemy on that basis. For example, the epitaph on his memorial stone reads: ‘Our teacher Teruya Chuei, of exalted character, faithful and wise, with a strong sense of duty, was a practical educator who lived according to his own teachings. However, during the Greater East Asian War, here in the land of his birth, in the confusion of the decisive battle for Okinawa, he was dealt a cruel end. We, former students, colleagues, friends and acquaintances, recall the greatness of our teacher, and erect here a sorrowful stone of remembrance.’

The more the fact that he was a ‘practical educator who lived according to his own teachings’ is stressed, the more the sorrow increases, and leads to intense anger towards ‘the crazed and hateful friendly troops’, towards the ‘madness of the Japanese troops’. Such anger has much in common with that which arose as news of Teruya’s massacre spread across the battlefield. Thus it leads also to anti-militarism and attempts to determine responsibility. But beyond the fact that it is based on Teruya being a ‘practical educator’ who enthusiastically advanced lifestyle reform, and who did not hold back in cooperating with the Imperial Army, this ‘sorrow’ cannot but make the attribution to him of the face of the ‘enemy Other’ a factor of the madness of war and the responsibility of ‘crazed’ Japanese troops. While we must not underestimate the significance of the anti-militarism movements and attempts to determine responsibility based on the anger arising from this ‘sorrow’, nor must we forget that the resultant style of critique, depending on the degree of anger involved, held that ‘his murder was a misunderstanding’, a ‘step too far’, or ‘deplorable’. By making his murder as the Other a factor of the external problems of ‘insanity’ and the ‘battlefield’, this kind of approach skirts the trauma of Teruya’s death. Also, the life recounted therein is limited to that of the Teruya who lived for lifestyle reform.

The next approach visible in the compilation is to seek the cause of his murder not in ‘madness’ or ‘misunderstanding’, but rather in the lifestyle reform movement. In the assertion that the history of imperial subject-making in pre-war Okinawa laid the groundwork for the battle of Okinawa, there is a slim chance of simultaneously narrating the two mutually exclusive Teruyas. But in this approach, lifestyle reform is equated with the policy of imperial subject-making, and narration of Teruya’s own practice in daily life is avoided. The policy and practice of imperial subject-making are made responsible for his death. With regard to this approach, too, we cannot underestimate its significance as agitation denouncing imperial subject-making. But by making his murder a factor of the external issues of ‘politics’ and ‘policy’, the trauma of Teruya’s death is again avoided. This approach does not narrate Teruya’s life, nor does it hold the possibility of referring to the fate of the interior Other born of lifestyle reform. In fact, it might even be said that this approach could turn everybody into a victim of imperial subject-making.

There is no mistaking that both these approaches are ‘spirit raising’, with regard to memories of the battlefield. And it is certain that both provide potential foundation for organizing movements
against the military and against the emperor. But within them there is also the avoidance of trauma, and oblivion. Further, they also contain the danger of bringing about oblivion of the fate of discarded Others.

The compilation contains a piece by Teruya’s third daughter Mariko, who was in her penultimate year at Okinawa First Prefectural Girls High School at the time of his death. [42] She was with Teruya up until just before his death. When she first heard the news of her father’s passing, she was not told that he had been massacred as a ‘spy’. She says that she thought, ‘so, as I feared, he has met his end in battle, cooperating with the military.’ Subsequently learning that he had been murdered, although distraught, she quelled her anguish out of consideration for the kindness of those around her. ‘If I despaired, the people around me would be even more burdened, so I tried as much as possible not to think about that hateful war. And so I would recall with fondness peaceful and pleasant childhood events.’ But it is not something that can be forgotten through effort. Rather than oblivion, the term silence is apt.

The Teruya who engaged in lifestyle reform does not appear in the daily life with her father that she recounts. She is silent about the trauma of her father’s death. Instead, scenes of ‘peaceful and pleasant childhood’ are picked out, as photos in an album. One could dismiss this as nostalgia, but there is also a silence here that declines to engage in too simplistic a ‘spirit raising’. And Teruya Mariko, who had become silent in the face of trauma, discovered a beautiful everyday life in the past, which looks also like a future to look forward to.

In the everyday life that she evokes, there is a description of when her father played a record for her on the gramophone, just before the start of the battle of Okinawa. ‘Listening, my father said to me, “Music today is almost all military anthems, but this music is really wonderful, Mariko. Let’s listen to it”. He lowered the volume, mindful of outward appearances, and we listened’. That gramophone never played music again.

If we accept the continuity of everyday life posited by Tsurumi, it would surely first be discovered in the task of constituting memories of the past, confirming them one by one. That would also constitute the discovery of everyday life as the scene of ideological struggle, and pose the problem of solidarity, of calling back the presence of the Others discarded in the process of becoming ‘a Japanese’. But, to discover this continuity, perhaps we need dreams of the future that look back to a beautiful past.

This article, published in Yoseba, volume 6, March 1993, was adapted and expanded in Senjo no kioku (Memories of the battlefield), Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Hyoronsha, 1995.


[17] Concerning lifestyle reform, see the writings of Tomiyama and Kaiho cited above.


[23] Okochi Kazuo, who was involved in war-time labour policies with the Industrial Patriotic Movement, for example, argued that the significance of ‘life renewal’ lay in fostering ‘human resources’ in the shape of ‘a strong “labour force”’, ‘able to be armed’, for the purpose of ‘engaging effectively in modern battle’. On that basis, he claimed that, ‘“human resources” are not only objective entities in economic terms. They are also the human and individual operators of that resource, and to that extent, they also know best their own resourceful existences, and can subjectively utilise their own potential. Through recognizing that “human resources” are also “resourceful persons”, I’d like to stress that they will best become able to harness their abilities as “human resources”’. To Okochi, fascinated by ‘resourceful persons’, must arise the question


[26] For example, the Administrative Continuance Documents of the Special Superior Section, Okinawa Prefectural Police, contained in the Governor’s Administrative Continuance Documents problematizes the abrupt end to migrant remittances related to the outbreak of war that result in the termination of children’s education. Okinawa Shiryo Henshujo (ed.), Okinawa Ken Shiryo, Kindai 1, 1987, p. 611.

[27] Chukonpu, pp. 83-84.

[28] Chukonpu, p. 139.

[29] Chukonpu, p. 80.


[31] Chukonpu, p. 171.


[34] Tomiyama, Kindai Nihon, pp. 124-125, note 12.

[35] First published as The History of the Oceanic Development of Okinawa (Okinawa kaiyo hattenshi) in 1941, it was later retitled The History of Japan’s Southern Development (Nihon nanpo hattenshi).

[36] While we can see therein how the subjectivity of ‘the Okinawan people’ is linked to ‘the Japanese people’ in the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, at the same time, there is a need to note the possibilities for disruption too. This point is related to the argument for Okinawan independence in the period immediately following defeat in the war. I’d like to treat this question separately on a later occasion.

[37] Tomiyama, Kindai Nihon.

[38] Chukonpu, p. 157.


[41] Ueda Masaaki says that ‘spirit-appeasing thought that breaks with and attempts to quiet vengeful spirits belongs to the ruling classes’, and further, defines ‘spirit-raising’ as ‘spirit-appeasing acts’ that re-ignite the ‘menace of the curses of vengeful spirits’. Ueda Masateru, ‘Tamafuri no sho’, in Seki Hironobu (ed.), Gendai no Okinawa sabetsu (Kaifusha, 1987).
“Memories of Okinawa: Life and Times in the Greater Osaka Diaspora”
Steve Rabson
2003
Islands of Discontent: Okinawan Responses to Japanese and American Power

Rabson’s chapter explores the experiences of Okinawans in mainland Japan, specifically the diaspora communities that developed in Osaka from the early 20th century to the present. These communities faced discrimination much like Irish, Jewish, and Italian immigrants in America. Rabson’s likening of Okinawan experiences on the mainland to that of foreigners trying to assimilate in a new country is an apt analogy. For example, as in America, some Okinawans changed their names to de-emphasize their Okinawan ethnicity, and laborers found they earned a lower wage than did other Japanese, and at times were told not to apply for certain jobs. Worsening economic conditions in Okinawa in the first decades of the 20th century had caused the sudden migration of Okinawans to the mainland, while other Okinawans migrated to Taiwan and the islands of Micronesia during the colonial period.

Rabson’s interviews with members of the Okinawan diaspora in Osaka reveal that not all experiences on the mainland were negative. Some Okinawans looked back fondly at their ability to earn any wages, even if they were low, and celebrated their experiences growing up in the hollows (kubun gwa in Okinawan dialect) of Taishō ward in Osaka, also referred to as the “Okinawan slums.” Some migrants embraced their Okinawan identity in the solace of Okinawan enclaves such as Taishō ward, where Okinawan cultural practices were observed, the Okinawan dialect was spoken, and Okinawans enjoyed a strong community spirit. However, other Okinawan memories focused on experiences of discrimination by Japanese who exaggerated ethnic and linguistic differences between Okinawans and Japanese. The experiences of discrimination led other Okinawans in Osaka to promote assimilation to eradicate their Okinawan-ness, that is, the qualities that made them targets of discrimination.

After the defeat of Japan in World War II, Korea and Taiwan became independent sovereign nations, although some would say that is debatable in Taiwan’s case, as it came under Kuomintang/Guomindang (the Nationalist Party, also known as the KMT) rule. Okinawa, on the other hand, was given to the US military in exchange for restoring Japanese sovereignty on the mainland, and it remained under American rule from 1952 to 1972. After strong Okinawan pressure for reversion, in 1972 American rule ended and Okinawa was returned to Japanese sovereignty. Okinawans expected that reversion would mean equality with the mainland, but, as Rabson notes, this hope was dashed; Okinawans discovered that discriminatory views toward them still persisted. Further, the US military bases continued as well. And so, the experiences of Okinawans who live on the mainland are similar to Ainu who live in Tokyo and other cities. Both groups still face discrimination and struggle to come to terms with their place in the nation state. Rabson also makes clear that Okinawans who lived in Okinawan diaspora communities found many ways to be Okinawan on the mainland and a plethora of ways to embrace or reject their identity. In some cases, Okinawans today reconcile their ambivalent place in the nation by claiming a dual identity as both Okinawan and Japanese.
Memories of Okinawa: Life and Times in the Greater Osaka Diaspora

Steve Rabson

This chapter is based on a study of people who have migrated from Okinawa to greater Osaka and their descendants. Okinawans are defined as individuals with at least one grandparent or two great-grandparents from Okinawa, including those who moved to greater Osaka between late 1945 and early 1972 when Okinawa was officially called “The Ryukyu Islands” by its American military occupiers. From July 1999 until June 2001, I administered a survey questionnaire to 313 respondents, interviewed more than 100 individuals, collected writings by and about Okinawans in greater Osaka, and attended their social functions, performance events, and informal gatherings. Throughout the two years of this study, I lived among Okinawan neighbors in the largest residential community of Okinawans in greater Osaka which is located in Taishō Ward of Osaka City. This chapter summarizes the history of Okinawan migration to greater Osaka; presents interviews and writings that describe, in particular, their experiences residing in what Okinawan scholars have called “ethnic communities”; examines the role of prefectural associations and other organizations of Okinawans in greater Osaka; and discusses the ways in which individuals in this diaspora remember Okinawa or view their relationship with an ancestral homeland where many of them have never lived.

Why they came to greater Osaka

Okinawans started moving to greater Osaka in significant numbers, mostly for temporary periods, around 1900, the same year commonly cited for the start of Okinawan emigration abroad. Most came either to work in factories or to sell Okinawan products, such as sugar, awamori, and textiles, after regular boat service was established between Naha and Osaka. During this period, Osaka was becoming known as “the Manchester of the East” for its many textile mills that recruited large numbers of workers, mostly women, including many from Okinawa and Korea as well as rural areas on the mainland. Families in Okinawa usually received a lump-sum payment for contracts negotiated through recruiters, and the factories provided their children, often girls as young as thirteen, with gainful employment, regular meals, dormitory lodging, and wages that helped support the household back home.

Unlike the vast majority of women from Okinawa who emigrated abroad either to join their families or marry emigrants, women and girls who went to work in mainland textile factories earned an independent income. Looking back decades later, many recall that, despite horrendous working and living conditions that were exacerbated by prejudice and discrimination, they felt proud to be earning money to help support their impoverished families and finance educations for their brothers. Retrospective accounts of this experience show a striking diversity of memories. In contrast to the first-hand accounts of exploitation and discrimination (quoted below) in Fukuchi Hiroaki’s 1985 book Okinawa jokō aishi (The tragic history of Okinawa’s women factory workers), Higa Michiko published a series of interviews ten years later in the Okinawa Taimusu quoting women who remember spinning factories as “good places where, as long as you could work, you could eat three meals a day. Even orphans could make a living.” Such memories remind us of desperate conditions in Okinawa, especially during the 1920s and 1930s when many families were short of food.

For mainland Japan, however, World War I brought enormous economic benefits. Besides adding former German concessions in China and German territories in the South Pacific to its
empire after Germany’s defeat, Japan gained a huge export market, which greatly stimulated its domestic industries. Manufacturers were deluged with orders for munitions and supplies as they displaced American and European manufacturers in large sectors both of the domestic consumer market and Asian markets.

The rural economy in Okinawa, already languishing, was devastated by the collapse of world sugar prices in 1921, compelling more Okinawans to leave for South America, Hawaii, and the Philippines, however, the largest number moved to mainland Japan. Meanwhile, expansion of the industrial and consumer economy on the mainland that started during the “World War I boom” intensified competition for workers among recruiters and employers. This resulted not only in better wages for women and men working in factories, but also made possible access to more prestigious jobs, especially for women, some of whom were now able to leave the spinning factories for work as department store clerks and telephone operators. New factories in Osaka and its environs brought a rapid increase in the city’s textile, construction, metal processing, and lumber industries. Shipbuilding firms also opened assembly plants in what was then the city’s Minato (“Harbor”) Ward where Osaka’s largest Okinawan community settled in the eastern portion that split off in 1932 to create Taishō Ward.

By late 1914, when Okinawan communities had begun to form, two-fifths of the population of Osaka’s Kita Okajima Precinct (part of Taishō Ward after 1932) was estimated to be from Okinawa. Of the approximately 20,000 who came to the mainland from Okinawa every year during the 1920s and 1930s, nearly half worked as manual laborers in the factories of greater Osaka. In 1925, for example, of 19,926 Okinawans moving to the mainland, 8,994 came to the Osaka-Kobe area. The recorded population of Okinawans residing there grew from 1,575 in 1920 to 8,994 in 1925 and 20,356 in 1930, declined to 16,929 in 1935, and grew again to 53,678 in 1940. During this same period for the mainland as a whole, the resident population grew from 9,626 in 1920 to 19,926 in 1925 and 43,150 in 1930, declined to 32,335 in 1935, and grew again to 88,319 in 1940. By 1940, the population of Okinawans on the mainland was approaching 15 percent of the total population of Okinawa Prefecture itself, some 600,000 at the time.

In contrast to Osaka, known as a “labor market,” Okinawans thought of Tokyo as a “center of arts and culture” where young people went to attend school and begin careers in such fields as literature, journalism, and painting, as well as in business. A popular saying in Okinawa at the turn of the twentieth century was “The rich emigrate abroad, the students go to Tokyo, and the poor go to Osaka.” In reality, of course, students also went to schools and colleges in Osaka and Kyoto. And, despite this “working-class” image of Osaka, many Okinawans in professions such as medicine, pharmacy, law, and education settled there after completing their schooling on the mainland. Okinawans in Osaka worked on the prefectural police force, in the city hall, on newspapers as reporters, and in local hospitals as physicians. By 1910 Osaka had approximately sixty Okinawan schoolteachers and thirty firefighters, Okinawans also worked in banks, shipping companies, and retail stores, managed restaurants and clothing stores, and owned small businesses in the city.

Yet in Okinawa today, there is a tendency to heroicize Okinawan emigrants abroad, especially those who have achieved prestigious social status, and to minimize discussion of Okinawan communities in greater Osaka which are still associated with poverty, day labor, unemployment, and slum conditions that no longer exist. To be sure, there are Okinawans in greater Osaka working in factories and on construction sites, but I also interviewed company presidents, a
middle level executive in a nationwide pharmaceutical company headquartered in Osaka, a
woman who was sales manager in the local branch of one of Japan’s largest insurance carriers,
the minister of a Christian church, teachers in public and private schools, university professors,
including one specializing in the Man’yōshū and another in Shakespeare, and a magazine
journalist who had just written her first novel. Commemorative volumes published by Okinawa
prefectural associations in greater Osaka accentuate Okinawan residents in high-status
occupations at least partly to counter negative stereotypes in Okinawa and among mainlanders.

When discussing Okinawan migration, mainlanders invariably refer to the “palm tree hell”
(sotetsu jigoku). This ironic phrase is commonly used to describe economic conditions in
Okinawa during the years following the collapse of world sugar prices in 1921. The devastating
shock, felt first by farm families, spread rapidly to related businesses and banks which failed one
after another. Employers could not meet their payrolls, and even the Okinawa Prefectural
Government, unable to collect taxes, went bankrupt.11 As in times of famine in the former
Ryukyu Kingdom, people resorted to eating the seeds and lower stalks of Japanese fern palm
(cycad) plants that provided nourishment, but required careful cooking to avoid food poisoning.
Okinawans, however, criticize the term “palm tree hell,” noting that it sounds like some kind of
natural disaster, obscuring the responsibility of the Japanese government for its discriminatory
policies toward Okinawa where, before World War II, people paid higher taxes and received
fewer social services than in any other prefecture. Okinawans also note that, far from protecting
the local sugar industry, the Japanese government abandoned it in favor of an intense program to
develop sugar plantations in Taiwan, Japan’s colony acquired as one of the spoils of victory in
the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95.12

With Okinawan migration to greater Osaka increasing thirteen-fold between 1920 and the early
1930s, the national government dealt with depression-era conditions in Okinawa by rejecting
proposals for relief and, instead, sending 56,000 Okinawans as emigrants to Japanese island
territories in the South Pacific where by 1940 they outnumbered local populations.13

Okinawan residents of greater Osaka today include people who came to rural areas of the
mainland initially in the massive evacuation that began in late 1944, and others who barely
survived the Battle in 1945. Memories of the evacuation, the Battle, and the firebombing of
Osaka in 1945 comprise an important legacy of the Pacific War in the Okinawan community. A
former resident of Motobu in northern Okinawa Main Island who migrated to Osaka in 1978
recalled his experience as a teenage survivor of the Battle in a September, 2000 interview.

I was drafted at sixteen for construction labor on the airfield at Kadena. The Imperial
Army soldiers had plenty of food, but for meals they gave Okinawan workers only one
brown-rice ball (nigiri) apiece. We were housed in Kin Village and, when it was bombed,
I was the lone survivor on our block, and had to take the bodies of my neighbors to their
relatives. By this time our rations had dwindled to almost nothing, so we chewed sugar
cane leaves and filled our stomachs with river water. After evacuating back to northern
Okinawa, I found Motobu in ruins and was wounded slightly in the head and leg by
shrapnel from an exploding shell nearby. I couldn’t find any of my relatives, so I stayed
with a family we had known well. The father fished for food in the bay off Sesoko Island
where he also swam to pick up leftovers that had been thrown away by crews on U.S.
warships. The American soldiers put us in a refugee camp, but I escaped and fled back to
Motobu, hiding inside caves and tombs along the way. After the war I was ill for a time from malnutrition.

In published reminiscences, Miyagi Masako, who later migrated to Amagasaki in Hyōgo Prefecture, remembered the Battle from when she was eight years old.

We had dug an air raid shelter under our house, but when the bombing and shelling got heavy, it was too dangerous and we had to leave. …We stayed for a while inside the family tomb, but couldn’t get any food there. …After one of my cousins died of starvation, we decided to set out for evacuation to northern Okinawa. …What I remember most after that is stepping over dead bodies and drinking water full of mosquito larvae. I tried not to look at the bodies, but they lay everywhere, swelling up grotesquely as days passed. I got so thirsty that I scooped up rain water with my hands from wash-tubs where baby mosquitoes were swimming. Finally, with no food or water and exhausted from walking, we became prisoners-of-war and ended up in the refugee camp at Koza.14

When the war finally ended, many Okinawans who had lived on the mainland or evacuated there before the Battle were unable to return during the period Okinawans call “kaosu” (chaos) stretching into the aftermath of massive destruction in which whole families were annihilated, villages obliterated, property demolished, and the landscape altered irrevocably. Thousands were finally able to go back, at least temporarily, beginning in 1946, but travel to and from Okinawa was strictly controlled under the U.S. “Military Government” which began requiring that people wanting to return provide family registers that had also, in many cases, been destroyed in the Battle. Those wanting to go to Okinawa included Okinawan soldiers returning from military service abroad or from prisoner-of-war camps in the U.S.S.R., as well as civilians. Occupation authorities on the mainland first established an office in Fukuoka to provide alternative documents, but many people were unable to obtain them. Later, U.S. occupation authorities in Okinawa issued what were euphemistically called “passports” for travel between the mainland and Okinawa, but were really more like the old Soviet exit visas, obtainable only after what were sometimes lengthy investigations. Those who did manage to return in the early postwar years often arrived to find their families decimated, their homes in ruins, little prospect for employment and, in some cases, their lands seized, without compensation, for U.S. military bases. As a result, many had to make U-turns back to the mainland. Kinjō Isamu recalls his family’s U-turn.

Both my parents had come to Osaka when the war started. My father got a job hauling military supplies, and my mother worked in a cotton-spinning factory. They fell in love, got married, and a daughter was born just as the war ended. But there wasn’t enough food in the place where they’d evacuated, and she died of mal-nutrition. They returned to Okinawa, where I was born, but couldn’t make a living there, so they took us back to Osaka. …Carrying our “passports,” the family—my parents and us five children—rode the boat over rough seas for three days and nights. …The first thing I remember about arriving in Osaka in 1954 at the age of three is that it was cold.15

A woman in her mid-fifties, born in Taishō Ward, commented on her questionnaire that “a month before I entered high school [in 1959], my parents took me for my first visit to Okinawa. It seemed so strange to me that we had to get a passport for traveling to what had been my parents’ home prefecture in Japan. I loved the beautiful scenery, but was shocked by all the military bases there, and it hurt me to see how many people were poor.”16
Having sacrificed 147,000 Okinawan lives in the 1945 war of attrition,\(^{17}\) the Japanese government continued to treat Okinawans as expendable after the war by agreeing in the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty not only to relinquish its colonies and territories, but also to hand over the Ryukyu Islands to the U.S. military in exchange for regaining Japanese sovereignty on the mainland. Many argue that the Japanese government’s discriminatory treatment of Okinawa continues today with post-reversion economic polices aimed at keeping the U.S. military presence concentrated in Okinawa by vastly increasing the “rents” paid Okinawans whose lands are still occupied by the bases, and by establishing a large “sympathy budget” (omoi-yari yosan) to fund construction in surrounding communities. The comparatively high unemployment rate (often twice the national average) resulting from this distorted economy still compels many in Okinawa to seek “work away from home” (dekasegi) on the mainland.

Where they settled: growth, movement, and changing conditions in the greater Osaka diaspora

Kansai, the mainland region with the largest number of migrants, encompasses Osaka, Hyōgo, and Kyoto Prefectures, but can also refer, along with Kinki, to a wider area including Mie, Nara, Shiga and Wakayama Prefectures. Okinawans reside throughout this region, but by far the largest numbers live in Osaka and Hyōgo, the only prefectures in Kansai with Okinawan residential communities. This is why, for the sake of convenience, I refer to Osaka and Hyōgo Prefectures as “greater Osaka.” Residential communities of Okinawans can still be found elsewhere on the mainland in Yokohama and Kawasaki, while in Fukuoka, Nagoya, Hiroshima and other cities, where such neighborhoods existed in the past, Okinawan migrants and their descendents have now largely dispersed, a process that occurs among migrant and immigrant diaspora in many countries. Such dispersion has also occurred in greater Osaka where Okinawans have settled in other neighborhoods and may have little or no connection with the residential communities.

Precise figures for Okinawans now residing on the mainland are not available. Until 1940 such statistics were compiled periodically from official family registers (kōseki) by the prefectural police in Okinawa. However, since the war, family registers of most Okinawans born in greater Osaka have indicated domiciles on the mainland, not in Okinawa. And many migrants established new family registers on the mainland after their official records were destroyed during the Battle of Okinawa. Prefectural associations have compiled estimates based on their membership lists, but, until recently, these have enumerated households, not individuals, and do not include non-member households. A more comprehensive, though imprecise, mainland-wide survey was published by the Okinawa Prefectural Association of Hyōgo (Okinawa Kenjin-kai Hyōgo-ken Honbu) in November of 2000 which estimated that the two largest populations by far were 36,500 in Yokohama City and 70,000 in Osaka Prefecture. Other sources estimate the population of Okinawans in Osaka City’s Taishō Ward at 19,000,\(^{18}\) by far the largest in Kansai.\(^{19}\)

Like migrant and immigrant communities elsewhere, Okinawan communities in greater Osaka formed near where jobs were available and where other Okinawans already lived who could provide support and contacts, especially important for newcomers. Many Okinawans also preferred an environment for daily life where it was possible to speak the dialects, eat the food, practice the religious observances, and maintain other social and cultural customs of the homeland to the extent possible in what were, for most, unfamiliar urban conditions. And, like migrants and immigrants in many places, people from Okinawa chose to live in such
communities in order to cope with prejudice and discrimination, including denial of lodging and employment, they encountered because societies at large have often tended to look down on or exclude people with differences, real or imagined. Relentless pressures to “assimilate” (dōka), coming both from mainlanders and from Okinawans themselves, caused many to abandon much of what was distinctively Okinawan when they stepped outside the community, but inside it people could still live, in many ways, as they had before coming to the mainland. In 1996 Kinjō Isamu recalled his early childhood in Taishō Ward shortly after his family moved there from Okinawa in 1954. By this time, Okinawans had been settling there for some three decades, and his childhood memories are far more positive than those of people who had migrated in the 1920s when the community was still going through its early growing pains. (See Oyakawa Takayoshi’s reminiscences below.)

My parents maintained our Okinawan lifestyle so completely that sometimes we forgot we were in Osaka. We always spoke in Okinawan dialect and, since we were among many other Okinawans in the Manzai-bashi section of Kita Okajima Precinct, it was easy to live this way. My father raised pigs [for the many cuts of pork used in Okinawan cuisine] and grew gōyaa [bitter gourd] in a vacant lot, and he made brown sugar candy. My mother had her weaving implements sent from Okinawa, and wove [Okinawan style] kasuri splash-patterned cloth. We conducted all the annual religious observances strictly by the old lunar calendar, including the spring shiimii festival of feast and prayer when relatives gather to honor departed ancestors, and the summer o-bon festival [when spirits of the ancestors are said to return to this world for a brief visit].

The distribution of the Okinawan population in greater Osaka has changed over time with shifting labor and consumer demands as old factories closed and new ones opened. The Okinawan community in Wakayama, a center of the prewar textile industry, virtually disappeared after World War II as many of its residents moved to the growing Okinawan community in Amagasaki where small and medium-sized metalworking shops were opening. Such shops can be found as well in Taishō Ward of Osaka, where community residents also work in the two large metal-parts factories, Kubota and Nakayama. Other Taishō residents work as proprietors or employees in stores, selling mostly consumer goods and services, including those which line the three-block long shopping arcade (shōten-gai) in Hirao Precinct, and also as professionals in real estate, pharmacy, medicine, dentistry, and teaching. Many single male residents in Taishō Ward work for local private contractors at construction sites, while, as elsewhere in Japan, there is a large and growing population of retirees.

Major movements of population have also occurred within localities, particularly starting in the late-1950s when families of Okinawans, as well as many mainland Japanese, moved from houses or tenements to apartment blocks (danchi) being built in large numbers at the time. This movement, however, was not always voluntary. In Taishō Ward, for example, residents of make-shift houses and barrack-like tenements in a low and often-flooded riverbank area of Kobayashi Precinct that Okinawans called “the hollows” (kubun-gwa in Okinawa dialect) were relocated by the city of Osaka to newly constructed municipal apartments nearby in the late 1960s and early 1970s. This was part of a citywide “slum clearance” plan that targeted this area of marshy, unclaimed land officially deemed unsanitary and unsafe. Okinawans had begun living there in the chaotic period just after World War II, which had left much of greater Osaka devastated from fire-bombings. On what had been unclaimed land they constructed dwellings from tarpaper, tin,
cardboard, plywood, and scrap lumber without official building permits. Interviewed in 1999, a former resident described the origins and growth of the hollows.

Many poor people began living there shortly after the war. When one person put up a house, others followed, building houses, moving in, and starting families. In the aftermath of recent bombings, there were always big puddles everywhere. Around 1950 people began putting up barrack-like tenements using lumber, tarpaper, and cement. Landlords living elsewhere also built tenements they rented.

There was electricity in the hollows, but the puddles slopped over with what seemed like sewer water. They were pumped out occasionally, but most of the time people had to put down boards for walk-paths to avoid sloshing through them.  

Kinjō Isamu recalled the hollows from the 1950s.

About one-third of the people there were Okinawans, with many of the others from Kyūshū and Shikoku. When new people moved in from Okinawa, their friends and relatives would come to help put up a house using discarded lumber and other materials. No one owned most of the land, so it was squatters’ rights for the first to claim an open space. My father built his first house this way with help from other Okinawans. Instead of paying them, he served food and drink afterwards. This was one of the ways the *yuimaru* (cooperative labor) system, used in Okinawa for such hard work as cutting sugar cane, also came to be applied in Osaka.  

Though called by the media at the time an “Okinawa slum,” some of the approximately 1500 Okinawan migrants and their descendants who lived there recall the hollows wistfully as a place with “a spirit of community cooperation” (*kyōdō-tai seishin*) where people helped build dwellings by *yuimaru* and loaned money to each other under the coop system, called “*moai*” in Okinawa, of pooling funds among relatives and close friends that is also practiced elsewhere in Asia. In addition, they made room in their homes for displaced neighbors, especially during such troubled times as when “typhoon Jane” leveled many dwellings and flooded the area in 1950. But other former residents call nostalgia for the hollows a romanticization of the past, and recall freezing winters, sweltering summers, flooding waters where sewage floated, swarming mosquitoes, devastating fires that fed on tarpaper, and taxi drivers who would refuse to take passengers to Taishō Ward for fear of soiling their vehicles in mud puddles or damaging their tires in potholes.  

Kinjō Isamu recalled that

Conditions there were much worse than in the neighborhoods of soggy old houses crammed together that we saw in a documentary film shown by one of our teachers at school with a passionate interest in the “Buraku problem.” I realized then that, like Buraku people, many Okinawans were hired only for grueling, dirty jobs, but that, in a way, we faced worse discrimination because, unlike them, we needed “passports” to visit our hometowns [in Okinawa under U.S. military occupation].

In 1996 Kakinohana Yoshimori remembered his first impression of the hollows from the early 1970s, shortly after he had moved to Osaka from Miyako Island.

Now people in Taishō Ward dress neatly, wearing the latest fashions, but in those days laborers walked the streets in baggy work fatigues. On the one hand, I was relieved to be among other Okinawans, but the place was depressingly poor. When I first saw the
The current fascination among mainland Japanese with things Okinawan, which includes Okinawan communities on the mainland, could explain, in part, why a place commonly called a “slum” in the past has become the object of recent nostalgia in Japan for the early postwar period and of admiration for the resourcefulness of its residents in the face of adversity. This trend could also explain why it has come to acquire a more positive image in the current memories of some Okinawans, and why published interviews and writings like those quoted in this chapter have been appearing recently. In May of 2001 the Kansai Okinawa Bunko (Culture Center) presented a four-day exhibition of work by Okinawan photographers who had been long-time residents of Taishō Ward. It was advertised as “photographs of the hollows,” and drew a steady stream of visitors, mainlanders and Okinawans alike, as well as coverage by the greater Osaka media.

Still, whatever “narrative” of the hollows one accepts today, for most residents it was their one and only home when Osaka City targeted it for “clearance” in 1969. Okinawan student leaders organized protests, applying such tactics as sit-ins at municipal government offices learned from local Buraku activists. Protracted negotiations with the city dragged on until most residents agreed to move, with negotiated rent subsidies, to new municipally owned apartment buildings (shi-ei danchi) in the early 1970s. The smaller number of people living in the hollows with deeds to their land were offered alternative lots, though of somewhat smaller size, in nearby precincts. Interviewed in 1999, one former resident recalled that “the compensation money the city was offering us to evacuate didn’t amount to a sparrow’s tear. They built fine apartments at the places we were relocated, but moving there put us all deeply in debt. I can still remember how worn out with worry members of the tenants’ association were as they ran around every day trying to scrape up the money for moving expenses.” The last tenant to hold out, an elderly woman, finally moved to a municipally owned apartment in 1979. “She was the last one to stay and fight the city’s evacuation order,” long-time Taishō Ward resident Kinjō Kaoru recalled in 1996. “Her life had been hard since she was a child. She couldn’t read and had no marketable skills. I once saw her walking alone through the pouring rain back to the hollows. She looked so lonely, though she never showed her sadness when she was with other people.”

After that, the hollows was sunk underwater, flooded deliberately for the artificial expansion of Osaka Bay. Meanwhile, some mainland Japanese living elsewhere in Taishō Ward voiced resentment because they were not offered relocation rent subsidies in the new apartments or alternative parcels of land. Today, nothing of the hollows or anything like it remains in Taishō Ward. Apartment buildings, large and small, and one-family houses predominate, along with residences storekeepers have built above or behind their shops. The Okinawan community there is now a modestly prospering, though far from affluent, neighborhood of merchants and working people roughly comparable in cultural distinctiveness and economic circumstances to Brooklyn’s ethnic neighborhoods in Williamsburg (Italian) and Greenpoint (Polish). As for land, virtually no vacant lots or open spaces remain today like those still available when Kinjō Isamu’s family moved to Taishō in 1954, so Okinawans can no longer raise pigs. However, many families still maintain small gardens of gōyaa that are so numerous on one street in Kobayashi Precinct that it
has come to be known as “gōyaa dōri.” Okinawan foodstuffs for preparation at home and in restaurants are sold in many neighborhood stores, including some run by mainlanders. 46% of the respondents to my questionnaire indicated that they ate Okinawan food regularly; 40% indicated that they observe Okinawan religious practices; and 60% indicated that they perform or listen to Okinawan folk music, which one can often hear walking along neighborhood streets in the evening.

**How they coped: adjusting to differences and responding to prejudice and discrimination**

People from Okinawa have encountered hardships on the mainland because of differences that are real, but more often imagined or exaggerated in the minds of mainlanders. A proportionally larger population from Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands settled in the Ryukyu Islands in prehistoric times than in what is now mainland Japan. As a result of this early migration, physiological characteristics distinguishing Okinawans from mainland Japanese include shorter average stature, darker skin, fuller chests, and rounder eyes. Yet many Okinawans are physically indistinguishable from a majority of people on the mainland where there is also significant individual and regional variation to the extent that some mainlanders are even said to “look Okinawan.” Mainlanders have tended to exaggerate or invent “differences,” cultural as well as physiological, fostering stereotypes which are likely to be activated when someone is thought to be Okinawan. Furthermore, people who are said to “look Okinawan,” like Okinawans themselves, have been ridiculed for features that are, in fact, envied by many on the mainland. In what is one of the most popular cosmetic surgical procedures in the country today, women have tissue removed to enlarge their eye openings. And the beaches in Okinawa are crowded year-round with women and men from the mainland assiduously darkening their skin, suntans acquired in the pursuit of leisure being a mark of wealth and sophistication often associated with travel abroad.

While their physical features have often attracted unwanted attention, language differences have posed more serious problems for Okinawans on the mainland. Again, both real and imagined differences are involved. During the U.S. military occupation of Okinawa, mainlanders sometimes asked people from Okinawa if they spoke English at home. As for actual differences, the dialects of mainland Japan and the Ryukyus are closely related structurally, and are said to have diverged from a single “mother dialect” in a process thought to have occurred between the second and seventh centuries A.D. Today Ryukyu dialects have come to be the most divergent among all local dialects in Japan, a distance which has been compared to the difference between French and Italian. And, like dialects in northern Honshū and southern Kyūshū today, the dialects of the Ryukyu Islands, some of which are mutually unintelligible, are not understood by people in other parts of the country unless they make a special point of studying them. On the other hand, for more than a century, since the middle of the Meiji Period (1868-1912), “standard” Japanese has been promoted by the media in Okinawa and required—at times punitively—in local schools. With daily discourse among those under fifty now conducted almost entirely in “standard” Japanese, the dialects of Ryukyu are gradually dying out despite recent efforts at preservation in the arts and education.

Nevertheless, many Okinawans on the mainland, especially those migrating after early childhood, have struggled, at least to some extent, with “standard” Japanese. Even younger migrants who have mastered it in Okinawa as their first language often retain a distinctively “Okinawan accent” and may be unfamiliar with certain local idioms, resulting in ridicule and a
self-consciousness that hinders their ability to express themselves fully. An “Okinawan accent” includes a more fluctuating intonation (as opposed to a flatter mainland intonation) along with the occasional lengthening and shortening of vowels contrary to the mainland standard (Amagasaki pronounced as “Amagasaaki” and Osaka pronounced as “Osuka”). A woman in her late fifties who had come to Osaka in 1953 reported that one reason she had become active in the local Okinawa Prefectural Association was so that “I could feel comfortable about speaking with others in an Okinawa accent (Okinawa-namari).” When speaking to each other in Osaka, first generation migrants from Okinawa often mix words and phrases from Okinawa dialect with Kansai Japanese. In an ironic reversal, the recent “boom” of interest in Okinawan culture has given the dialect a “trendy” status in Japan today so that mainlanders are now picking up expressions like chura (pretty girl or handsome boy), waji-waji (angry), and kūsu (awamori aged at least five years), as well as learning the words for such Okinawan cuisine as gōyaa (bitter gourd), mimi-gaa (pickled pigs’ ears), and saada-andagii (spherical donut).

Among Okinawans interviewed for this study who recalled struggles with language on the mainland was a woman in her fifties who had moved to Osaka from Nago in the early 1960s. After finally receiving her “passport,” she arrived in Osaka and was hired in an office where she had to answer the telephone and take messages. She often needed to ask callers to repeat information because she could not understand it the first time or worried that her reply was not being understood by the caller. At such times she would apologize, explaining that she had arrived only recently from Okinawa.

A woman in her mid-forties who had come to greater Osaka in the mid-1970s told in a June, 2001 interview of a co-worker from Okinawa at a supermarket who was harassed relentlessly by his supervisors because he couldn’t adjust immediately to local customs of repeatedly greeting and thanking customers with the correct phrases of Osaka dialect. And, in a case that became a “cause celebre” in the Taishō Ward community, a nurse trainee from Okinawa was fired in 1977 by a local hospital for alleged “inefficiency” because, her supervisor said, she spoke with an Okinawa accent. Despite intimidation by yakuza thugs, her supporters lodged a formal protest with the hospital director and the young woman’s dismissal was rescinded. She subsequently resigned her job, received compensation from the hospital as part of a settlement, and returned to her home on Iheya Island.

Interviewed in April of 2000, a 48-year-old neighbor of mine who had migrated to Osaka in the early 1970s and remains single gave struggles with language as the main reason he never dated women born and raised on the mainland, though he had been approached a number of times over the years, including on two occasions during my residence there, by such women who said they found him attractive. And a woman from Nago in her early thirties who had migrated as recently as 1985 reported that “I had real trouble with language when I first arrived, especially because idioms and intonation was different. I felt depressed because I was often unable to express myself or understand completely what others said. Even today, I have occasional problems.”

It is important to note, however, that Okinawans are not the only people from local areas of Japan to struggle with language. As noted above, some dialects spoken on the mainland, especially in northern Honshū, southern Kyūshū, and other mountainous or rural areas, are also largely incomprehensible outside their localities of use. People from these areas have also encountered language problems when they left home for work in Osaka and elsewhere in Japan. Even today, people from other places on the mainland who live in Osaka are said, often
disparagingly, to speak with “a Kyūshū accent” or “a Shikoku accent.” Speaking Japanese with an accent or lacking immediate mastery of local greetings hardly justify the mistreatment Okinawan workers have suffered at the hands of mainland employers who have sometimes sought to exclude them altogether.

Aside from language, other differences exaggerated or invented have spawned prejudices and discrimination in their most virulent forms. Japanese who traveled or worked in Okinawa early in the Meiji Period initially conveyed stereotypes that were already widespread and deeply rooted in Japan by the turn of the twentieth century. Perhaps the most blatant (and subsequently most studied) manifestation of these attitudes was the notorious 1903 “human pavilion incident” at the Fifth World Trade and Industrial Exhibition, held that year in Osaka. The so-called “scientific human pavilion” (gakujutsu jinrui-kan) was not one of the official, government-sponsored exhibits, but was designed and constructed as a private business venture in consultation with Tsuboi Seigorō, known as “the founder of Japanese anthropology.” What has subsequently been described as a “freak show” was located just outside the main entrance to the exhibition grounds where it could easily attract some of the estimated 5,300,000 visitors to what was Japan’s largest yet international exhibition. Scheduled to open on March 10, it was to feature twenty-one highly exoticized “representatives” of “eight peoples:” five Ainu, four Taiwanese, two Koreans, three Chinese, three (Asian) Indians, one Javanese, one Bulgarian, and two Okinawans, all dressed in their “native” (genjū-min) clothing and displayed in cubicles that were later compared to animal cages at circuses. Protests from the Chinese Embassy and from Koreans in Osaka led to cancellation of exhibits from these countries (Korea was “annexed” by Japan as a colony seven year later in 1910), and protests from Okinawa, such as an angry editorial in the April 7, 1903 Ryūkyū Shinpō declaring “We must never tolerate such humiliation,” led to removal of the “Ryukyu” exhibit in May after two months of display.

Poet Yamanokuchi Baku (1903-1963), born in Naha, who spent virtually all of his adult life on the mainland, poignantly evoked mainland stereotypes of Okinawans. In his short story “Mr. Saitō of Heaven Building,” the narrator recalls the experience “of living in Tokyo as a man from ‘Ryukyu’ for the past sixteen years. I’ve run into people wherever I go who…stare at me strangely—as if I’m not even human. And in those stares I can hear their questions. Is Ryukyu in Okinawa Prefecture? Do the people there eat rice?” More recently, during the U.S. military occupation when far fewer mainlanders than now made visits to Okinawa which then required passports and entry permits, people from Okinawa on the mainland were asked such questions as whether they lived in a jungle, wore grass skirts, or ate with knives and forks.

Moving from Okinawa to Osaka in 1925 at the age of nine, Oyakawa Takayoshi recalls his first few weeks in school on the mainland.

Some of the other students would look at me derisively, calling me “Ryukyuan.” …I was shocked, having no idea why they made fun of me because I was from Okinawa. …It got so bad I couldn’t stand it, and stopped going to school for about a week. My parents understood what was happening, though, and didn’t scold me.

Drafted into the Imperial Japanese Army in 1937, Oyakawa writes, “the first unit I was assigned to was all Okinawans because, it was explained in the company briefing, soldiers from each prefecture were trained in separate units. But the company commander made fun of us, saying it was really because ‘Okinawa is thirty years behind the mainland.’”
Okinawans have encountered prejudice on the mainland whether, like Oyakawa, they settled there or came temporarily for “work away from home.” Kinjō Tsuru went to work in 1919 at the Fukushima Spinning Factory in Shikama, Hyōgo Prefecture.

My contract was for three years, but I ran away after working for only one. … I just couldn’t stand it anymore, always being made fun of because I was from Okinawa.

I was taunted especially by the woman of about fifty who was in charge of our rooms in the dormitory. Whenever she talked to me, she would yell out scornfully, “Hey, you, Ryukyu” or “Listen here, Ryukyu.” I’m no weakling, though, and yelled back at her. … “So what’s wrong with being from Okinawa?” or “Didn’t you also come out of a womb?” …

We Okinawan women formed a group that stood up to her, and there were a lot of big arguments. I remember Ms. Yonamine especially. She was about forty and really told that room manager off. “We might be under contract here,” she said, “but we haven’t sold our lives to you.” I’ll never forget how good that made me feel. …

If we were late getting back for the five-o’clock curfew, we’d be called into the office the next day for a bawling out of “you Ryukyu girls.” Only one person there, a man working in the kitchen, treated us well because, he said, we had come from so far away. We called him Dad.45

Besides barbs and insults, the problems people faced on the mainland simply because they came from Okinawa manifested themselves in material ways that directly affected their lives and livelihoods. Starting in the 1920s, some employers and landlords posted signs in front of factories, employment offices, and lodging houses announcing “Koreans and Okinawans prohibited” (Chōsen-jin Ryūkyū-jin o-kotowari). In explaining such exclusion, employers sometimes complained that Okinawans tended to change jobs if they were offered better conditions elsewhere, and landlords claimed that Okinawans tended to live with too many relatives in lodgings meant for fewer tenants. It is true that people who traveled long distances to “work away from home” often lived with relatives, at least temporarily until they got settled. But Okinawans were certainly not the only ones coming from remote rural areas of Japan to lodge with relatives in cities like Osaka, especially during the acute prewar housing shortage. Furthermore, large families that often included in-laws and grandparents were still the norm in Japan at this time. And, while it is true that Okinawans would change jobs for higher wages, especially since they had to send at least part of their earnings back to their families, they were surely not the only workers in Japan leaving one workplace for better conditions at another.46

In fact, Okinawans might have been motivated, at least in part, to change jobs because employers seem to have considered it smart business practice to offer them lower wages and inferior working conditions. Extensive statistical records from the 1920s and 1930s reveal a pattern of discrimination in employment contracts, housing, and even workplace safety measures. Tomiyama quotes published interviews of company officials who recalled that, seeking workers at low wages, “we made a special effort to recruit factory women from among Koreans, Okinawans, and Burakumin.”47 Employers at mainland cotton spinning factories in particular assumed that
“Ryukyuans” could be paid lower wages, would put up with abusive working conditions, and did not require compensation for fires or accidents. This discriminatory attitude manifested itself in a number of management policies, such as housing Okinawans separately and giving them different meals from mainland workers.\textsuperscript{48} Statistics also show that women from Okinawa were disproportionately assigned the most dangerous and arduous jobs in spinning factories.\textsuperscript{49} Arakaki Kaeko, who worked in 1927 at the Fukushima Spinning Factory, in Hyōgo Prefecture, describes one of several successful protests against discriminatory treatment of workers from Okinawa.

They deducted 15 sen from our monthly wages for meals, but served only leftovers to the Okinawans. The mainland workers got warm rice, while ours was always cold. It was clearly discrimination.

Finally, we couldn’t stand it anymore, and six of us Okinawan factory women decided to take action in protest. “The hell with this,” we told them. “You deduct all this money from our pay, and give us nothing but leftovers.” Then, as soon as they served us the food, we hurled it back in their faces and knocked the serving trays down on the floor.

This really shocked the company, and after that we got the same food as the mainland workers.

Also, among other insults, our supervisors were always telling us that “Okinawans are dirty because you eat garlic and pork, like Koreans who eat red pepper.”

So one day all the Okinawans gathered for a protest in the factory yard. We sat down on the ground and refused to work or eat in what today would be called a hunger strike. Then, maybe after the company contacted him, the president of the prefectural association, Mr. Kinjō, arrived in a hurry to check out the situation. “We can’t work any more in a place like this,” we told him. “Please get us the money for our return fares.”

At last the factory manager showed up and apologized to us, and since the supervisors had to go along with him, our treatment suddenly improved.\textsuperscript{50}

As recalled in interviews, these experiences from the spinning mills indicate, first, that Okinawans did not necessarily accept prejudice and discrimination passively, and, second, that mainland co-workers and supervisors were responsive at times to their protests. Blatant discrimination persisted well into the postwar years despite the fact that it was now illegal. Two people I interviewed for this study reported seeing signs in front of apartment buildings in Taishō Ward as late as 1973 announcing, “Okinawans and members of Soka Gakkai not admitted” (Okinawa to Soka Gakkai, nyūkyo o-kotowari), and a local community leader reported in 1987 that some landlords in the city were still refusing to rent to Okinawans.\textsuperscript{51} A woman interviewed in April of 2000 said she was told by landlords that Okinawans tend to live with too many relatives, the same excuse given in earlier decades, and that members of Soka Gakkai, a Buddhist sect that actively recruits and proselytizes, tend to hold crowded, noisy prayer meetings at night. Signs excluding Okinawans on taverns and restaurants in Tokyo and Yokohama have been observed as late as the mid-1980s, and were given by one interviewee in March of 2001 as a major reason for moving from Yokohama to Osaka.
Protests by women mistreated in textile factories and by supporters of the nurse fired in 1977 for speaking with an “Okinawan accent” represent some of the many ways Okinawans on the mainland have responded to these injustices. Considering that the source of prejudice and discrimination is often psychological—presumptions of superiority by a majority over a minority—many Okinawans have sought to associate themselves in mainland minds with the majority by undertaking prodigious efforts to “assimilate.” Throughout the prewar and wartime years, and during the U.S. military occupation, Okinawans have often identified themselves with this majority by vigorously emphasizing their Japanese nationality. Published reaction from Okinawa in 1903 to the “human pavilion” at the Fifth World Trade and Industrial Exhibition in Osaka did not criticize the inhumanity of such a display, but its inclusion of Okinawans with Ainu and Taiwanese. An April 7 editorial in the Ryūkyū Shinpō declared that “it is a great insult for people of our prefecture to be singled out for inclusion with Taiwanese tribesmen and Ainu. …Our prefecture is making rapid strides today in education and in conforming with (itchi suru) other prefectures in all matters, such as styles of dress for men and women.” The writers objected, not to the exhibit in principle, but to its inclusion of “Japanese citizens of Okinawa Prefecture,” and complained that “lining up citizens of Okinawa Prefecture with Taiwanese barbarians (seiban) and Hokkaido Ainu is to view Okinawans…as one of these.” With heavy overtones of scapegoating, the editorial described this “humiliation” as the result of “being portrayed as an ‘inferior race’ (rettō shuzoku).”

This attitude has been characterized as the victims of discrimination becoming its perpetrators, and was also observed among women factory workers in Osaka from Okinawa and Korea who are said to have hurled the derogatory epithets “Korean whore” (Chōsen pii) and “Ryukyu pig” (Ryūkyū buta) at each other during arguments. Furthermore, Okinawans sometimes assign high and low “status” among themselves. A first-generation migrant from Miyako Island, interviewed in April of 2001, reported that some migrants to Osaka from Okinawa Main Island (hontō) have tended to look down on people from the outer islands (ritō). Protesting “the evils of discrimination” with a more positive appeal to shared national identity, Okinawan novelist Kushi Fusako pointed out in 1932 that “Like mainlanders, Okinawans serve in the military and perform their other duties as citizens.”

Okinawans who emphasize their Japanese nationality have often, but not always, de-emphasized their Okinawan ethnicity. Their efforts to “assimilate” culturally with majority Japanese (Yamatun-chu) have included not only practicing mainland customs of dialect, diet, dress, interpersonal formalities, and religious observances, at least outside the home or neighborhood, but also rejecting traditional Okinawan religious practices and such art forms as classical dance (ryūbu) and folk songs (min’yō or shima-uta), or performing them in private, away from the eyes and ears of Yamatun-chu. Oyakawa Takayoshi recalled that, after moving to Osaka in 1925 as a child, he developed a strong aversion for things distinctively Okinawan.

I hated Okinawan dance and sanshin [Okinawan shamisen] music…and despised the word ‘Ryukyu.’…In Chitose Precinct there was an open field where performers erected a lean-to stage, set up a booth for collecting admission, and put on Okinawan plays. Mainlanders would gather to watch in fascination, but they made fun of Okinawans in loud voices and I felt ashamed.
Another thing I hated was when people riding the trains or walking down the street spoke in Okinawa dialect. I thought that in public they should always use standard Japanese or Osaka dialect.\(^{55}\)

Perhaps the most conspicuous way Okinawans on the mainland have sought to de-emphasize or conceal their ethnicity has been changing the pronunciations, and sometimes the Chinese characters, in their distinctive Okinawan names. This trend started in Okinawa itself after Japan’s victory in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 when more and more Okinawans wanted to identify themselves with a nation rising in wealth, power, and status. Name-changing is, of course, an expedient familiar to many Americans, like myself, whose names were changed from those of recognizably Irish, Italian, or Jewish origin to inconspicuous “Anglo” alternatives. My grandfather, who emigrated from Russia to the Lower East Side (then a Jewish ethnic community) of Manhattan in 1900, agreed somewhat reluctantly when his children changed the legal family name from the obviously Jewish Rabinowitz (meaning rabbi’s son) to “Rabson” during a time of widespread anti-Semitism in the 1930s. (Despite the legal change, he never used “Rabson.”) Okinawans changed their family names around the same time in mainland Japan so that Kinjō became “Kaneshiro,” Higa became “Hiyoshi,” and Kabira became “Kawahira;” and men also changed their personal names from, for example, Shin’yū to “Masahiro,” Ryōmei to “Yoshiaki,” and Shōtoku to “Masanori.”\(^{56}\) In Japan before 1945, changing one’s name to characters or their readings more common on the mainland was a relatively easy procedure, and even officially encouraged at a time when the Japanese government was also endeavoring to “assimilate” residents of colonies in Taiwan and Korea as “imperial subjects.” In fact, such changes were made mandatory in Korea by the notorious “Name Order” of 1939 requiring Koreans to adopt Japanese names.

Yet even during the prewar years when pressures to assimilate were at their peak, some Okinawans on the mainland opposed tendencies to reject their traditional culture, vigorously asserting its value. In 1927 sanshin performer Fukuhara Chōki founded a record company in Osaka devoted to Okinawan folk music; and Kushi Fusako wrote five years later, “I do not believe that our customs that differ from those on the mainland should be despised or discarded. [They] have deep roots in our culture [and] natural environment.”\(^{57}\) Interviewed in 1996, Kinjō Kaoru, who immigrated to greater Osaka as a small child in 1954, asserted that “people being different doesn’t make them better or worse. I think it’s been a mistake for us to try to become Japanese to the extent of destroying our own ethnicity.”\(^{58}\) Published in 1996 during a nationwide “boom” of interest in Okinawa, such affirmations of the value of Okinawan ethnicity could well have had more resonance among readers in contemporary Japan than Kushi’s affirmations would have had in 1932 when government policy and popular trends for assimilation were intensifying after the Manchurian Incident the previous year.

**How they organized: changing forms and agendas of the Okinawa prefectural associations**

Along with the sometimes-painful efforts to “assimilate” with mainland Japanese, migrants from Okinawa have had notable successes organizing for their mutual benefit and advocacy as Okinawans. This organizing, crucial to survival for people dealing with poverty, cultural differences, and discrimination, began informally with the first “pioneer” migrants who provided material assistance and networks of contacts for housing, employment, and even marriage, to friends, relatives, and fellow-villagers moving to the mainland. The first formal organization in
greater Osaka was the Kansai Okinawa Prefectural Association (Kansai Okinawa Kenjin-kai), founded in 1924. The association’s newspaper *Dōhō* (Comrades) explained:

Our prefecture is under the same government as the rest of Japan, but, because we are in a remote location and have a different history and economic structure, we encounter unexpected misunderstandings and insults from the people of other prefectures. If we are to overcome the many obstacles imposed only on our prefecture and advance, socially and economically, to the status of people in other prefectures, we cannot possibly rely on the strength of disparate individuals. …It is through one organization that we must move into society.59

The authors of this article go on to support their call for organizing with comparisons that pose discrimination in global terms, but are sure to raise eyebrows today.

As individuals, the Jewish people have produced great numbers of outstanding individuals compared with other peoples of the world, and, it is fair to say, have been praised and honored since ancient times as being truly the highest among races in human society. Yet, the reality of their daily lives is precisely the opposite. In Europe and America today, Jews are subjected to outrageous insults. This is because their strength as individuals is dispersed and they have not organized as a group. …In the reverse phenomenon, the Burakumin have not produced outstanding individuals of world-renown, but, in less than four years time, they have built an organization and forged an ethnic solidarity that have made them the largest and most powerful social movement in Japan.60

Despite a founding statement that contained apparently unintended slights of Burakumin and factual errors (there were numerous Jewish organizations in Europe and America in the 1920s), the Kansai Okinawa Prefectural Association built on appeals for ethnic solidarity to establish numerous local branches and subdivisions. The association has subsequently gone through one dissolution and rebirth as well as several re-organizations. Meanwhile, separate associations have been formed in the other prefectures of greater Osaka, the largest and most active today being the Hyōgo Okinawa Prefectural Association (Okinawa Kenjin-kai, Hyōgo-ken Honbu), founded in 1946. People have also organized into groups from local areas of Okinawa, and today there are hometown friendship associations (*kyōyūkai*) of migrants and their descendants for Nakijin, Haneji, Haibaru, Kochinda and other localities from which large numbers of people have moved to greater Osaka.

The roles of the prefectural associations have, of course, differed from each other and changed over time. In the early years, they provided essential support systems, including loans and temporary housing, to new arrivals and, unlike today, they led the movement for improved conditions among Okinawan factory workers. While they have continued to aid new arrivals from Okinawa, they function more as social and cultural facilitators today, presenting concerts and Okinawan products expositions, arranging and providing venues for classes in Okinawan performing and design arts, and organizing regular gatherings of community members. While they cooperate with each other in a wide range of ways, disagreements have arisen from time to time within and among prefectural associations over, for example, whether and how to become involved in political issues.
The first incarnation of the Kansai Okinawa Prefectural Association was led by activists committed to Marxist ideals, and organized on the model of a political party. Established in 1924, it was deeply involved in labor-union efforts to improve the wages and working conditions of factory workers in Osaka, many of whom came from Okinawa. However, within two years, this organization was virtually decimated by arrests of its leaders following brutal government suppression in 1926 of a strike by Okinawan workers that association leaders helped organize at the Tōyō Cotton Industries’ Sangenya factory, located in the present Taishō Ward of Osaka. On August 11 union members submitted a fifteen-point written petition to company officials seeking compliance with factory labor laws, freedom to leave the company grounds, an end to mandatory transfers of workers’ earnings to their families in Okinawa, equalization of wages, and reforms of other discriminatory practices. The company responded by firing forty of the petitioning union members. A strike began in the early morning of August 14 with 200 factory women from Okinawa leaving the dormitory. The police were quickly mobilized to drag them forcibly back to the factory grounds where many were beaten, kicked, and thrown in the mud by company supervisors. Now the police arrested more than 50 labor activists in the Kansai Okinawa Prefectural Association on charges of inciting a riot, and jailed many of them. Two years later the labor organizing activities of the association were effectively shut down by the massive police round-ups of “leftists” and others viewed as dissidents on March 25 and April 16, 1928, and continuing government suppression resulted in an end to all the association’s activities in the late 1920s.  

This experience has loomed large in the memories of older Okinawans in Osaka, and was cited by Okinawan sociologist Shingaki Masami as one reason that the current leadership of the Osaka League of Okinawa Prefectural Associations (Osaka Okinawa Kenjin Rengō-kai), established in 1946, a successor organization to the Kansai Prefectural Association, has been reluctant to pursue an active agenda on social and political issues today. When the Kansai Okinawa Prefectural Association was re-established in 1931, the labor activists were gone and its new leadership was comprised of professionals with university degrees who turned away from labor activism. In place of the former political-party structure, the leaders re-centered the organization around the hometown friendship associations of people from local areas of Okinawa. Though debate resumed over the relative merits of assimilating or living as Okinawans, leaders called for Okinawans to speak “standard Japanese,” associate more with people from other prefectures, minimize the practice of Okinawan customs, and abandon Okinawan religious practices in favor of mainland Shintō. This was, of course, a highly repressive period of growing militarism in Japan when the government was compelling the worship of state Shinto and banning indigenous religious practices as part of the “policy to make imperial subjects” (kōminka seisaku) in Okinawa, as well as in Japan’s colonies and territories.

Since World War II the leaders of prefectural associations have continued to disagree on how to respond to pressures for assimilation and whether or how to advocate on political issues. However, as in Okinawa itself, overwhelming support developed among members for reversion, particularly after U.S. seizures of private land for military bases brought many involuntary “migrants” to greater Osaka. Okinawans there felt increasingly cut off from their homeland after what they called the “disappearance of Okinawa Prefecture” in 1945 and the Japanese government’s agreement to a Peace Treaty that “severed Okinawa from Japan” in 1952. Overcoming initial reluctance among leaders of the Osaka League, prefectural associations in greater Osaka and elsewhere on the mainland went on to play a major role in the reversion
movement. They organized large demonstrations in 1956 which featured speakers from Okinawa as part of the “land struggle” (tochi tōsō) protesting U.S. seizures of land for military bases in Okinawa and occupation rule generally. Subsequent protests calling for reversion drew many participants, including a demonstration by more than 10,000 in Osaka City on October 1, 1966 during which a petition was presented to visiting Prime Minister Satō Eisaku.

Large numbers of mainland Japanese joined the struggle for reversion, though Okinawans sometimes complained about ulterior motives among those on the right who seemed interested mostly in recovering territory lost in war and those on the left who seemed intent on using “the Okinawa problem” as a political football to attack the conservative government. Nevertheless, achieving reversion was crucial materially and psychologically for the entire Okinawan diaspora, removing the stigma of Okinawans as “an occupied people” and freeing the flow of communication, information, and travel.

Japanese citizens no longer needed “passports” to enter Okinawa, and published materials from the mainland were no longer screened by military censors. However, as in Okinawa itself, the terms of the reversion agreement provoked anger and a sense of betrayal because U.S. bases remained virtually intact despite the Japanese government’s constantly repeated promises to reduce the military presence in Okinawa to “mainland levels” (hondo-nami). As a result, the reversion agreement (henkan-kyōtei) came to be known sarcastically among Okinawans as the “discriminatory agreement” (henken kyōtei).

While the Hyōgo Okinawa Prefectural Association has continued to advocate for removal of the bases, including a petition drive in 2001, the Osaka League has been comparatively quiet on the issue. Residents of the community in Taishō Ward explained to me that one reason is that, since reversion, some community residents, including prominent League members, have been receiving substantially increased “rental” payments from the Japanese government for land seized from them by the U.S. government in the 1950s. In an effort to “stabilize” land-use for bases after reversion, the Japanese Defense Facilities Agency immediately increased these payments to “military landowners” (gun-jinushi) by as much as six times the pre-reversion rates paid by the U.S. government. During 2000 and 2001 I met four individuals receiving such payments, including one interviewee in Taishō Ward who showed me her contract from the Defense Facilities Agency that specified annual payments of 12 million yen or about $100,000 in 2001. Her land in Oroku, seized originally to build barracks for U.S. Naha Air Base, is now a dependents’ housing area for Japan’s Air Self-Defense Forces which took over the base after reversion.

The Japanese government’s “hush money” strategy has not always worked, however, either in Okinawa, where “antiwar landowners” (han-sen jinushi) have formed an active protest organization, or on the mainland. Another interviewee in Taishō Ward told me in February of 2000 that his family in Okinawa, whose land was confiscated in the 1950s to expand Kadena Air Base, contributes these payments to support the anti-base movement while he personally devotes much of his time to organizing protests and speaking at rallies in greater Osaka. Meanwhile, in another example of diverse opinions on this issue, not all Okinawan residents of Hyōgo Prefecture agree with that association’s opposition to military bases. One interviewee from the Hyōgo Okinawan community in Takarazuka City told me in April of 2001 that her father, who also receives “rent” for land seized in the 1950s, gets angry whenever he reads about another
protest demonstration, insisting that, if the bases are to be removed, landowners should receive compensation for lost income.

Partly because of such diversity of views and circumstances among members, Osaka League leaders have sometimes been hesitant to “lead” on other issues as well, taking up the banner only after a clear membership consensus develops. Officials explain that their organization, descended from the second, less activist incarnation of the Kansai Okinawa Prefectural Association, has a more conservative membership and is necessarily less “political” than the Hyōgo association, founded in 1946 during a time of vigorous activism on issues such as reversion and military bases in Okinawa. League leaders in Osaka are still haunted by memories of the brutal government suppression during and after the 1926 strike at the Tōyō Cotton Industries’ Sangenya factory, and see their most pressing issue as maintaining their organization of an estimated 7,000 members of whom an increasing proportion are elderly, first-generation migrants.67 This trend is borne out by results from my survey which showed a 20% higher rate of prefectural association membership among respondents in their 60s and 70s (53.6% and 51.5% respectively) as compared with respondents in their 40s and 50s (35.7% and 30.4% respectively).

Some League officials believe that elderly members would prefer not to be reminded of hardships they have suffered simply for being Okinawan, or to attract too much attention. In the years before Okinawan culture became trendy in the early 1990s, one official discouraged a group of younger community residents in the mid-1970s from organizing performances of eisa dances and presenting this annual Okinawan festival in the neighborhood because he feared that, for mainlanders to see these traditional dances in colorful costumes, would “embarrass” the Okinawan community. Another League official in his late sixties has refused to acknowledge in interviews that there has been discrimination against Okinawans in Osaka. Such denials contradict League publications which fully document it,68 and interviews by me and others of League members who described discrimination they have personally encountered.69

Nowadays, amidst the nationwide “Okinawa boom,” all the prefectural associations in greater Osaka organize events to which the public is eagerly welcomed, where eisa-odori and other traditional dances and music are performed. The Osaka League now actively supports and promotes Okinawan culture in many ways, sponsoring concerts, offering space for training studios in the performing arts, and inviting speakers in various fields from Okinawa to lecture in the Osaka area. The most important functions of this organization today include providing space and organizational support for such social occasions as banquets to celebrate the New Year, honor elderly members, and commemorate such special occasions as the anniversary of the League’s founding, events at which Okinawan music and dance are almost always performed. The League also organizes the annual September “sports festival” in which local Okinawa prefectural associations in greater Osaka and nearby prefectures compete in relay races and other events. In addition, the League sells tickets and rents buses for the semi-annual pilgrimages to root for Okinawa’s representative team in the National High School Baseball Tournament held at Kōshien Stadium in Nishinomiya, an Osaka suburb, where officials from the Osaka League and Hyōgo Association also distribute tickets, arrange bus transportation, help rooters find seats, and clean up discarded trash at the game’s conclusion.

Over the years, the prefectural associations have not only provided for survival-support, advocated vigorously in the 1920s for labor reform and in the 1950s and 60s for reversion, but have also contributed to postwar infrastructural and economic improvements in the community.
Prefectural associations in greater Osaka were crucial for the community during the chaotic period immediately after World War II. They aided in the resettlement both of Okinawa residents who had evacuated to rural areas on the mainland, but whose status changed to “refugees” after their prefecture was devastated by the Battle; and, of Okinawan soldiers and civilians who chose to be repatriated to greater Osaka from Taiwan, Micronesia, the Philippines, and other areas formerly part of the Japanese empire because many of them had nothing left to go back to in Okinawa. Prefectural associations continue to assist new arrivals from Okinawa to settle in greater Osaka. The Osaka liaison office of the Okinawa Prefectural Government also helps people from Okinawa to find jobs in greater Osaka, and to secure housing. In the years following reversion, this office recruited migrants to work mostly in factories, while in today’s economy they are more likely to work as nurse trainees, cooks, or waitresses. Approximately 260 young people each year find jobs in greater Osaka through this office. Although some of these people settle in the area, often becoming managers of stores, restaurants, or small factories, virtually none choose to live in Okinawan communities, preferring, like many other Okinawans coming to the mainland today, to reside near the places where they work or study. In contrast, many who migrated in the early 1970s before reversion in “grouphirings” (shūdan-shūshoku) organized by commercial recruiters settled in Taishō Ward after their contract periods ended.

Where things stand: lingering prejudice, a new pride in “roots,” and mixed blessings of the “Okinawa boom”

From what were often troubled beginnings, life for most residents of the Okinawan communities in greater Osaka has improved over the years as many migrants saved their factory wages, started businesses, bought property, and sent their children to colleges or professional schools. And, while their economic resources have not reached the average level of Japanese “salarymen” in more upscale residential areas, many have enjoyed relative prosperity in recent years. Mainlanders living in the more affluent areas of greater Osaka refer to these communities as “downtown” (shita-machi) or, in the case of Taishō Ward in southwestern Osaka, somewhat disparagingly as “the deep south.” With the currently heightened interest in Okinawa throughout Japan, many mainland visitors have been attracted to the community where they shop in stores that sell Okinawan products, eat in restaurants serving Okinawan cuisine where Okinawan music is often performed, and learn to perform Okinawan dance and music themselves at the culture centers and studios. This influx has provided relief for some in the community from the economic doldrums that have been felt in Japan as a whole since the early 1990s.

In the year and a half between June of 1999 and December of 2000, a new store selling Okinawan products and four new restaurants, one with nightly performances of music and dance, opened in a four-block area near the Taishō train station. There were already three Okinawan restaurants, one offering live performances, making a current total of seven in this area which is still three miles from the Okinawan neighborhoods in Kobayashi, Hirao, and Okajima where such businesses can be found in virtually every block. Community residents often make fun of the Yamatun-chu tourists, and sometimes express regret for what they see as growing dilution (or “mainlandization”) of Okinawan arts and culture. But most proprietors eagerly welcome the large crowds of visitors who regularly pack local restaurants offering Okinawan cuisine and live music, especially on Saturday nights when even the local regulars (jōren) are turned away unless they have reservations.
Many Okinawans in greater Osaka today have themselves developed greater interest and pride in their “roots” (rūtsu), using the English word in describing this trend. Today, second and third-generation Okinawans, as well as mainlanders, are studying the traditional performing arts, design arts, and cuisine, along with learning some Okinawa dialect. Their motivations are many and varied. Interviewees cited the influence of parents and grandparents, strong impressions from a visit to Okinawa, or the effects of a performance they had attended. A professional writer in her late thirties said in November of 2000 that she had never felt pride in her family’s origins, largely because she associated being Okinawan with being poor, until Shō High School became the first team from Okinawa to win the national high school baseball tournament in April of 1999. She felt proud, she said, because Okinawans had “finally beaten the Yamatun-chu at something.” She is now writing her first novel which is based largely on her father’s experience as a migrant from Okinawa living in Osaka. On the other hand, some second and third-generation Okinawans in greater Osaka still seek to minimize their connections with Okinawa, emphasizing, for example, that “I’m Osakan, though my father came from there.”

Today, amidst the “Okinawa boom” and a popular trend for exploring one’s ethnic “roots,” it is much too easy to look back with a smirk at people who never spoke their local dialect or ate Okinawan foods in public, only practiced sanshin secretly in closets, and changed their names. Yet it must be remembered that, during the years of malicious prejudice and blatant discrimination, for Okinawans living and working on the mainland, the issue was often physical and psychological survival. Though discrimination is now illegal, it has by no means disappeared (see interviews cited above). Today prejudices based on stereotypes persist on the mainland despite—and to some extent because of—the recent fascination in Japan with an exoticized and commercialized “Okinawa” that has made recordings of Okinawan pop music into best sellers and singers from Okinawa into super-stars. A woman in her mid-sixties who had migrated to greater Osaka in 1962 commented on her questionnaire that “I was shocked when I first came at how many people were ignorant about Okinawa, mostly because it wasn’t mentioned in school curriculums. But nowadays everyone’s trying to ride the wave of interest in it.” Since reversion, community residents are no longer asked if people in Okinawa speak English at home or use knives and forks for daily meals, but they are still subjected to such double-edged praise of Okinawans as “so relaxed and carefree” (implying a certain indolence and lack of responsibility) or “so casual and easy-going” (implying a lack of courtesy and diligence). Koreans and Chinese are also subjected to such “praise” in Japan for being “clever” (implying wily or tricky). The president of a loan agency in Taishō Ward told me he never lends money to Okinawans because “they don’t pay it back.” And an executive of a manufacturing company in Osaka told me his firm decided not to locate a factory in Okinawa because “people there can’t do quality work.”

In official ways, too, there are still problems, as when the All-Japan High School Baseball Federation banned the wearing of eisa robes by second-generation Okinawan rooters from Amagasaki for the semi-annual national baseball tournament at Kōshien Stadium in Nishinomiya, near Osaka. The Federation explained that its regulations forbid the wearing of “strange” (kii) garments, though the Okinawan rooters pointed out that fans from Kōchi and Hiroshima Prefectures were allowed to wear their brightly colored local costumes. Fans have defied this ban recently by carrying their packaged eisa robes in through the stadium entrances, then changing clothes in the rest rooms. In recent years, teams from Okinawa have placed high in the tournament, regularly reaching the finals or semi-finals. Then in the spring of 1999, when
Okinawa Shō High School became the first team from Okinawa in the tournament’s 55-year history to win the championship, residents of Okinawan communities on the mainland, which always send bus-loads of rooters to their games, celebrated joyously. Savoring this victory of Uchinaan-chu over Yamatun-chu, Okinawans commented that “the postwar period is finally over for us.” This is a mocking reference to the phrase used by Prime Minister Satō Eisaku who negotiated the Okinawa reversion agreement with U.S. President Richard Nixon in 1969, viewed by Okinawans as yet another mainland betrayal for failing to include promised reductions in the U.S. military presence.

In September of 1995, the movement among community activists opposing American military bases in Okinawa shifted into high gear after the September, 1995 rape of a twelve-year old elementary school girl in Kin by two U.S. marines and one sailor. Protest marches were organized in Osaka to coincide with the massive demonstration of an estimated 85,000 in Ginowan City, Okinawa. Subsequent marches and rallies drew large numbers of participants in Osaka and Kyoto. In addition, regular information meetings (gakushū-kai) have been held in public auditoriums and university lecture halls with activists and scholars from Okinawa as featured speakers. Former Okinawa Governor Ōta Masahide has given a number of well-attended lectures recently in Osaka auditoriums. In greater Osaka and elsewhere on the mainland, singers from Okinawa perform anti-war and anti-base protest songs at regular concerts. Yet, while members of the greater Osaka Okinawan community often take the lead in organizing these events, the proportion of community residents who participate in political activism is comparatively small. Among respondents to survey questionnaires, only 6.8% of migrants and 4.5 of descendants indicated such participation. Though many Okinawans in greater Osaka joined protests against the military bases following the 1995 rape, most of the time one tends to notice the same core of activists from the community turning out for events, which usually draw larger numbers of mainlanders, and for organizational meetings.

The “Okinawa boom” has also made residents aware of the need to convey full and accurate information about the communities to outsiders, especially to the media which is now reporting on them frequently. To keep up with growing demands, the Kansai Okinawa Bunko (Culture Center) has assumed what has become an increasingly heavy burden, offering written materials, recordings, video tapes, lectures, and guided tours to the public at very low cost and with an extremely small, largely volunteer, staff. Groups of students and teachers from public and private schools in greater Osaka and nearby prefectures come regularly to the Bunko for “field work” seminars that include lectures and guided tours as well as performances of Okinawan music. Demands on the Bunko for information and interviews reached a fever pitch during the months leading up to the 2000 G-8 Summit Conference held in Okinawa. Scholars from the Taishō Ward community and from Okinawa have subsequently met there regularly to prepare fuller information and check existing materials for accuracy.

Though the influx of tourists and consumers has provided income for some, the greater Osaka communities, where small and medium industries depend heavily on sub-contracts from larger companies, have been hit hard by economic doldrums afflicting Japan as a whole in the 1990s and 2000s. Residents have suffered in the continuing series of lay-offs, euphemistically called “restructuring” (risutora), at the medium-size metalworking factories, and orders for extracted metal and molded metal parts have dwindled at the smaller workshops. Local merchants often complain that business has fallen off sharply since the “bubble burst” on Japan’s economy in 1990-91, and the incomes of construction workers have dropped sharply with local labor.
agencies offering fewer jobs. A growing number of homeless wander Osaka streets now, sleeping on sidewalks or in parks, as elsewhere in Japan’s cities. And, as elsewhere, the economy is the issue community residents say is of the greatest concern to them.

Clearly, the “Okinawa boom” has brought mixed blessings to Okinawan communities in greater Osaka as well as to Okinawa itself. Nowadays visitors from the mainland sometimes comprise the majority in audiences at live performances there of Okinawan music and a high proportion of the participants in such anti-base demonstrations as the recent “human chains” around Kadena Air Base. Okinawans themselves are divided over whether to welcome mainlanders to partake in the islands’ culture and politics, or to discourage their participation. At least one eisa performance group in Osaka bars mainlanders because, as the director explains, eisa has special religious significance for Okinawans. (This group does accept people with only partial Okinawan ancestry.) Okinawans inside and outside the prefecture are caught between a desire, on the one hand, to convey accurate information about their culture and political oppression to mainlanders and non-Japanese, and frustration, on the other, when these efforts result in a superficial fascination with “Okinawa” that encourages dilettantism, stereotyping, and commercial exploitation.

Interviewed in April of 2000, a teacher at a local junior college in his early forties complained that, for too many mainlanders, “Okinawa” has become a “tasty morsel” to consume in the media and on forays to Okinawa or the greater Osaka community; and, that, for some academics, it has become a “hot topic” they can use to publish research which is too often based on one-dimensional portrayals of Okinawans and the issues confronting them. Perhaps the most important message conveyed in the interviews and questionnaires collected for this study is that Okinawans in greater Osaka have responded in a wide variety of ways to these challenges, and that their responses have frequently changed over time to adjust to new conditions. What is often presented as a dichotomy of “assimilation versus cultural preservation” is, more often today, a continuing series of choices made in daily life that depend on individual preferences rather than on decisions to take one side or the other. An eighteen-year old musician interviewed in February of 2001 explained that, although both her parents were from Okinawa, she had chosen to make her career performing mainland folk music from northeastern Japan (tsugaru-jamisen) because she was better able to express what she felt in its melodies and rhythms. At the same time, she preferred Okinawan food which her mother cooked at home.

Nowhere is diversity more evident than in the ways Okinawans in greater Osaka remember or conceptualize a “homeland” they might have left many years ago or where they never lived at all. Among interviewees, several women who came originally to work in textile factories before World War II said they had decided to remain in greater Osaka after their contract periods ended because Okinawa did not offer comparable economic prospects for them, their spouses, or their children. Other migrants from both the prewar and postwar period cited limited social and cultural horizons in the rural Okinawan villages where they grew up as reasons for remaining on the mainland. Descendants who had visited Okinawa only during the U.S. occupation period described a place of natural beauty, but with widespread poverty and an oppressive atmosphere under foreign military occupation. Other descendants associated Okinawa with poverty on the mainland as well as with discrimination their parents experienced there, and tried to minimize their connections with it. The magazine journalist quoted above, who came to appreciate her heritage after Shō High School won the national baseball tournament in 1999, had previously associated Okinawa with her family’s poverty, employment discrimination her father had
encountered, and teasing she had suffered in school for her parents’ origins. On the other hand, many Okinawans in greater Osaka, migrants and descendents alike, have visited their “homeland” regularly and describe highly positive memories, associating Okinawa with a congenial natural and cultural environment, as well as a leisurely and healthy lifestyle, where people suffer less stress and live longer. A number of individuals over 60 expressed a desire to relocate to Okinawa when circumstances in their lives, such as family obligations, would permit. In the case of one couple in their 70s, the husband had in fact returned in 1999 to enjoy his retirement years living in the family’s home on the seashore in a quiet village north of Nago while his wife remained to live with their son’s family in Taishō Ward where she preferred the urban life style. Such diverse responses, shared by people in many places with memories of an ancestral “homeland,” should remind us that, far from being static and monolithic, attitudes and choices vary widely among individuals in diaspora communities.

Notes

1. “Ryukyu” never caught on as a place name during the U.S. occupation, either in Okinawa or on the mainland. This was partly because the word “Ryukyu” evoked memories of derogatory references by mainland Japanese who identified people from Okinawa Prefecture with what had recently been a “foreign” kingdom. This implied that Okinawans were not fully Japanese and, thus, “inferior” to mainlanders.

In addition, Okinawans at home and on the mainland easily saw through the U.S. military’s insistence on calling Okinawa “The Ryukyu Islands” and the people there “Ryukyuans” as part of a heavy-handed effort to separate them from from Japan. The failed American attempt to re-”Ryukyuans”ize Okinawans was undertaken in hopes of suppressing the reversion movement, which had gained support steadily since the early 1950s.

2. In a sense, I was one of those “occupiers,” though my job as a U.S. Army draftee in the maintenance platoon at an ammunition depot in Henoko from July, 1967 to June, 1968 had nothing to do with administering the occupation.


7. Yūhi (Launching forth), Volume of essays and photographs commemorating the 40th anniversary of the founding of the Osaka League of Okinawa Prefectural Associations (Osaka Okinawa Kenjin Rengo-kai, 1987), 40,47; Yūhi (Launching forth), Volume of essays and photographs commemorating the 50th anniversary of the founding of the Osaka League of Okinawa Prefectural Associations (Osaka Okinawa Kenjin Rengo-kai, 1997), 50, 62.


10. Interviews in Okinawa, June, 2000. Officials at the Okinawa Prefectural Association of Hyōgo complained to me in June of 2001 that commemorative publications of recent “Uchinan-chu Taikai,” highly publicized gatherings of people from the Okinawa diaspora held periodically in Okinawa, devote many pages of text and color photographs to participants from Hawaii and North and South America, but include barely two paragraphs on a back page for Okinawans in greater Osaka.


17. This currently estimated figure is cited in such official publications of the Okinawa Prefectural Government as “Heiwa no ishiji” (Cornerstone of peace), 1995, and “Okinawa heiwa shiryō-kan sōgō annai” (Okinawa peace museum guidebook), 2001.


19. They are concentrated mostly in its Hirao, Kobayashi, Kitamura, Kita Okajima and Minami Okajima precincts, and comprise about one-fourth of the ward’s total population officially listed at 75,043 for the year 2000 (Taishō Ward Office, General Affairs Section, 2001). For the other communities in greater Osaka, unofficial and unpublished estimates are that 7500 migrants and their descendents live in Osaka’s Nishinari Ward, next to Taishō Ward, and approximately 10,000 live in or around the Tonouchi section of Amagasaki City, just across the Kanzaki River from Osaka City in Hyōgo Prefecture where another 1500 are estimated to live in the Takamatsu section of Takarazuka City and 900 in Itami City.


21. Ōta, Osaka no Uchinaan-chu, 89-90.


24. Interviews for this study conducted in September 1999.
29. Ōta, *Osaka no Uchinaan-chu*, 98.
30. Arasaki Moriteru, 44.
33. Some Okinawans over fifty articulate the consonant “s” as “sh” in words like *sensei* (teacher), pronounced “shenshei,” or *sensō* (war), pronounced “shenshô.” Some of them also articulate the vowel sounds “o” and “e” as “u” and “i,” respectively, in words like *teiki* (commuter pass), pronounced “tiiki,” and *hako* (box), pronounced “haku.”
34. Written comment on questionnaire, April 2001.
35. Interview, April 2000.
37. Written comment on questionnaire, December 2000.
39. Chinen Seishin’s acutely satirical stage play “Jinruikan” (Human pavilion, 1976) features a uniformed “trainer” brandishing a whip who barks commands at “male” and “female” specimens.
41. Molasky and Rabson, *Southern Exposure*, 89.
42. Interviews, June and August 2000.


47. Tomiyama, *Kindai Nihon*, 130.


49. Higa, 6.

50. Fukuchi, *Okinawa jokō aishi*, 120.


54. Though references to the former Ryūkyū Kingdom and its cultural legacy were usually free of negative connotations, calling someone “Ryūkyū” or “Ryūkyū-jin” was more problematic. As in examples quoted above, mainlanders used the term “Ryūkyū” or “Ryūkyū-jin” derisively when scolding factory workers returning late for curfew; or, when announcing on signs in front of factories and rooming houses “Chōsen-jin, Ryūkyū-jin o-kotawari” (Koreans and Ryukyuans prohibited). Women from Okinawa who were displayed like circus animals in the notorious “Human Pavilion” at a 1903 international exposition in Osaka were called “Ryūkyū-jin.” And Hirotsu Ryūrō’s 1926 novel, which he titled “Samayoeru Ryūkyū-jin” (The vagabond Ryukyuan), was widely criticized by Okinawans on the mainland for a protagonist caricatured from negative Okinawan stereotypes. Its author subsequently made a public apology and canceled scheduled reprintings.

Recently, however, the status of the word “Ryūkyū” seems to have improved among Okinawans and mainlanders alike, though some connotations remain problematic. Okinawans at home and in the diaspora express varying degrees of pride and nostalgia from historical memories of the formerly independent Ryūkyū Kingdom, in part because hopes have been unrealized for a significant reduction of the military presence and healthy economic development in Okinawa after reversion. Furthermore, there is currently a widespread fascination among mainlanders with cultural manifestations of an often exoticized “Ryūkyū,” which has been exploited commercially. N.H.K. television’s 1993 serial historical drama, criticized by some Okinawans for stereotyped characterizations, was entitled, like the book it was based on, “Ryūkyū no kaze” (The Winds of Ryukyu). The word “Ryūkyū” now occurs frequently in the titles for recordings of widely popular Okinawan folk and folk-rock music, such as the 1995 c.d. “Ryukyu Magic” (Air-4001, Tokyo). Okinawans in the prefecture and on the mainland offer lessons in Ryūkyū buyō (classical dance), Ryūkyū ryōri (cuisine), and Ryūkyū min’yō (folk music) to a growing clientele.

57. Molasky and Rabson, *Southern Exposure*, 82.
64. *Koko ni yōju ari* (The banyan tree here) Volume of essays and photographs commemorating the 35th anniversary of the founding of the Hyōgo Okinawa Prefectural Association (Okinawa Kenjīn-kai Hyōgo honbu, 1982), 145-216.
69. See Ota Jun’ichi.
72. Published interview of Kinjō Kaoru, co-director of the Kansai Okinawa Bunko (Culture Center), in *Yomiuri Shinbun*, May 13, 2001.
73. Comment from interview of descendant in his mid-30s, February 2001.
75. For analysis of this crime and its impact in Okinawa, see chapter by Linda Angst in this volume.
Part III: Postcolonial Struggles

To this day, groups formerly oppressed by Japanese imperialism do not enjoy total equality, and the articles in Part III illustrate how these present-day controversies both stem from the Japanese colonial past and are intertwined with contemporary geo-political concerns in East Asia. In his study of anti-Japanese activism by certain Taiwanese Aborigines, Scott Simon examines how ethnicity is used to mobilize nationalist movements in Taiwan and explores the political consequences reaching beyond the legacies of Japanese colonialism. Next, Kawabata and Kitazawa discuss the legacy of the Battle of Okinawa and the controversy over how it should be portrayed in textbooks within the context of the longer history of Okinawa’s colonization. Kawabata and Kitazawa suggest these present-day controversies show the persistence of discriminatory treatment that harkens back to the colonial period. In sharp contrast to these recent controversies, William Underwood’s article about the repatriation of the bones of conscripted Korean soldiers to what are now South and North Korea illustrates a positive step toward reconciliation by the Japanese government. Lastly, ann-elise lewallen tracks progress in Japanese official recognition of the Ainu, particularly formal acknowledgement that they are an indigenous group in 2008. This development, together with Ainu participation in the Indigenous Peoples Summit (IPS), is a historic moment in the Ainu struggle to redress injustices of the colonial period by asserting their agency on a platform based upon their indigeneity. She argues that the IPS is part of a larger global phenomenon across the world in which indigenous groups are claiming the authority to speak out about both indigenous rights and issues that concern humanity in general, like environmental conservation.
Simon’s article profiles the Atayal, one of the fourteen officially recognized groups of indigenous people in Taiwan (also collectively referred to as Taiwanese Aborigines), who today comprise 2% of the total population. Simon raises many important concerns faced by former colonized subjects both Taiwanese and people still living in Japan, such as the Ainu and zainichi Koreans today, and particularly focuses on the issue of representation and who has a legitimate claim to speak on behalf of an oppressed group. In comparison to Chinese and Koreans, Taiwanese (including Taiwanese Aborigines) tend to have a more positive view of the Japanese colonial period, especially when contrasted with later Kuomintang (Guomindang) rule. Simon then illustrates how memories of the Japanese colonial period are often mobilized for anti-Japanese protests and other nationalist purposes. For example, in 2005 an Atayal woman May Chin organized demonstrations at Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo. May Chin and her supporters demanded the removal of the names from Yasukuni Shrine of an estimated 10,000 Taiwanese Aborigine volunteer soldiers who fought on the side of the Japanese during the Asia-Pacific War. To the Aborigine activists, the removal of the names would symbolize the return of their enshrined souls. (Although the spirits of the dead are said to reside at Yasukuni it is not the actual place of interment and there are no physical remains there).

Simon explains that May Chin’s protest at Yasukuni Shrine is part of a larger pan-Asian movement; for instance, Koreans and Chinese have also protested against the Japanese prime minister’s visits to Yasukuni Shrine. He also explains that some of the greatest tension over these issues is not between external groups such as Taiwanese and Japanese; rather, the greatest tension occurs among Taiwanese Aborigines themselves. Indeed, there are many critics of May Chin within the indigenous community; some point to her “inauthentic” ancestry (she is half Atayal, half Han Chinese), while others question her motivations, citing her background as a former actress, challenging her attempt to be a legitimate spokesperson for the Atayal. Showcasing these divisions, at the same time May Chin was protesting the enshrinement of Aborigine soldiers at Yasukuni, some former Aborigine soldiers were fighting for the right to have a monument in Taiwan that commemorated their service to the Japanese empire. Thus, it is clear that May Chin does not represent all Atyal let alone Taiwanese Aborigine voices.

The past experiences of Taiwanese Aborigines during wartime and the colonial period were multi-faceted, and Simon’s article explores how and why these memories are mobilized for political means. Simon argues that one must understand postcolonial issues

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4 Beyond those officially recognized, some indigenous groups, like the Siraya, continue to seek official government recognition as an indigenous group.

5 In contrast to the Taiwanese Aborigines, or those considered indigenous peoples, the other 98% percent of the population of Taiwan refers to the “native Taiwanese” or those of Han ethnicity, from the Hoklo and Hakka groups who emigrated from China between the 17th and 19th centuries and settled in Taiwan.
within two contexts: within the highly politicized debate over Taiwanese independence, and in relation to events before 1945. In Taiwan, assertions against or for the Japanese empire are often linked to the divide between “pan-green” and “pan-blue” parties—those who advocate Taiwanese autonomy from China, and those who wish for unification with China, respectively. Simon explains how May Chin’s protest was emblematic of a pan-blue movement supporting eventual unification of Taiwan with China, pitting her against pan-green parties supporting Taiwanese independence. Simon complicates the issue further by presenting the results of his fieldwork in Taiwan, conducted among the Taroko community of the Atayal people, consisting of interviews he conducted with Aborigine elders about their experiences of Japanese colonialism. Simon’s interviewees did not align themselves along green and blue lines, and reveal differing views of the colonial period, including both condemnatory and fond memories.
Formosa’s First Nations and the Japanese: from colonial rule to postcolonial resistance

By Scott Simon

Abstract

The Japanese administration of Formosa from 1895-1945 changed the island’s social landscape forever; not least by bringing the Austronesian First Nation people of eastern and central Taiwan under the administration of the modern nation-state for the first time. The Taroko tribe of Northeastern Taiwan (formerly part of the Atayal tribe) was the last tribe to submit to Japanese rule, but only after the violent subjugation of an anti-Japanese uprising in the 1930s. Shortly thereafter, however, Taroko men were recruited into the Japanese Imperial Army. The names of those who died during the war are now honored at the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo, a situation that occasionally becomes the object of protests by Taiwanese politicians. This article, based on field research in a Taroko community in Hualien, looks at how social memories of the Japanese administration have contributed to both Taroko identity and to various other forms of nationalism in contemporary Taiwan. How do Taroko individuals and collectivities remember the Japanese? How do these memories articulate with nationalist ideologies in the larger Taiwanese society?

On June 13, 2005, Taiwanese independent legislator May Chin, who claims an Atayal identity, arrived in Tokyo with a group of fifty comrades-in-arms representing nine indigenous tribes from Taiwan. Their goal was to protest in front of the controversial Yasukuni Shrine where the spirits of 2.5 million war dead are honored. Among the dead commemorated in the shrine are 28,000 Taiwanese, including approximately 10,000 aboriginal men, who fought for the Japanese Imperial Army during the Pacific War. Although the families of Taiwanese soldiers have long demanded compensation from Japan for unpaid pensions, this protest made only one demand: that the names of aboriginal soldiers be removed from the shrine.

When May Chin and her cohort arrived at the shrine on June 14, Japanese police refused to let them get off the bus, allegedly in order to protect them from Japanese right-wing extremists who had already arrived at the scene. For a few days, this became the leading news item in Taiwan, with television news broadcasting images of Taiwanese aborigines in traditional dress being prevented from exiting their bus by Japanese police. May Chin accused Japan of violating their democratic rights of protest. This event, part of the tensions between Japan and its neighbors, underscores the importance of memories of Japanese occupation to contemporary indigenous peoples in Taiwan.
May Chin

Chin’s aboriginal protest occurred at a time of widespread protest against Japan that involves more than Formosan aboriginal grievance against the former colonial overlords. During the same summer, the Chinese and South Korean governments also objected publicly to both Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro’s visits to the shrine and revisions to history textbooks in Japan. During the race for Taiwan’s KMT (Chinese Nationalist Party) leadership, candidate Wang Chin-ping also led protests against Japanese occupation of the Senkaku (Tiao-yu-tai) Islands which Taiwan claims is a part of the Republic of China. May Chin’s protests at the Yasukuni Shrine thus articulate with a larger pan-Asian mobilization against Koizumi. The memories of the deceased aboriginal soldiers, depicted as victims of Japanese imperialism by Chin and her group in much of the Taiwanese media, are potent symbols when mobilized in that struggle. As this essay attempts to illustrate, however, Taiwanese memories of Japanese colonialism are very different from Chinese and Korean memories. Korean and Chinese anger toward the Japanese has been much more potent than that of the Taiwanese, many of whom also remember positive dimensions of their experience under Japanese colonial rule. It is thus crucial to contextualize the local meaning of anti-Japanese protest and to grasp how memories of the Japanese occupation are mobilized to different ends in different situations.

Scholars working on collective memory, following in the footsteps of Maurice Halbwachs (1980 [1950]) and Henri Lefebvre (1991 [1974]), point out that social space is the product of struggle between conflicting groups of people attempting to give concrete form to collective memory. Through her protests at the Yasukuni Shrine over several years, May Chin brought Japan’s Formosan aboriginal soldiers into Taiwanese social memory as symbols of Taiwanese, and particularly aboriginal, suffering and injustice during the colonial period. In understanding these and other political events, the job of the anthropologist is to look beyond media images and political symbolism, elucidating and understanding social memory within a broader ethnographic and political economic context (Gupta and Ferguson 1997).
Like most issues in Taiwan, memories of Japanese administration must be understood as part of the contending nationalism of “pan-blue” and “pan-green” political discourse which shape the national political agenda. The Chinese Nationalist “pan-blue” parties include the KMT, the People First Party (PFP), and the Chinese New Party (NP). In favor of eventual unification with China, at least under the conditions that China democratizes and becomes prosperous, they emphasize the importance of unity among ethnic groups and highlight memories of cross-ethnic resistance against Japan. The Taiwanese nationalist “pan-green” parties include the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU). Stressing Taiwanese autonomy from China, they emphasize Taiwanese differences from mainland Chinese. They thus celebrate aboriginality as a non-Chinese identity; and perceive both Japanese and Chinese rule as colonialism at the expense of all Taiwanese. One important element of pan-green discourse is that the Japanese brought modernity to the island, making its Taiwanese inhabitants more civilized and advanced than the Chinese who arrived with Chiang Kai-shek in 1945 and afterwards. These two ideologies color different spots on the maps of these contested “imagined communities” (Anderson 1983) on the island.

May Chin’s aboriginal protest at the Yasukuni Shrine was part of this larger struggle between pan-blue and pan-green camps. Just two months earlier, Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) Chairman Shu Chin-chiang had paid a visit to the shrine and was greeted upon his return to Taipei by May Chin and a group of protesters who pelted him with eggs at the airport. Two days later, a coalition of veterans who had served in the Japanese military protested outside of Taiwan’s legislature in favor of Shu’s visit to the Shrine and against May Chin’s actions. Chen Chun-chin, president of the Association for the Bereaved of Taiwanese Serving as Japanese Soldiers, defended Shu and others of his generation who regularly visit the Yasukuni Shrine to pay respect to their former colleagues and relatives. He said that the KMT has consistently neglected former Japanese soldiers, as they failed to bring many survivors back from Japan after the war and subsequently failed to seek compensation from Japan on their behalf. The TSU thus promised to seek compensation for the veterans and build a Shinto Shrine in Taiwan for the memory of those who died in the war.

May Chin began organizing her trip immediately after this conflict, making the Yasukuni Shrine into an aboriginal issue. Without anthropological study of the memory of Japanese colonialism, however, it is difficult to understand the extent to which May Chin and other politicians represent the grievances of indigenous communities or merely use aboriginality in the service of other political goals. Based on fieldwork in Taroko communities, we query the relationship between the mobilization of social memory in such protests and aboriginal perceptions of the Japanese period. How and why are memories of the Japanese period contested in their communities? What is at stake for these people? What other social memories exist, and what alternative political possibilities do they suggest?

Memories of Japan: Voices from the Field

In the summer of 2005, I spent three months doing field research in a Taroko village which I will call Bsnan. I had previously established an ongoing relationship with the village, having visited it several times since 1996 and having worked with members of the community on issues surrounding the Asia Cement excavation on land belonging to villagers. The village lies at the foot of the Taroko National Park and has a frequently contentious relationship with park
administration. This village is inhabited largely by members of the Truku subgroup of the Taroko tribe, which is composed also of the Tkedaya and Teuda subgroups.

The Taroko are related to the Atayal tribe of which May Chin is a member, being born of an Atayal mother and Mainlander father. The Taroko broke away from the Atayal tribe, however, on January 14, 2005, when Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan recognized their long-standing claims to be an independent ethnic group. Many observers, including some members of the tribe, argued that this reclassification was divisive and reduced the numbers of the tribe, hence political influence. Taroko claims to be different from the Atayal, based on linguistic and cultural criteria, nonetheless, are recorded in Japanese-era ethnographic studies (Taiwan Governor-General Provisional Committee 1996: 5). The reclassification gave the Taroko greater autonomy and positioned them to perhaps become the masters of Taiwan’s first indigenous autonomous region. As discussed below, the establishment of a Taroko autonomous region is currently promoted by the Presbyterian Church, an institution with strong historical links to the pan-green parties in Taiwan. In Bsngan, the Presbyterian Church has its roots in the Japanese period, when the local authorities tried to suppress all forms of Christianity and the local people were forced to hold services clandestinely in a cave.

As in most Taiwanese indigenous villages, the people of Bsngan have vivid memories of the Japanese occupation that ended with the conclusion of World War II. This village of 2,224 people, with its main residential area located at the mouth of the Taroko Gorge, was important as the site of armed resistance against the Japanese. Even before the tribe was subdued, it was a trading post where aborigines could sell hides to Japanese and Hoklo-speaking Han Chinese (now the “Native Taiwanese”) in exchange for such items as alcohol, matches, and salt. Like most communities in Taiwan, the village is dotted with Japanese-era construction. In Bsngan, those architectural reminders include a Japanese-era power plant, an abandoned campus of workers’ dormitories, a few homes, and the former nursing station. The Japanese language can still be heard every day in Bsngan, not just in the conversations of the elderly, but also in songs crooned in road-side karaoke stalls and in everyday Taroko conversation. Even young people use “arigatoo” to say thank you, some shopkeepers are in the habit of calculating money in Japanese, and the Taroko language is interspersed with Japanese words. Church sermons, for example, are delivered in Taroko peppered with Japanese words in both the Presbyterian and True Jesus churches. These are not just foreign church-related terms like kyokai (church), and kamisama (gods), but also such words as jikan (time), ishoo ni (together), and tokubetsu (especially). The use of Japanese time measurements, including the days of the week and even usages such as nansai da to ask a person’s age or nanji da to inquire about the time, all reveal how modern usages of time were introduced by the Japanese. The young as well as the old incorporate Japanese into daily conversation.

Memories of the Japanese era come up in daily conversation, and not just by people who lived through that era, showing that the Japanese experience is central to Taroko identity. In contrast to the historical memories promoted by politicians such as May Chin, who cast themselves in a Manichean drama of good versus evil, memories of Japan in the villages are far more nuanced. This paper draws its examples primarily from conversations with members of the Mawna family. [This, like all names of private individuals, is a pseudonym.] The courtyard of Ukan Mawna, decorated with photos from the Japanese era, is often the site of dinners and conversation over tea between leading members of the community. Along with the courtyard and exhibition hall of
his brother, who has done research on the tribe’s custom of facial tattooing, this is also one of the first places that a visitor to the village will see. The memories of this family are highlighted here not only because they can be said to be representative of the tribe, but also because they illustrate the complex articulation between personal and social memory.

The Japanese as Agents of Modernity

Like the entire Taroko tribe, the family of Ukan Mawna has had a close relationship with Japan. Their mother, whose biological mother had traveled around the island making facial tattoos for members of the Atayal tribe, spent most of her childhood in the home of a Japanese policeman. After the Japanese sent her to nursing school, she worked in the clinic in the village. Her children boast that she vaccinated the entire village. With her medical training, in fact, she was one of the main agents of Japanese modernity and a key part of the process of displacing traditional Taroko healers from their position in society. In the past, each village had healers, who could contact the spirit world and prescribe cures for medical and other ailments. Now Bsnan has no healer. The nearest healer is an elderly woman in a neighboring village. [1]

Ukan’s father had a much more conflictual relationship with the Japanese, especially with the police. One of the earliest aboriginal converts to the True Jesus Church, which was illegal under Japanese occupation, he established the congregation in Bsnan. In the many social gatherings at his home, Ukan Mawna delights in telling the miraculous story of his father. At one point, the Japanese arrested him, put him on trial, and planned to execute him for his illegal missionary activities. They imprisoned him in a bamboo hut to await execution. On the night before his execution, however, a typhoon struck the island and destroyed his bamboo prison. He managed to escape through the forest and his sentence was later commuted. Ukan concludes his story by saying that his father subsequently received a Japanese education and learned to love the Japanese in the village. “My father never let anyone say a bad word about the Japanese,” he says with every re-telling of the story.

Ukan, a retired policeman, participates regularly in meetings to discuss development plans in the village. He is an outspoken proponent of restoring Japanese-era buildings as tourist sites, and has even suggested rebuilding the Shinto Shrine as a tourist site and historical museum. On one of many drives through the countryside in which he pointed out Japanese-built irrigation systems, water towers, power plants and an alcohol distillery, he summed up his perception of Japan’s legacy in the village:

There are no Taroko who hate the Japanese. Quite the contrary. They love the Japanese. Why do they love the Japanese? Because of the charity of the Japanese. The Japanese took them from the worst kind of feudalism and brought them civilization. It was the Japanese who brought them roads and electrical power plants.

Neither Ukan nor most members of his tribe are apologists for Japanese colonial expansion. In contrast to pan-green revisionists, they do not use nostalgic memories of Japan to criticize the KMT. Ukan, in fact, is a staunch supporter of the KMT in his village, is an acquaintance of May Chin, and has even made a TV series on the 1930 Wushe Incident, in which violent conflict rose between the Japanese and the Taroko. In that series, he portrayed the Japanese as cruel overlords who manipulated differences between the Truku, Tkedaaya and Teuda to gain control of their territory, even using some groups in military attacks against the others. These and other memories of Japanese rule, also a part of village life, emphasize the pain of colonial rule. Unlike
the social memories mobilized by politicians, however, individual memories such as those of his parents are often contradictory, highlighting the brutality of the Japanese but also their contributions to the community.

**Memories of Japan: the Price of Development**

Older women remember vividly one of the most painful episodes of the colonial era, as it was the Japanese who banned the Atayal and Taroko custom of tattooing their faces. Whereas facial tattoos were formerly considered a sign of female beauty and were necessary conditions for marriage, the Japanese quickly brought an end to the custom. Older women recall that they had to have their facial tattoos removed in order to attend school, which they and their families wanted because Japanese education held out the promise of a better life. [2] The girls thus removed their tattoos by having the skin removed surgically, which sometimes disfigured their faces permanently. One graduate student at Donghwa University told me that she had interviewed several of these women, one of whom burst into tears at the memory of the painful and humiliating operation as well as subsequent disfigurement.

Taroko men identify strongly with the forest, so closely associated with their lifestyle of hunting and gathering. They recall how they once lived in villages high in the mountains, but were forced by the Japanese and later by the KMT state to move down into the plains. The Taroko still lament the fact that this forced relocation removed them from their ancestral lands and made it more difficult to access their traditional hunting territories. The move also incorporated them into a new social system that included agriculture and the use of cash rather than commodity exchange in trade relations. Many claim that they were better off with a lifestyle of hunting and gathering than they are today, when most men make a living as construction or cement workers if they have regular employment. Those who venture into the forests to hunt in the nearby National Park that covers their traditional hunting territories risk being arrested as poachers.

Frequently, however, the men contrast Japanese rule with subsequent Chinese rule under the KMT, adding subtle nuance to negative colonial memories by contrasting that experience with what came afterwards. Ukan Mawna, for example, said that the Japanese left the former village intact and they often visited it after moving to the plains. The roads to the village were maintained and the Japanese constructed a Shinto shrine there. Another elder pointed out that the Japanese cut down camphor and other trees, but they always negotiated with the indigenous peoples about access to land. They also took good care of the aboriginal people with education and health care, even sending the sick to be treated at Taiwan Imperial University hospital if necessary. This theme of the Japanese era as the “good old days” is not uncommon in Taroko reminiscences of the era, even as the same interlocutors also acknowledge the pain of colonial occupation.
Simon: Formosa’s First Nations and the Japanese

Memories and Identity: Comparing Indigenous and Native Taiwanese Experiences

These indigenous memories of Japanese occupation articulate with, but remain distinct from, those of the so-called “Native Taiwanese.” They are thus not merely the result of the Native Taiwanese taking over the construction of political discourse under the presidencies of Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian. The Native Taiwanese are the Hoklo and Hakka groups whose ancestors arrived in Taiwan from Fujian and Guangdong Provinces between the 17th and 19th centuries. Unlike the Mainlanders, who arrived after World War II with Chiang Kai-shek, the Native Taiwanese lived through Japanese occupation. For many Native Taiwanese, memories of the Japanese occupation are central to their ethnic identity. For them, Japan is primarily a symbol of modernity and their Japanese education a sign of their higher levels of development compared to Mainlanders (see Simon 2003). For aboriginal people, however, the Japanese period was also important to identity formation because it positioned them as resisters against colonial encroachment. This makes their memories of Japan very different from those of the Native Taiwanese. Whereas Native Taiwanese collective memory focuses on the trope of modernity, the Taroko use memory to highlight their fierce resistance to outsiders.
In B스ngan, even young people take pride in what they describe as the “fierceness” of their tribe. One young woman, whom I shall call Biyuq here, explained to me over coffee in her shop how her tribe had resisted the Japanese for decades. The Japanese built many roads up into the mountains, she explained, in order to transport heavy artillery up to high places and shoot down on the local people. It was very hard for the Japanese to take over Taroko territory, however, because the hunters would hide in the forest and then attack the Japanese with bows and arrows.

By far the best-known event in Taiwan is the Wushe Incident of 1930, the memory of which has often been mobilized by pan-blue parties as evidence of “Chinese” resistance to Japanese occupation. On October 27, 1930, a group of over 300 Atayal warriors led by Mona Rudao attacked Japanese spectators at a sports event in Wushe and killed 130 people. It took Japanese forces two months, and the deaths of 216 aboriginal people, to completely quell the uprisings that followed (Ukan 2002). In an account that emphasized Taroko rather than Chinese identity, Biyuq explained that the Wushe Incident was meant to be the final battle, and that one village decided to sacrifice themselves for the good of the tribe as a whole. According to her version of events, all of the women and children committed suicide to encourage the men to sacrifice their lives willingly. [3] The men then went out to fight the Japanese to the death. Without families to return to, they had no need to fear death and could fight to the end to drive the Japanese out of the forests forever.

Although the ultimate result was military defeat, mass slaughter and loss of territory, the Taroko still remember this event as a tribute to their tribal fierceness. They are not mistaken. According to John Bodley, 4,341 Japanese and Han Chinese settlers died at the hands of indigenous Formosans between 1896 and 1909 (Bodley 1999: 56); and a further 10,000 casualties were recorded during the 1914 pacification campaigns against the Taroko (Nettleship 1971: 40). [4] This experience of resistance, which is constantly revived and celebrated through collective memory, altered Taroko life forever. Although the suppression of the Tribe in the Taroko, Hsincheng and Wushi Incidents eventually ended control over their own territory, it also made the Taroko self-conscious subjects of history. This has been translated from personal to social memory in the Taroko Gorge. It remains, however, a social memory very different from that promoted by May Chin in Tokyo.
In the summer of 2005, the Taroko tribe became the subject of a special exhibit in the basement of the Taroko National Park Visitors Centre. This exhibit, designed by temporary curator Chin Shang-teh (a Han from Tainan and a graduate student at National Donghwa University in Hualien), illustrated the history of the Taroko Incident with photos and artifacts he had collected in Japan. The exhibit showed how the Japanese slowly encircled indigenous villages, even constructing electric fences to restrict their movement, in order to get them to surrender to Japanese forces.

In 1910, the Japanese Governor-General Sakuma Samata launched the “Five Year Plan to Subdue the Barbarians.” In May 1914, Japanese troops attacked the people of the Taroko Gorge by coming in simultaneously from Hualien City in the South and Wushe through mountain passes from the West. The Taroko resisted fiercely for 74 days, but were ultimately forced to surrender control of their lands to the Japanese.
Sakuma Samata

The exhibit contained graphic photos of the military expeditions, including the electric fences, Japanese artillery, and Taroko people resisting with simple hunting guns. Many of the photos were taken from memorabilia albums sold in Japan at the time to celebrate the victory. The final panel of the exhibit, a drawing of the sun setting over the mountains, brought the issue of resistance to contemporary Taiwan. The text said that the Taroko came down from the mountains, saw their land occupied by outsiders, and “have not yet been able to return to their ancestral lands.” Putting it into context, museum visitors could recognize that the arrival of the Republic of China and later the establishment of the Taroko National Park were precisely extensions of imperial conquest, the replacement of one colonial overlord with another. This written discourse repeated Taroko activist Tera Yudaw’s contention that the Taroko National Park is a form of “environmental colonialism” (Tera 2003: 169).
According to the curator, the exhibit almost never saw the light of day. When the Han park superintendent viewed the exhibit the day before the opening ceremony, she asked the curator to remove the final panel with its oblique reference to the National Park as another colonial power. She said that it risked inciting “ethnic conflict.” The curator refused to comply and threatened to remove the entire exhibit if she removed the plaque without his permission. The superintendent backed down and allowed the exhibit to open with the final panel in place.

In the subsequent months, however, the National Park refrained from advertising the exhibit to the surrounding communities. Instead, the Presbyterian Church, which has close links with the indigenous social movements, took the lead in inviting their members to visit the exhibit. This move was consistent with other church actions in promoting Taroko identity. The Presbyterian Church, in fact, has become the main institution behind the recognition of the tribe as distinct from the Atayal, and now the most important lobbyist for the establishment of autonomous indigenous regions in Taiwan. [5] The Presbyterian Church is well-known for its close relationship with both the DPP (Rubinstein 1991, 2001) and indigenous social movements.
(Stainton 1995, 2002). They hope that local recognition of indigenous sovereignty will eventually lead to international recognition of Taiwanese sovereignty.

The difficulties encountered by the curator of this exhibit and its promotion by the Presbyterian Church rather than by the park administration and the local government reveal the political fault lines underneath these contested social memories. The main difference centers on indigenous autonomy, an issue that divides the pan-blue camp and the pan-green camp in indigenous communities and beyond. The DPP has promised to establish autonomous districts for indigenous peoples as part of its desire to emphasize the non-Chinese identity of the island. Its policy assumes that self-determination should be the basis for activities in indigenous areas just as they insist on the right of self-determination for Taiwan. The pan-blue parties favor more assimilacionist policies toward indigenous peoples, emphasizing economic development and employment over autonomy. Their parties thus say little about self-government and justify the employment-generating activities of mining and other companies on indigenous land. Just as the memories of Japan evoked by May Chin fit into a larger pan-blue imagining of Taiwan, the memories exhibited in the park exhibition fit into a wider pan-green discourse. In this context, ownership of indigenous social memory has potential implications that go far beyond the local community.

**Conclusion**

Anthropologists John and Jean Comaroff have called for bringing historical understanding into ethnography, saying that, “No ethnography can ever hope to penetrate beyond the surface planes of everyday life, to plumb its invisible forms, unless it is informed by the historical imagination” (1992: xi). It is important to note, however, that the historical imagination is often also a national imagination; part of contested ideologies that can very well influence the fate of a people. Yet every time historical memory is mobilized in support of contemporary nationalist narratives, conflicting personal memories are silenced. This dynamic is especially visible in Taiwan, a society torn between two conflicting historical imaginations.

May Chin, in attacking the former colonial overlords, has long used highly publicized protests to draw indigenous support away from the pan-green parties. In this case, she managed successfully to draw attention away from pan-green TSU attempts to seek compensation for the veterans and even to portray that party as complicit with Japanese imperialism. In doing so, she discredited locally the same people who promise indigenous autonomy within the framework of the existing state on Taiwan. She is able to do so at relatively low cost by mobilizing resentment against Japan, which also articulates well with the larger geopolitical context in which both China and Korea protest against state visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, preeminent symbol of Japanese wartime nationalism and empire.

In the months leading up to the local elections in December, 2005, the KMT continued to appropriate indigenous social memory by covering their headquarters in Taipei with a large image of Wushe hero Mona Rudao. This tactic has the twin effect of appealing to Mainlander anti-Japanese sentiments and of positioning the KMT as the voice of indigenous peoples. The party’s consistent support in indigenous areas, including overwhelming support in the December 2005 local elections, suggests that this strategy has contributed to electoral success. May Chin’s protests are only a part of this larger struggle.
Mona Rudao, center

Taroko perceptions of May Chin, however, are just as ambivalent as are their memories of Japan. In fact, although most aboriginal people support the pan-blue KMT and PFP parties (Wang 2004: 695) and although May Chin was re-elected, there was very little enthusiasm in Bsngan for her well-publicized protest trip to Japan. As the news came on TV the morning after her trip, I asked the people around me in the breakfast shop (an important place for anthropological research) what they thought of the commemoration of aboriginal soldiers in the Yasukuni Shrine. One middle-aged man and Presbyterian Elder stated matter-of-factly that the news has nothing to do with him, since the protesters are not Taroko. He added that May Chin has spent so much time with Mainlanders that she no longer understands aboriginal needs.

When I asked if any Taroko had served in the Japanese military, he said that they had. He insisted, however, that many groups are commemorated in the Yasukuni Shrine, so it would be unreasonable for any one group to ask for their spirit tablets without returning them to the countries and families of all 2.5 million spirits. The breakfast shop owner, who is a member of both the Presbyterian church and the KMT intervened by saying that the Taiwanese who fought for the Japanese were not volunteers. The conversation turned into a discussion of reasons why they would serve, the man saying they were forced to join the army by circumstances of poverty, not by Japanese conscription. Despite different interpretations of the Japanese period, however, one perception emerged as consensus: that May Chin was acting primarily for personal political gain, trying to position herself as the primary advocate of indigenous communities even in comparison to other aboriginal KMT candidates. If it were not for her political manipulations, which included getting funding for the trip, it is unlikely that her group of aboriginal people would show up to protest at the shrine.

Personal memories of the Japanese era in the Taroko community are thus ambivalent, showing both positive and negative aspects of the occupation. As Halbwachs observed, historical memory is preserved not just in regions, provinces, parties, and classes, but also in certain families and in the minds of individuals. It is thus important to make a distinction between individual and collective memory (Halbwachs 1980: 51). The individual memories of Japanese colonialism are now passing away with the individuals who carry them. The few remaining Taroko men who served in the Japanese military show no resentment against the Japanese; if anything, they were well treated (Nettleship 1971: 43). It is striking, in fact, that few Taroko individuals even bring up the issue of having been forced into the Japanese military, focusing instead on issues of forest resources, education, health, and tattooing. This gap, more than anything, illustrates how those specific memories are mobilized by politicians more than they are discussed by individuals.
Collective memories persist, given expression through monuments, actions in space including demonstrations, as well as words spoken in the community; they often reflect current political struggles and can be mobilized for political goals. Since May Chin’s protests at the Yasukuni Shrine are so obviously tied to pan-blue politics, there are good reasons for the Taroko to remain ambivalent about those events. They know that the discourse comes from outside of their community and is tied to a political agenda not of their own making. The social movement for autonomy is also led by Taroko community members, including Presbyterian ministers and school teachers. In spite of pan-blue success in the elections, they provide a very prominent alternative to the historical imagination of the KMT and its allies; albeit one that is also widely perceived as coming from outside of the local community. The struggle for indigenous memory is in many ways a struggle for indigenous future as local members of different parties claim to be the legitimate heirs of Taroko fierceness. Like any claims for a valuable inheritance, they are hotly contested. The ultimate outcome, especially whether or not they will choose a pan-green version of local autonomy, is thus far from certain.

In any event, it is clear that the Japanese occupation of Taiwan was the defining moment that constituted aboriginality as it is currently imagined in Taroko territory. Before the Japanese arrived, the Qing Dynasty had merely labeled the Taroko and other unassimilated tribes as “raw barbarians” (shengfan) and had not attempted to administer their territories. The threat of having their heads cut off, in fact, was sufficient deterrence to keep Chinese settlers out of indigenous territories -- especially in Taroko land. The Taroko tribe was known as “wild people” and was only “civilized” after the Japanese came to Taiwan (Nettleship 1971: 39). When they finally encroached on those territories with far superior weaponry, however, the Japanese also created the conditions for resistance that became the core of Taroko identity for members of all sub-groups.

As aboriginal individuals subsequently became agents of Japanese modernity, even as soldiers for the Japanese army, they were conscious of doing it as members of the fierce Taroko tribe. It was thus the Japanese occupation that fashioned the Taroko into self-conscious historical actors. The various social movements of this tribe in recent years, with demands for name changes, land settlements, and now autonomy, show that this spirit of resistance is alive and well. As “savages” become soldiers, and soldiers become social activists, the tribe has rapidly developed a First Nations identity as advocates of both stripes mobilize memories of past resistance in different contexts. Whether the state is green or blue, therefore, Taroko memories will continue to shape the relationship between state and tribe.

Thanks to Mark Selden and Jim Orr for their comments on earlier drafts of this article.

References


Endnotes

[1] After a long period in which these practices had fallen out of favor and were perceived as sinful, there are signs of a revival. She now has two apprentices. That, however, is beyond the scope of this essay.

[2] For similar accounts about how the Ainu of Hokkaido were forced to end tattooing practices and join Japanese modernity in colonial Hokkaido, see Honda 2000 and Kayano 1994.

[3] I have not seen this account of the Incident in historical accounts of the event, but that does not mean she is mistaken. It is interesting how her story makes the women critical agents of Taroko history.

[4] Unfortunately, neither of these authors could break down the statistics into different national and ethnic groups of the victims.

[5] To outsiders, it may seem unclear why they would support Taroko independence from the Atayal. From the perspective of the activists, however, it is a logical strategy. Considering that indigenous communities get many financial resources from county governments and that political factions are closely tied to county electoral processes, it will be much easier for them to develop the necessary consensus within the smaller Taroko tribe rather than within a larger Atayal tribe spread throughout several counties and one urban area in northern Taiwan. Even then, it is likely that the Taroko Autonomous Indigenous Region will only include the Taroko of Hualien because those in Nantou do not support the project. Members of pan-blue factions accuse the DPP and their Presbyterian allies of manipulating the Taroko in order to gain an electoral foothold in Hualien County.
Kawabata and Kitazawa’s article addresses the Battle of Okinawa, which was fought as a war of attrition; the Japanese government leaders knew that the more they prolonged a battle in Okinawa, the longer they would be able to stave off invasion of mainland Japan. One of the horrors of war that unfolded during the nearly twelve-week conflict was the Japanese military’s abandonment of the civilian population. The number of civilian causalities reached around 100,000, among the highest total for any single battle in the Pacific Theater during the Asia-Pacific War. During the battle the Japanese Imperial Army encouraged Okinawan civilians to kill themselves rather than surrender to American forces, asserting that the Americans would rape, torture, and sadistically kill them. Over one fourth of the Okinawan civilian population died and many of these deaths have been attributed to the Japanese army’s direct orders to commit suicide. The army distributed grenades and poison and instructed families on how to commit group suicide. Even though many survivors of the battle have recounted their experiences, the Japanese Education Ministry in 2007 challenged their accounts, insisting that the military leaders had not demanded that Okinawans die for the emperor. The Education Ministry called for the removal of the term “group suicide” (shudan jiketsu) from history textbooks, a step that most Okinawans view as an attempt to whitewash history. The authors of this article recount several survivors’ stories of the battle, including the Japanese army’s encouragement that they commit suicide. Okinawans believe it is important to remember their treatment by the Imperial Army as well as the horrors of civilian suicides, because it is part of a longer legacy of colonization and discriminatory treatment by those from the mainland.
A Story That Won’t Fade Away: Compulsory Mass Suicide in the Battle of Okinawa
Kawabata Shunichi and Kitazawa Yuki

Introduction by Matthew Allen

From early in 1945, Okinawa’s geopolitical location at the southern border of ‘Japan proper’ made it an obvious and immediate target for the Allies’ invasion of the mainland of Japan. In the most intensive land attack launched against Japan by the United States, the so-called ‘typhoon of steel’ rained down on Okinawans for months as the Japanese military dug in for a war of attrition.

Okinawans, who became ‘Japanese’ after events in the late nineteenth century led to annexation of the former independent kingdom, were perceived by Tokyo, and particularly by the Japanese military, as potentially disloyal subjects. The concept that Japan should protect civilians, and especially those from the margins of nation – i.e. Okinawans – was anathema for the military, who tended to see Okinawans as impediments to their defence campaign (Ota, 2000). This distrust of Okinawans as ‘the other within’ (Tomiyama, 2000), led to a policy of disseminating disinformation about the motives and behaviour of the invading Americans, which in turn led to a directive that Okinawan civilians should choose to die by their own hand rather than at the hand of the evil, rapacious Americans.

Grenades were distributed to villagers, and many families, hiding in caves on the outer islands in particular detonated the devices, killing themselves and their families. This state-sponsored self-sacrifice was seen as necessary by the Japanese government at the time. Okinawans were caught in a conundrum; they were told that the military would not protect them, that were they caught they would be raped and/or tortured, and that in order to demonstrate their loyalty to the emperor, and for practical reasons, they were expected to die rather than surrender. That more than one quarter of the population died in the battle is evidence of the sacrifice Okinawans made for Japan. From survivors’ accounts, there is little doubt that a considerable number of these deaths were directly or indirectly caused by the Japanese army and its policies, including direct orders to commit suicide.

Today, 35 years after the postwar reversion of Okinawa to Japanese rule, the Japanese education ministry has decreed that the military policy of enforcing villagers in the front line of the land invasion to lay down their lives ‘for the sake of the emperor’ is historically ‘debatable’ and therefore references to ‘shudan jiketsu’ should be expunged from seven new high school textbooks. Such perspectives do great harm to the rapprochement which Tokyo and Okinawa have been developing since Japanese recovery of Okinawa in 1972. Moreover, such perspectives demean Okinawans, their sacrifice during the Pacific War, and their extraordinary will to survive against all odds. Already condemned to a footnote of Japan’s history as a nation, Okinawa’s wartime history is being officially rewritten in a way which denies the discrimination with which the former independent kingdom was viewed by officials in Tokyo in 1945.

Decisions such as that taken by the education ministry reinforce the idea that there are some in power in Japan who would like to see history cauterised, and in doing so reject the lessons that one can learn from a more critical, reflexive, and informed perspective of history. It is exactly such historical recidivism that concerns China, Korea, and indeed many nations in Asia today.
Under the education ministry’s screening of history textbooks, references to coercion by the Japanese military in forcing Okinawan civilians to commit mass suicide in 1945 have been erased.

But what will not vanish is survivors’ memories. Time and again, survivors of the bloody Battle of Okinawa have spoken of how they were told to kill themselves, often in groups, rather than be shamed by being taken prisoner by invading American forces.

Of the roughly 200,000 casualties, 94,000 were civilians, accounting for nearly one-quarter of Okinawa’s population.

The testimony of survivors adds to a barrage of criticism against the government, which has instructed many publishers of high school history textbooks to alter descriptions that refer to the Japanese military’s direct involvement in the mass suicides of islanders.

In the Kerama islands, plenty of survivors are willing to tell their stories. Miyazato Ikue, 82, is one. She told The Asahi Shimbun that she was told by a Japanese soldier to take her life by pulling the pin on a hand grenade.

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**Miyahira Haruko points to the site of a bomb shelter where she says she was told by a soldier to kill herself.**

(Kawabata Shunichi)

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Kerema Islands
Miyazato was working at a Japanese army unit stationed on Zamamijima island when U.S. forces started aerial bombing raids of the Kerama islands on March 23, 1945, in a prelude to landing on the Zamamijima and Akajima islands on March 26 and Tokashikijima island on March 27.

Miyazato said she asked Japanese soldiers to take her with them when they rallied to counterattack.

Refusing her request, a Japanese soldier handed her a grenade, saying, “In an emergency, kill yourself with this (grenade).” He then showed Miyazato how to detonate the device.

Mass suicides of local residents occurred March 26, the day U.S. troops began to land on the island. The previous night, islanders had been told to gather in front of a monument near their village. Because of heavy shelling by U.S. forces, some islanders didn’t make it.

It emerged that many residents committed suicide separately and in groups at various locations, such as in dugouts and caves.

Miyazato later learned that her mother and a sister had committed suicide together. She, too, contemplated committing suicide with a group of friends but the grenade she was given did not explode.

Miyahira Haruko, 80, said she was also told by a soldier to kill herself rather than be taken captive when she took cover from the bombing in a shelter on Zamamijima island.

“No please have the good grace to kill yourself to avoid being caught,” Miyahira quoted the soldier as saying.

Uezu Sachiko, 84, said a Japanese soldier told a group of evacuating islanders, including her, to commit suicide before they were found by U.S. troops.

Uezu was fleeing with her mother and her elder brother’s wife, among others, when they met with another group of residents in a mountainous area.

A Japanese soldier who was with the group told them to kill themselves by any means possible, even by biting off their tongues, if they were found by the Americans.

According to Uezu, one of the islanders, a young man, began to cry, saying he did not want to die.

Many of the Zamamijima islanders fled into the mountains after U.S. troops landed.

On Tokashikijima island, mass suicides occurred March 28.

Yoshikawa Yusuke, 78, said he had no doubt that Japanese army soldiers ordered the suicides. Yoshikawa, who then worked at a village office, was with his father and mother when civilians started taking their lives en masse.

He now lives in Aichi Prefecture. He said that he and other residents reached a site near a Japanese army position after an all-night walk while watching U.S. troops landing on the island.

Local residents drafted into military service also gathered with their families. Many took hand grenades with them, Yoshikawa said.
Typically, mass suicides occurred after a village mayor had been contacted by a locally drafted soldier who served as a messenger.

Yoshikawa said he could not hear what the messenger was saying above the roar of shelling. Soon after, he heard a series of explosions caused by grenades all around him.

Yoshikawa’s father tried to set off an explosion by hurling four grenades, one after another, to the ground. But none of them blew up.

Aniya Masaaki, professor emeritus at Okinawa International University, said it was impossible for civilians, including islanders who had been drafted into military service, to prepare hand grenades for use in mass suicide without receiving orders from superiors.

However, some survivors deny the Japanese army played a direct role in the suicides.

Chinen Choboku, 84, former officer of a naval special volunteer unit on Tokashikijima island, said he had never heard his unit chief hand down such instructions.

*This article appeared in the International Herald Tribune/Asahi Shimbun on May 15, 2007 and was posted at Japan Focus on July 12, 2007.*

*Matt Allen teaches Asian history at the University of Auckland and is a Japan Focus associate. He is the author of Identity and Resistance in Okinawa.*
“New Era for Japan-Korea History Issues: Forced Labor Redress Efforts Begin to Bear Fruit”
William Underwood
March 8, 2008
http://japanfocus.org/-William-Underwood/2689

While Kawabata and Kitazawa’s article regarding the whitewashing of history and erasure of the term “group suicide” from history textbooks shows the Japanese government trying to hide its crimes of the colonial period, Underwood describes a more positive—albeit small—step forward in redressing colonial harm. Due to former South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun’s actions between 2003 and 2008, the process of repatriating the remains of Koreans to South Korea has begun, after several attempts by previous administrations stalled.

On January 22, 2008 the remains of 101 Korean military conscripts were returned to South Korea from Yutenji Temple in Tokyo following an official memorial ceremony. Over one thousand sets of remains were scheduled to follow soon after. This achievement was based on Roh’s tough stance toward Japan, which he saw in terms of a diplomatic war, and a desire among both Koreans and Japanese to resolve this issue. The fruits of Roh’s labor were not realized until the presidency of his successor, President Lee Myung-bak (2008-2013), who called for a “mature relationship” with Japan focusing on the future, and so downplayed Roh’s policies, which focused on redressing colonial harm. The repatriation of the bones from Yutenji Temple in Tokyo in 2008 was intended to be the first step in redress between both Koreas and Japan—a process that would include repatriation, compensation, and truth-finding commissions—but Underwood is pessimistic due to President Lee’s weaker commitment to redress.

Furthermore, although Underwood sees the Yutenji repatriations as a positive first step, he also discusses several cases in which the Japanese government rejected redress; for example, the government has refused to help repatriate Korean civilian, as opposed to military remains, and has also refused to return money in post-office savings accounts that Korean laborers deposited during the colonial period. Underwood explains that there is still much work to do, including finishing the repatriation of over 2000 sets of remains of Korean civilians who died in Japan, many of whom had essentially been kidnapped and brought to Japan as forced labor.

The repatriation process does not involve just bones, but also living people. After Japan’s defeat in the Asia-Pacific War, Russia regained control of the entire island of Sakhalin (previously divided at the 50th parallel, with the southern portion, Karafuto, a Japanese colony). In his other articles published with the Asia-Pacific Journal, Underwood explains that, even sixty years after the end of colonial rule, South Koreans who had been forced to work in Karafuto in coal mines and lumber yards still were trapped there because neither Japan nor the Soviet Union worked to bring them home. Similar issues are ongoing regarding Koreans in Japan who have citizenship in North Korea, as Tessa Morris-Suzuki explains in another article published with APJ. Please see the Recommended for Further Reading section at the end of this course reader for the full citations to these articles.
New Era for Japan-Korea History Issues: Forced Labor Redress Efforts Begin to Bear Fruit

William Underwood

Historical issues involving Japan and South Korea have entered a new phase with the inauguration in Seoul on February 25 of a conservative president and the repatriation in January of the remains of 101 Koreans who died while forcibly serving in the Japanese military during World War II.

President Lee Myung Bak has said he “does not want to tell Japan to apologize or engage in self-reflection,” calling instead for future-oriented ties and a “mature relationship” with Japan. Lee replaced President Roh Moo Hyun, who spoke of a “diplomatic war” with Tokyo over history.

Yet the tough stance of the previous president, coupled with vigorous cross-border activism involving South Korean and Japanese citizens, has begun yielding results. Tokyo is cooperating “on humanitarian grounds” in resolving some historical legacies, but it is digging in its heels on many others.

Japan’s mixed track record prior to and during the Roh era is most evident in the case of wartime labor conscription. Roughly 700,000 Koreans were forced to work for private companies within Japan. More than 300,000 Koreans were forced to serve in the Japanese military in fighting and support roles; 22,182 are known to have died.

On January 22, the remains of 101 Korean military conscripts killed in nearly a dozen countries were returned to South Korea from Yutenji Temple in Tokyo, following an official memorial ceremony attended by high-ranking diplomats from Japan and South Korea. The Japanese government, for the first time, invited 50 South Korean family members to attend the ceremony—paying their travel and lodging expenses and providing about $300 in condolence money for each fatality. The South Korean government extended similar condolence payments.

South Korea’s ambassador to Japan called the repatriation of the remains a “valuable start to heal historical wounds.” The 1,034 sets of Korean bones still stored at Yutenji Temple are slated to be returned later this year to South Korea and perhaps, subsequently, to North Korea, the ancestral home of 431 of the war dead. The remains belong mostly to military conscripts killed on overseas battlefields, but they include civilians (some of them women and children) who died in the accidental sinking of the Ukishima-maru transport ship soon after the war.

During the Yutenji memorial ceremony, a Japanese government representative expressed “deep remorse and apology” for suffering inflicted upon Koreans under Japanese colonial rule from 1910 to 1945, quoting from the written apology offered by former Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo to former President Kim Dae Jung in 1998.

Access to the main ceremony, however, was tightly restricted by the Japanese government. Media personnel, members of Japanese activist and religious groups, and even a current Japanese Diet member were barred from attending. Japan’s Foreign Ministry claimed in the days before the event that South Korean family members had requested the private service, but this depiction was rejected by the South Korean government. Larger, more inclusive memorial rites were held for the war victims on January 23 at the Manhyange Dongsan national cemetery in Chonan, South Korea.
Memorial services for Korean remains repatriated from Japan six decades after World War II were conducted in a variety of religious traditions at the Manhyange Dongsan national cemetery in South Korea in January. (Nanba Koji photos)

Returning Korean military conscript remains has been a fitful, decades-long process. Japan reportedly sent 6,000 sets of remains to South Korea during the Occupation under American supervision, followed by an additional 8,800 sets in 1969. Using military name rosters supplied by Japan, Seoul authorities during the 1970s worked to track down relatives and return remains, but a public backlash ensued because Tokyo provided bereaved families with no apologies and only inexpensive obituary gifts.

This helped to derail the remains repatriation process within South Korea and essentially stranded the bones now at Yutenji Temple, which had been stored in the compound of Japan’s Health Ministry until 1971. It has also recently come to light that Japanese officials attempted to send the Yutenji remains to both South Korea and North Korea in the 1970s. Seoul’s anti-communist regime, however, blocked the plan because it might have led to warmer North Korea-Japan relations.

Former Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro promised former President Roh at their December 2004 summit meeting that Japan would promptly return the Yutenji bones and assist South Korea’s broader efforts to settle forced labor issues. But reparations work bogged down due to emotional history disputes that erupted in 2005, scuttling what was supposed to be a “Year of Friendship” marking 40 years of restored diplomatic ties. The main flashpoints were Koizumi’s visits to Yasukuni Shrine, Japanese history textbooks, and the ownership of a group of tiny islets (known as Dokdo in the East Sea to Koreans and Takeshima in the Sea of Japan to Japanese).

Roh stated that Japan’s forced labor and comfort women systems were tens of thousands of times worse than the abductions of Japanese citizens by North Korea in the 1970s and 80s. He repeatedly charged that Japan had failed to live up to global norms of morality concerning historical wrongdoing, and suggested that legal claims by A-bomb survivors, former comfort women and former conscripts abandoned on Sakhalin Island have not been resolved.

South Korea’s 85-member Truth Commission on Forced Mobilization under Japanese Imperialism has received over 220,000 statements from elderly former conscripts or family members since 2005. Among the 60,000 cases of forcible conscription certified so far are Koreans who were convicted of Class B and C war crimes stemming from mistreatment of
Allied prisoners of war. The commission described the men as “double victims” whose honor should be restored.

Public hearings held across South Korea have helped former conscripts reclaim their dignity and produced a historical record of the forced labor experience—along with a list of more than 2,000 Japanese firms that benefited. Oral histories have been published, in Korean and Japanese, and a documentary movie is being planned. A truth commission website helps former conscripts locate wartime companions, with the site’s database of high-resolution photos being searchable by year of conscription, destination and type of work. The South Korean government plans to eventually open a forced labor museum and research center, most likely in the southeastern city of Pusan.

Last fall the Truth Commission on Forced Mobilization reported that Yasukuni Shrine has inaccurately listed the names of 60 Koreans among the rolls of Imperial Japanese war dead. Forty-seven of the Koreans were confirmed to have died after World War II, but 13 are still alive. Shrine officials, however, refuse to remove the names of individuals once they have been enshrined. Yasukuni received the names of Korean military fatalities from the Japanese government, which never attempted to notify Korean families of their relatives’ fates.

Guided by local Japanese activists, Korean truth commission members have also conducted fact-finding investigations at former mines and construction sites across Japan where civilian conscripts toiled and frequently died. The ambitious goal is to find, identify and repatriate the remains of forced laborers still in Japan.

The Japanese government claims, despite much historical evidence to the contrary, that the state was never directly involved in labor conscription by Japanese companies. On this basis, Tokyo insists it does not know how many Korean civilians were conscripted or how many died in the custody of private firms—and displays little interest in finding out.

In addition to the Yutenji bones, some 2,000 sets of civilian Korean remains have been located in Japanese temples and charnel houses since 2005, following a Japanese government request to corporations, municipalities and religious bodies to supply information. Hundreds of the remains may belong to forced laborers who died during the war. But most probably belong to Koreans who died before or after the conscription years (1939-1945) or were not labor conscripts; the latter category would apply to perhaps two-thirds of the two million or so Koreans in Japan at war’s end. South Korean and Japanese officials have jointly inspected charnel houses containing a small number of these civilian remains. Most Japanese companies are declining to assist researchers.
The Roh administration in 2005 made public all 35,000 pages of diplomatic records involving the 1965 treaty that normalized relations with Japan, setting a new regional standard for information disclosure. The accord provided Seoul with the equivalent of $500 million in grants and loans, but it also states that claims “concerning property, rights and interests” of the South Korean government and its citizens “have been settled completely and finally.” Disclosure of the records cemented the public perception that the treaty’s “economic cooperation” formula had betrayed the countless individual Koreans harmed by Japanese colonialism.

In response, Roh spearheaded the passage in November 2007 of a law granting compensation from South Korean coffers to individual victims of wartime forced labor. The measure will provide just over $20,000 to families of military and civilian conscripts who died or went missing outside of Korea; conscripts who returned to Korea with disabling injuries; and families of conscripts who returned to Korea with injuries and died later. Payouts are expected to begin in May 2008.

In addition to fixed-amount compensation, the new law also calls for the South Korean state to make individualized payments to former conscripts and families based on financial deposits now held by the Bank of Japan (BOJ)—money that forced laborers earned but never received. The 60-year-old deposits consist largely of unpaid wages, pension contributions, and death and disability benefits for both civilian and military conscripts.

Partly to discourage Koreans from fleeing worksites in wartime Japan, companies funneled their salaries into “patriotic savings accounts” and made mandatory deductions for the national welfare pension fund. Japan’s Welfare Ministry ordered companies to deposit all unpaid sums for civilian conscripts into the national treasury in October 1946. American Occupation officials approved of the Japanese government directive, which was considered a first step toward
remunerating the large numbers of ex-conscripts in Japan and Korea. The former industrial
workers were viewed as a potentially destabilizing force in both societies precisely because they
had been harshly mistreated and then cheated out of their pay.

Wages for Korean soldiers and support personnel conscripted into the military were similarly
deposited into postal savings accounts during the war. Japanese authorities deposited salary
arrears and related benefits for Korean (and Taiwanese) military conscripts into the BOJ in
February 1950. Japan’s Finance Ministry reported the total amount of these deposits to
Occupation officials later that year, with the figures broken down by branch of military service.

It has only recently become clear that the Japanese government prior to 1965 made extensive
preparations to compensate the families of Koreans killed while serving with the armed forces,
even earmarking funds for this purpose in the national budget. Likewise, the original intent of the
civilian deposit system was to disburse to workers the funds they had earned. The final form of
the normalization treaty, however, sidestepped the question of compensating individuals for
conscription and recast reparations as a purely state-level diplomatic issue. The South Korean
government was aware, at least in a general sense, of Japan’s two postwar deposit schemes.

The Koizumi administration conceded in response to Diet questioning in 2004 that the Bank of
Japan continues to possess more than 2 million yen in financial deposits related to Korean labor
conscription. The deposits could be worth $2 billion today, if adjusted for six decades of interest
and inflation. Japanese courts have confirmed the existence of wage and pension deposits in
individual cases, while ruling that the 1965 treaty nullified the rights of Korean plaintiffs to
claim the money. Judges have also found that the Japanese state never notified or attempted to
notify ex-conscripts or families about the deposits, even when it would have been possible to do
so.

The future status of these financial deposits, which remain shrouded in secrecy and are virtually
unknown to the Japanese public, represents a major piece of unfinished reparations business.
Japan’s commitment to historical reconciliation is now being tested by South Korean requests for
details about the deposits and other aspects of labor conscription.

Seoul will not be able to fully implement its domestic compensation program without fuller
Japanese cooperation at least in providing records. The South Korean truth commission has
requested Japanese welfare pension records in order to verify that applicants for compensation
were conscripted during the war. To provide individually tailored payments, the commission will
also need a Japanese document known as the Unpaid Financial Deposits Report.

At a state-level conference last December, Japanese officials reportedly supplied their Korean
counterparts with name rosters and, for the first time, financial deposit information for 11,000
military conscripts. Japan is inching toward open discussion of the deposits based on the
understanding that Tokyo is not legally responsible for wartime conscription and the money will
not be released. However, the Japanese side stated that similar data for the far larger class of
civilian conscripts is dispersed across Japan and would be difficult for the central government to
compile.

This double standard is consistent with Japan’s past practice, for foreigners as well as Japanese
nationals, of privileging the status of military victims of the Asia Pacific War over civilian ones.
Since 2006 the Japanese government has footed half the bill for memorial visits by Korean
family members to battle sites in Okinawa and six South Pacific nations where their conscripted relatives died. There is no similar program for visits to places in Japan where civilian laborers perished.

Neither is the Japanese government helping to send the bones of civilian conscripts home to Korea. In late February, a citizens group called the Hokkaido Forum returned the remains of three Korean teenagers killed at Nippon Steel’s Muroran foundry in July 1945 during an American naval bombardment, along with the remains of a fourth conscript who died at a nearby coal mine during the war. The government rejected the group’s request for an official representative to attend the Muroran memorial service and for travel expenses, funeral expenses and condolence money to be paid to visiting relatives—as in the case of the Yutenji Temple remains in January.

Repatriation of all civilian conscript remains in Japan could take years. Community activists say the project should include compensation, apologies by the state and corporations involved, and explanations about causes of death. Systematic government cooperation concerning cremation records and domicile registries would greatly speed up the work of identifying remains. But local authorities in some cases are withholding such dusty data on privacy grounds, a practice that activists say shields Japanese companies by masking deaths on the job.

A Fukuoka-based citizens group called the Truth-Seeking Network for Forced Mobilization was formed in 2005 to facilitate the work of the South Korean government’s truth commission within Japan. A month-long project in 2006 featured public memorial rites and symposiums at 27 sites nationwide, as well as visits by 20 Korean relatives of conscripted workers who died in Japan. More than 200 people excavated a communal grave in an open field in Hokkaido, containing the remains of 10 Koreans who died while constructing an airfield and were apparently cremated on the spot.

Beginning in 1991, dozens of compensation lawsuits have been filed in Japanese courts against private companies and the Japanese state for civilian and military conscription. Related litigation demanding apology and compensation has involved Koreans who were forced into military sexual slavery, exposed to the atomic bombings, killed in the Ukishima-maru accident, convicted
of Class B and C war crimes, abandoned on Sakhalin Island, interned in Siberia, and enshrined in Yasukuni against their families’ wishes.

Virtually all of these legal efforts have failed due to the claims waiver language in the Japan-South Korea treaty and time limits for filing claims. A decision by the Toyama District Court in September 2007 was typical. Judges dismissed the suit by elderly female plaintiffs, but agreed that as teenagers they had been threatened or deceived into going to Japan and then forced to work at a factory where they were confined without pay. Three companies—New Nippon Steel, NKK, and Nachi-Fujikoshi—have compensated a handful of Korean forced labor victims over the past decade in isolated cases through out-of-court settlements. Led by Mitsubishi, Japan’s top wartime munitions manufacturer, Japanese industry has otherwise evaded all responsibility for the massive forced labor program.

In an unprecedented ruling in November 2007, the Japan Supreme Court found that the government’s refusal to provide health-care benefits to A-bomb survivors living overseas is illegal, and ordered the state to pay damages. The top court confirmed that the plaintiffs had been forcibly taken from Korea and forced to work for Mitsubishi Heavy Industries in Hiroshima, but rejected their demand for back salary. In a December 2007 decision that could aid reparations activities, the Tokyo District Court ruled that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs violated Japan’s information disclosure law by failing to respond in a timely manner to a request for documents concerning the 1965 accord. The Japanese government has appealed the decision.

More than 600 elderly Koreans were moved—at Japanese expense—from Sakhalin to South Korea last October, in the latest phase of a program that has resettled 2,300 people since 1992. Japan denies official responsibility for encouraging or coercing as many as 150,000 Koreans to move to Sakhalin before 1945, but Tokyo has quietly spent millions of dollars building a special village for the repatriates in South Korea. Late last year a dozen Sakhalin Koreans, now living in Sakhalin, South Korea and Japan, filed a new lawsuit seeking the refund of money they deposited into postal savings and postal life insurance accounts when the island was part of the Japanese empire.

The tens of thousands of Korean “comfort women” represent an egregious class of forced labor outside the formal conscription system. In operation from 1995 to 2006, the Asian Women’s Fund (AWF) was a landmark initiative by Japanese standards of postwar responsibility, extending prime ministerial apologies and compensation from private sources. But only about 300 women across East Asia accepted the payments due to deep suspicions about Japanese sincerity. The response by Japanese citizens to the government’s appeal for AWF donations was embarrassingly weak; it is likely that much of the private funding was covertly provided by the Japanese government, whose overriding concern was avoiding legal responsibility. The South Korean government has offered financial assistance and medical benefits to former comfort women since 1993.

Last year former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo suggested that comfort women had not been forced into providing sex for Japan’s military. Abe first implicitly repudiated, then under international pressure explicitly supported, the Kono Statement of 1993 acknowledging direct military involvement. The firestorm of controversy prompted national legislatures in North America and Europe to pass resolutions calling on Japan to do more to repair the injustice. In Seoul last month, the eight hundredth “Wednesday demonstration” was held in front of the Japanese Embassy, demanding more robust apologies and compensation based on legal culpability.
North Korea is obviously a central player in Japanese-Korean reconciliation efforts. Pyongyang has often undermined redress efforts through exaggerated propaganda, nuclear weapons development, missile launches and, above all, the abduction of Japanese nationals. Japan is currently excluding North Korea from the remains repatriation process, and North Korean relatives of deceased conscripts have been barred from entering the country to take part in community events.

Tokyo has been trying since the early 1990s to normalize relations with Pyongyang using the economic assistance strategy it employed with Seoul. But North Korea has insisted on formal state reparations for war and colonial responsibility. Around ten percent of forced laborers came from northern Korea and their compensation claims, for damages as well as the salary arrears essentially being held in escrow by Japan’s treasury, remain open. While the Japanese government is keeping silent about its ultimate plans for the BOJ financial deposits, it seems clear that the funds will remain frozen until ties with North Korea are established.

President Lee Myung Bak vowed during his election campaign to roll back key features of the past ten years of liberal leadership in South Korea, especially the “Sunshine Policy” of tolerant engagement with the north that the Roh administration inherited from his predecessor Kim Dae Jung. Lee indicated during the presidential transition that he will allow the Truth Commission on Forced Mobilization to expire when its funding mandate ends in late 2008. Although Lee was elected on a primarily economic platform, one reason for the rise of South Korea’s “New Right” is waning public support for the state’s 14 historical commissions, several of which target colonial-era collaboration with Japan. Lee and Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo have agreed to resume reciprocal summit meetings this spring.

Lee himself was born in Japan in 1941 to voluntary Korean immigrants who returned to their homeland in 1946. He was jailed in 1964 for taking part in student demonstrations against the South Korean government and the treaty with Japan. Two years from now, he will oversee commemorations of Japan’s annexation of Korea in 1910, an event that promises to be both painful and cathartic.

The global trend toward repairing historical injustices offers few parallels for the recent direct involvement of the South Korean government in redress efforts targeting a neighboring democratic state. Japanese and Korean civil society actors will try to maintain the momentum of
the Roh years and continue healing the scars of forced labor. The effect upon Japanese-Korean reconciliation of Lee’s weaker commitment to reparations remains to be seen.

*William Underwood, a faculty member at Kurume Institute of Technology and a Japan Focus coordinator, completed his doctorate at Kyushu University on forced labor in wartime Japan.*

**Note on Sources**

Much of this article is based on unpublished information obtained from the *Kyosei Doin Shinso Kyumei Nettowaku* (Truth-Seeking Network for Forced Mobilization), a Japanese group comprised of leading academic historians and community-based researchers. The Truth-Seeking Network cooperates closely with citizens groups in South Korea and the South Korean government’s Truth Commission on Forced Mobilization under Japanese Imperialism. The group maintains an extensive website for its “*Together with Korean Families*” project, aimed at resolving the conscript remains issue. The author subscribes to the group’s closed email discussion list, which features daily Japanese translations of history-related articles from Korean media sources. The email list frequently includes “on background” postings by central actors in the remains repatriation process describing developments not reported elsewhere. For general background see Utsumi Aiko, Uesugi Satoshi and Fukudome Noriaki. *Ikotsu no Sengo: Chosenjin Kyosei Doin to Nihon* (Remains after the War: Forcibly Mobilized Koreans and Japan). Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2007 (*Iwanami Booklet No. 707*).
In this article, lewallen discusses a pivotal moment in Ainu history, when on June 6, 2008, the Ainu were formally recognized as an indigenous people by the Japanese government. For a people whose history of colonization has often been brushed aside in studies of Japanese history, such as in textbooks, this official recognition appears to be a step in the right direction. However, this is probably not the last battle. The government recognized the Ainu as indigenous due to international pressure that came when the G8 summit was hosted in Toyako, Hokkaido in 2008; it was a potential cause for embarrassment if the host country was seen to be blatantly ignoring indigenous people’s rights. Therefore, some Ainu leaders have doubted the commitment of the Japanese government to their needs, since Japanese officials have not acknowledged that imperial government policies marginalized and impoverished Ainu. Fundamentally, it remains to be seen whether the government will enact policies that actually redress colonial treatment of the Ainu.

The Ainu push for formal recognition as an indigenous people is part of a growing global movement across the world in which indigenous peoples are building a transnational coalition that advances indigenous rights, since their indigeneity was often the excuse for colonization or other discriminatory policies in the past. This is the first step to changing the way in which legislation that affects indigenous people is created and passed. This international movement led to the Indigenous Peoples Summit (IPS), which included indigenous people from all over the world and met in Hokkaido prior to the G8 Summit in 2008. The IPS was the first international gathering in the context of a G8 Summit to focus exclusively on indigenous peoples, as well as to their responses to “climate change solutions,” and their critique of the “the global economic model being promoted by G8 nations.” The Ainu organizers who participated in the IPS sought to affect national policies, to empower Ainu youth, and to connect Ainu issues to the larger transnational indigenous movement. They also insisted on the importance of including indigenous people’s points of views in future environmental policy making. Ainu participation in the IPS is envisioned as a way to grow a larger network of “global Ainu and indigenous grassroots organizing,” and as an alternative to the traditional channel of reform, the Ainu Association, the oldest government-sanctioned organization in Hokkaido, established in 1930. At the end of her essay, lewallen warns that the IPS may represent some of the interests of Ainu in Hokkaido and throughout Japan, but the diversity of Ainu in general must not be overlooked; Ainu individuals have a variety of priorities and areas of concern that may not align with the goals of the IPS.

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Indigenous at last!

Ainu Grassroots Organizing and the Indigenous Peoples Summit in Ainu Mosir

ann-elise lewallen

On June 6, 2008, Ainu people across Japan achieved a long-sought goal: they were unanimously granted recognition as an indigenous people by both houses of the Diet with passage of the “Resolution calling for the Recognition of the Ainu People as an Indigenous People of Japan.” Although the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (DRIP) was approved in September 2007 with a “yes” vote from Japan, the government continued to refuse indigenous recognition for Ainu people, citing the absence of an international standard for indigeneity. This June lawmakers forced the government’s hand by adopting the resolution; the Cabinet Secretariat accepted the resolution on the same day. It would seem that the Cabinet Secretariat was the last to realize what international society and indigenous peoples across the world had acknowledged since the 1980s and what Hokkaido governor’s Utari Affairs Council had determined in 1988; that Ainu rightfully belonged to the community of indigenous peoples. Japan’s plan to host the G8 Summit in Hokkaido during July and much-anticipated global attention were undoubtedly the primary factors in the hasty adoption of the resolution; the Indigenous Peoples Summit in Ainu Mosir created added pressure vis-à-vis grassroots mobilization. As such, the G8 Summit made possible a critical moment—a moment for articulating agency—whereby a new generation of grassroots Ainu leaders were able to launch new initiatives, by harnessing the wave of international attention focused on Hokkaido in early July to articulate a new politics of Ainu indigeneity, which this time had received the imprimatur of Japanese officialdom.

Aside from a small group of Ainu living in Kamchatka, Ainu today reside across Japan, and Hokkaido or Ainu Mosir is considered by most Ainu to be their ancestral territory. “In the past our ancestors lived abundantly on this earth [Hokkaido], unrestrained and freely carrying on their lives, and its an unmistakable fact that we have inherited this vast earth from our ancestors,” Ainu organizer Shimazaki Naomi emphasized. International and domestic attention to indigenous issues was elevated with DRIP’s passage, and the Japanese government anticipated heightened international attention to Ainu issues, with the G8 scheduled for Hokkaido. Expecting that Ainu groups might orchestrate protests in downtown Sapporo or Tokyo thereby exposing the bankruptcy of Japan’s progressive stance on social issues—especially concerning human rights legislation—many have argued the Diet adopted the Resolution to avoid a public shaming before the world community. Legislators were concerned that if Japan, the world’s second largest economy and an aspiring leader among so-called advanced nations, were held to international standards for human rights, it would rank embarrassingly low on the global scale. Their concerns were warranted as Ainu and other minority groups have disparagingly categorized Japan a “third world nation” by human rights standards, and they did organize protest marches straight to the Diet. But these took place in May before the G8 started. Japan’s reported sensitivity to international opinion and external pressure (gaiatsu) has long been exploited by minority communities to improve human rights inside Japan, and domestic rallying to pass the resolution ahead of the G8 Summit once again supports this argument.

Undoubtedly attention to indigenous issues has been amplified through adoption of DRIP and global civil society has been responding to the indigenous movement in recent years. In Latin
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America, indigenous peoples have emerged as significant leaders of the new social movements; Bolivians elected an indigenous Aymara leader, Evo Morales, as President in 2006, and Paraguayan President Fernando Lugo recently appointed an indigenous woman as Minister of Indigenous Affairs. In the Commonwealth, Kevin Rudd’s apology to Australia’s “Stolen Generation” (February 2008) has been widely considered a defining moment for initiating a reconciliation process,[4] followed by Steven Harper’s official apology to survivors of Canada’s “Indian Residential Schools” (June 2008),[5] and recently the New Zealand government transferred ownership of 176,000 hectares of forest land to seven Maori tribes.[6]

Just ahead of the G8 Summit, twenty-four indigenous delegates gathered in Hokkaido to discuss climate change and indigenous survival during the Indigenous Peoples Summit (IPS) in Ainu Mosir 2008, from July 1 to 4. “Because the main theme of the Toyako Summit was “environmental issues,” [the Japanese government] created a situation where indigenous Ainu could not be ignored,” Ainu organizer Shimazaki Naomi argued. “We felt that it was critical to make an appeal to the G8 leaders that Ainu are still living here and thriving, and communicate the thoughts of indigenous peoples [during the G8 Summit]. Holding the IPS ahead of the G8 Summit also had a major ripple effect. This impacted not only Ainu people but represents a big step forward for rights reclamation for indigenous people overseas as well.”[7]
Staging Ainu at the G8: The only official stage granted to Ainu was this tourist-style photo-op of G8 spouses in borrowed Ainu cloaks, posing with Ainu Association head Kato. (Photo courtesy of Philip Seaton)

The G8 host site, Toyako, was located in the heart of Ainu ancestral territory and this summit represented an opportunity for indigenous peoples to urge G8 nations to look beyond economic growth-based models for solutions to the current environmental crisis, to urge non-signatory states [8] to adopt the DRIP, and heed the appeals of indigenous peoples in each nation-state. The G8 Summit provided an occasion for the Japanese government to present Ainu as a “model of man [sic] living in harmony with nature,” according to one media report. [9] While this media report offers a compelling portrait of how Ainu might strategically position themselves to advise visiting G8 delegations on designing eco-friendly policies, to my knowledge the Japanese government displayed no formal interest in Ainu or other indigenous peoples’ sustainable practices during the actual G8. According to Utari Association representatives, several traditionalist kimonos were created by local Ainu women cloth artists to be formally presented to G8 leaders. The Utari Association also requested to perform a kamuynomi ritual blessing ceremony to welcome G8 leaders Ainu-style. Both requests were turned down. The kimonos were placed on display in the Rusutsu Press center and made available for international media to play dress-up. [10] The only case in which Ainu were “presented” in any formal way took place when G8 First Ladies were invited by Hokkaido Governor Takahashi Harumi to don traditional Ainu coats for a group photo, before being whisked off to First Lady Kiyoko’s Japanese tea ceremony.

As the first event of this magnitude to be organized principally by an Ainu-centric Steering Committee – outside government-sanctioned networks of power such as the Ainu Association of Hokkaido [11] - the IPS constitutes a pivotal moment for grassroots and Ainu activism in Japan and the forging of international bonds.[12] The IPS Steering Committee received an unexpected boost from the Japanese Diet when, after twenty years of organized campaigns and 140 years of colonization and assimilation, the Ainu were abruptly recognized as indigenous peoples on June 6. Thanks to the Diet resolution and G8 “summit fever,” the IPS enjoyed international media attention across Europe, Asia, and North America, and was attended by roughly 1800 people, including between 200-250 Ainu. Momentum from the resolution created a mood of celebration and indigenous delegates attending the IPS officially welcomed Ainu into the community of
indigenous peoples. Meanwhile, some Ainu leaders were suspicious that this eleventh-hour haste to recognize Ainu indigeneity was another deal brokered for the G8.

The IPS offers one site for critically examining the dynamics of this emergent politics of indigeneity in the Ainu community today. One indicator that the IPS exemplifies a critical moment for Ainu activism, in connection with the indigenous movement globally, is that key IPS organizers plan to formalize this body into a network of global Ainu and indigenous grassroots organizing. Until now, the principal mouthpiece for Ainu rights recovery has been the Ainu Association. As a national and future trans-national network, the IPS group provides a counterpoint to the solitary voice of the Ainu Association and is expected to interject dynamic dialogue into the wider Ainu community itself. The Ainu Association has been criticized for failing to meet the needs of many Ainu-identified persons, especially Ainu outside Hokkaido who are ineligible for membership and for government-issued social welfare subsidies funneled through the association. [13] the Ainu Association originated as a social welfare organization with close ties to the prefectural government, and is now widely perceived as government-dependent and fundamentally undemocratic. Leadership is seen as being out of step with an increasingly diverse Ainu-identified population roughly 4,000 of which are members, or 12,000 including total household members. (The official Ainu population numbers roughly 24,000 inside Hokkaido and 5,000 in Greater Tokyo, though observers cite unofficial figures closer to 100,000 throughout Japan.) The Board of Directors is internally-appointed and membership is dependent on these directors for leadership and accountability, both of which are lacking. Key deliberations affecting the Ainu community are not expeditiously communicated with regional branches, and after 21 years of sending delegations to UN indigenous consultative bodies, the majority of Ainu members remain under-informed about DRIP contents.

In contrast, IPS organizers achieved a degree of indigenous protocol through reintroducing practices such as ukocaranke, or intensive dialogue to work through disagreements. As Shimazaki Naomi put it:

“Holding ukocaranke discussions is a tradition we revived. There are few places inside large Ainu organizations for speaking openly or asserting an opinion. We disgorged our true intentions from the pit of our stomachs and created a spirit of thoroughgoing discussion until all parties reach consensus [inside the Steering Committee]. From these discussions there was much reflection and sometimes emotional pain, but in the end this process led to mutual understanding and trust developed between us. This summit allowed me to understand the importance of forming trust-based relations between generations. Our Indigenous brothers and sisters gave us great encouragement with these words, “We were shocked to see how much the Ainu people have matured, it’s clear that they no longer need us!”[14]

During the IPS itself, with Ainu participants gathered from across Hokkaido and Japan, there was a sense that the Ainu community had begun a process toward a nation-wide dialogue, including communities and stakeholders dispersed across Japan. As one delegate described it, the IPS encapsulated a “watershed moment,” a moment toward “creating a national Ainu organization that includes all Ainu...all Ainu communities in Japan, men and women, old and young, rural and urban.”[15]
A Note on Positionality

I have been involved with the Ainu community in various capacities since 1998. In this article I have written about the IPS in Ainu Mosir from my perspective as a member of the Steering Committee. My initial intention in joining the steering committee was to contribute to the Ainu community by providing resources and information about indigenous campaigns overseas, and help link Ainu with indigenous communities internationally. Anthropologists and archaeologists have been intensely scrutinized in the Ainu community because of unscrupulous research practices and I hoped in part to counterbalance that history through work on the IPS project. [16] As I discuss below, the political and social currents in Japanese society concerning Ainu and indigenous rights shifted dramatically from September 2007-July 2008. Though I sought to avoid factionalism and maintain a neutral position as a supporting member, the IPS itself was controversial within the Ainu community. I was swept up in politicized currents surrounding IPS planning and had difficulty adjusting my position to gain impartiality. In this article I attempt to analyze developments of the previous year and their implications for the ongoing Ainu quest for indigenous rights.

“Ripple effect”: The G8, the Indigenous Peoples Summit, and the Diet Resolution

G8 Summit-related events – including the IPS in Ainu Mosir 2008 – have been identified as the key elements which pushed the Diet toward granting Ainu indigenous recognition. Certainly international and domestic media touted the IPS as a major factor in the Diet Resolution.[17] “The Summit was a great success from many angles,” organizer Kayano Shiro reflected, “however, we had the benefit of timely developments in society and it was the manipulation of those changes to our advantage that made the summit successful. The June 6 Resolution [recognizing Ainu indigeneity] was adopted in the Diet and other actions were preventive measures to protect the reputation of the Japanese government which served as host nation for the G8 Summit. All of these developments were favorable for our Summit.”[18]
However, IPS-related events in fact represent only a small piece of the larger chain of events leading to the resolution. Although Japan had joined 144 other nations to vote in favor of DRIP, the Japanese government persisted in its claim that “no indigenous peoples [as referred to under the declaration] reside in Japan.” Japan’s “yes” vote came with a caveat: Japan would not recognize “self-determination” if this might harm the sovereignty of existing nation-states, or “collective rights” if these might endanger the human rights of existing citizens. After adopting DRIP, Japanese government representatives distributed clandestine surveys to 100 UN-member states seeking their definitions of indigeneity, local interpretations of self-determination, and policies for “collective human rights.” Whether this was a well-meaning attempt to gather information about other nations' interpretations of DRIP in domestic contexts, or an attempt to subvert Ainu calls for DRIP implementation, is difficult to assess. The tone of the survey indicated reservation about DRIP’s impact on Japanese sovereignty and hesitation toward the collective rights concept and international interpretations of indigeneity more generally.

Adopting DRIP in September 2007 prompted a series of more aggressive-than-usual initiatives by Ainu organizations across Japan which gained momentum toward July and the opening of the G8 summit. In early 2008, the Tokyo-based Ainu Utari Liaison Group organized a petition drive in downtown Tokyo. In May 2008, they delivered upwards of 6600 signatures to the Prime Minister together with the following requests: 1) that Ainu be recognized as indigenous peoples, 2) that the government issue an official apology to Ainu people, 3) that a nationwide survey of Ainu living conditions be enacted as a precursor to implementing a national policy; 4) that the Ainu Cultural Promotion Act (1997) be reviewed; 5) that a new Ainu/ethnic law be implemented; and 6) that a commission of inquiry be set up to design this Ainu/ethnic law. If the mounting domestic pressure were insufficient, international society added its own support in mid-May. During the Universal Periodic Review of Japan, member states in the UN Human Rights Council’s Working Group recommended the Japanese government initiate dialogue with Ainu and undertake a review of land and other legal rights of Ainu people as steps toward implementing DRIP in Japan.

![Photo: author]
The Ainu Association also piloted initiatives that were reminiscent of campaigns to support the proposal for the “Ainu New Law” in 1984, which was substantially revised and adopted as the Ainu Cultural Promotion Act (1997), Japan's first multicultural legislation. Focusing initially on Hokkaido legislators and later expanding to national coalition party leaders, the Association orchestrated visits to legislators, recruiting lawmakers to Ainu political rights work. In March 2008, their efforts bore fruit when the “Legislative Coalition to establish Ainu People’s Rights” was established to push for a resolution “recognizing the Ainu’s pride and dignity as indigenous peoples” ahead of the G8 meetings in July. [24] On May 22, the association coordinated a march on the nation’s capital, attended by more than 400 Ainu from across Japan. Adorned in traditional kimonos and waving placards anticipating the G8 environmental theme, “Ainu are kind to the earth” and “the Earth is on loan from our children,” the group marched toward the Diet buildings. Here Ainu Association directors formally read and delivered a formal request for indigenous rights to assembled lawmakers.

One legislator, Suzuki Muneo (New Party Daichi), was especially insistent in pressing for Ainu indigenous rights. Readers may recall Suzuki’s 2002 indictment and arrest for accepting bribes from a Hokkaido lumber company, and connection with perjury, bribery, and bid-rigging with Hokkaido construction companies providing government-sponsored development aid to Russian-held Kurile Islands in the late 1990s. [25] Suzuki, who was thereafter forced out of the Liberal Democratic Party, has refashioned himself as an advocate for the long-suffering Hokkaido economy, and is now championing Ainu issues as well.

Observers have suggested that Suzuki’s political tenacity combined with the Ainu Association’s one-on-one visits to Diet members provided sufficient pressure leading to the Resolution recognizing Ainu indigeneity. From September 2007-July 2008, Suzuki sent a total of sixteen official Diet inquiries pressing the Japanese government to honor DRIP and recognize Ainu as indigenous peoples. This is the same Suzuki who, in 2001 had described Japan as an ethnically
homogeneous nation, brushing Ainu aside as “largely assimilated.”[26] Clearly the political winds have shifted. In 2007, his New Party Daichi ran the first Ainu woman candidate on their ticket, [27] and still issued no formal apology for the 2001 statement. [28] Suzuki is nevertheless a career politician and certainly had additional rationales for pushing Ainu indigenous status, namely his interest in liberating Japan from “energy poverty.” The Russian government has indicated a willingness to negotiate with Ainu in returning the southern Kuriles to Ainu as the indigenous inhabitants of the islands. [29] Suzuki argued, therefore, that the Japanese government would gain leverage in bargaining with Russia for transfer of the islands if Ainu are granted status as Japan’s Indigenous People. By establishing Ainu indigeneity as irrefutable and locating Ainu within the context of Japan the nation-state, Suzuki believes Japan may gain access to these long-disputed islands, and simultaneously reduce its dependence on foreign oil and gas. [30]

On June 6, the electronic display board in the Upper House read “261 In Favor, 0 Against,” and “480 – 0” in the Lower House – unanimous votes passing the Resolution in both houses.[31] However, the Resolution had been significantly revised. The original text placed historical responsibility for Ainu assimilation and colonization on the shoulders of the Japanese government.[32] The revised version masks the linkage between colonial policy and naturalizes the Ainu plight as an unintended casualty of modernity, policies that were indispensable for Japan’s economic and global prowess. While supporters were generally thrilled with the Resolution, many were critical and called it an empty symbolic gesture, especially because its only legal requirement is to set up an Expert Panel.

On July 1 (Day 1 of the IPS), the Cabinet Secretariat announced appointees for the “Expert Meeting on Ainu Policy” (hereafter “Expert Meeting”) established under the Resolution. The Expert Meeting is entrusted with 1) evaluating the situation of Ainu livelihoods and discrimination, 2) evaluating government-sponsored Ainu policy through the present, 3) conducting a review of indigenous policies implemented in other nations, a reference to DRIP, and 4) considering future Ainu policy development, and reporting back to the Cabinet Secretariat in July 2009. Ainu Association Executive Director Kato Tadashi was the only Ainu representative appointed, and while this is a great improvement from the 1995 Expert Meeting on Ainu Affairs with zero Ainu representatives, this limits the diversity of Ainu opinions to one voice. There is room for optimism. During an Ainu Association-sponsored “Ainu Peoples Summit” this July, Tokyo Ainu Liaison members joined with Hokkaido Ainu and Karafuto Ainu descendants to form the first-ever national coalition to issue recommendations to the Expert Meeting. [33] This coalition; however, does not represent the opinions of all Ainu. Although slightly more than half of the Ainu-identified population in Hokkaido are members of the Ainu Association (roughly 12,000), grassroots organizations including the IPS and the non-vocal majority may not be reflected in this coalition. Moreover, in Hokkaido, dialogue about Expert Meeting deliberations has been limited to the Association’s Board of Directors, and thus local members cannot contribute to policy recommendations discussed at the meetings.

In its initial gathering, Expert Meeting members suggested questions of granting indigenous rights to Ainu be shelved during the year-long deliberations, and the government has indicated indigenous rights may not apply to Ainu in any case. In response to an official Parliament inquiry about whether “indigenous peoples” as referred to under DRIP were equivalent to “indigenous peoples” as referred to under the Diet Resolution granting Ainu indigenous status, the government replied, “we are unable to conclude [whether they refer to] the same meaning in
In other words, the June resolution may simply indicate symbolic "indigeneity" for Ainu.

Ainu Association representatives have criticized the short twelve-month period allotted for devising a national Ainu policy, and have responded with their own strategy: to achieve as many concessions from the government as possible, aside from constitutional amendments. Based on recommendations from the national coalition, Kato is pushing to expand the Utari Taisaku (Utari Welfare Measures) to the national level. Ainu Association officials often refer to the proposed Ainu New Law (1986), noting that only a small percentage of these proposals were included in the CPA (1997), and that they still seek redress on the same issues.[35] Notably, education, pensions for elderly Ainu, and overcoming the gap between Ainu and majority household income are priority items on this agenda. Together with fellow Ainu in Kanto, Hokkaido Ainu also seek a formal apology from the Japanese government for colonialism, assimilation, and institutionalized discrimination, and seek retribution payments through this process. Most Diet legislators are largely ignorant of Ainu history and the Ainu Association is sponsoring study sessions to bring supporting Diet legislators up to speed on historical and current Ainu issues and gain their advocacy to draft an official apology backed by compensation payments.[36] Finally, the Ainu Association will push the government to set up a commission of inquiry with half or more representatives from the Ainu community, to continue discussions on indigenous rights and other issues which emerge when the Expert Meetings have been completed in 2009.

Evaluating the Indigenous Peoples Summit

The IPS forged a space for a new generation of Ainu leaders to articulate their visions of Ainu indigenous politics and highlights Ainu as viable actors in Japanese civil society, but it was not without its weaknesses, nor its critics. I argue the summit serves as a barometer to gauge the position of the Ainu movement internationally and understand key areas for future growth.

From July 1 to 4, twenty-six delegates representing the Americas (Maya Kachikel, Miskito, Nauha, Lakota Sioux, Mohawk, St’at’imc, Cherokee, Comanche and Pueblo); Europe (Saami), the Pacific (Chamoru, Hawai’i, Maori, Yorta Yorta, and Uchinanchu); and Asia (Taiwan, Juma, Igorot, and Ainu) gathered in Biratori and Sapporo to discuss indigenous issues. The main summit program featured delegate position speeches, a keynote address from Victoria Tauli-Corpuz (Chair, United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, hereafter UNPFII) and intercultural exchange, followed by themed workshops focusing on the environment, education, and rights recovery on the second day. On day three, delegates visited Ainu sites in Biratori threatened by development and then traveled to Sapporo for a ritual kamynomi prayer ceremony, cultural exchange, and an Ainu traditional foods banquet. Two separate appeals, the Nibutani Declaration of Indigenous Peoples and the Appeal from the IPS to the Japanese Government were draft and then read for approval at the main assembly in Sapporo. [37] Both appeals were adopted by thunderous applause.

In the Appeal to the Japanese Government, delegates addressed future Ainu policy, demanding that: 1) at least half of the designated Experts should represent the Ainu community in the Experts Meeting; 2) an official apology be issued to Ainu people for colonization and earlier Ainu policies; 3) recovery of Ainu indigenous rights as elaborated in DRIP be granted; 4) Ainu language and history be included in Japan’s public education; 5) Ainu representatives be included in southern Kurile negotiations, and 6) the government make strides toward forging “a multiethnic, multicultural” society in Japan. In the Nibutani Declaration, delegates argued that
climate change, the global food crisis, high oil prices, increasing global poverty, and escalating violence around the world are all symptoms of growth-based economic models promoted by G8 nations and are therefore fundamentally unsustainable. The declaration urges non-signatory nations to approve DRIP immediately and asks that indigenous peoples be included in future climate talks and assessments to evaluate the impact of climate mitigation measures. Both documents were submitted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for distribution to G8 leaders and posted online. With these appeals now circulating globally, IPS organizers have now begun focusing specifically on recommendations to the government-established Expert Meeting in Japan, because this panel will determine future Ainu policy by July 2009. They will also continue to strengthen international ties established through the IPS to hold the Japanese government accountable to Ainu and fellow minority communities across Japan, and to indigenous peoples worldwide.

One purpose of the IPS – aside from the political objectives – was to facilitate leadership development and empower young Ainu through the organizing process. Reluctance to engage in power-sharing among Ainu Association elites combined with members’ collective focus on cultural revival since introduction of the Cultural Promotion Act (1997, hereafter CPA), has produced a contingent of Ainu youth who are disillusioned with overemphasis on traditionalism and unresponsive leadership, disengaged from indigenous rights issues, and often shirk the Ainu community. “We hoped to involve many young Ainu” organizer Shimazaki reflected. “Through hosting the summit, the younger generation of Ainu who have lacked opportunities for self-expression until now, were central organizers and have now developed a new network among themselves and are working to expand their global network. It was evident that many Ainu were reawakened to their identity as Ainu, they gained self-confidence, and were able to recover assurance in an Ainu way of living.”
Recovering Indigeneity: Trajectory from Colonization to Innovation

Leaders of up-and-coming Ainu fusion music groups including Ainu Rebels’ Sakai Mina and Sakai Atsushi, and Ainu Art Project’s leader Yuki Koji, formed the core of the steering committee. Youth who do openly identify as Ainu have begun to articulate identities and modes of self-expression which focus on hybridity, blending resistance musical genres such as hip-hop, electronica, reggae, and dub with more traditionalist Ainu music, and adapting dance and other creative forms to convey their newfound pride. The grand finale of the IPS was the Indigenous Music Festival, featuring the widest slate of Ainu artists on one stage in history, including Kano Oki and his Dub Ainu Band, [38] the Marewrew vocal group, Toko Emi, Ainu Art Project, [39] and Ainu Rebels. [40] The music festival offered a space for showcasing contemporary Ainu expression as polyvocal, challenging traditionalist imperatives. In this forum, organized by young Ainu members of the Steering Committee, Ainu youth broke away from the politicized rhetoric of the summit to celebrate ethnic distinctiveness through performance, as an articulation independent of politics.
Resistance music: Ainu Rebels blend hip-hop and electronica to create a new Ainu vibe

Ainu rock in the family: Ainu Art Project performs traditional songs with hard rock beat
In planning the Summit, organizers concentrated on three major objectives. The first objective was internationally oriented – to connect Ainu issues and agendas to the indigenous movement internationally and gain from the knowhow of fellow indigenous peoples who had won both political and symbolic historical gains from their respective governments. Secondly, IPS planners hoped to create a network of engaged Ainu persons working outside the usual loci of power, in particular the Ainu Association, and to work on a domestic level for policy change and rights recovery. A third objective was to harness the symbolic capital generated by the G8 itself to urge international leaders to heed indigenous peoples’ concerns, to protect indigenous livelihoods threatened by global warming, and to ensure indigenous participation in future environmental policy-making on a global level.[41]

**Objective 1: Globalizing Ainu**

The fact that Ainu have now achieved indigenous status enables a reinterpretation of history and the emergence of a new narrative of Japan as a multicultural nation, with historically multiethnic internal populations. Moreover, state-level acknowledgment that Ainu are an indigenous people ultimately exposes Japan’s position as an erstwhile and ongoing colonial occupier in Hokkaido by extension.[42] This implication notwithstanding, the Diet Resolution recognizing Ainu indigenous status did not include direct references to colonialism. Now that Ainu have achieved greater recognition in the eyes of the Japanese state, they can more effectively press for indigenous rights, land restoration, compensation, and other forms of government accommodation, including an official apology for colonialism. As the first ethnic minority to win multicultural legislation (CPA 1997), and achieve indigenous recognition (2008), they also bear responsibility for pushing Japanese society toward greater acceptance of all minorities, both internal historical minorities including Okinawans, Burakumin, Hibakusha, and persons with disability, and immigrant minorities such as Resident Koreans, Nikkei immigrants, and foreign nationals more generally. While a handful of Okinawans are also campaigning for indigenous recognition, they were not included in the Diet Resolution, and only peripherally in the IPS. [43]
Since Ainu organizations began sending delegations to the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations in 1987, the thrust of the Ainu movement has been to pressure the Japanese government to first acknowledge that an Ainu minority exists in Japan (achieved in 1991), and second, to accord recognition that Ainu are indigenous peoples (achieved in 2008). Interest in establishing and strengthening a network between Ainu and indigenous comrades overseas primarily reflects the need for guidance at home, on how to move the Japanese government toward accountability. [44] In both international and domestic contexts, Ainu political elites have focused almost entirely on achieving recognition. This hyper-focus on recognition has eclipsed development of a strategic plan for pursuing indigenous rights beyond becoming “indigenous”; the Resolution has resulted in momentary inertia.

Ainu alignment toward domestic action is in sharp contrast to the focus of IPS indigenous delegates who benefit from treaties and more progressive domestic policies. Many are involved with international organizing and trans-national ventures such as collaboration and leadership training; others serve as leaders of regional indigenous blocks and represent these constituencies in international contexts. They are therefore apprised of the techniques of international law and familiar with the vernacular of international legal-speak. Producing the Nibutani Declaration was an extension of ongoing work on the DRIP for international indigenous leaders.

Producig these appeals involved calling up resources and expertise beyond the range of IP Summit organizers themselves. The *Nibutani Declaration*, for example, was based on proposals generated from workshop discussions and pre-summit proposals. Program time scheduled for developing this appeal was insufficient, as many delegates noted, and Tauli-Corpuz relied on her own knowledge of international mechanisms and climate change discussions from the UNPFII in May to draft the Nibutani Declaration. The scheduled plan to draft an international declaration based on a single day of negotiations in workshops without any fruitful dialogue in plenary
sessions was effectively impossible. The fact that a mere handful of indigenous delegates and Ainu representatives were involved in the process exposes the unfairness of these negotiations and the degree to which an impossible program forced these participants to forego consensus-based indigenous protocol. Meanwhile, on the other side of the room, Ainu representatives feverishly drafted the *Ainu Appeal*. Here again, the disparity between Ainu representatives’ focus on the local, and international delegates’ focus on the global was thrown into relief. Ainu planners and indigenous delegates praised the finished versions of these two documents although they remained dissatisfied with the composition process. One planner lamented, “The next time we plan an international meeting, we shouldn’t settle with the satisfaction of “all’s well that ends well.” Rather, I think it’s critical to work out a detailed plan and a strategy for obtaining maximum results from the international meeting well in advance of its start.”[45]

Inevitably, language – both language for communication and legal-speak – is a central issue for Ainu in the international arena, and at the IP Summit. The lack of knowledgeable English and Spanish speakers has posed a significant barrier to Ainu networking overseas, leading to a dependency on interpreters who are not always sympathetic to Ainu or indigenous issues. This dependency has its roots in a long history of discrimination manifest in lack of confidence in school-based learning which plays into lower educational achievement than majority Japanese, and limited opportunities for exposure to English as a communicative system. All of these factors have produced a wedge between Ainu persons and possibilities for indigenous-based networking which have been critical for indigenous peoples’ organizing elsewhere.

Summit planners initially hoped to invite foreign-language competent Ainu working overseas to serve as interpreters and showcase their skills through the Summit, but this plan was foiled by insufficient funding. Lack of English and Spanish language ability ultimately served to be a major barrier to full Ainu engagement with the planning process. As one indigenous delegate with an active language revival program noted, English, Spanish, and Japanese are all “colonial
languages,” and indigenous peoples need bi- or tri-cultural interpreters who are skilled in one or more of the colonial languages and their own language to facilitate enhanced communication between all parties.[46] This is not now a central issue for Ainu persons as speakers of Ainu language, as all Japanese Ainu are now fluent in Japanese, and those who do speak Ainu as heritage speakers or are self-taught, are not sufficiently fluent in English or other “colonial languages” to negotiate all three linguistic domains. One positive outcome of the IPS is that younger Ainu organizers are now considering study abroad with newfound indigenous comrades overseas. Ukocaranke on Education: Workshops lead to intergenerational discussion

Objective 2: Expanding the Grassroots to the Nation

Regarding the second goal, to create a grassroots network of Ainu, many Ainu point to the need for power redistribution inside the Ainu Association and without. Insiders charge that the nearly all-male Board of Directors, notoriously cozy with Hokkaido Prefecture and government authority, must make way for a wider network more reflective of the diversity of identity and purpose in today’s movement, not to mention gender and regional differences. The IPS was designed to present an alternative voice on Ainu and indigenous matters, a means toward generating grassroots perspectives to counter Ainu Association hegemony. Despite the obstacles to forging this network, many organizers still argue the summit successfully fomented empowerment among Ainu. “I think we can take pride in the fact that we held the first Indigenous Peoples Summit-named meeting in the host site for the G8 Summit,” organizer Kayano opined. “The fact that we were able to successfully organize an international meeting with our own hands led us Ainu to feel more confident in ourselves. Some members of the Steering Committee achieved remarkable growth through this process. I believe that among fellow Ainu, a feeling of solidarity was born. Through this opportunity, I anticipate that Ainu will achieve greater unity.”[47]
Communicating the IPS’ purpose to Ainu across Japan proved a central hurdle through the final day of the Summit. Since the IPS Committee included both Ainu and non-Ainu members, it was criticized as being dominated by non-Ainu. Working outside official channels was risky because summit organizers lacked the backing of the Ainu Association which is a necessary ingredient for entrée into rural Ainu communities. They were thus unable to promote the IPS widely. Outside urban areas, the Association is the primary “glue” uniting Ainu. In Biratori, the host community for the summit, planners did not engage the community in advance and were unable to recruit logistical support or local participation.

The urban-rural gap was remedied by a creative initiative led by young Ainu planners. In June, three Tokyo Ainu women embarked on a “Caravan Tour” across Hokkaido to promote the IPS. Colonization and assimilation have splintered Ainu communities and now Ainu live scattered across Hokkaido and Japan. Caravan leaders zig-zagged to these communities and plotted their progress in an online blog [48] and through video, which was aired at the IPS. This Caravan Tour provided a context for Tokyo Ainu to connect with Hokkaido Ainu and forge new networks where before there had been separation, silence, and resentment. Their work to connect Ainu across Japan was one of the most productive grassroots efforts to emerge from Summit planning and brought greater numbers of Ainu to the Summit than any other strategy.

Objective 3: Climate in Crisis, Indigenous Peoples, and G8 Responsibility

Taking place just ahead of the Toyako G8 Summit with its climate change centered theme, the IPS sought to highlight environmentally-sound practices embedded in indigenous lifestyles, and to critique the growth-based economic model advocated by industrialized nations. Indigenous communities argue that they have a special mandate to address the global environmental crisis because they are directly dependent on the natural environment for their livelihood, experience immediate consequences when the environment fluctuates, and have observed and experienced global warming-related changes for decades.[49] Mitigation measures now being introduced to combat global warming have also adversely affected indigenous communities in what might be dubbed “neo-energy colonialism.” During the last century, indigenous peoples’ lands were targeted for fossil fuel extraction; now indigenous-managed lands are being targeted for corn, soybean, and oil palm plantations for bioethanol production. [50] Indigenous peoples are experiencing loss of traditional gathering and agricultural lands due to competition with biofuel plantations and hydroelectric dams. [51]
The Ainu community has not been immune to these issues. Hokkaido Ainu were faced with a hydroelectric project, the Nibutani Dam, the subject of a protracted legal battle between two Ainu landowner-farmers and Japan’s Ministry of Construction. The case was launched because construction of the Nibutani Dam would radically transform the landscape of the Saru River, submerge several places of spiritual, economic and cultural import, and destroy several acres of farmland. Although the Ainu plaintiffs won the case through appeals, dam construction had been completed and the court ruled it could not be removed. Ultimately Ainu plaintiffs continued the case to force the court to recognize Ainu as indigenous peoples – a goal achieved in 1997. Ironically, Nibutani Dam has now proven ineffective. During a devastating typhoon in 2003, the dam nearly buckled from a deluge of debris and silt. A second dam scheduled for construction upstream on the Saru River, Biratori Dam, has been rationalized as a panacea to correct the weaknesses of the earlier dam, but opponents argue that it too will fail to meet projected goals and ask that dam construction be stopped.
In Biratori, the dam issue has been especially divisive within the Ainu community because many residents see these public works projects as deliverance from a sluggish economy and rural depopulation while a minority is concerned about cultural and environmental sustainability locally. Biratori Dam construction will necessitate submerging three sacred Ainu sites (*cinomisir*), 17 archaeological sites, and destroy habitat for Ezo Brown bears, an endangered species of falcon, and wild mountain vegetables which have sustained Saru River Ainu communities for centuries. The proposed Biratori Dam was also a focal point of the Environment workshop. During the IPS fieldwork program, a local Ainu elder led a tour of the dam construction site.

Maori delegation offers a prayer in respect for *cinomisir* and Ainu ancestors (Photo: Author)
Standing before the sacred mountain her grandfather had worshipped, this lifelong resident of Biratori explained her ambivalence about the project. She feels wedged between pressure to support the local economy through dam construction and realization that the natural environment which nourished her community for generations will be forever changed. She mentioned that she likely would not live long enough to see the dam to its completion. Next, indigenous delegate Joan Carling described the Filipino San Roque Dam project, describing how Igorot communities welcomed the development until they lost their homes, farmland, and then began to oppose dam projects.

Indigenous peoples are said to have the “smallest ecological footprints on earth” in greenhouse gas emissions, but will bear the brunt of the ecological damage from failed environmental policy. [53] Currently there are reportedly 370 million indigenous peoples scattered in communities across the globe today many of whom will be deeply affected by climate change; however, indigenous peoples in industrialized nations occupy a more complex position. The majority of IPS delegates came from industrialized nations, yet all continue to practice indigenous life ways in these industrialized nations, and many have abandoned contemporary consumption practices to reinstate traditional economies. They did not elect to be assimilated, and colonization has no doubt wrought tremendous damage to their communities. In their pre-colonial phases each of these cultures incorporated a self-preservation strategy based on respecting natural resource limits without over-harvesting.

As Japanese citizens, Ainu also consume the energy, resources, and cheap commodities being circulated under G8 policy and globalization. As unwitting beneficiaries of Japan’s trade and investment policies across Asia, Ainu are at the same time a colonized people and Japan’s only nationally-recognized indigenous people. As such Ainu occupy an ambivalent and complex position within Japan, within Asia, and among indigenous peoples worldwide.

Indigenous Women en force: Shimazaki, Tauli-Corpuz and Mayan and Miskito delegates at IPS
On the other hand, the largest portion of the world’s 370 million indigenous peoples must cope with the threat of invasive development and the fallout from overdevelopment. There is a palpable sense of urgency that indigenous peoples themselves will be the first “environmental refugees,” or human populations displaced by climate change, unless drastic policy changes are introduced soon. Indigenous peoples have the capacity to choose sustainable practices, choices which have protected 80% of the world’s biodiversity, concentrated in indigenous-held lands. [54] One of the summit’s larger objectives was to force G8 leaders to heed indigenous peoples’ demands for partnership in finding solutions to climate change issues. Indigenous peoples have been largely excluded from global climate change talks until now. [55] In 2009, they will hold an Indigenous Peoples’ Global Summit on Climate Change, and will officially join the Copenhagen global climate talks. [56]

At the same time, indigenous peoples are exercising some degree of strategic essentialism to push an agenda of “traditionalists vs. moderns.”[57] There is a danger in broad brushing all indigenous peoples as “ecologically noble savages,” [58] even if these images are in part self-authored. Effectively, strategic essentialism obscures the actual complexity, fluidity, and hybridity of most indigenous peoples today who have become flexible interpreters of their own cultures, who combine modernist and traditionalist livelihoods, and who, by necessity, have learned to adapt to the shifting political and physical landscapes in their home communities and beyond. This model also masks the realities of urban indigenous peoples who have been displaced from their land, or who live in cities for economic security, by declaring them somehow less indigenous by virtue of their urban-ness. And most importantly, this image does not account for the complex situation facing Ainu, who have been displaced from their land, have been robbed of their connection to the natural sphere where human-deity relations are negotiated, have lost access rights to the raw materials of cultural reproduction, and have been forcibly assimilated to majority Wajin lifestyles. [59] I do not intend to discount the majority of Ainu-identified persons today who trace their involvement to the cultural revival movement which emerged in tandem with but did not necessarily politically align with Ainu ethnic nationalism in the 1960s and 1970s. Even for Ainu cultural revivalists, however, cultural practice is continued in a separate domain from livelihood, which is predominantly aligned with the majority Japanese economy of consumption. A glimpse of the global diversity indigenous peoples represent was in evidence at the IP Summit. Indigenous perspectives spanned the gamut between industrialized and developing nations, land-rich and land-poor, environmentally-engaged and rights-focused, urban and rural, the global South and the global North, and language-intact and language-moribund communities.
Conclusion

As I have described, the IPS was a turning point for the Ainu community and significant for the international indigenous movement as a display of indigenous agency in the face of neoliberal policies advocated by the world’s leading capitalist economies. Nevertheless, it is difficult to evaluate the efficacy of the IPS because there is no clear indication that G8 leaders actually will respond to or act upon the IPS appeals. There were however significant internal gains from the IP Summit. Younger Ainu were able to participate fully without age-based hierarchies which often constrain youth participation in larger Ainu organizations. Perhaps most importantly, planners overcame geographic, political, economic, and mental barriers to build solidarity as an organizing body for the summit. With the strength of this unity as their base, they now hope to transform the IPS organization into a nationwide coalition of Ainu and work toward deepening the international network which emerged from the Summit.

Here I have tried to emphasize the diversity of positions both within the Ainu community, and within the larger indigenous people’s movement. The Ainu movement inside Japan has suffered from prolonged political inertia since passage of the Ainu CPA (1997), although Tokyo Ainu have actively sought an “ethnic law” expanding the scope of Ainu policy beyond the Tsugaru Strait. Since 1987 Ainu Association leaders have pressed the state for indigenous recognition through international fora, and as of June 2008 have finally achieved this goal. Many insiders are wary of the next step, however. Specifically, they cite the crisis of leadership and absence of a long-term strategic plan as the main barriers to future rights recovery for Ainu people. On the whole most self-identified Ainu embrace generalized ideas about reparations for colonization and institutionalized discrimination; yet few are acquainted with how to articulate these in the language of indigenous rights, or with how the DRIP may serve their specific needs. The non-democratic and government-reliant structure of the Ainu Association has fostered blind dependence on leadership and overall apathy concerning rights-work. To counter these tendencies IPS organizers are now planning study sessions to empower Ainu individuals in knowledge and application of the DRIP; they are also forging community-based networks between Ainu and majority Japanese supporters to formulate appeals for submission to the
Expert Meeting in Tokyo. To continue the momentum generated by the IPS Ainu groups are now working on spreading their newfound empowerment to the wider Ainu community.

Concerning the IPS, despite my criticism of “native ecology,” I want to recognize the agency of indigenous peoples to choose their own narratives and locate potent symbols to articulate their concerns to the international community in the language of international law. Fundamentally, indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination is ensured by Article 3 of DRIP, and I support unimpeded realization of this right. Yet, not all Ainu or indigenous people may be painted as unapologetic ecologists; they are sandwiched between competing demands of the ideals of modernity, allegiance to ancestral systems, and modernity-in-crisis. The international indigenous community has managed to form an effective global bloc in part through emphasizing commonalities to defend themselves against multinational corporations’ and state-led encroachment into their territories. The threat of climate change and the potential damage to many Pacific Islanders, permafrost dwellers, and countless other communities who do depend on the resiliency of the ecosystem to sustain themselves, is immediate and real. Having the support of the world’s indigenous peoples to pressure nation-states for accountability to their own populations together with other vulnerable populations overseas, is essential for drafting better policy to ensure survival for humans, flora and fauna. Asserting that the eyes of the world are on each of the nation-states mentioned in the Nibutani Declaration is key to regaining not only rights, but also dignity and self-respect – two critical ingredients for survival and adaptation.

References

[1] Ainu Mosir means the “domain of humans,” in the Ainu language (as opposed to kamuymosir, or the “domain of the gods”) and is currently the most widely-accepted term for Hokkaido. Some Ainu language scholars argue that yawnomosir, or “land country” (as opposed to repunmosir or “ocean country”) is a more fitting name for Hokkaido. Technically there is no overarching term in the Ainu language which refers specifically to Hokkaido, because Ainu historically dwelled in Southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands, Hokkaido, and Northern Honshu, and did not conceptualize their terrain using modernist concepts of territory such as the nation-state.


[3] Imazu Hiroshi (House of Representatives) led a group of non-partisan Hokkaido politicians in launching the “Legislative Coalition to establish Ainu people’s rights” in March 2008.


[5] United States president elect Barack Obama has suggested that he may consider an official apology to Native Americans for the legacy of discrimination and abusive treatment they have received at the hands of the U.S. government (Obama at Unity Journalists of Color Convention, Chicago: July 27, 2008).


[8] Non-signatory states include Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States; Russia abstained from the DRIP. In the Nibutani Declaration, IPS delegates focused principally on G8 nations, and therefore included Australia and New Zealand only indirectly.


[11] Membership of the Ainu Association voted in May 2008 to revert the organization’s name from Utari Association (Utari Kyokai) to the original Ainu Association (Ainu Kyokai) in April 2009. However, the name was never changed in English translation, because “Utari” is thought to be confusing and the organization wanted to be clear that they represented Ainu people (Interview: Sato Y., 16 September 2008) (Ainu Association website)

[12] During the 1989 International Indigenous Peoples Conference, Ainu were not included in the planning process and were involved only tangentially; in the 1993 Nibutani Forum Ainu organizers were centrally involved but lacked local community support; and during the 2005 Biratori-Nibutani Forum local Ainu organizers formed the core of the planning team and enjoyed community support, but Ainu were not involved on a national or global scale.


[19] The final vote for DRIP were 143-4, with 11 abstentions. Negative votes were cast by the CANZAUS states; Canada, the US, Australia, and New Zealand. Votes of abstention were cast by Russia, Azerbaijan, Israel, and Georgia, among others.


[22] Ainu Utari Liaison Group (Ainu Utari Renrakukai) is composed of four main organizations: Rera no Kai, Tokyo Ainu Kyokai, Kanto Utari Kai, and Pewre Utari Kai, all located in the greater metropolitan area. (Ainu Utari Renrakukai blog)

[23] Specifically, the UNHCR Working group issued the following comments, “Review, inter alia, the land rights and other rights of the Ainu population and harmonize them with the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Algeria); Urge Japan to seek ways to initiating a dialogue with its Indigenous peoples so that it can implement the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Guatemala)” ï¼”Online, Accessed August 22, 2008ï¼”.


[25] See for example article on the Kunashiri Project and article on Suzuki-backed aid to Kunashiri, also see the high court's February 2008 ruling on Suzuki’s case.

[26] On July 2, 2001, Suzuki stated, “I think it’s reasonable to say [that Japan is] a ‘one nation, one language, one race/ethnicity nation-state.’ In Hokkaido, there are these people known as the Ainu, and I’m sure there are those who will object to this comment, but they [the Ainu] are completely assimilated now” (Hokkaido Shim bun. July 3, 2001). At the time Suzuki was an upper house legislator representing the Liberal Democratic Party.

[27] For discussion of Suzuki’s influence on Tahara’s candidacy, see Japan Times article.

[28] In fairness, I should note that Suzuki reportedly negotiated with top representatives of the Ainu Association in a closed-door meeting in October 2001, and then held a press conference where Association officials agreed that they issue had been resolved (lewallen field notes, Sapporo, May 2007).


[30] Note these comments from an endorsement speech for Upper House Candidate Tahara Kaori in May 2007: “If we succeed in establishing Ainu rights, Japan will for the first time be in a position to share international standards and international values [with the rest of the world]. Through that, we can find a solution for Japan’s weak point, the energy question, and
improve relations with Russia...Northern Territories’ residents recognize Ainu to be an indigenous people; the Russian government also recognizes Ainu indigeneity. By properly calling for [recognition of] Ainu indigeneity, I believe we can launch a new approach to the movement to return the Northern Territories, and [work toward] a solution” (Speech: Suzuki Muneo. May 2007, translation by author.)

[31] Legislators in both houses were reportedly in attendance for the yes vote; although one legislator later claimed he “did not understand the implication of the Resolution” after voting in favor of it (Interview: Sato Y., 16 September 2008.)

[32] The ruling Liberal Democratic Party cited this text as “too emotional”: “We must acknowledge the historical fact that, in the course of Japan’s modernization, because Ainu people were constrained as forced labor and exploited, destruction of Ainu culture and society was accelerated, and in addition, as a result of the so-called assimilation policy, their traditional lifestyles were restricted and eventually prohibited, and due to the damage resulting from these policies, great numbers of Ainu persons were subjected to discrimination and forced to live in poverty even though they are Japanese citizens and equal under the law (Original Paragraph 2 of the “Resolution calling for the Recognition of the Ainu People as an indigenous people of Japan”).


[36] According to the Ainu Utari Renrakukai’s survey of Diet legislators conducted in February 2008, while a handful of legislators had an extraordinarily high level of awareness and concern about Ainu issues, the majority were poorly informed (Kobayashi, Junko 2008. “2008-nen harukara natsu he, Ainu minzoku no doko – Senju minzoku no kenri kakuritsu wo motomete.” Senju minzoku 10-nen news 143: 14-15). While the survey had a 10% response rate, it should be noted that respondents were likely self-selected with a prior interest in Ainu issues which compelled them to respond.

[37] The full text of both appeals is available in English and Japanese Online.

[38] Kano Oki’s website

[39] Ainu Art Project website

[40] Ainu Rebels website

[41] This third objective aiming to link indigenous relationships with the natural environment to ecological practice served as a central symbolic metaphor for marketing the IP Summit to indigenous guests, supporters, and funding agencies.

[42] By that extension, all settler nations, including Canada, the US, Australia, and New Zealand, for example, may also be considered as erstwhile and ongoing colonizers with varying degrees of recognition among the general population and not always satisfactory government policy advocated by different administrations. Indigenous-identified persons from these settler nations
often correct discussion of “post-colonialism” by emphasizing that their own experience of colonialism is ongoing or “advanced colonialism.”


[44] I do not intend to claim that the Ainu movement will necessarily follow a similar trajectory of empowerment and political mobilization as evident in other indigenous communities. Canadian First Nations, New Zealand Maori, Australian Aboriginals and Sami, for example, each have separate histories of colonial invasion and treaty-building with their respective nation-states, and their paths to rights recovery each involve separate trajectories. In particular, because Ainu lack any sort of treaty with the Japanese government they face a formidable challenge in future legal action. But it is worth noting that many Ainu activists perceive indigenous peoples overseas as comrades in work toward political rights recovery work.


[48] IPS Caravan Tour Blog.

[49] Indigenous peoples have witnessed an increase in droughts, desertification, coastal and riverbank erosion, erratic weather patterns (stronger hurricanes, typhoons, flooding, extreme cold/heat), an increase in tropical diseases and disease-resistant insects, loss of biodiversity, changes in flora and faunal habitats and related food insecurity due to speciation change, and loss of agricultural land to the above factors.


[55] Tauli-Corpuz and Lynge 2008: 4

[56] The Global Summit will be sponsored by the Inuit Circumpolar Council (Online, Access date: 30 August 2008).

[57] By “strategic essentialism,” I refer to symbolic and other strategies employed by indigenous peoples such as emphasizing shared values and similar histories to accentuate essential characteristics to achieve political objectives.


[59] In some cases Ainu chose to be assimilated to have better access to education and livelihood, especially under Ainu Association campaigns in the 20th century. But in the early colonial period most Ainu resisted assimilation, although the lines where assimilation policies started and Ainu autonomy ended were often blurred.
Articles Recommended for Further Reading

Part I: Expanding the Contours of the Empire

From Asia-Pacific Journal

“Japan’s Pan-Asianism and the Legitimacy of Imperial World Order, 1931–1945”
Cemil Aydin
March 12, 2008
http://japanfocus.org/-Cemil-Aydin/2695

“Migrants, Subjects, Citizens: Comparative Perspectives on Nationality in the Prewar Japanese Empire”
Tessa Morris-Suzuki
August 28, 2008
http://japanfocus.org/-Tessa-Morris_Suzuki/2862

From Other Sources

For work that explores the importance of combining imperial and national histories see:


For other work that explores the origins of Japanese imperial behavior see:


*For colonial policies directed toward the Karafuto people see:*


*For more on the ways that customs such as hairstyles and clothing were used to define the Ainu as barbaric see:*


**Part II: Experiences of the Colonized**

**From Asia-Pacific Journal**

“The Song the Owl God Himself Sang. “Silver Droplets Fall Fall All Around,” an Ainu Tale *Kamuichikap kamui yaeyukar, “Shirokanipe ranran pishkan”*”

Transliterated in Romaji and Translated from Ainu into Japanese by Chiri Yukie, translated into English and introduced by Kyoko Selden

January 24, 2009

http://japanfocus.org/-Kyoko-Selden/3026

“The Ainu and Their Culture: A Critical Twenty-First Century Assessment”

Chisato (“Kitty”) Dubreuil

November 26, 2007

http://japanfocus.org/-Chisato__Kitty_-Dubreuil/2589

“Japanese Tourism to Korea, Circa 1940: The Tension between Tourism Promotion and Assimilation Policies”

Kenneth Ruoff

March 14, 2011

http://japanfocus.org/-Kenneth-Ruoff/3498

“Being Okinawan in Japan: The Diaspora Experience”

Steve Rabson

March 19, 2012

http://japanfocus.org/-Steve-Rabson/3720
From Other Sources

For an overview of the Japanese empire see:


For more on the Ainu and Japanese colonization see:


For more on Japanese colonization in relation to Taiwanese Aborigines see:


For more on the experiences of Koreans during the colonial period and in the army see:


Part III: Postcolonial Legacies

From Asia-Pacific Journal

“Yasukuni Shrine and the Double Genocide of Taiwan’s Indigenous Atayal: New court verdict”
Tanaka Nobumasa
http://japanfocus.org/-Nobumasa-Tanaka/1928

“Desecration of the Dead: Bereaved Okinawan Families Sue Yasukuni to End Relatives’ Enshrinement”
Tanaka Nobumasa
May 7, 2008
http://japanfocus.org/-Nobumasa-Tanaka/2744

“Okinawan Perspectives on Japan’s Imperial Institution”
Steve Rabson
February 16, 2008
http://japanfocus.org/-Steve-Rabson/2667

“Okinawa’s Turbulent 400 years”
Gavan McCormack
January 12, 2009
http://japanfocus.org/-Gavan-McCormack/3011

“Exodus to North Korea Revisited: Japan, North Korea, and the ICRC in the ‘Repatriation’ of Ethnic Koreans”
Tessa Morris-Suzuki
May 30, 2011
http://japanfocus.org/-Tessa-Morris_Suzuki/3541

“Hundreds of Ethnic Koreans from Sakhalin to Return Home: A Colonial Legacy”
Korean Overseas Information Service and William Underwood
September 7, 2007
http://japanfocus.org/-Korean_Overseas_Information_Service/2515
“Redress Crossroads in Japan: Decisive Phase in Campaigns to Compensate Korean and Chinese Wartime Forced Laborers”
William Underwood
July 26, 2010
http://japanfocus.org/-William-Underwood/3387

From Other Sources

For more on the Battle of Okinawa see: